Кондратева А wаы то суццессфул реадинг цомпрехенсион 2011

http://89.151.116.67/info/inf103.html

Ex.1

1.What is the share of low-level and intermediate-level waste in the total amount of radioactive waste produced globally?___ (1)

2.What kind of waste is stored in the repository located in New Mexico? ___(1)

3.What is the key factor in achieving maximum safety in the transport of nuclear waste? __(2)

4.In what circumstances does plutonium become extremely dangerous for living organisms?___(3)

5.How long does it take for high-level wastes to scale down to the level of radiation intrinsic for uranium ore? ___(5)

6.What is the level of acceptable exposure to radiation for professionals working in this field? ___(7)

7.What is the share of the cost of the spent fuel disposal in the total cost of electricity production from a nuclear power plant? ___(8)

8.What considerations make the idea of disposal of waste into space extremely impractical? ___(9)

9.What technical problems restrict a successful use of transmutation for waste management? ___(10)

Ex.2

Work in pairs. Interview your partner to find out what he or she thinks about the statements below. Use the expressions given in units 4 and 5.

1.Disposal solutions being developed for HLW are safe, environmentally sound and publicly acceptable. (1)

2.Nuclear power stations do not cause any pollution. (1)

3.The fuel for nuclear power is virtually unlimited. (1)

4.The safety record of nuclear energy is better than for any major industrial technology. (1)

5.Transportations of nuclear materials cannot be referred to as ‘mobile Chernobyls’. (2)

6.Comparisons between toxic substances are not straightforward. Toxins such as ricin and some snake venoms and cyanide are signifi-

cantly more toxic. (3)

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7.Most high-level wastes are held as stable ceramic solids or in vitrified form (glass) making them very difficult to disperse by terrorist action, so that the threat from so-called ‘dirty bombs’ is not high. (4)

8.Most nuclear wastes are hazardous for only a few tens of years. (5)

9.A stable geological formation, within which the waste will be disposed, constitutes a highly reliable barrier. (6)

10.Radiation emitted from manmade radionuclides is exactly the same form as radiation emitted from naturally-occurring radioactive materials. (7)

11.The costs of waste management do not drastically increase the price of electricity. (8)

12.It is too expensive and dangerous to dispose the waste into space.

(9)

13.Transmutation is not feasible for all of the wastes produced in the past or to be produced. (10)

4 Read about the invention of the World Wide Web (WWW) at

http://public.web.cern.ch/Public/en/About/Web-en.html

Ex.1

Read the texts and complete the grid below with information about the history of the WWW.

Ex.2

How the web works

PART IV

GRAMMAR REVISION

Infinitive

1. Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed that it was essential and urgent to bring nuclear energy under effective international control and to ensure that it would be used for peaceful purposes only.

2. Unlike conventional explosives, poison gases or bacteria, the physical characteristics of nuclear materials make them relatively easy to detect and measure.

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3.This scheme was far too visionary to survive the shocks of the Cold War, and by the end of the 1940s it was tacitly abandoned.

4.The expectations proved to be incorrect, and in practice the IAEA has never handled or exercised direct control.

5.The nuclear co-operation agreements that the USA concluded in the 1950s and 1960s usually provided that the safeguards to be applied by the USA would in due course be turned over to the IAEA.

6.It was clear that the 1961 system would prove to be inadequate.

7.For each country the decision whether or not to join the NPT was and has remained optional, but the pressure on non-nuclear-weapon States to do so began to mount.

8.Since the first edition of this book many of the expectations have been shown to be unrealistic.

9.But the most important conclusion to be drawn from the IAEA’s experience in Iraq was that even the most rigorous accounting for nuclear material would not ensure the detection of a clandestine nuclear programme.

10.The Board confirmed SAGSI’s view concerning the assurance to be provided by safeguards.

Participles and ing-Noun

1.The IAEA ran into some problems in applying comprehensive safeguards in Korea (the DPRK).

2.In 1946 the USA launched the first comprehensive scheme to outlaw nuclear weapons by proposing to bring atomic energy under the management and ownership of the UN.

3.For instance, South Africa supplied uranium concentrates to the UK, France and Israel without requiring IAEA safeguards.

4.Hence, France could become a nuclear weapon State without violating the Treaty of Rome.

5.In practice, accounting for nuclear material in declared nuclear operations thus became the main task of IAEA safeguards.

6.A significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions seems unlikely, given our continued heavy reliance on fossil fuel.

7.Nuclear can provide the energy to do it without causing pollution or greenhouse gas emissions.

8.By using one fossil fuel to obtain another there are even more greenhouse gas emissions than from burning conventional oil supplies.

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9.Dr.Blix also stressed that it would be necessary for the IAEA to have the backing of the Security Council if the State concerned obstructed the effective application of safeguards.

10.The high burnup spent fuel produced by these two plants would yield a mixture of plutonium isotopes that has not been used as the source of nuclear explosives for a nuclear arsenal.

11.In April 1993 SAGSI (the group of senior safeguards experts that advises the IAEA on the implementation of safeguards) recommended that safeguards should provide assurance that there were no undeclared nuclear activities in States having comprehensive agreements.

12.This was dubbed the Programme 93+2 – 1993 being the year the programme was formally launched and the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference being the target date for completion of the programme.

13.The measures foreseen in Part I (which could be applied relatively quickly) consisted mostly of obtaining additional or earlier information from States, for instance about facilities that had been closed down or about those that were still at the planning stage, of collecting socalled ‘environmental samples’ at locations to which inspectors already had the right of access, and of using advanced technology for the remote monitoring of movements of nuclear material.

14.From March 1995 until April 1997, the Board, the Secretariat and a special committee set up by the Board drew up the text of the new legal ‘instrument’ that would authorize the IAEA to implement Part II.

15.In early 1998 the IAEA embarked on a project aimed at assessing the relative effectiveness of the new measures in comparison with the IAEA’s traditional verification activities.

16.By demonstrating that effective verification was feasible and did not impair military security, the IAEA encouraged reluctant nuclear weapon States to accept on-site inspection by each other and later by international officials.

Modal Verbs and Subjunctive Mood

1.It was already clear that “a nuclear arms race… would be a universal concern…” and not only a mortal danger to the few countries that might have or might soon acquire nuclear weapons.

2.The loose pre-war framework of international obligations would have been quite inadequate to constrain this new force. (nuclear Armageddon)

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3.The consequences of a breach of pre-war treaties were often severe, but they were of different order from those that might follow the uncontrolled spread of nuclear technology or breaches of nuclear agreements.

4.In practice, the first applications of safeguards resulted from more limited and prosaic, but nonetheless valid concerns - unless it was strictly monitored, international nuclear trade could lead to nuclear proliferation.

5.It should be stressed that since the early 1960s the improvement of safeguards has been a dynamic and continuous process.

6.The Statute required that IAEA safeguards be applied to nuclear plant and material furnished by the IAEA.

7.At that time the concepts of short notice and unannounced inspections, now increasingly important features of IAEA safeguards, would have been regarded as inadmissible infraction of national sovereignty.

8.The flow of nuclear material was to be monitored at certain “strategic points” within the nuclear plant and routine inspection access would be confined to these points.

9.If other countries had followed France’s path, there wouldn’t be as much of a climate change issue around power production as there is today.

10.A conversion to hydrogen would not only solve greenhouse gas and pollution concerns, it would have considerable geo-political implications regarding energy security.

11.In due course it was decided that, to make progress as rapidly as possible, the recommendation made by Programme 93+2 should be presented to the Board in two steps.

12.Better use was also to be made of national systems of accounting and control. This would lead to a more cost efficient operation and enable the IAEA to reduce its routine inspections at certain standad types of plant.

13.At the end of the 1960s, France proclaimed that it would not ratify the NTP but would behave as though it were a party to the Treaty.

Emphatic Constructions

1.At that time it seemed to many that if any additional States did acquire nuclear weapons those most likely to do so would be leading industrialized non-nuclear-weapon States. It was here that the nuclear indus-

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try was already well established and growing rapidly, thus providing the technical infrastructure that would be needed for a nuclear weapon programme.

2. That is where I believe discussion and public debate on the question needs to begin and remain based.

Other difficulties

1.The review also took account of recent advances in safeguards technology.

2.Accordingly this booklet opens with a brief historical outline of this evolution. This is followed by a discussion of the aims of IAEA safeguards.

3.Today, safeguards are beginning to serve as a means to further nuclear disarmament indirectly.

4.The inspector had to enter, travel in and leave the country at points and on routes designated by the government concerned.

5.The arrangements for safeguarding the reactor fuel and the reactor itself were set out in an ad hoc exchange of letters.

6.It was assumed that if such plants were built they would be detected by means other than IAEA safeguards.

7.Under present scenarios, even with aggressive growth in renewable technologies, coal and natural gas consumption will continue to increase rather than decrease.

8.In the late 1980s and in the 1990s, new technologies became available enabling the IAEA to detect even minute trace indicators of various types of nuclear activities.

9.National authorities had to modify the procedures and to help their nuclear industry to meet the requirements of INFCIRC/540.

10.This is often referred to as universality.

Tests

Translate the texts either orally, or in writing. 1.

Safeguards have gone through three major phases. The first began in the late 1950s as nations started to trade in nuclear plants and fuel. The safeguards of that time were designed chiefly to ensure that this trade did not lead to the spread of nuclear weapons.

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The second phase reflected a growing perception that, “pending nuclear disarmament and nuclear weapon served with fewer rather than more nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon States”. This found expression in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which “…shut the doors of the nuclear club” by confining nuclear weapons to the five nations that possessed them at that time. The tool to be used for this purpose was to apply safeguards on all the nuclear material in the States that had not acquired nuclear weapons and to keep a rigorous account of such material. The safeguards system to be applied by IAEA was approved by the IAEA’s Board of Governors in 1971. The States that had already acquired nuclear weapons undertook, in the N PT, to pursue in good faith the goal of eliminating them in due course, without, however, setting any timetable for this process.

The third and most recent phase has consisted of a far-reaching review designed to remedy shortcomings that had come to light in the 1971 system.

2.

The IAEA’s inspectors must, for instance, have right of access, not only in those plants using nuclear material that was already under safeguards, but also in any plant relevant to the national nuclear programme even if it did not contain nuclear material, and in any plant at a nuclear site whether or not it was declared to be engaged in nuclear activities. Examples of the latter would be plants that manufactured the components of a nuclear facility such as centrifuges for enriching uranium or that produced ‘non-nuclear material’ such as heavy water.

3.

An often asked question is why the IAEA does not concentrate its safeguards on countries whose intentions are regarded as suspect. It is, however, both constitutionally and politically impossible for an international organization to make a judgment of this type about a Member State unless the State has openly violated its international obligations and has been found delinquent by the Board of Governors. Nonetheless, the refocusing of safeguards so as to verify the activities of States rather than the operations of individual plants and the fact that the range of information collected by safeguards has been greatly broadened and includes media reports are expected to permit a differentiation between States on an objective basis.

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PART V

FORMAL LETTERS

Layout of a formal letter

Your address

The date

Other person’s name and address

Dear Sir/Madam,/ Dear Mr Brandon/Ms White,

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Yours faithfully, / Yours sincerely,

Your signature

Your name - printed

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I. Important tips:

Write the recipient’s name and address on the left-hand side below the date.

Only use Dear Sir or Dear Madam if you don’t know the person’s name.

If you begin Dear Sir or Dear Madam, end with Yours faithfully, If you begin with a name, end with Yours sincerely.

Write Yours with a capital “Y” and faithfully or sincerely with small “f” or “s”. These endings are followed by a comma.

Never put your name before the address.

Write the house number first, followed by the street, town (and postcode, if you know it).

Give your reason for writing at the beginning, if you are replying to an advert, say where you saw it, and when, if you are replying to a letter, give the date of the letter.

Print your name clearly after your signature.

II. Job application

Explain clearly which post/job you are applying for and, if you are responding to an advertisement, say where you saw it and when. Give all the necessary information about yourself, including age, qualifications, past employment, relevant experience and any special hobbies or interests, and explain why you are particularly interested in this post. Use a new paragraph for each main topic. It’s also helpful to say when you would be available to attend an interview.

Useful language:

I am interested in applying for the post of … which was advertised in (newspaper/ magazine) on (date).

I was interested in the advertisement in (newspaper) on (date) and I would like to apply for the post/ position of (job title).

My reason for applying is that I would like to broaden my experience and also…/ I am interested in (area) and I would like to use my foreign languages.

I am … years of age and I have a Diploma in (area)

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