Akkermans. Concurrece of Ownership and Limited Property Rights

European Review of Private Law 2-2010[259-284] © Kluwer Law International BV | Printed in the Great Britain

Concurrence of Ownership and Limited Property Rights

BRAM AKKERMANS*

Abstract: In Comparative and European Property law, there is a clear need for studies into the fundamental basis of the legal systems in Europe. One part of this fundamental basis is the creation and extinction of property rights.1 One of the most interesting elements of this subject and the reason for this article is the idea of concurrence of the right of ownership and a limited property right burdening that same right of ownership held by the same person. This possibility is not recognized in every legal system. In the discussion on the development of a European property law, this fundamental question and the differing treatments it receives in various European legal systems are very vital. Very interestingly, the argumentation used in German, French, Dutch and English law is very similar but reaches different results. The possibility of holding a property right and ownership over the same object is recognized in German law, but generally not in Dutch, French and English law. Only when the position of third parties is taken into account some convergence between the various approaches to this problem can be reached. The European Commission, when working on property law proposals such as a possible right of Euro-Mortgage, other property security rights, but also in the area of EU consumer law, should therefore take these doctrinal differences and similarities between these four Member States into account.

Résumé: Il existe en droit comparé et en droit européen de la propriété un besoin évident d’approfondir les bases fondamentales des systèmes de droit en Europe. Une partie de cette base fondamentale concerne l’acquisition et l’extinction des droits réels.2

L’un des éléments les plus intéressants sur ce sujet, objet de cet article, est l’idée de concours entre le droit de propriété (right of ownership) et un droit réel limité (limited property right) grevant ce même droit de propriété, détenus par la même personne. Cette possibilité n’est pas reconnue dans tous les systèmes de droit. Dans la discussion sur le développement d’un droit européen de la propriété, cette question fondamentale, ainsi que les différents traitements reçus dans les divers systèmes de droit sont d’une extrême importance. Il est très intéressant de constater que l’argumentation utilisée en droit allemand, français, néerlandais et anglais est très similaire, mais aboutit à des résultats différents. La possibilité de détenir un droit réel (holding a property right) et un droit de propriété

*Assistant Professor European Private Law and Post-Doctoral Fellow Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, the Netherlands. This article is partly a result of the author’s research on a Ph.D. thesis on the principle of numerus clausus in European Property Law and the work on the Ius Commune Casebook Property Law. The author is greatly indebted to Prof. Dr Sjef van Erp, Maastricht University, and Prof. Dr Pierre Crocq, Université Pantéon-Assas (Paris 2), for their valuable advice. Moreover, the author wishes to thank John Alasdair McLeod, University of Edinburgh, for his very valuable remarks and comments on this contribution. The ideas expressed in this paper are, however, the author’s only.

1Throughout this contribution the terms ‘extinction’, ‘ceasing’ or ‘end’ will be used for the extinguishment or termination of property rights.

2Dans le présent article, les termes ‘extinction’, ‘cessation’ et ‘expiration’ seront utilisés pour la cessation ou l’expiration des droits de propriété.

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(ownership) sur le même objet est reconnue en droit allemand, mais généralement pas en droit néerlandais, français et anglais. C’est seulement lors de la prise en compte de la position des tiers que certaines convergences apparaissent entre les différentes approches de ce problème. La Commission européenne, lorsqu’elle travaille sur des propositions concernant le droit de la propriété tel qu’une éventuelle euro-hypothèque, d’autres droits de sûretés, mais aussi le droit européen de la consommation, devrait donc prendre en considération les différences et similitudes doctrinales entre ces quatre États Membres.

Zusammenfassung: Im rechtsvergleichenden und europäischen Sachenrecht besteht ein starkes Forschungsbedürfnis nach den fundamentalen Grundlagen der Rechtssysteme in Europa. Der eine Teil dieser fundamentalen Grundlagen liegt in der Schaffung und Löschung von dinglichen Rechten.3 Eines der interessantesten Elemente dieses Themas und gleichzeitig auch der Grund für diesen Beitrag ist die Frage nach der Konkurrenz zwischen dem Eigentumsrecht und einem beschränkt dinglichen Recht, das das Eigentumsrecht belastet, das durch die gleiche Person ausgeübt wird. Diese Möglichkeit wird nicht in jedem Rechtssystem anerkannt. In dieser Diskussion über die Entwicklung des europäischen Sachenrechts steht diese grundlegende Frage sowie ihre unterschiedliche Behandlung in den einzelnen europäischen Rechtssystemen im Mittelpunkt. Interessanterweise sind die Argumente, die im deutschen, französischen, niederländischen und englischen Recht vorgebracht werden, sehr ähnlich, führen aber zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen. Die Möglichkeit der Begründung eines dinglichen Rechts und dem Eigentum an der gleichen Sache ist im deutschen Recht anerkannt, grundsätzlich aber nicht im niederländischen, französischen und englischen Recht. Nur wenn die Stellung eines Dritten beachtet werden soll, kann eine Annäherung zwischen den unterschiedlichen Lösungsansätzen dieses Problems erreicht werden. Die Europäische Kommission sollte daher bei ihren Arbeiten zu den Vorschlägen zum Sachenrechts, wie zum Beispiel dem möglichen europäischen Hypothekenrecht sowie auch anderen dinglichen Sicherungsrechten, aber auch im Rahmen des europäischen Verbraucherrechts, die Unterschiede als auch die Gemeinsamkeiten in der Doktrin dieser vier Mitgliedstaaten beachten.

1.Introduction

In Comparative and European Property law there is a clear need for study of the fundamental principles of legal systems in Europe.4 Among these are the rules surrounding the creation and extinction of property rights. Although most legal systems in Europe recognize a similar set of property rights, the ways in which these property rights are created and, equally importantly, cease to exist forms one of

3Im Rahmen dieses Beitrags werden die Begriffe Löschung, Wegfall oder Beendigung als Synonyme für das Löschen oder die Auflösung von dinglichen Rechten verwendet.

4See, for example, J.H.M. van Erp, European and National Property Law: Osmosis or Growing Antagonism?, 6 (Walter van Gerven Lecures; Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2006); V. Sagaert, ‘Het goederenrecht als open systeem van verbintenissen? Poging tot een nieuwe kwalificatie van de vermogensrechten’, Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht, 42, no. 3 (2005): 983–1086, 983 ff.; K.G.C. Reid & C.G. van der Merwe, ‘Property Law: Some Themes and Some Variations’, in Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective. Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa, eds Reinhard

Zimmermann, Daniel Visser & Kenneth G.C. Reid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 637–670, 637 ff.; G. Gretton, ‘Ownership and Its Objects’, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (2007), 802–851, 802 ff.

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the areas that have been almost neglected by comparative scholarship. This is to be regretted because in the fundamental doctrinal basis of the property law systems in Europe there are great similarities in the approach that is followed.

One of the most interesting aspects of the creation and extinction of property rights and the reason for this article is the idea of concurrence of the right of ownership and a limited property right created on that same ownership in the same hands.5 This possibility is not recognized in every country. When looked at French, German, Dutch and English law, it is German law that gives rise to this investigation of concurrence of ownership and property rights. The German system, as outlined in the BGB, recognizes what is known in German as Rechte an der eigener Sache or Eigene Rechte. The BGB explicitly deals with the creation and continuance of this special type of property right: paragraph 889 of the BGB states:

Ein Recht an einem fremden Grundstück erlischt nicht dadurch, dass der Eigentümer des Grundstücks das Recht oder der Berechtigte das Eigentum an dem Grundstück erwirbt.6

The idea that ownership and limited property rights may be held concurrently raises fundamental questions of property law. These questions concern technical doctrinal aspects of the law of property, especially in respect of the model of creation and extinction of property rights but also legal-political choices of the legislature concerning the position of third parties.

These aspects centre on the same question: what is the legal nature of a limited property right, how is it created and how does it come to an end? This contribution seeks to explore two theories regarding this question. In general the leading opinion seems to be that a limited property right contains certain powers of the right of ownership that are temporarily in the hands of another person. When ownership and limited property rights are combined, the powers contained in the limited property right return to the owner and the property right ends to exist through a merger with the powers of the right of ownership.

In German legal literature the effect of concurrence of ownership and property rights is known as Konsolidation. However interesting and relevant the subject, it has not received much attention. In the Staudinger Kommentar’s introduction to the law of property, Hans Herman Seiler mentions concurrence as one of the

5In short: concurrence or concurrence of ownership and (limited) property rights. The term concurrence will be used throughout this contribution to describe concurrently held ownership and limited property rights.

6In translation this article would state: A right to another piece of land does not expire when the owner acquires the piece of land or the holder of the right receives the ownership of the same land. Translation taken from the forthcoming Ius Commune Casebook Property Law.

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particular features of German property law.7 However, the exact doctrinal reasoning behind the existence of concurrence is, save a few short remarks, left aside.8 Karl-Heinz Gursky, when dealing with the effects of a concurrence of ownership and limited property rights, states:

Die Frage, wie ein solches Recht an der eigenen Sache juristisch zu konstruieren ist, ist seit jeher umstritten, aber doch wohl nur von theoretischer Bedeutung….

In a recent thesis, Füller examines the exception created by paragraph 889 BGB.9 He explains how paragraph 889 BGB should be seen as an exception to the general rule for extinction of property rights that was adhered to in Roman law.10 As a general rule of property law, Füller explains, German law deviates from the Roman law principle of nulli res sua servit.11

Moreover, Füller states that, although paragraph 889 BGB enables concurrence of ownership and property rights in the same hands, the paragraph does not authorize the creation of property rights by the owner on his own object.12 It is paragraph 1196 BGB that authorizes an owner to create a right of Grundschuld over his own land. Therefore, Füller states, according to the strict letter of the BGB, concurrence of ownership and property rights occurs as a consequence of the falling into the same hands of these rights or by the creation of a right of Grundschuld by an owner.13 At a later stage only, the German courts have extended the possibility of creation of property rights by the owner for the owner himself and not for another person.14 Today, therefore, this type of creation is also recognized for rights of servitude, usufruct and real burdens.15

7J. von Staudinger et al., Drittes Buch – Sachenrecht. Einleitung zum Sachenrecht; §§ 854–882 (J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen; Berlin: Sellier – de Gruyter, 2000), 28–29.

8J. von Staudinger & K.-H. Gursky, Buch 3 Sachenrecht – §§ 883–902 (J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen; Berlin: Sellier – de Gruyter, 2002), 313–314.

9J.T. Füller, Eigenständiges Sachenrecht?, Band 104 (Jus Privatum. Beitrage zum Privatrecht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 468 ff.

10Füller, 2006, 468.

11Füller, 2006, 468. See also G. Knöchlein, Das Recht an der eigenen Sache. Die Eigentümterbriefgrundschuld nach deutschem und österreichischem Recht. Die Rechtsüberlagerung in ihren rechtsgeschichtlichen Grundlagen, ihre Gestaltungsbereiche und Grenzen in einem modernen Rechtssystem. Ein Beitrag zur Fortschreibung eines Eigentümergrundpfandes im österreichischen Zivilrecht. (Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 1991), 59. Whether this is really a deviation, as is also argued in Pandectist literature, depends more on the model of creation of property rights, and therefore the nature of limited property rights, rather than the model of extinction.

12Füller, 2006, 469.

13Füller, 2006, 469–472.

14RGZ 142, 231; BGHZ 41, 209.

15Füller, 2006, 472–479. See also von Staudinger et al., 2000, 28–29.

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An Austrian thesis by Knöchlein deals exclusively with concurrence of ownership and limited property rights in Austrian and German law.16 Knöchlein explains that when a limited property right is created, the holder of that property right is awarded claims to protect his right. These claims are not vis-à-vis the owner, but in particular against third parties. Moreover, these claims follow from the limited property right itself and not from the contents that were derived from the right of ownership.17 When subsequently the limited property right and the right of ownership fall into the same hands, the owner will have claims to protect his right of ownership following from his right of ownership and claims to protect his limited property right following from his limited property right.18 In other words a situation of Doppelwirkung or the existence of concurrent rights to claim protection in the hands of the same person enables the limited property right to remain into existence in a situation of concurrence.19

The application of the doctrine of Konsolidation in German law seems to particularly focus on property security rights in land. When the subject is touched upon at all, it is usually in the context of security rights on land. On closer examination, this is no surprise as both the historical origins of property rights and ownership in the same hands are relating to rights of hypothec on land, especially in Prussian Land Law.20

Under the law of Prussia, which existed before the introduction of the BGB, it was possible to create a limited property right, in particular a right of hypothec, that would continue to exist once it returned to the owner, enabling the owner to use the same right again for another transaction.21

The Motive, the explanation of the first draft of the BGB, after recalling the economic importance of the possibility of holding a right of hypothec and ownership at the same time, mention, when discussing paragraph 889 BGB, which was paragraph 835 in the first draft:

Wie das in dem § 835 anerkannte recht an der eigenen Sache juristisch zu konstruiren ist, entzieht sich der Bestimmung durch das Gesetz. Die Konstruktion ist

16Knöchlein, 1991, 213–237.

17Knöchlein states that with that the limited property right becomes subjektübergeordnet. Knöchlein, 1991, 213.

18Knöchlein, 1991, 213, 227–228.

19In other words, there is no effect of Konsolidation. I owe gratitude to my colleague Dr Nicole Kornet for the suggestion of the use of the term concurrent claims. On doppelwirkung see T. Kipp, ‘Über Doppelwirkungen im Recht’, Festschrift der Berliner Juristischen Fakultät für Ferdinand von Martitz zum fünfzigjährigen Doktorjubiläum am 24. Juli 1911 (Berlin: Verlag von Otto Liebmann, 1911), 211–233, 211 ff.

20See Knöchlein, 1991, 37–39.

21Specifically under the Prussian ALR, see Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbu-

ches für das Deutsche Reich – Sachenrecht, III (Berlin: Verlag von J. Guttentag, 1888), 203–204; M. Wolff & L. Raiser, Sachenrecht. Ein Lehrbuch, 10th edn (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1957), 128–129, 592–593.

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Aufgabe der Wissenschaft. Nur das mag hier hervorgehoben werden, daß der oft gehörte Einwurf gegen die Eigenthümerhypothek, der Eigenthümer könne ein besonderes Recht an der Sache nicht haben, weil das Eigenthum bereits alle mit der begrenzten Rechten verbundenen Vortheile gewähre, nicht zutreffend ist. Die bisherigen Erörterungen ergeben, daß der Eigenthümer, wenn das Grundstück veräußert wird, das an demselben ihm zustehende Recht vollinhaltlich ausüben und, wenn er das Eigenthum behält, zu Gunsten eines Dritten verfügen kann, - beides Vortheile, deren reeller Werth sich nicht bestreiten läßt.22

Now that the German legislature, in particular in the person of the drafter of the part on property law Johow, embraced the idea of concurrence of ownership and limited property rights in respect to land, the Motive continue to bring further advantages to support the decision. Where a third party holds another right over the limited property right, and the limited property right would be ended when the property right ceased because of merger with the right of ownership, the drafters of the BGB considered it that the right of the third party would also cease to exist.23

Especially because of this effect, the range of property rights that may, under paragraph 889 BGB, be held concurrently extends beyond proprietary securities to cover all limited property rights. Additionally, a specific paragraph, 1196 BGB, was added concerning the right of Grundschuld, that is the non-accessory property security right on land:

(1)Eine Grundschuld kann auch für den Eigentümer bestellt werden.

(2)Zu der Bestellung ist die Erklärung des Eigentümers gegenüber dem Grundbuchamt, dass die Grundschuld für ihn in das Grundbuch eingetragen werden soll, und die Eintragung erforderlich; die Vorschrift des § 878 findet Anwendung.

(3)Ein Anspruch auf Löschung der Grundschuld nach § 1179a oder § 1179b besteht nur wegen solcher Vereinigungen der Grundschuld mit dem Eigentum in einer Person, die eintreten, nachdem die Grundschuld einem anderen als dem Eigentümer zugestanden hat.

This contribution will seek to discover some of the doctrinal foundations of the concurrence of ownership and property rights. Moreover it will compare some of the reasoning of the German legislature with that of other civil law legislatures, in particular France and the Netherlands. Finally, also some remarks regarding English law will be made. In order to understand the subject of concurrence, the model of

22 Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das Deutsche Reich – Sachenrecht, III

(Berlin: Verlag von J. Guttentag, 1888), 205.

23 Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das Deutsche Reich – Sachenrecht, III

(Berlin: Verlag von J. Guttentag, 1888), 201–205.

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creation of property rights must first be examined. Closely connected to the creation is the extinction of property rights, which will also be dealt with. After these two elements, the subject of concurrence can be returned to.

2.Models to Create Limited Property Rights

2.1French Law

In property law theory there are two models with which a limited property right can be created. The theory of these models dates from the aftermath of the French Revolution and should be considered in connection to the abolition of the feudal duplex dominium that applied at the time before the Revolution.24

The abolition of the feudal system in France led to a return to the Roman law inspired unitary concept of ownership.25 The French Code civil therefore describes the right of ownership as the right to use and enjoy an object in the most absolute manner (de la manière la plus absolue). With these words, the French legislature sought to clarify that the right of ownership was the only right of such importance and therefore implied that the drafters rejected the feudal system.26

At the same time the right of ownership was further defined with a threefold division derived from the Glossators.27 The right of ownership in French law comprises the rights of to use, usus, the right to enjoy, particularly the fruits, fructus, and the right to dispose, abusus.28 The right to dispose includes the owner’s ability

24Decree of 11 Aug. 1989 Abolishing the Feudal System. On duplex dominium see inter alia P. Birks, ‘The Roman Law Concept of Dominium and the Idea of Absolute Ownership’, Acta Juridica (1985), 1–27, 1 ff.; A.J. van der Walt & D.G. Kleyn, ‘Duplex Dominium: The History and Significance of the Concept of Divided Ownership’, in Essays on the History of Law, ed. D.P. Visser (Cape Town: Juta & Co, 1989), 213–260, 213 ff.; D. Heirbaut, ‘Feudal Law: The Real Ius Commune of Property in Europe, or: Should We Reintroduce Duplex Dominium’, European Review of Private Law 3 (2003): 301–320, 301 ff.

25See R. Libchaber, ‘La recodification du droit des biens’, Le Code civil 1804–2004; Livre du Bicentenaire (Paris: Dalloz & Lexis Nexis Litec, 2004), 297–372, 305; P. Crocq, Propriété et garantie (Bibliothèque de droit privé – Tome 248 (Paris: Librarie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence (L.G.D.J.), 1995), 64 ff.

26See T. Huc, Commentaire théorique & practique du Code Civil, 4. (Paris: Librarie Cotillon, 1893), 96–97;

P.Jourdain, G. Marty & P. Raynaud, Les biens (Paris: Dalloz, 1995), 46; A.M. Patault, ‘La propriété non exclusive au XIXe siècle: histoire de la dissociation juridique de l’immeuble’, Revue historique de droit français et étranger (1983), 217–237, 220–221. On the absolute nature of the right of ownership in French law, see inter alia F. Terré & P. Simler, Droit civil – Les biens, 5th edn (Paris: Dalloz, 1998), 65; P. Malaurie & L. Aynès, Les biens, 2nd edn (Droit civil; Paris: Defrénois, 2005), 109 ff.

27See M. de Vareilles-Sommières, ‘La définition et la notion juridique de la propriété’. Revue trimestrielle de droit civil (RTD) 4 (1905), 443–495, 448 ff.; Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud, 1995, 46.

28C. Demolombe, Traité de la distinction des biens; de la propriéte; de l’usufruit de l’usage et de l’habitation; tome premier, 4th edn (Paris: Auguste Durand & L. Hachette et Cie, 1870), n. 543, 462; Jourdain, Marty & Raynaud, 1995, 47; Terré & Simler, 1998, 93–98; Malaurie & Aynès, 2005, 119–121;

J.Carbonnier, Droit Civil 3/Les biens : Monnaie, immeubles, meubles, 19th edn (Thémis; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), 2000), 128–131; F. Chabas, Biens: Droit de propriété et ses démembrements, Tome 2, 8th edn (Leçons de droit civil; Paris: Montchrestien, 1994), 84–85.

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to separate parts, corresponding to these three elements, of his ownership and grant them to another person in the form of a property right other than ownership, for example, a right of usufruct that includes the right to use and to take the fruits of an object.29

Under this model, known as démembrement, which translates best into English as subtraction, one, or a combination of these parts of the right of ownership, can be transferred to another person.30 However, as a result of the abolition of the pre-revolutionary concept of fragmented ownership, these subtracted elements were conceptualized as something other than ownership, as iura in re aliena.31 Therefore, there cannot be two persons at the same time, sharing rights contained in the right of ownership who both have a right of ownership itself. Usually, a right of ownership that has been burdened with a limited property right is referred to as bare ownership to signify that some of the rights contained in it have been transferred to another person in the form of a property right other than ownership.32 However, even bare ownership is ownership and entitles its holder to the full set of rights at the end of the life of the limited property right.33

With this systematic approach to the creation of limited property rights the post-Revolutionary legislature expressed its rejection of the feudal system and the fragmented ownership that it entailed.

2.2 German Law

The model of démembrement was also followed by other civil codes that were made around the same time as the French Code civil. However, when 100 years later, the German legislative commission considered the right of ownership and its relation towards property rights other than ownership, the opinion of scholarship had changed. The Historical School had returned to the study of Roman law and rejected interpretations and choices that were made at the time of the French Revolution.

29Article 543 C.civ.

30Another term to be used could be dismemberment, but due to the connotation of the word with disembodyment this author does not prefer it. On the use of the term subtraction, see also T.H.D.

Struycken, De numerus clausus in het goederenrecht (Diss.) (Serie Onderneming en Recht; Deventer: Kluwer, 2007), 361–363.

31However, iura in re aliena did exist also before the abolition of the feudal system, but can be considered to have received a different function in the system of property law after the abolition and reinstatement of a unitary concept of ownership. R. Libchaber, ‘La recodification du droit des biens’, Le Code Civil 1804–2004; Livre du Bicentenaire (Paris: Dalloz & Lexis Nexis Litec, 2004), 297–372, 357.

32However, the term bare ownership is usually reserved for the right of ownership that remains after a right of usufruct is created, the term describes an effect that is no different from the situation when another limited property right is created.

33In Honoré’s definition of ownership this is the residuary character of ownership. See A. M. Honoré, ‘Ownership’, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, ed. A.G. Guest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 107–147, 126–128.

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One example was the emphasis that was made on the Roman nature of the distinction between the law of obligations and the law of property.34

The system that was developed as a first proposal for a German Civil Code clearly reacted against other codifications of private law, especially those civil codes in which the distinction between contract law and property law was not as clear.35 According to the Historical School, these included the French Code civil and the Prussian ALR.36

Like their French counterparts, German scholars considered the right of ownership as a unitary right. However, and herein lies a difference between their approach and the French one, because the right of ownership is seen as the paramount entitlement to a corporeal object, ownership was seen as an indivisible power over an object.37 It was held that the right of ownership could therefore not be explained as the sum of certain rights or powers, let alone separated into more than one type of ownership. According to this line of reasoning, separation of rights or powers contained in the right of ownership would deprive the right of ownership of its primary characteristic. In order to solve this, German doctrine follows the reasoning that the creation of a property right will not deprive the right of ownership of its characteristics; the transfer of certain powers of the owner will not make the other party owner. Instead, the other person will hold a property right as a ius in re aliena. Ownership will remains intact, even if another property right is created.

With this approach the German legislative commission had created a problem regarding the relation between the right of ownership and limited property rights. Johow (the drafter of the property law part of the Civil Code) stated, in considering the second and final draft of the Civil Code:

(…)Das Verfügungsrecht des Eigenthümers findet seine natürliche Begrenzung durch den Begriff des Eigenthums. Dieser Begriff ist durch das objektive Recht gegeben und der Bestimmung durch Privatwillkür entrückt. Der Eigenthümer kann allerdings an sich mit die Sache machen, was er will, er kann dieselbe namentlich

34Von Savigny stated: ‘Das Römische Recht hält beide [the law of property and the law of obligations. BA] streng aus einander, und behandelt jeden Theil für sich als ganz unabhängig innerhalb seiner Gränzen’, F.K. von Savigny, System des heutigen römischien Rechts, 1 (Aalen: Scienta Verlag, 1981), 374. See also R. Liebs, ‘Die unbeschänkbare Verfügungsbefugnis’, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, 175/1–2 (1975), 1–43, at 13, Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das Deutsche Reich – Sachenrecht, III (Berlin: Verlag von J. Guttentag, 1888), 2–3.

35See explicitly Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das Deutsche Reich – Sachenrecht, III (Berlin: Verlag von J. Guttentag, 1888), 3.

36Also the Austrian ABGB was included in the criticism.W.J. Zwalve, Hoofdstukken uit de Geschiedenis van het Europese Privaatrecht, 2nd edn (Deventer: Kluwer, 2003), 46.

37W. Wiegand, ‘Die Entwicklung des Sachenrechts’, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, 190. Band (1990), 112–138, 117; E.B. Rank-Berenschot, Over de scheidslijn tussen goederen – en verbintenissenrecht (Diss.) (Deventer: Kluwer, 1992), 243.

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auch aus seinem Vermögen ausscheiden und also das Eigenthum aufgeben. Aber er kann nicht die Sache in seinem Vermögen behalten und gleichzeitig sein Eigenthum durch willkürliche Abtrennung einzelner Befugnisse, welche dasselbe verleiht, abschwächen. Dürfte er dies, so läge es in seiner Hand, das Eigenthum an einer bestimmten Sache in ein Recht umzuformen, welches die Rechtsordnung nicht mehr als Eigenthum gelten lassen könnte. Damit aber wäre der Eigenthumsbegriff selbst verflüchtigt. (…) Als unhaltbar ist wohl jetzt allgemein erkannt die von einigen Schriftstellern, z.B. Puchta, Pand. §. 145, aufgestellte Ansicht, dass die dinglichen Rechte aus dem Eigenthum herausgenommene Befugnisse seien. Das Eigenthum ist ein untheilbares Recht, welches zwar eine Reihe von Befugnissen gewährt, aber nicht aus solchen sich zusammenfasst. Der Eigenthümer ist mithin gar nicht in der Lage, ein solche Befugniss aus seinem Rechte herauszunehmen und auf einen Anderen zu übertragen. Das dingliche Recht, welches er bestellt, besteht auch nicht in einer Beschränkung des Eigenthums; es ist einfach ein Recht des Nichteigenthümers an der Sache, welches die Herrschaft des Eigenthümers über deselbe beschränkt. Mit dem Erlöschen dieses Rechts erlischt zugleich die Beschränkung. Das Eigenthum konsolidiert sich wieder, ohne dass es einer Rückerwerbung der dem Berechtigten zugestandenen Befugnis seitens des Eigenthümers bedürfte.38

In Johow’s view, a limited property right does not comprise parts of the right of ownership in hands of another person. Instead, a limited property rights comprises powers that limit the right of ownership. In Johow’s view these powers need not be ‘cut’ from the right of ownership, which would lead to a result incompatible with the right of ownership in the German Civil Code. Johow was not alone in taking this approach. Windscheid, for example, states in respect to rights of servitude:

Ich muss mich auch gegen diese Auffassung erklären. So wenig wie die Dienstbarkeiten nach ihrer Begründung Eigenthumsbestandtheile sind, so wenig sind sie aus Eigenthumsbestandtheilen gebildet.39

It seems, in other words, that both Johow and Windscheid reject démembrement as an explanation for the creation of limited property rights. Instead, these authors propose an alternative conception of the creation of limited property rights. They suggest a system of limitations, under which the content of property rights may be modelled on the content of the right of ownership, but the right of ownership

38R. Johow (ed.), Sachenrecht, Teil 1 Allgemeine Bestummungen, Besitz und Eigentum (Die Vorlagen der Redaktoren für die erste Kommission zur Ausarbeitung des Entwurfs eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1982; Reprint of the original manuscript from 1876 to 1888 editions), Begründung, 126, 127.

39B. Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 1. Band, 4th edn (Düsseldorf: Verlagshandlung von Julius Buddeus, 1875), 634.

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