- •Time-Limited Interests in Land
- •The Common Core of European Private Law
- •Contents
- •General editors’ preface
- •Preface
- •Contributors
- •Abbreviations
- •1 Setting the scene
- •1. The scene
- •2. Balancing the interests: a handful of common problems
- •3. Time-limited interests arising by operation of law
- •2 General introduction
- •1. Overview
- •2. The hybrid character of time-limited interests in land
- •3. The approach and purpose of this study
- •3.1. Background
- •3.2. Drawing a geographical map of the law of Europe
- •4. The genesis of the book
- •4.1. Narrowing down the topic
- •4.2. Terminology
- •5. Structure of the book
- •3 Historical evolution of the maxim ‘sale breaks hire’
- •1. Introduction
- •2. The Roman-law approach
- •3. The ius commune position
- •3.1. Medieval learned law
- •3.2. From medieval learned law to the Prussian Civil Code
- •3.3. From the Prussian Civil Code to the German Civil Code
- •4. Conclusions
- •4 The many faces of usufruct
- •1. Usufruct in tax and estate planning
- •1.1. Transferring assets yet retaining control and income
- •1.2. Overview
- •2. The concept of usufruct
- •3. The traditional face
- •3.1. Control
- •3.2. Income
- •4. The modern face of usufruct
- •4.1. Control
- •4.2. Income
- •5. The Janus face
- •6. The twisted face
- •6.1. Default rules
- •6.2. Contractual expansion
- •6.3. Limits
- •7. Conclusion
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Comparative observations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Case 1
- •Case 2
- •Case 3
- •Case 4
- •Case 5
- •Case 6
- •Case 7
- •Case 8
- •Case 9
- •Case 10
- •Case 11
- •Case 12
- •Belgium
- •Denmark
- •England
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Hungary
- •Italy
- •Poland
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •South Africa
- •Spain
- •Bibliography
- •GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
- •AUSTRIA
- •BELGIUM
- •DENMARK
- •ENGLAND
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •HUNGARY
- •ITALY
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •POLAND
- •PORTUGAL
- •SCOTLAND
- •SOUTH AFRICA
- •SPAIN
- •General index
- •Country index
- •Books in the series
‘ s a l e b r e a k s h i r e ’ |
31 |
4. Conclusions
In his now celebrated work on obligations, Zimmermann identified three reasons for the demise of the Roman-law rule ‘sale breaks hire’ in the history of the ius commune.46 In his view, these reasons were the textual inconsistencies in the Roman law, the force of local customary law as is visible, for example, in Roman-Dutch law of the seventeenth century, and the pervasive influence of secularised natural-law doctrine in the eighteenth century. While these factors undoubtedly played an important role in the history of this maxim, there are a number of additional factors which need to be highlighted. The first of these is the rigidity of the distinction between real and personal rights in Roman law and the Roman jurists’ unwillingness to accept the principle of contracts in favour of third parties. The second important factor is the interplay in the works of medieval jurists between the intellectual ideal of the Roman-law rule and the reality of leases based on feudal custom. It seems plausible that the reason why the medieval jurists were so intent on extending protection to sitting tenants was because of the realities of feudal tenure with which they would have been familiar in daily practice. The development of dominium directum and dominium utile must not be underestimated in this context. The third important factor is the interaction between Germanic custom and the Roman-legal rule and the manner in which the strength of Germanic customs resisted the adoption of it. Although this led to a host of different legal positions, there appears to have been a convergence between the customary and by now ius commune position regarding sitting tenants in the sense that both regimes favoured protecting the sitting tenant against the singularis successor of the landlord. This convergence seems to have been noticed by the supporters of the natural-law doctrine and it therefore comes as little surprise that the drafter of the Prussian Civil Code opted to award the sitting tenant a real right in lease which enabled him to resist the singularis successor. Although there is no direct evidence that the changes in the structure of the law of contract in the ius commune had an impact on this maxim, it is worth pointing out that the mid-seventeenth century also witnessed the abandoning of the closed Roman system of contracts in favour of a general principle of contract based on consent and it is conceivable, though as yet unproven, that this may have influenced juristic perceptions regarding the Roman prohibition
46 Zimmermann, Obligations, pp. 377–80.
32 i n t r o d u c t i o n a n d c o n t e x t
against contracts in favour of third parties. While the real-right construction offered by the Prussian Civil Code was an interesting conceptual leap forward, it was held back by the drafter’s attempt to link the real right with possession. By linking the real-right construction to possession, it is also clear that the drafter of the Prussian Civil Code was not yet prepared fully to entertain the notion of party substitution in contract. The period between the enactment of the Prussian Civil Code at the end of the eighteenth century and the codification of German civil law in 1900 was dominated by differing points of view. On the one hand, the supporters of the Historical School favoured a return to the Roman-law position, while on the other hand, supporters of the Pandectist movement held different opinions. The construction eventually chosen by the drafters of the German Civil Code is a compromise. On the one hand, it was made explicit that a lease would only ever generate a personal right for the tenant, but on the other, the sitting tenant was given a level of protection by permitting the successor singularis to step into the shoes of the former landlord. By playing down the link between the sitting tenant’s protection and possession, this construction has removed many of the infelicities which plagued the Prussian approach. The model rules for a harmonised European private law which to date have only dealt with the lease of movable property, have mimicked the German approach in relation to immovable property almost entirely. Whether these rules truly reflect the rich historical past of this institution in European legal culture is debatable, but at least they resolve some of the historical complexities.
