- •Rita Meyer-Spasche
- •A. The Condictio ob Turpem Causam In Classical Roman Law
- •1. Overview of the Roman Civil Procedure
- •2. Actio Certae Creditae Pecuniae and Actio Certae Rei
- •1. The Roman Contractual System
- •2. The Interplay of the Law of Contracts and the Condictio
- •1. Immoral Agreement
- •2. Tainted Acts in the Context of the Execution of a Contract
- •I. Origin and Field of Application of the Bar to Recovery
- •II. The In Pari Delicto Rule as a Strict Rule, or a Matter of Discretion?
- •C. The Condictio ob Iniustam Causam
- •I. Legal Prohibitions in Roman Law
- •1. Prohibition of Transactions
- •2. Prohibition of Non-Juridical Acts
- •II. Fragments Dealing with the Condictio Ex Iniusta Causa
- •1. The Case of the Lease of Land
- •2. The Actio Rerum Amotarum
- •3. The Case of Marital Donations
- •4. Illegal Transfers and the In Pari Delicto Rule
- •I. The Development of the Distinct Condictiones
- •1. The Formation of Distinct Claims
- •2. The Change of the Contractual System
- •II. The Link between the Condictio ob Turpem Causam and the Condictio ob Iniustam Causam in the Digest
- •E. Conclusions
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R. Meyer-Spasche |
University of Aberdeen |
4.Illegal Transfers and the In Pari Delicto Rule D. Postclassical development
I. The Development of the Distinct Condictiones
1.The Formation of Distinct Claims
2.The Change of the Contractual System
II. The Link between the Condictio ob Turpem Causam and the Condictio ob Iniustam Causam in the Digest
E. Conclusions
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A. THE CONDICTIO OB TURPEM CAUSAM IN CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW
I. The Function of the Condictio in Roman Law
The condictio is best viewed in the light of the rei vindicatio.1 The rei vindicatio was a claim in the law of property. It enabled the owner of a certain thing (certum) to claim this certum from any possessor who did not have a right of retention over it. However, as soon as the owner transferred the ownership to the possessor (dare, datio), the rei vindicatio was no longer available: being a claim in the law of property, the rei vindicatio presupposed that the pursuer was the owner of the thing claimed. However, the fact that ownership passed does not necessarily mean that the transferee was entitled to the benefit. The law of property may thus trigger rigid results since, according to the law of property, ownership may pass, and the rei vindicatio cease, even though the transferee may not have a right to retain the benefits according to other rules of civil law. This rigidity of the law of property is mitigated to an extent by the law of obligations. The Roman jurists allowed recovery if the transferee, for certain reasons the jurists had developed, did not have a legal reason to retain the property (causa). In these cases, certain actions were granted to reverse the transfer; thereby, the results of the law of property which were seen to be unfair were corrected. So, for instance, recovery was permitted if the transferor’s intention had been vitiated in some important manner when he transferred ownership, as, for example, where he had paid a sum of money under error as to legal liability towards the transferee. Thus, the law of property is closely interlaced with what we call today the law of unjustified enrichment, the latter operating to moderate legally unacceptable results of the former.
1 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 841 sq.; Kaser, RP I, pp. 592 sq.; Reuter/Martinek, Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung (1983), § 1 I 1 b (pp. 6 sq.).
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R. Meyer-Spasche |
University of Aberdeen |
The jurists granted the condictio as a means to allow recovery of benefits transferred under certain conditions.2 Originally, condicere meant denuntiare, i.e. to announce a <6> judicial date3: in the early times of the formal legis actiones4 the action for recovery of a certain thing (certum dare) was introduced with a formal announcement of the pursuer before the praetor, saying that the defender had to appear in foro after thirty days for the appointment of a judge. When the legis actiones had fallen into disuse, the terms condicere and condictio continued to be used generally of a claim certum dare.5 According to Otto Lenel6, the remedy that was given by the praetor was the actio certae creditae pecuniae where it was a certain sum of money that was claimed, or the actio certae rei where a certain thing was claimed from the defender. The formula of the actio certae creditae pecuniae ran as follows7:
2D. Liebs, "The History of the Roman Condictio up to Justinian", in: N. MacCormick/P. Birks (eds.), The Legal Mind – Essays for Tony Honoré (1986), 163. The condictio was the oldest and most important but not the only action in this context. In cases where the condictio did not lie the praetor developed actiones in id quod ad eum pervenit or quanto locupletior factus est to allow recovery. See Levy, Privatstrafe und Schadensersatz (1915), pp. 88 sqq.; G. H. Maier, Prätorische Bereicherungsklagen (1932), pp. 1 sqq., and below notes 86, 91. <6>
3Gai., Inst. 4.17a.
4On the early procedure of legis actiones see in detail Kaser/Hackl, ZP, pp. 34 sqq.
5I. 4.6.15. See Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 835; Kaser, RP I, p. 593, and Reuter/Martinek, Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung (1983), § 1 I 1 b (p. 6). – The scope of the condictio was probably already in classical times expanded to certain narrow cases where an incertum was claimed: Kaser, RP I, pp. 598 sqq. with references.
6Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), pp. 237, 240; Lenel, loc. cit., p. 234, states that in classical times the actio was not yet called condictio certi.
7Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), p. 237.
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R. Meyer-Spasche |
University of Aberdeen |
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Titius iudex esto. |
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Intentio |
Si paret Nm Nm Ao Ao sestertium |
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decem milia dare oportere, |
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Condemnatio |
iudex, Nm Nm Ao Ao sestertium decem |
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milia condemnato. |
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Si non paret absolvito. |
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Intentio |
Titius shall be judge. |
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If it is proved that the defender |
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Numerius Negidius has to give ten |
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thousand sestertii to the pursuer Aulus |
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Condemnatio |
Agerius, |
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you, judge, shall condemn Numerius |
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Negidius to give ten thousand sestertii |
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to Aulus Agerius.
If it is not proved you shall free him.
According to Lenel's reconstruction, the formula of the actio certae rei named the thing claimed instead of the sum of money but was, apart from that, identical.8 <7>
1. Overview of the Roman Civil Procedure
In order fully to understand the significance of the actio certae creditae pecuniae and the actio certae rei, a brief outline of the Roman civil procedure should be given. Classical Roman law was highly determined by procedural means.9 The procedure was divided between the praetor (in foro) and the iudex (apud iudicem). The key position was held by the praetor, a magistrate who had the power to grant procedural formulae. The praetor listened to the pursuer's demand as well as to the defender's objection. If he came to the
8For instance: Si paret Nm Nm Ao Ao tritici Africi optimi modios centum dare oportere, quanti ea res est, tantam pecuniam Nm Nm Ao Ao condemnato. – If it is proved that the defender Numerius Negidius has to give one hundred measures of best African wheat to the
pursuer Aulus Agerius, you, judge, shall <7> condemn Numerius Negidius to pay the value of this to Aulus Agerius. Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), pp. 239 sq.
9On the following see E. Metzger, "Actions", in: E. Metzger (ed.), A Companion to
Justinian's Institutes (1998), 208 (pp. 212 sqq.); Kaser/Hackl, ZP, pp. 151 sqq.; Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), pp. 14 sqq.; Sohm, Institutes (3rd ed., 1907), pp. 256, 257 sq.
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R. Meyer-Spasche |
University of Aberdeen |
conclusion that the pursuer's demand was actionable because there was an appropriate cause of action he granted a formula.
Such a formula had a certain structure.10 First, a judge was selected. He was in charge of evidence and of reaching the final judgment. Then followed the demonstratio where the facts of the case were described; this clause might be omitted when the facts were not complicated. The intentio expressed the aim of the claim; for instance to recover a certain thing (certum dare oportere or sestertium milia decem dare oportere). Thus, the intentio determined the nature of the action.11
The important point about these formulae was that the existence of a formula determined the success of the pursuer's claim in the sense that if there was no formula that fitted the submitted facts, there was no action12 and the pursuer could not enforce his demand. There were as many kinds of actions as there were different kinds of intentiones.13 This shows that the Romans thought not so much in terms of material rights but rather in terms of remedies. The formulae were published in the praetor's edictum perpetuum.14 <8>
2. Actio Certae Creditae Pecuniae and Actio Certae Rei
The actio certae creditae pecuniae and the actio certae rei did not mention the causa, that is the ground of the claim. Their formulae were abstract.15 To take the example of the actio certae creditae pecuniae, the formula did not say why the ten thousand sestertii were due. Therefore, this formula could be used for a wide range of cases where a certum dare, i.e. the transfer of a certain sum of money, or a certain thing in the case of the actio certae rei, was claimed.16 At first, the formula was used for actions ex certa stipulatione and ex causa
10Kaser/Hackl, ZP, pp. 310 sqq.
11Sohm, Institutes (3rd ed., 1907), p. 258.
12In cases where not giving an action would have contradicted equity the praetor had the competence of creating new formulae in factum or utiles; he intervened adiuvandi vel supplendi vel corrigendi gratia (Pap. D. 1.1.7.1). See E. Metzger, "Actions", in: E. Metzger (ed.), A Companion to Justinian's Institutes (1998), 208 (pp. 220 sqq.); Kaser/Hackl, ZP, pp. 328 sqq., 238.
13Sohm, op. cit., note 11 above.
14See Otto Lenel's reconstruction of the edictum perpetuum (Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum [3rd ed., 1927]). <8>
15Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, pp. 835 sq.; Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed., 1927), p. 237; Kaser, RP I, p. 593.
16Siber, Römisches Recht II (1928), p. 15; Kaser, RP I, p. 593; Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, p. 836.