- •Time-Limited Interests in Land
- •The Common Core of European Private Law
- •Contents
- •General editors’ preface
- •Preface
- •Contributors
- •Abbreviations
- •1 Setting the scene
- •1. The scene
- •2. Balancing the interests: a handful of common problems
- •3. Time-limited interests arising by operation of law
- •2 General introduction
- •1. Overview
- •2. The hybrid character of time-limited interests in land
- •3. The approach and purpose of this study
- •3.1. Background
- •3.2. Drawing a geographical map of the law of Europe
- •4. The genesis of the book
- •4.1. Narrowing down the topic
- •4.2. Terminology
- •5. Structure of the book
- •3 Historical evolution of the maxim ‘sale breaks hire’
- •1. Introduction
- •2. The Roman-law approach
- •3. The ius commune position
- •3.1. Medieval learned law
- •3.2. From medieval learned law to the Prussian Civil Code
- •3.3. From the Prussian Civil Code to the German Civil Code
- •4. Conclusions
- •4 The many faces of usufruct
- •1. Usufruct in tax and estate planning
- •1.1. Transferring assets yet retaining control and income
- •1.2. Overview
- •2. The concept of usufruct
- •3. The traditional face
- •3.1. Control
- •3.2. Income
- •4. The modern face of usufruct
- •4.1. Control
- •4.2. Income
- •5. The Janus face
- •6. The twisted face
- •6.1. Default rules
- •6.2. Contractual expansion
- •6.3. Limits
- •7. Conclusion
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Case 1
- •Case 2
- •Case 3
- •Case 4
- •Case 5
- •Case 6
- •Case 7
- •Case 8
- •Case 9
- •Case 10
- •Case 11
- •Case 12
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Bibliography
- •GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
- •AUSTRIA
- •BELGIUM
- •DENMARK
- •ENGLAND
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •HUNGARY
- •ITALY
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •POLAND
- •PORTUGAL
- •SCOTLAND
- •SOUTH AFRICA
- •SPAIN
- •General index
- •Country index
- •Books in the series
4 The many faces of usufruct
a l a i n - l a u r e n t v e r b e k e , b a r t v e r d i c k t a n d d i r k - j a n m a a s l a n d
1. Usufruct in tax and estate planning
The various national reports demonstrate that the institution of usufruct has always been and still is a popular legal mechanism that offers a broad range of options that can be employed in many diverse situations. It is, however, not merely its application that is manifold. The concept itself is not as unequivocal as it appears at first glance. The area of continental estate planning in particular, reveals several nuances of the concept of usufruct.
1.1. Transferring assets yet retaining control and income
Estate planning is a complex process aimed at organising and transferring an estate to one’s partner, the next generation, or to charity.1 Transfers can be made after death, but also during the transferor’s lifetime. Most people prefer to retain (at least indirect) control over their estate and gain income therefrom for as long as they live. In Anglo-American jurisdictions, trusts are the obvious device for realising such aspirations. Continental jurisdictions lack this tradition, although foundations and other trust-like vehicles have become increasingly popular in recent years.
In several civil law jurisdictions, gifts and donations function as typical estate planning tools. They allow the transfer of assets during a person’s lifetime to the next generation, while still retaining some control over the assets and income therefrom through several modalities and conditions. This can be in the interest of the donor who needs the income to maintain a certain standard of living. The donor may also wish to retain substantial direct or indirect control and management
1 See in general Verbeke, Buyssens and Derycke, Handboek Estate Planning.
33
34 i n t r o d u c t i o n a n d c o n t e x t
over the donated assets. This can serve the interests of both the donor and the beneficiary. For example, the managerial expertise of the donor may allow the assets to be put to their most efficient use. This allows the donor to realise his aspiration of managing the property, while the beneficiary is protected against unwise management and can in fact reap the benefits of skilful management.
In most jurisdictions, there are no real tax incentives to donate. Generally, donation and inheritance tax (estate duty) are treated alike,2 and in several European jurisdictions, inheritance and donation tax between spouses and children have been abolished or the rates of taxation have been reduced substantially.3 In Belgium, gifts and donations are very popular for tax reasons. It is possible to donate goods to a partner, children or even third parties without being taxed or at least with substantially reduced rates of taxation (except for real estate located in Belgium). Donations of movables, if registered in Belgium, are taxed at 3 per cent for spouses, certain cohabitants and children and 7 per cent for others, while inheritance taxes go up to 27 per cent for spouses, certain cohabitants and children and 65 per cent for others.4 Since 1 January 2012, donations of shares are taxed in Flanders at 0 per cent subject to certain conditions (Flemish Registration Tax Code, art. 140bis). Donations not registered in Belgium are not taxed and will also not incur inheritance tax if the donor dies more than three or seven years respectively after the donation was made (Inheritance Tax Code, art. 7).
In spite of the identical treatment of inheritance and donation tax in the Netherlands (10 per cent (up to EUR 115,708) to 20 per cent (for anything over EUR 115,709) to children), one can reduce inheritance tax5 by making staggered donations or gifts during one’s lifetime. Parents can donate assets up to a value of EUR 115,708 to each child annually at a rate of 10 per cent.6 A similar technique is permitted under
2E.g. the Netherlands (Dutch Gift and Inheritance Tax Code, art. 24) and France (General Tax Code, art. 777).
3E.g. Denmark: no inheritance or gift tax between spouses, 15 per cent to children; France: no inheritance tax between spouses; Italy: 4 per cent on the net value exceeding 1 million euro per beneficiary; Luxemburg: up to maximum 5 per cent inheritance tax or death duties and maximum 4.8 per cent between spouses and direct heirs; the Netherlands: spouses exempted up to 600,000 euro; Portugal: no inheritance nor gift taxes between spouses and direct line; Spain: regional regulations with huge exemptions between spouses and direct line; Switzerland: cantonal regulations with no taxation between spouses and in most cantons also for direct line (see www.ibfd.org).
4On inheritance taxes, see Verbeke and Van Zantbeek, ‘Succession Law’, pp. 68–78.
5 See above for exemptions. 6 Successiewet 1956 (Dutch Inheritance Tax Code), art. 24.
u s u f r u c t 35
French law where donations up to a value of EUR 159,325 (2012) per child are tax exempted.7 However, contrary to the position in the Netherlands, there has to be a time lapse of six years between each gift in order to benefit from the exemption. In the case of donations with reservation of a usufruct, the tax exemption is calculated on the value of the nude ownership of the property.8 As usufruct can have a substantial value, donations with reservation of usufruct are often favoured as an estate planning mechanism in France.
These tax benefits do not, however, prevent the goods donated from immediately and irrevocably leaving the estate of the donor, which often militates against his/her objective to keep control over the property and its income. It is precisely this concern that explains the popularity of the ‘reservation of usufruct’ clauses in deeds of donation. The usufruct seems to offer a sound compromise between the desire to transfer goods to the next generation during a person’s lifetime and yet not to lose all control over the property or the income from the property.
Usufruct comes in different forms and shapes which determine the powers and competences of the donor-usufructuary. The more extensive these powers are, the better the compromise between transferring assets (and resultant tax benefits) and maintaining a strong position for the donor. In this chapter, we briefly discuss these different faces of usufruct, an instrument which is often used as a tool in tax and estate planning in some continental jurisdictions.
1.2. Overview
The concept of usufruct is explained in section 2 below. We shall see how the traditional concept of usufruct (referring back to Roman Law) offered rather limited entitlements to the usufructuary in relation to both the issues of control and income (section 3 below). In a more modern approach (section 4 below), but still in line with the ratio legis of the traditional approach, the situation appears to be somewhat ameliorated with regard to the issue of control. This modern face of usufruct was introduced in French and Belgian law through the application of usufruct in new contexts such as shares and stocks, or ‘universalities’ such as an investment portfolio or a commercial enterprise (not incorporated as a company).
In the discussion of the Janus face of usufruct (section 5 below), the usufructuary’s position appears to be quite powerful. Indeed, the
7Code Ge´ne´ral des Impoˆts (General French Tax Code), art. 779.
8Following General French Tax Code, art. 669.
