4. Conclusion

It will be apparent from the foregoing analysis that public law illegality plays a different role in damages actions in the two systems. The illegality–fault (p.57) equation in French administrative law is undoubtedly favourable to the victim of administrative wrongdoing. In effect, this places—in common law parlance—an obligation of strict liability upon the administration. It is thus irrelevant whether the administration intentionally or carelessly took an illegal act; the mere fact that it fell foul of the rules of legality is sufficient to constitute administrative fault.

Many reasons explain the rejection of such an approach in English law. Primarily, there are worries that it would result in a vast extension of liability, an inhibition of administrative activity, or a correlative retrenchment of the scope of ultra vires.²⁰⁵ It has been seen that parallel fears played a role in the earlier period of French administrative law, only to be rejected in time. This does not mean that the policy concerns underlying the more restrictive approach have been entirely abandoned. Certainly, they have played a more reduced role at the fault level in France. But we will see that potent control mechanisms operate in French administrative law in respect of other elements of the liability equation.

Secondly, there is also a certain reluctance in English law to inject public law notions directly into a sphere which is primarily regarded as constituting part of private law. Introducing concepts of illegality into the sphere of tort liability immediately runs the risk of a clash of concepts. So, we have seen that the stipulation in X (Minors) of Wednesbury unreasonableness as a precondition of liability created a difficult problem of delimitation between those cases which required judicial deference to specifically administrative activities and those in which it was inappropriate to apply this precondition. Without a cast-iron definition of administrative decisions in English law, resort cannot be had to the French law technique of dividing between décisions exécutoires and agissements. Uncertainties in dividing between public law and private law in English law also exacerbate this issue.²⁰⁶ Thirdly, liability for loss caused by an invalid act would raise difficulties in terms of causation. This will be examined at a later stage.²⁰⁷

Despite what has been said, the role of illegality in the English law of governmental liability cannot be entirely ignored. As we have seen above, the influence of Community law and the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 mean that the illegality–fault relationship in English law is by no means immutable.

Notes:

(1) See e.g. C. Gour, ‘Faute de Service’ in F. Gazier and R. Drago (eds.), Dalloz Encyclopédie de Droit Public: Répertoire de la Responsabilité de la Puissance Publique (Paris, 1988) para 255 .

(2) For a case law illustration, see CE 26 Apr. 1985, Léon Vincent [1985] Rec 126; CE 26 June 1970, Bartoli [1970] Rec 442.

(3) See Chap. 5.

(4) e.g. CE 27 June 1997, Guyot [1997] Rec 267.

(5) Brown and Bell, 158, citing CE 16 Oct. 1970, Pierre, Req 80960 (see (1971) 249 Cahiers Juridiques de l'Electricité et du Gaz 171). This scenario is now regulated by the Law of 31 Dec. 1957 which accords the tribunaux judiciaires jurisdiction for legal actions relating to ‘all damage caused by any vehicle’.

(6) But note that there is a procedural tenet in French administrative law known as la règle de la décision préalable, which stipulates that for an action to be brought before the administrative courts, there must be a pre-existing administrative decision to contest (Art. 1, Decree of 11 Jan. 1965, AJDA 1965.190). Thus an injured victim must obtain an administrative decision by asking the public body for compensation and then wait for an official refusal. The refusal will be implicit if the relevant public authority fails to respond to the applicant's demand within 4 months (Decree of 11 Jan. 1965). It might be argued that if an action is subsequently found to lie in damages, then the décision préalable, the administration's refusal, was itself unlawful. Thus the precondition of invalidity is satisfied by the décision préalable. This argument is weakened by the fact that this illegality cannot be regarded as having caused the applicant's ultimate loss, and, in any case, the règle de la décision préalable is not an absolute one: the Decree of 11 Jan. 1965 provides that an aggrieved claimant does not need to obtain a décision préalable where the action concerns travaux publics (see J. Roche, ‘Les Exceptions à la Règle de la Décision Préalable Devant le Juge Administratif’ in Mélanges Offerts à Marcel Waline (Paris, 1974) 733) . Consequently, in certain circumstances there will be no invalid administrative decision prior to the award of damages against a public body.

(7) The conditions precedent for such an action are several and various: see Chapus, paras. 1006–1019; Brown and Bell, chap. 7.

(8) G. Vedel and P. Delvolvé, Droit Administratif (12th edn, Paris, 1992) i, 582 .

(9) Markesinis, Auby et al., 16; Brown and Bell, 190; B. Schwartz, French Administrative Law and the Common-Law World (New York, 1954) 278 .

(10) See generally Deguergue, 752–6; C. Gour, ‘Faute de Service’ in F. Gazier and R. Drago (eds.), Dalloz Encyclopédie de Droit Public: Répertoire de la Responsabilité de la Puissance Publique, para. 259.

(11) L. Delbez, ‘De l'Excès de Pouvoir Comme Source de Responsabilité’, RDP 1932.441, 461; P. Duez, La Responsabilité de la Puissance Publique (2nd edn, Paris, 1938) ; P. Weil, Les Conséquences de l'Annulation d'un Acte Administratif Pour Excès de Pouvoir (Paris, 1952) 253 ; M. Khalil-Kamel, La Notion d'Illégalité et son Rôle dans la Responsabilité de l'Administration (Thesis, L'Université de Paris, 1953) 294.

(12) Conclusions of CG Detton and CG Gazier respectively in CE 3 Apr. 1936, Benjamin, Sirey 1936.3.108 and CE 30 July 1949, Patureau-Mirand, D.1950.3.109.

(13) ‘Error of fact’, CE 7 June 1940, Vuldy [1940] Rec 197.

(14) ‘Procedural impropriety’ CE 4 Nov. 1921, Monpillié [1921] Rec 903. See also CE 23 June 1916, Halles de Bordeaux [1916] Rec 243. See Delbez, n. 11 above, 461; Duez, n. 11 above, 56.

(15) ‘Error of law’, CE 1 Dec. 1922, Grellet [1922] Rec 900. See also CE 31 Jan. 1936, Sociéte Lustria [1936] Rec 148.

(16) L. Trotabas, ‘La Responsabilité de l'Etat en Droit Interne Francais’ [1933] Revista de Drept Public 7, 13.

(17) Delbez, n. 11 above, and Duez, n. 11 above, clearly prioritized the grounds of quashing in terms of their categorization. But see the dissent of J. de Soto, Contribution à la Théorie de Nullités des Actes Administratifs Unilatéraux (Thesis, L'Université de Paris, 1941) 76.

(18) ‘Breach of a decided issue’. This is a complex notion with similarities to the plea of res judicata, although without the same framework of precedent that operates in the common law. See Brown and Bell, 215–16.

(19) Brown and Bell, 246, translate this as ‘abuse of power’ where ‘an administrative power or discretion has been exercised for some object other than that for which [the] power or discretion was conferred by the statute’.

(20) See J.-C. Hélin, Faute de Service et Préjudice dans le Contentieux de la Responsabilité pour Illégalité (Thesis, L'Université de Nantes, 1969) 50, for a synthesis of this doctrinal categorization.

(21) Respectively, ‘want of authority’ and ‘error of law’. See R. Odent, Contentieux Administratif (Paris, 1965–6) 923–4 ; Duez, n. 11 above, 57.

(22) But note that CG Detton did advert to a more sophisticated method of determining the seriousness of an illegality: see his conclusions in CE 3 Apr. 1936, Benjamin, Sirey 1936.3.108.

(23) P. Craig and G. De Bùrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford, 1998), chap. 12 . See e.g. R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No 5) [2000] 1 AC 524.

(24) Hélin, n. 20 above, 24. See also comments of Pacteau [1986] La Revue Administrative 43, 43.

(25) P. Weil, Les Conséquences de l'Annulation d'un Acte Administratif Row Excès de Pouvoir (Paris, 1952) 255 ; R. Bonnard, Précis de Droit Administratif (4th edn, Paris, 1943) 93 .

(26) Weil, n. 25 above, 255; Hauriou, case note on CE 3 Aug. 1900, Ville de Paris, Sirey 1902.3.41. Although Hauriou vacillated, see case note on CE 29 May 1903, Le Berre, Sirey 1904.3.121.

(27) Moreover, many of these local authorities were inadequately insured: Hélin, n. 20 above, 107.

(28) J.-C. Hélin, Faute de Service et Préjudice dans le Contentieux de la Responsabilité pour Illégalité (Thesis, L'Université de Nantes, 1969) 63: ‘it is difficult to deny that the financial argument, invoked by the doctrine in order to restrict the ambit of liability, has been taken into account in the case law itself.’

(29) Although Duguit had already adopted such an argument in his Traité de Droit Constitutionnel in 1930 (L. Duguit, Traité de Droit Constitutionnel (3rd edn, Paris, 1930) iii, 498) it was not until Hélin's ground-breaking thesis in 1969 that this theory was expounded in detail (Hélin, n. 20 above). See also L. Nizard, La Jurisprudence des Circonstances Exceptionnelles et la Légalité (Paris, 1962) 68 .

(30) G. Vedel, Droit Administratif (2nd edn, Paris, 1961) 281 .

(31) Ibid .

(32) J.-C. Hélin, Faute de Service et Préjudice dans le Contentieux de la Responsabilité pour Illégalité (Thesis, L'Université de Nantes, 1969) 105.

(33) For instance, due to the fact that the damage was caused by the public body in circumstances of a voie de fait (flagrant irregularity).

(34) See comments of Mathiot in a case note on CE 22 July 1949 and 22 Dec. 1949, Société des Automobiles Berliet, Sirey 1951.3.1 at 5.

(35) CE 4 Nov. 1921, Monpillié [1921] Rec 903.

(36) Hélin, n. 20 above, 251 explained the attitude of the courts by lack of préjudice, but may have actually been referring to the causal link (préjudice direct).

(37) CE 23 Jan. 1925, Anduran [1925] Rec 82.

(38) CE 1 Dec. 1922, Grellet [1922] Rec 900.

(39) Deguergue, 188.

(40) Monpillié illustrates this point: CE 4 Nov. 1921, [1921] Rec 903. See the translations of various Conseil d'Etat decisions in the Appendix.

(41) ‘Error of fact.’ See CE 7 June 1940, Vuldy [1940] Rec 197.

(42) ‘Error of law.’ See CE 31 Jan. 1936, Sociéte Lustria [1936] Rec 148.

(43) J.-C. Hélin, Faute de Service et Préjudice dans le Contentieux de la Responsabilité pour Illégalité (Thesis, L'Université de Nantes, 1969) 318.

(44) CE 26 Jan. 1973, Driancourt [1973] Rec 78. A translation of this case may be found in the Appendix. See also CE 22 May 1974, Charrois [1974] Rec 297.

(45) Many cases have subsequently repeated the principle enunciated in Driancourt, e.g. CE 9 June 1995, Lesprit [1995] Rec 239.

(46) See e.g. CE 17 June 1983, SCI Italic [1983] Rec 267.

(47) ‘Manifest error in the evaluation of the facts.’ See CE 26 July 1978, Vinolay [1978] Rec 315.

(48) CE 4 Nov. 1992, Lorgues, RDP 1993.261 (procedural illegality); CAA Lyon 9 Dec. 1992, Gire [1992] Rec 1296 (erreur manifeste d'appreciation); CE 3 Apr. 1992, SARL Nouvelles Frontières, RDP 1993.262 (error of law).

(49) CE 28 Feb. 1992, Arizona Tobacco Products [1992] Rec 78. See also the significant case of CAA Paris 1 July 1992, Dangeville [1992] Rec 558, overturned on different grounds in CE 30 Oct. 1996, Dangeville [1996] Rec 399. See further W. van Gerven, J. Lever, and P. Larouche, Tort Law (Oxford, 2000) 380 .

(50) Chapus, para. 1454. For private law see C. von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts (Oxford, 1998) i, para. 31 .

(51) J. Rivero and J. Waline, Droit Administratif (17th edn, Paris, 1998) para. 287 .

(52) See the confusion in C. Gour, ‘Faute de Service’ in F. Gazier and R. Drago (eds.), Dalloz Encyclopédie de Droit Public: Répertoire de la Responsabilité de la Puissance Publique, para. 255.

(53) Note also that an illegality causing loss might not give rise to liability where a loi de validation has been promulgated by the legislature in order to validate the previously unlawful act: see CE 22 Apr. 1970, Remusat [1970] Rec 264.

(54) This will be examined in more detail in Chap. 4, sects. 3.1 and 3.2.

(55) e.g. CE 7 July 1971, Gérard [1971] Rec 513; CE 24 Oct. 1990, Philibert [1990] Rec 290.

(56) CE 29 June 1990, Société CERP [1990] Rec 193.

(57) CE 21 June 1972, Foucault [1972] Rec 461.

(58) The terms ‘invalidity’ and ‘illegality’ are used in this context to mean that the act falls within one of the grounds of review in a judicial review action.

(59) Generally, see Craig, chap. 26; H. Woolf, J. Jowell, and A. Le Sueur, de Smith, Woolf and Jowell's Principles of Judicial Review (5th edn, London, 1998) chap. 16 ; J. McBride, ‘Damages as a Remedy for Unlawful Administrative Action’ [1979] CLJ 323.

(60) Markesinis, Auby et al.; J. Bell and A. Bradley, Governmental Liability: a Comparative Study (London, 1991) .

(61) See generally Markesinis and Deakin, 336–53; K. M. Stanton, Breach of Statutory Duty in Tort (London, 1986) ; Arrowsmith, chap. 7; Winfield and Jolowicz, chap. 7; A.J. Harding, Public Duties and Public Law (Oxford, 1989) .

(62) See Craig, 847.

(63) Com Dig Tit, ‘Action upon Statute. F’, Comyn's Digest (5th edn) 442; Couch v Steel (1854) 3 E&B 402.

(64) See Schinotti v Bumsted (1796) 6 TR 646; Pickering v James (1873) LR 8 CP 489.

(65) (1877) 2 Ex D 441.

(66) Read v Croydon Corporation [1938] 4 All ER 631; Phillips v Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co [1923] 2 KB 832. But there have been maverick cases taking a more generous view: Dawson & Co v Bingley Urban District Council [1911] 2 KB 149.

(67) X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 731; R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex p Hague [1992] 1 AC 58; Capital & Counties [1997] QB 1004, 1049–50.

(68) But see Telecommunications Act 1984, s 18(6); Building Act 1984, s 38; Local Government Act 1988, s 19(7)(b). Other statutes expressly exclude a damages remedy for breach of their provisions: Guard Dogs Act 1975, s 5(2)(a); Medicines Act 1968, s 133(2).

(69) F. Bennion, ‘Statutory Interpretation: Code’ [1995] All ER 496. Reference may be made to Parliamentary debate in Hansard where appropriate: Richardson v Pitt-Stanley [1995] QB 123.

(70) X (Minors) [1995] 2 AC 633, 731.

(71) See Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398, 407; Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173, 185 ; Scally v Southern Health Board [1992] 1 AC 294; Wentworth v Wiltshire County Council [1993] QB 654.

(72) X (Minors) [1995] 2 AC 633, 731; Capital & Counties [1997] QB 1004, 1049–50; O'Rourke v Camden LBC [1998] AC 188, 192.

(73) O'Rourke v Camden LBC [1998] AC 188, 194; Feakins Ltd v Dover Harbour Board The Times, 9 Sept. 1998; Danns v Department of Health [1996] PIQR 69.

(74) See ibid.

(75) [1998] AC 188.

(76) Ibid., 193.

(77) This is supported by extrajudicial statements: Lord Hoffmann, ‘Human Rights and the House of Lords’ (1999) 62 MLR 159, 163 .

(78) Ibid .

(79) Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398; Grant v National Coal Board [1956] AC 649.

(80) Richardson v Pitt-Stanley [1995] QB 123; Wentworth v Wiltshire County Council [1993] QB 654.

(81) Although there is no doubt that in principle damages for economic loss are recoverable for breach of statutory duty: Rickless v United Artists Corporation [1988] QB 40; Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post [1991] 2 AC 370, 420.

(82) The Times, 9 Sept. 1998. The Board was regarded as a public body for the purpose of judicial review proceedings.

(83) See Parker LJ in Wentworth v Wiltshire County Council [1993] QB 654, 661 who adverted to the consequences of a wide conception of this tort which would allow ‘an action for large, perhaps very large, damages’. For a general discussion of pure economic loss, see Chap. 7, sect. 2.

(84) Olotu v Home Office [1997] 1 All ER 385.

(85) R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex p Hague [1992] 1 AC 58.

(86) Calveley v Chief Constable of Merseyside [1989] AC 1228.

(87) Capital & Counties [1997] QB 1004, 1050.

(88) Phelps v Hillingdon LBC [2001] 2 AC 619, 668.

(89) Clunis v Camden & Islington Health Authority [1998] QB 978.

(90) X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 732; Clunis [1998] QB 978; R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex p Hague [1992] 1 AC 58, 167 (Lord Goff). For planning law see Lam v Brennan [1997] PIQR P488.

(91) Ministry of Defence v Blue Circle Industries Plc [1998] 3 All ER 385. See also Stark v The Post Office [2000] ICR 1013.

(92) Koonjul v Thameslink Healthcare Services [2000] PIQR 123. Which is not necessarily the same as taking reasonable care: Jayne v National Coal Board [1963] 2 All ER 220; Edwards v NCB [1949] 1 KB 704.

(93) [1995] 2 AC 633, 747.

(94) ‘The X Case: Implications for Education Lawyers’ (Education Law Association, The Cavendish Conference Centre, 14 Nov. 1996).

(95) Winfield and Jolowicz, para. 7.9; R.A. Buckley, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (21st edn, London, 1996) 252 ; Harlow, 69. See also Lord Denning's remark in Ex parte Island Records [1978] Ch 122, 134–5 cited in n. 97 below.

(96) See F. Bennion's reform proposals: ‘Codifying the Tort of Breach of Statutory Duty’ (1996) 17 Statute Law Review 192 .

(97) Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398, 401. Without much success Lord Denning remarked in a later case that: ‘[t]he truth is that in many of these statutes the legislature has left the point open. It has ignored the plea of Lord du Parcq in Cutler's case [1949] AC 398, 410. So it has left the courts with a guess-work puzzle. The dividing line between the pro-cases and the contra-cases is so blurred and so ill-defined that you might as well toss a coin to decide it’; Ex parte Island Records [1978] Ch 122, 134–5).

(98) See R.A. Buckley, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (21st edn, London, 1996) 252 .

(99) See Staughton LJ's comments in the Court of Appeal in M v Newham London Borough Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 670.

(100) Law Commission, Interpretation of Statutes (Law Com No 21, London 1969).

(101) K.M. Stanton, Breach of Statutory Duty in Tort (London, 1986) 32–3, 54 .

(102) Arrowsmith, 197.

(103) Abbott v Sullivan [1952] 1 KB 189, 215; Dunlop v Woollahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 158, 172; Lonrho Plc v Tebbit [1991] 4 All ER 973, 980 (High Court, upheld in CA, [1992] 4 All ER 280); R v Knowsley MBC, ex p Maguire, The Times, 26 June 1992; R v Home Secretary ex p Dew [1987] 1 WLR 881, 894–5; R. (Isik) v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham (CA, 19 Sept. 2000) para. 15. See also the Australian case of Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration (1991) 103 ALR 499.

(104) [1995] 2 AC 633, 730.

(105) [2001] 2 AC 550.

(106) [2001] 2 AC 619.

(107) [1970] AC 1004.

(108) Ibid.

(109) Ibid, 1068.

(110) Ibid, 1031. The exact import of Lord Reid's dicta will be examined in detail below.

(111) Although Lord Hutton in Barrett interpreted the ratio of Dorset Yacht differently: [2001] 2 AC 550, 579–80.

(112) See the comments of Lord Slynn in Barrett [2001] 2 AC 550, 570. Lord Wilberforce was more ambiguous on this point in Anns v Merton LBC [1978] AC 728, although he did conclude that a ‘plaintiff complaining of negligence must prove, the burden being on him, that action taken was not within the limits of a discretion bona fide exercised, before he can begin to rely upon a common law duty of care’: [1978] AC 728, 755. See Harlow, 54.

(113) [1991] 4 All ER 973 (High Court, upheld in the CA [1992] 4 All ER 280).

(114) [1991] 4 A11 ER 973, 982.

(115) P. Hogg, Liability of the Crown (2nd edn, Toronto, 1989) 131 . See also the Scottish case of Bonthorne v Secretary of State for Scotland 1987 SLT 34.

(116) [1995] 2 AC 633, 736.

(117) [1995] 2 AC 633, 736.

(118) See ibid., 736 and 761. This standard of unreasonableness derives from Lord Greene's judgment in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, 229: ‘[s]omething so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority.’

(119) [1995] 2 AC 633, 761.

(120) [1996] AC 923.

(121) Ibid., 953.

(122) Evans LJ in the Court of Appeal in Barrett doubted whether Wednesbury unreasonableness was relevant other than in the context of a judicial review action ([1998] QB 367, 379). See the discussion of the House of Lords' judgment in Barrett in sect. 3.2.2 below.

(123) See P. Cane, ‘Suing Public Authorities in Tort’ (1996) 112 LQR 13, 16–17 ; J. Wright, ‘Local Authorities, the Duty of Care and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1998) 18 OJLS 1, 6 .

(124) X (Minors) [1995] 2 AC 633, 736.

(125) Dorset Yacht [1970] AC 1004, 1031.

(126) Lord Reid subsequently diluted the unreasonableness requirement substantially: ‘[t]here could only be liability if the person entrusted with discretion either unreasonably failed to carry out his duty to consider the matter or reached a conclusion so unreasonable as again to show failure to do his duty’: Dorset Yacht [1970] AC 1004, 1031.

(127) Mentioning this twice in one section: ibid., 1031.

(128) ‘The X Case: Implications for Education Lawyers’ (Education Law Association, The Cavendish Conference Centre, 14 Nov. 1996).

(129) X (Minors) [1995] 2 AC 633, 761.

(130) P. Cane, ‘Suing Public Authorities in Tort’ (1996) 112 LQR 13, 16–17 , citing Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd [1988] 1 AC 473.

(131) This will be examined in more detail in Chap. 4, sect. 2.1.1.

(132) For intance the police may be liable for negligence when driving: they owe the same duty of care to road users as other drivers: Gaynor v Allen [1959] 2 QB 403; Marshall v Osmond [1983] QB 1034.

(133) [1995] 2 AC 633, 735.

(134) Ibid., 739.

(135) [1995] 2 AC 633, 739. The normal conditions of a duty of care as set out in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 would also have to be satisfied.

(136) The key to this distinction, the notion of ‘discretion’, is a notoriously slippery notion when applied in a legal context: see M. Aronson, Public Torts and Contracts (Sidney, 1982) 69–72 .

(137) See M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve, ‘Sufficiently Serious?’ in M. Andenas (ed.), English Public Law and the Common Law of Europe (London, 1998), 307–13 .

(138) [2001] 2 AC 550.

(139) [2001] 2 AC 619.

(140) On this case see S.H. Bailey and M.J. Bowman, ‘Public Authority Negligence Revisited’ [2000] CLJ 85; P. Craig and D. Fairgrieve, ‘Barrett, Negligence and Discretionary Powers’ [1999] PL 626; A. Mullis, ‘Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council: A Compensation-seeker's Charter?’ (2000) 2 CFLQ 185 .

(141) [1998] QB 367.

(142) [2001] 2 AC 550, 570.

(143) Ibid., 571–2.

(144) See Chap. 4, sect. 2.1.1.

(145) [2001] 2 AC 550, 571–2.

(146) Ibid., 572.

(147) Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605.

(148) [2001] 2 AC 550, 572.

(149) This will be examined in more depth in Chap. 4, sect. 2.1.2.7.

(150) [2001] 2 AC 550, 586.

(151) The facts, procedure, and impact of this case on public authority liability will be examined in more depth in Chap. 4, sect. 2.1.2.3.

(152) [2001] 2 AC 550, 653.

(153) Ibid., 653.

(154) Ibid.

(155) Ibid., 666–8. Lord Nicholls described the case of an educational psychologist employed by an education authority and assessing children with learning difficulties as ‘an example par excellence of a situation where the law will regard the professional as owing a duty of care to a third party as well as his own employer’: ibid., 666.

(156) ‘But while no common law duty can stand in contradiction of some statutory provision, and it may be hard to impose a duty of care in the exercise of a statutory power (Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923, 954), the existence of a statutory background against which the professionals are exercising their particular skills should not inhibit the existence of a common law duty of care’: [2001] 2 AC 550, 673. Note also Lord Slynn's parallel observation that ‘there may be cases where to recognise such a vicarious liability on the part of the authority may so interfere with the performance of the local education authority's duties that it would be wrong to recognise any liability on the part of the authority’: ibid., 653.

(157) Although Lord Clyde does refer to Lord Browne-Wilkinson's stipulation in X (Minors) that an administrative decision must be shown to be so totally unreasonable as to amount to an abuse of the discretion, he limits this to a very narrow area and seems to elide this with the discussion of justiciability: Phelps v Hillingdon LBC [2001] 2 AC 619, 673–4.

(158) See Lord Hutton's explanation of X (Minors) and his conclusion that this case did not preclude actions against decisions which are within the ambit of statutory discretion: Barrett [2001] 2 AC 550, 585.

(159) [2001] 2 AC 619, 653.

(160) See text accompanying nn. 111 and 117 above. See also W v Home Office [1997] Imm. AR 302, 310.

(161) See, e.g. R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex p B [1995] 2 All ER 129.

(162) See comments of Harlow, 53; H. Woolf, J. Jowell and A. Le Sueur, de Smith, Woolf and Jowell's Principles of Judicial Review (5th edn, London, 1998) paras. 16–006–16–007 .

(163) Per Lord Greene ‘[s]omething so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority’: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, 229.

(164) For an analysis of judicial restraint in negligence actions against public bodies see M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve, ‘Sufficiently Serious?’ in M. Andenas (ed.), English Public Law and the Common Law of Europe (London, 1998) . See also the discussion in R. v London Borough of Ealing ex p Parkinson (QBD, 19 Oct. 1995).

(165) For instance in planning cases: R. v Hillingdon LBC, ex p Royco Homes Ltd [1974] QB 720. See also the comments of Lord Cooke in R. v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex p International Trader's Perry Ltd [1999] 2 AC 418, 452, and R. (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 AC 532, 549. Note also the influence of the HRA 1998: P. Craig, ‘The Courts, the Human Rights Act, and Judicial Review’ (2001) 117 LQR 589, 600 .

(166) The claimant must show that the professional concerned did not exercise the skills of a competent professional and failed to act in accordance with the accepted views of a substantial reputable body of opinion: Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.

(167) See P. Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (Oxford, 1997) 41 ; Clerk & Lindsell, para. 8–35.

(168) Barrett [2001] 2 AC 550, 572 and 591; Phelps [2001] 2 AC 619, 655 and 672.

(169) Some remaining uncertainty may exist as to the relationship between Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 and Barrett and Phelps. The precondition of public law irrationality for founding a duty of care on the failure to exercise a statutory power as expounded in the former case must now be read in the light of their Lordships' expunging of invalidity from negligence as expressed in Barrett. But Lord Hutton suggested in Barrett that the ratio of Stovin v Wise would still apply to omissions to perform a statutory power: Barrett [2001] 2 AC 550, 586.

(170) Beaudesert Shire Council v Smith (1966) 120 CLR 145.

(171) The principle was rejected in Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173, 188.

(172) Three Rivers District Council [2000] 2 WLR 1220; Three Rivers District Council [2001] UKHL 16. In French law, an abuse of power may itself be quashed on the basis of détournement de pouvoir, which may then give rise to liability for the loss caused.

(173) See Chap. 4, sect. 2.2.1.

(174) See M. Amos, ‘Extending the Liability of the State in Damages’ [2001] LS 1.

(175) Cases C–6/90 & C–9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991] ECR 1–5357; Cases C–46/93 & C–48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany; R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd [1996] ECR I-1029. The elements of the action are that the rule of Community law which has been infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach of this rule is sufficiently serious; and there was a direct causal link between the breach and the loss complained of.

(176) R. v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 5) [2000] 1 AC 524. It was said in the High Court that ‘whilst it can be said that the cause of action is sui generis, it is of the character of a breach of statutory duty’ [1997] EuLR 475, 531. In another decision in the Factortame saga, it was held by Toulmin QC (Official Referee) in the Technology and Construction Court that an action for damages for an infringement of Community law was an action founded on tort within the meaning of s 2 of the Limitation Act 1980, and that the term ‘Eurotort’ may be indeed apt: R. v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 7) [2001] 1 WLR 942, 966.

(177) Namely, whether the Member State has ‘manifestly and gravely’ disregarded the limits on its discretion: Cases C–46 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany, ibid., 499.

(178) Ibid.

(179) See R. v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No 5) [2000] 1 AC 524, 541, and 554.

(180) Ibid., 555.

(181) Case C–5/94, R. v MAFF, ex p Hedley Lomas Ltd [1997] QB 139; Cases C–178, 179, & 188–190/94, Dillenkofer v Germany [1997] QB 259. See P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford, 1998) 245 .

(182) M. Amos, ‘Extending the Liability of the State in Damages’ [2001] LS 1, 4.

(183) The potential ‘spill-over effect’ of Community law is well-documented: see P. Craig, ‘Once More Unto the Breach: The Community, the State and Damages Liability’ (1997) 113 LQR 67, 89 ; W. van Gerven, ‘Bridging the Gap between Community and National Laws: Towards a Principle of Homogeneity in the Field of Legal Remedies’ (1995) 32 CMLRev. 679 ; ‘Bridging the Unbridgeable: Community and National Tort Laws After Francovich and Brasserie’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 507, 538; M. Amos, ‘Extending the Liability of the State in Damages’ [2001] LS 1; M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve, ‘Sufficiently Serious?’ in M. Andenas (ed.), English Public Law and the Common Law of Europe (London, 1998) . For an extra-judicial comment on this matter see Lord Bingham, ‘A New Common Law for Europe’ in B. Markesinis (ed.), Millennium Lectures: the Coming Together of The Common Law and the Civil Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 34–5 .

(184) See generally Sir Robert Carnwath, ‘ECHR Remedies from a Common Law Perspective’ (2000) 49 ICLQ 517 and ‘Welfare Services—Liabilities in Tort after the Human Rights Act’ [2001] PL 210; I. Leigh and L. Lustgarten, ‘Making Rights Real: The Courts, Remedies and the Human Rights Act’ [1999] CLJ 509; K. Starmer, European Human Rights Law (London, 1999) chap. 2 ; M. Amos, ‘Damages for Breach of the Human Rights Act 1998’ [1999] EHRLR 178; D. Fairgrieve, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998, Damages and Tort Law’ [2001] PL 695; Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Damages under the Human Rights Act 1998 (Law Com No 266, 2000; Scottish Law Com No 180, 2000).

(185) S 6(1) of the HRA.

(186) S 8(3)(a) of the HRA. Which thus suggests that damages under the HRA is a residual remedy. This has been confirmed by the courts. In Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ. 64, Lord Philipps MR held that where the applicant had a valid claim in nuisance, in respect of a concurrent claim for damages under the HRA ‘[i]t is reasonable to assume, however, that the damages to which Mr Marcic is entitled will afford him “just satisfaction” for the wrong that he has suffered. On that premise, and having regard to the provisions of section 8(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998, Mr Marcic's right to damages at common law displaces any right that he would otherwise have had to damages under the Act.’

(187) S 8(3)(b) of the HRA.

(188) A. R. Mowbray, ‘The European Court of Human Rights' Approach to Just Satisfaction’ [1997] PL 647; S. Grosz, J. Beatson, and P. Duffy, Human Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2000) para. 6–21 .

(189) HRA, s 8(4).

(190) The Law Commission has argued that the HRA creates a new form of action for breach of statutory duty, although this analogy was qualified with the reservation that ‘the remedy is discretionary, rather than as of right’: Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Damages under the Human Rights Act 1998 (Law Com No 266, 2000; Scottish Law Com No 180, 2000) para. 4.20. A. Lester and D. Pannick have described this remedy under the HRA as ‘a new public law tort of acting in breach of the victim's Convention rights’: (2000) 116 LQR 380, 382. On the other hand, Lord Woolf has expressed reservations about describing this remedy as a new government tort (‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and Remedies’ in M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve (eds.), Judicial Review in International Perspective: Volume II (Deventer, 2000) 432) .

(191) See, e.g. the definition of a tort give by Toulmin QC (Official Referee) in R. v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No 7) [2001] 1WLR 942, 965 as ‘[a] breach of noncontractual duty which gives a private law right to the party injured to recover compensatory damages at common law from the party causing the injury’ (emphasis added).

(192) See Craig, 850–1.

(193) Lord Woolf, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and Remedies’ in M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve (eds.), Judicial Review in International Perspective: Volume II (Deventer, 2000) .

(194) Otherwise than to compensate a person under Art. 5(5) of the Convention, which provides for an enforceable right to compensation for victims of arrest or detention in contravention of Art. 5.

(195) A. Olowofoyeku, ‘State Liability for the Exercise of Judicial Power’ [1998] PL 444, 460.

(196) Art. 5(5) ECHR seems to provide for an enforceable right to compensation for breach of the provisions of Art. 5 ECHR (i.e. regardless of fault). However, the ECtHR has not interpreted this as necessitating a right to compensation, and has often held that a finding of a violation of the Convention is sufficient just satisfaction: Damages under the HRA, n. 190 above, para. 6.80.

(197) See sect. 3.3.1. above.

(198) The right to life.

(199) The right to freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

(200) Subject, of course, to showing that the breach caused loss to the applicant.

(201) It covers the accidental deprivation of life by the use of lethal force: K. Reid, A Practitioner's Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1998) 361 .

(202) See, e.g. Salman v Turkey, Appl. no 21986/93, Judgment of 27 June 2000.

(203) Many of the principal Art. 3 cases have occurred in the context of direct physical ill-treatment by agents of the State: Reid, n. 201 above, 377.

(204) See Lord Woolf, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and Remedies’ in M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve (eds.), Judicial Review in International Perspective: Volume II (Deventer, 2000) 433 .

(205) Craig, 902–4. See also the comments of H. Woolf, Protection of the Public: A New Challenge (London, 1990) 56 .

(206) See the comments of S.H. Bailey, B.L. Jones, and A.R. Mowbray, Cases and Materials on Administrative Law (3rd edn, London, 1997) 736 .

(207) See Chap. 6, sect. 3.2.