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102

 

The implied conditions in sale of goods contracts

 

 

 

 

 

a risk of injury to users of the product. Equally, goods may be unsafe because

 

 

of a lack of appropriate instructions for use. Of course, any claim under sec-

 

 

tion 14(2) based upon the safety of the item must be brought by the buyer as

 

 

the only person with contractual privity. If someone other than the buyer has

 

 

been injured by the unsafe and unsatisfactory goods, their claim must be made

 

 

through product liability or negligence, as relevant.

 

 

In addition, unsafe goods may, of course, breach criminal law controls.

 

 

It is an offence contrary to the General Product Safety Regulations 2005 (SI

 

 

2005/1803) for a producer to place a product on the market unless the product

 

 

is a safe product, or to offer or agree to place a product on the market or expose

 

 

or possess a product for placement on the market unless it is a safe product.105

 

 

Further, distributors of the product, which would include retailers, can be held

 

 

criminally liable for a similar range of offences.106 While it is possible for civil

 

compensation to result from the breach of a criminal offence, the position of

 

the buyer vis-à-vis the unsatisfactory nature of unsafe goods has been strength-

 

ened considerably by the inclusion of safety as a factor to be considered under

 

section 14(2B).

 

 

(v)â Durability

 

 

It seems reasonable to expect goods to last for a reasonable period, as discussed

 

 

by Lord Diplock in Lambert v. Lewis,107 where he suggested that goods should

 

 

remain fit for their purpose ‘for a reasonable time after delivery’. What that rea-

 

 

sonable period is will, naturally, depend to some extent on the product con-

 

 

cerned. A car should last longer than a perishable foodstuff. Equally, whether

 

 

the product is new or second-hand will play a part, as will the price paid, with

 

 

the corresponding expectation of value for money as regards the quality and the

 

 

anticipated life of the product. The presumption in section 48A(3) of the 1979

 

 

Act that goods that prove defective within the first six months following deliv-

 

 

ery are assumed not to have complied with the contract at the time that it was

 

 

made may also aid the consumer buyer questioning durability, but again issues

 

 

such as the nature of the product will be relevant.

 

 

Q8 Consider how the introduction of the five factors in section 14(2B) will

 

 

help the court in assessing whether goods supplied under a contract satisfy the

 

 

requirement of ‘satisfactory quality’.

6â Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 14(3): fitness for purpose

The fitness of goods for their common purpose has already been considered as part of satisfactory quality but there remains the issue of liability for the ‘particular purposes’ to which goods may be put. Liability will arise under section 14(3)

105General Product Safety Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/1803), reg. 5.

106Ibid. reg. 9.â 107â [1981] 1 All ER 1185.

103

6â Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 14(3): fitness for purpose

 

 

 

 

of the 1979 Act for any particular purpose for which the goods are being bought,

 

irrespective of whether it is a common purpose, as long as the buyer has made

 

that purpose known to the seller either expressly or impliedly. If goods have

 

only one common purpose, then that will be deemed to be a particular purpose

 

for the purposes of section 14(3), as evidenced in Priest v. Last108 concerningÂ

a

 

hot water bottle and Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills109 regarding underwear.

 

Where goods are multipurpose, the seller must be able to demonstrate that the

 

goods are fit for one of those purposes110 but would not be liable under section

 

14(3) if they were not fit for one of those various purposes, unless the buyer had

 

made clear that that particular purpose was the one for which the goods were

 

being acquired.

 

 

 

Particular purpose is wide enough to take into account particular spe-

 

cial needs or idiosyncrasies that might affect the buyer, hence the decision in

 

Griffiths v. Peter Conway,111 where the seller was held not liable for the buyer

 

suffering dermatitis after wearing a Harris Tweed coat when it was shown that

 

the buyer had unusually sensitive skin and that a normal user would not have

 

suffered any ill-effect from wearing the coat. Had the buyer informed the seller

 

of her particular needs, the result might have been different. In this example, of

 

course, the buyer knew her particular needs while the seller did not, but would

 

it be reasonable to hold the seller liable where neither buyer nor seller knew of

 

the pertinent facts? The House of Lords in Slater v. Finning Ltd112 was firmly of

 

the view that no liability would follow in that situation. The defendant, a marine

 

engineer, installed a new camshaft in a fishing boat belonging to the plaintiff.

 

The camshaft failed due to an abnormality in the engine of the boat about which

 

neither party knew. The House of Lords held that it would be unreasonable to

 

hold the seller liable in those circumstances.

 

 

 

Assuming that a particular purpose has been identified to the seller, two

 

further issues arise: the need for reliance to be shown and that the goods sup-

 

plied were not reasonably fit for that purpose. The current version of the Sale of

 

Goods Act 1979 places the burden on the seller to demonstrate either that there

 

was no reliance or that such reliance was unreasonable, a reversal of the burden

 

of proof from the 1893 Act in which the responsibility lay on the buyer to dem-

 

onstrate that reliance had taken place.113 A general assumption of reliance may

 

arise from the fact that a buyer has chosen to purchase the goods from the seller

 

in question, the argument being that the buyer is relying on the seller to have

 

selected his stock carefully.114

 

 

 

However, what if the buyer knew that the seller only sold goods of one

 

brand or, alternatively, that while the seller might sell goods produced by vari-

 

ous manufacturers, the buyer specified goods by brand name for his purchase?

 

108â [1903] 2 KB 148.â 109â [1936] AC 85.

 

 

110

Ashington Piggeries v. Christopher Hill [1972] AC 441.

 

 

111

[1939] 1All ER 685, CA.â 112â [1996] 3 All ER 398.

 

 

113

Sale of Goods Act 1893, s.14(1).

 

 

114

Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, above n. 109.

 

104 The implied conditions in sale of goods contracts

There is a strong argument here for saying that there has not been any reliance upon the seller but rather a reliance upon the reputation and publicity of the manufacturer. Thus, in Wren v. Holt,115 the court failed to find reliance when the buyer purchased beer from a tied house. Of course, the reversal of the burden of proof might now mean that reliance would be assumed on the basis of Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills (above), with the burden falling on the seller to demonstrate a lack of reliance. Further, it is clear, following the decision in Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd v. Manganese Bronze & Brass Co. Ltd,116 that reliance might be partial in that none exists in respect of any specifications for the product laid down by the buyer, but that reliance will be presumed in respect of other aspects of the goods unless the seller demonstrated that even partial reliance did not occur or would have been unreasonable. In that case, the seller was to provide two propellers for two ships. The buyer laid down certain specifications regarding the design but other factors, including the thickness of the blades, were not covered by the specifications. In the event, the propellers were not fit for the purpose because they were not thick enough. The House of Lords held that the seller was liable for any factors not governed by the specifications as, in respect of those, the buyer was relying on the seller’s skill and judgement.

As for the suitability of the goods themselves, section 14(3) requires that they are reasonably fit for the intended purpose. This does not provide an absolute guarantee of suitability and factors similar to those considered when assessing satisfactory quality come into play. Hence, things such as age, price and durability must be considered when evaluating fitness for purpose as one cannot reasonably expect second-hand goods to perform as well as new ones and cheaper goods may not last as long as more expensive ones. That said, there is authority that the seller will be held liable in respect of latent defects that render the goods not fit for the purpose even though it may be that the seller could not have discovered the defect even with the exercise of care and skill. Thus, in Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Co. Ltd,117 the seller of milk infected with typhoid was held liable despite the defect being unknowable, a strict approach supported in Kendall v. Lillico.118 This approach is to be expected given that the section imposes strict liability and not liability based on care and skill. A different approach to the unknowable defect occurs in tort where, under product liability, the producer of defective products will escape liability using the state of the art defence if the defect was unknowable given the state of scientific and technical knowledge available at the relevant time.119

Q9 Analyse the relationship between section 14(2) and (3) as regards liability for the fitness for purpose of goods supplied under a contract. Further, consider the role of reliance in liability under section 14(3).

115

[1903] 1 KB 610.â

116â [1934] AC 402.

117

[1905] 1 KB 608.â

118â [1969] 2 AC 31.

119

Consumer Protection Act 1987, s.4.

105

7â Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 15: sale by sample

 

 

7â Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 15: sale by sample

The last of the implied conditions relates to a sale by sample, which is defined in section 15(1) as occurring where the contract provides either expressly or impliedly that it is a contract for sale by sample. The mere fact that a sample is provided for the buyer to see will not necessarily mean that the contract is one by sample. In the much quoted dicta of Lord Macnaughten in Drummond v.

Van Ingen:120

The office of a sample is to present to the eye the real meaning and intention of the parties with regard to the subject matter of the contract which, owing to the imperfections of language, it may be difficult or impossible to express in words. The sample speaks for itself.121

It has been suggested that sales by sample only occur in the business context but Professor Macleod argues122 that consumers often buy after inspecting a demonstration model and will expect the specific item that they finally receive under the contract to comply with the demonstration model. This approach is more in line with section 11 of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 and sections 5 and 10 of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, which refer to relevant contracts being ‘by reference to a standard’, arguably a less demanding provision than that of section 15.

Provisions about sales by sample are scattered throughout the 1979 Act. The primary section 15(2) provides for two conditions, the previous requirement of section 15(2)(b) having been moved to become section 14(2C)(c) in 1994. What remains are the requirements that the bulk of the goods will comply with the sample123 and that the goods will be free from any defect which would render them unsatisfactory which would not be apparent upon a reasonable examination of the goods.124 The requirement for the bulk compliance with the sample does not, of itself, make any statement as to the quality of the goods and it may be that the bulk, and indeed the sample, have an inherent defect that would not have been apparent on examination of the sample without breaching this requirement. As explained previously, by virtue of section 14(2C) there is no liability for defects that would have been apparent on a reasonable examination irrespective of whether one actually takes place. Section 35(2)(b) of the 1979 Act further protects the buyer by providing that, in a contract for sale by sample, the buyer will not be deemed to have accepted the goods until he has had a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods to establish that the bulk complies with the sample.125 Section 15(2)(c) merely affirms the protection regarding latent defects.

120

(1887) 12 App. Cas. 284.â 121â Ibid. 297.

122

Macleod, above n. 80.â 123â Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.15(2)(a).

124Ibid. s.15(2)(c).

125Until 1994, the right to a reasonable opportunity to compare the bulk with the sample was to be found in Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.15(2)(b).