- •(P.V) Preface
- •(P.XV) Abbreviations
- •Introduction Duncan Fairgrieve
- •Abstract and Keywords
- •1. Comparative Law Approach
- •2. Delimitation of the Study
- •Overview of State Liability in English and French Law Duncan Fairgrieve
- •Abstract and Keywords
- •1. Introduction
- •2. The Historical Evolution of State Liability
- •2.1. The Early Period of State Liability
- •(P.9) 2.2. The Pre-modern Era
- •2.3. The Inception of Modern State Liability
- •(P.14) 2.4. Conclusion: Vestiges of Immunity?
- •3. Overview of Modern State Liability
- •4. State and Servant
- •(P.20) 4.1. France
- •4.2. England
- •4.3. Elements of Convergence
- •Public Law Unlawfulness and Liability in Damages Duncan Fairgrieve
- •Abstract and Keywords
- •1. Introduction
- •2. The Illegality–Fault Equation in French Law
- •2.1. Illegality as a Necessary Condition of Liability
- •2.2. Illegality as a Sufficient Condition of Fault
- •2.2.1. Traditional Theory
- •(P.33) 2.2.2. Modern Theory
- •(P.36) 3. The Role of Ultra Vires in English Tort Liability
- •3.1. Civil Action for Breach of Statutory Duty
- •3.2. Ultra Vires and Negligence Liability
- •3.2.1. The Status Quo Ante: Unlawfulness as a Precondition of Liability
- •3.2.2. The Barrett and Phelps Cases: Re-evaluating the Role of Public Law Unlawfulness
- •3.3. Public Law Unlawfulness and Other English Torts
- •3.3.1. Community Law
- •3.3.2. Damages under the Human Rights Act 1998
- •4. Conclusion
- •Beyond Illegality: Liability For Fault in English and French Law Duncan Fairgrieve
- •Abstract and Keywords
- •1. Introduction
- •2. English Law
- •(P.59) 2.1. Breach and Duty in the English Law of Negligence
- •2.1.2. The Notion of Proximity and the Test of Fairness, Justice, and Reasonableness
- •(P.64) 2.1.2.1. The Restrictive Approach to Duties of Care of Public Authorities
- •2.1.2.2. Recent Cases on Public Authority Liability: a Shift in Emphasis?
- •2.1.2.3. The House of Lords' Decisions in Barrett and Phelps
- •2.1.2.4. The Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
- •2.1.2.5. The New Approach to Public Authority Liability
- •2.1.2.6. Move Away from Duty: a More Nuanced Approach to Policy Considerations
- •2.1.2.7. Move Away from Duty: a Shift to Breach
- •2.2. Beyond Negligence: Public Authority Liability in Tort
- •2.2.1. Misfeasance in Public Office
- •2.2.1.1. Introduction
- •2.2.1.2. Constituent Elements of Misfeasance in Public Office
- •2.2.1.3. The Place of Misfeasance in State Liability
- •2.2.2. Nuisance
- •2.2.3. Conclusion
- •3. French Law
- •3.1. The Notion of Faute de Service
- •(P.106) 3.2. Graded Standards of Fault in French Administrative Law
- •3.2.1. The Notion of Faute Lourde in French Administrative Law
- •3.2.1.1. Medical Sphere
- •3.2.1.2. Regulatory Authorities
- •3.2.1.3. Administrative Police
- •3.2.1.4. Emergency Services
- •3.2.1.5. Conclusion
- •3.2.2. Defining Faute Lourde
- •3.2.3. Theoretical Foundations of Faute Lourde
- •3.2.4. The Future of Graded Standards of Fault in French Administrative Law
- •3.3. Presumptions of Fault
- •3.4. Procedural Impact
- •4. Comparative Law Remarks
- •(P.125) 4.1. Signs of Similarity?
- •4.2. Comparative Lessons for the Application of Policy Concerns
- •Lawfully Caused Loss Duncan Fairgrieve
- •Abstract and Keywords
- •1. Introduction
- •2. French Law
- •2.1. Risk-based No-fault Liability
- •2.1.1. Risks Arising from Dangerous Operations
- •2.1.2. Risks of Assisting in Public Service Activities
- •2.2. Egalité devant les Charges Publiques
- •2.2.1. Legislation and Compensation
- •2.2.2. Liability Arising from Treaties
- •2.2.3. Liability for Lawful Administrative Acts
- •2.2.4. Conditions of Actions for Breach of Egalité
- •2.3. Miscellaneous Categories of No-fault Liability
- •2.3.1. Loss Arising From Public Works
- •2.3.2. Facilitating Reparation in the Medical Sphere
- •2.3.3. Statutory Regime
- •2.4. Conclusion
- •3. English Law
- •(P.155) 3.1. Nuisance
- •3.2. Rylands V Fletcher
- •(P.159) 3.3. The Influence of Human Rights Law
- •3.4. Other Regimes of No-fault Liability
- •(P.162) 4. Conclusion
- •Assessing the Causal Link Duncan Fairgrieve
- •Abstract and Keywords
- •1. Introduction
- •2. An Overview of the Tests of Causation in English and French Law
- •2.1. English Law
- •2.2. French Law
- •2.2.1. Orthodox Approach
- •2.2.2. Nuanced Approach
- •3. Comparing Approaches to Causal Problems
- •3.1. Multiple Causes
- •3.1.1. Act of a Third Party
- •(P.177) 3.1.2. Contributory Fault of the Injured Party
- •3.1.3. Act of Nature
- •3.2. Causation and Unlawful Administrative Acts
- •4. Conclusion
- •Damage and Compensation Duncan Fairgrieve
- •Abstract and Keywords
- •1. Introduction
- •1.1. French Administrative Law
- •(P.192) 1.2. English Law
- •2. Economic Loss30
- •2.1. Contrasting Stances Regarding Pure Economic Loss
- •2.1.1. English Law
- •2.1.2. French Law
- •2.2. Signs of Convergence
- •2.2.1. French Law: Limitations on Recovery?
- •2.2.2. Alternative Remedies in English Law
- •2.3. Conclusion
- •3. Loss of a Chance
- •3.1. The Lost Chance Doctrine in English Law
- •3.2. Damages for Lost Chances in French Law
- •3.3. Doctrinal Debate
- •(P.210) 3.4. Conclusion
- •4. Moral Damage in English and French Law
- •(P.211) 4.1. Préjudice Moral in French Law
- •4.1.1. Reluctance in Awarding Damages for Préjudice Moral
- •(P.213) 4.1.2. Status Quo
- •(P.214) 4.2. Non-pecuniary Loss in English Law
- •4.3. Comparative Law Comments
- •5. Damages for Injury to the Person
- •5.1. Basic Principles
- •(P.222) 5.2. Points of Divergence
- •5.2.1. General Comparative Remarks
- •(P.225) 5.2.2. Comparing the Treatment of Collateral Benefits348
- •6. Death and Damages Liability
- •6.1. Death Extinguishing a Right of Action
- •6.2. Right of Action Deriving From Death: Compensating Secondary Victims
- •6.2.1. French Law
- •6.2.2. English Law
- •6.2.3. Comparative Law Remarks
- •7. Property Damage
- •8. Conclusion
- •Alternative Means of Redress Duncan Fairgrieve
- •Abstract and Keywords
- •1. Introduction
- •2. France
- •3. England
- •3.1. Investigation by Ombudsman
- •(P.250) 3.2. Internal Procedures Providing Redress for Maladministration
- •4. Compensation Schemes in England and France
- •(P.254) 5. The French Medical Compensation System
- •6. Conclusion
- •Conclusion Duncan Fairgrieve
- •Abstract and Keywords
- •1. Similarities and Differences
- •(P.265) 2. Accounting for the Differences
- •2.1. Introduction
- •2.2. Difference in Philosophy
- •2.3. Procedural Factors
- •3. Learning from Comparative Law
- •3.1. Comparative Law and the Courts
- •3.2. Comparative Law and State Liability
- •3.2.1. Public Law Unlawfulness and Liability
- •(P.275) 3.2.2. Alternative Methods of Redress
- •3.2.3. Challenging Policy Concerns
- •3.2.4. Establishing a Balanced Approach to State Liability
- •(P.279) 3.2.4.1. Breach of Duty
- •3.2.4.2. Quantum of Damages
- •3.2.4.3. Causation
- •4. Conclusion
- •(P.285) Appendix
- •Illegality entails fault.
- •(P.287) 1. Tc 8 February 1873, Blanco, d.1873.3.17
- •1. Decision in French
- •(P.288) 2. Translation
- •(P.289) 2. Ce 21 June 1895, Cames [1895] Rec 509
- •1. Translation
- •1. Decision in French
- •2. Translation
- •1. Translation
- •1. Decision in French
- •2. Translation
- •(P.297) 6. Ce 26 January 1973, Driancourt [1973] Rec 78
- •Illegality entails fault
- •1. Decision in French
- •2. Translation
- •(P.301) 7. Ce 27 January 1988, Giraud [1988] Rec 39
- •1. Decision in French
- •(P.303) 2. Translation
- •(P.304) 8. Ce 29 December 1999, Communauté Urbaine de Lille [1999] Rec 436
- •1. Decision in French
- •2. Translation
- •(P.310) 9. Ce 28 June 2002, Magiera, Req 239575
- •1. Decision in French
- •2. Translation
- •1. Decision in French
- •2. Translation
- •(P.325) Bibliography
3. England
In England, public bodies may grant compensation to victims of administrative blunders by means of ex gratia payments without admitting legal liability.58 Statutory schemes have similarly been set up to provide for compensation. The analysis of non-judicial means of gaining compensation will be structured as follows. First, we will look at the role of ombudsmen in facilitating ex gratia payments. Secondly, we will examine the developing consciousness within the administration of the need to provide ex gratia payments for maladministration as a matter of course. There will inevitably be some overlap with the comparative law analysis of administrative and statutory schemes for awarding compensation in England and France (section 4 below).
One initial point will be made. There can be difficulties in delimiting the boundaries of ex gratia payments. In orthodox terms, ex gratia payments are grace and favour payments made by public bodies where there is in fact no legal liability to make financial reparation.59 These are to be contrasted with payments made by public bodies when they have negotiated a settlement with a claimant on the basis that they are legally (p.245) liable. In this study, we will focus upon the first category: it is difficult to obtain detailed information on the procedures leading to negotiated settlements,60 and the occurrence of settlements is evidently limited by the restrictive stance of the courts in respect of the tort liability of public authorities acting in the exercise of their statutory functions.
3.1. Investigation by Ombudsman
Ex gratia payments may be made after investigation by an ombudsman. In this section, we will examine the work of the main public sector ombudsmen: the Health Services Commissioner, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, and the Local Government Ombudsman.61
The Health Services Commissioner (HSC) investigates complaints about the National Health Service.62 If a complaint is upheld, the HSC will make recommendations to avoid a repetition of similar maladministration, but the recommendation of a financial remedy is rare.63 It has always been underlined that the HSC procedure is not designed for those who are looking for damages.64
The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (PCA)65 and the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO)66 can recommend financial (p.246) remedies when injustice has been caused by maladministration of a public body within their remit.67 There is no statutory definition of ‘maladministration’, and differing attempts have been made to sketch the contours of this notion.68 One thing that is clear is the flexibility of the notion of maladministration.69 The Local Government Ombudsman has given the following examples: delay in acting; breaches of the law or the authorities' own rules or promises; provision of incorrect information.70 The notion of maladministration relates to an abstract model of proper administration, and some parallels may be detected with the concept of administrative fault in French law.71
The maladministration must have resulted in an ‘injustice’ to the complainant. The notion of injustice has also been given a wide interpretation. The ombudsmen have shown less inhibition than the judiciary in respect of claims for reparation of pure economic loss.72 There are numerous examples of the LGO and PCA recommending the payment of compensation for economic loss, such as ‘loss of business opportunity’73 or loss of profits.74 The position is similar for non-pecuniary harm. Whereas feelings of anxiety and uncertainty do not constitute actionable injury in a negligence action,75 the ombudsmen may recommend financial redress for distress76 and worry77 suffered by the complainant.
(p.247) On occasion, the amounts paid after an ombudsman's report can be significant. In the 1996–7 annual report, the LGO recorded an ex gratia payment of over £160,000 for injustice caused by misleading information about a council's planning policy.78 The PCA has had some even more impressive results. Farmers who were victims of governmental maladministration in the salmonella saga received £600,000 in total,79 and the Barlow Clowes affair resulted in ex gratia payments amounting to £150 million.80
These important examples, however, are exceptions to the rule that ex gratia payments made after an ombudsman's intervention are generally of a modest size.81 In 1997–8, payments made after the PCA's investigation ranged from £6 to £50,000.82 The average was around £2,000. At a local level, sums gained are generally under £10,000, and often the award is merely a few hundred pounds ‘in recognition of time and trouble in pursuing the complaint’.83
The LGO and PCA are both prevented from investigating complaints for which the aggrieved person has a remedy in court.84 There has nonetheless been an overlap between their investigations and legal actions which have come before the courts.85 For instance, in the social services sphere, the LGO found maladministration in the council care of a young adolescent86 and in the investigation of child abuse.87 In respect of special education needs, a council was found at fault in its assessment of a dyslexic child.88 Similarities can thus be detected with the facts of (p.248) cases such as X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council.89 Indeed, in that case Lord Browne-Wilkinson argued that the ombudsman system would be a more appropriate way of remedying certain grievances than litigation would be.90 To what extent is a complaint to an ombudsman a suitable alternative to an action in damages?
There are procedural advantages of the ombudsman in terms of speed, cost, and informality. Moreover, as we have seen, the notion of injustice is more malleable than the recognized heads of loss in a negligence action, with ex gratia compensation often paid for feelings of anxiety and uncertainty, and ‘time and trouble’ in pursuing maladministration.91 The ombudsmen are much more willing than the courts to find the public authorities to be at fault. Unlike the English courts, the ombudsmen consider that public bodies and their servants are under an obligation to administer competently, as emphasized by the LGO's published list of principles of good administration.92 The ombudsmen can thus facilitate the granting of compensation in circumstances in which a tort claim would have failed. Whereas the informal giving of advice by planning authorities is all but excluded from negligence liability,93 reports from the LGO have on many occasions led to compensation for the provision of erroneous information by planning authorities.94 Likewise, compensation has been gained for maladministration in the granting of planning permission,95 for instance when account was taken of irrelevant considerations in the granting of planning permission for a forestry contractor's yard next to the complainants' home.96
Similar examples may be found in the PCA's reports.97 In the Reeman affair, the claimants lost a substantial amount of money when the seaworthiness certificate of a fishing boat they had purchased was withdrawn as (p.249) the certificate had been based upon faulty calculations previously carried out by a Department of Transport (DoT) surveyor. The Court of Appeal held that the DoT did not owe these boat purchasers a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid causing them economic loss.98 A complaint was then made to the PCA, who investigated the facts and concluded that both the surveyor and the DoT were guilty of gross maladministration in respect of the boat survey.99 The PCA recommended that an ex gratia payment should be made to the Reemans, covering the financial loss on the vessel (£134,500) plus interest and reasonable expenses and loss which had been caused by the purchase of the boat.100
There are however limitations on the ombudsman procedure. The complainant has no right to compensation if his or her complaint is upheld: the ombudsman can simply recommend a remedy. The public body can, and sometimes does,101 ignore recommendations.102 Moreover, reparation made after an ombudsman's report is generally modest.103 Tort actions are undoubtedly more appropriate for obtaining larger sums, and are generally the only way to gain substantial reparation for future loss, such as future loss of earnings.104 An ombudsman's investigation generally focuses upon recent maladministration, with a time bar on complaints made more than a year after the maladministration came to the complainant's notice.105 This compares unfavourably with the three-year limitation period applying to damages actions for negligently caused personal injury.106 Moreover, some areas of administrative activity are outside the ambit of an ombudsman's investigation, such as the internal affairs of educational establishments,107 and contractual and commercial transactions.108
