Encyclopedia of Sociology Vol

infant gives nothing in return, while the parent has a great deal of power and the infant has none. These seven relationships can also be represented visually in a two-dimensional space according to their power and status (affection) locations (See figure 1).

Kemper (1989; and Reid 1997) distinguishes love from liking as follows: one feels love for another when the other’s qualities match one’s standards to an extremely high degree. It does not matter what the standards are; they may be trivial (e.g., he dresses well; she dances well) or they may be profound (e.g., he is a noble man who would

risk his life to preserve others; she is compassionate woman whose concern is with the well-being of others). In either case, if one has standards that are met by these qualities in the other, then it is likely that feelings of love will be induced. Ordinarily, more than one standard must be met by the qualities of the other in order for love to bloom. No small standard in Western culture is appearance, which often dominates all others, at least among the young. Love thus has to do with the qualities of the other and how they match our standards.

Liking, on the other hand, according to Kemper, is the pleasant feeling that arises when the other

gives us status or affection. Liking requires that the other act well toward us; love has no such requirement, as shown by such types (above) as adulation, unfaithful love, infatuation or unrequited love, and parent–child love. In each of these, one party loves another who gives no affection in return. In love this is possible; in liking, it is not.

Kemper’s use of power and status is matched by Heise (1979) and his colleagues (Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988; MacKinnon 1994) in another structural approach to emotions known as affect control theory (ACT). Heise’s model of interaction and emotions stems from a linguistic paradigm, most notably the semantic differential (SD), which purports to get at fundamental categories of meaning in the use of language. Supported by many cross-cultural studies, the proponents of the SD have found three fundamental dimensions: potency (power), evaluation (status), and activity. Kemper does not include activity in his approach to emotions, although it has a place in a more general social organizational framework as standing for technical activity in the division of labor.

Working with the potency, evaluation, and activity dimensions, Heise and his colleagues have developed a mathematically sophisticated set of formulas to predict a variety of outcomes, including emotions. First, common language terms— nouns, verbs, adjectives—are rated by samples of respondents for their potency, evaluation, and activity standing. For example, the term father may stand relatively high on each of these; on the other hand, the term criminal may stand high on potency and activity but low on evaluation. Heise has compiled a large dictionary of such terms whose potency, evaluation, and activity values can be entered into complex regression equations to predict emotions.

The basic notion in ACT is that individuals behave so as to maintain their fundamental identity. If something has occurred—whether action by oneself or another—that questions the validity of that identity, an emotion results. For example, a parent may usually be loving to his or her child, but if the parent acts out of character by behaving cruelly or indifferently to the child, there is a felt need to reequilibrate the relationship and reclaim the identity of loving parent. The emotion, whether it is shame or guilt, provides some of the

motivational energy to repair the relationship and maintain the fundamental identity.

In some examples of how this works, Heise and his colleagues found that when a father serves a son, the father’s emotions were predicted to be pleased, contented, and relieved, while the son’s emotions (the emotions of the recipient of interaction can also be predicted) were predicted to be amused, light-hearted, and euphoric. If a judge sentences a gangster, the judge’s emotions were predicted to be contented, relieved, and proud, while the gangster’s emotions were predicted to be uneasy and awestruck. Several emotions are usually generated by the ACT equations because they have approximately equal value in potency, evaluation, and activity terms for the given situation.

Heise has examined complex instances in which an individual is observed to perform an act and reveal a number of emotions. How others will judge the actor is predicted to be based on the emotions the focal actor reveals. For example, when a man kisses a woman, if he is cheerful, he is identified as a gentleman, pal, or mate, identities that gain significantly in evaluation, with some loss in the potency dimension. On the other hand, if he kisses a woman and manifests disgust, he is identitified at a much lower evaluation level, but with his potency remaining unchanged. If he displays nervousness, he is identified as having lower standing in both evaluation and potency.

Heise’s method also allows for a distinction between emotions and moods. For example, if a father ignores a son, the father is predicted to feel unhappy. ACT now predicts that the father will act to reinstate his identity as a father who does not ignore his son. In contrast to the father who became unhappy over his act, there is the unhappy father, a fundamental identity combining a social position with an emotion. Heise identifies this as a mood. According to ACT, moods give rise to consistent behavior; for example, the unhappy father might neglect or attack the son.

In all, the structural theorists of emotion are concerned with predicting emotions from the social locations and relationships of actor. This assumes that there is a natural (or pancultural) universal reaction to certain kinds of social relational outcomes. For example, insult evokes anger. One

of the most important differences between the social structural and cultural approaches (to be discussed next) hinges on whether this assumption is correct.

Cultural Approaches to Emotions. In contrast with the social structural view of emotions as direct results of social relations between actors, the cultural approach inserts an intervening stage; namely, the normative definition of situations and the specification of what emotions are appropriate in them. Hochschild proposes that these ‘‘feeling rules’’ define and regulate the expression of emotion. Examining emotions from this perspective leads to a strong emphasis on the study of how emotions are managed so that they conform with the normative requirements of given situations. Culturally oriented sociologists of emotion are also concerned with how emotions contribute to social order. Guilt and shame are significant emotions for this purpose.

The cultural approach to emotions is partial to cognitive and idealist models, since these concern themselves with mental processes that come to determine emotions. The fundamental source of the cultural approach is symbolic interactionism. In this school, whose prime practitioner and exemplar was George Herbert Mead (1934), the fundamental notion is that virtually nothing, not even mind or self, precedes social interaction. Thus social interaction actually constitutes or constructs these fundamental categories.

Mead proposed that after some cooperative interactions with another person, we have the capacity to call up in ourself the probable reaction of the other to any proactive behavior of our own. This is based on the recollection of the pattern of interactions with the other when one or another behavior on our part elicited one or another response on the part of the other. The ability to recapitulate all this in our head prior to any actual behavior is what Mead termed mind and the process, thinking.

Having derived mind from prior social interaction, Mead went further and located the origin of the self in the same kinds of interactive encounters with others. In Mead’s terms, we become capable of putting ourself in the place of the other and looking at ourself as if we were an object. This

mental operation provides us with a sense of self– our identity–as derived from the perspective of another. The actual self of the individual is some composite of the many selves that are available when one takes the perspective of the many others with whom one interacts.

The most widely known approach to emotions from the symbolic interactionist perspective is offered by Hochschild (1979, 1983). She posits that emotions arise in a somewhat natural way in situations or frames. But the emotion is then subjected to examination as more or less appropriate from the perspective of the normative borders of the situation. Expressed as ‘‘feeling rules,’’ the norms specify the required emotions in given frames: happy at birthday parties, sad at funerals, and so on. Because most people react emotionally to situations in more or less the ways that the rules require, they are rarely conscious of the rules. But should there be a discrepancy between the emotion and the rule, there is a sense of discomfort and a felt pressure to adapt. Hochschild offers a number of likely strategies that are used to manage one’s emotions in such emotionally deviant situations. Principally, one may engage in either surface or deep acting. In the former, one puts on the manifest signs of the emotion even if one does not authentically feel it; for example, smiling at the host of a party, despite the fact that one despises him. In deep acting, the individual actually tries to evoke the prescribed emotion.

For Hochschild, emotion essentially results from a discrepancy between what we perceive and what we expected. The inchoate feeling is labeled by cultural fiat as anger, fear, shame, and so on, and this provides a reservoir of cultural associations with the significance, meaning, implications, and so on of having such an emotion. These may ramify into modifying or seeking to change the emotion. Thus culture, the aggregate of normative understandings derived from others, intervenes early in the emotion process, leading to the judgment that emotion is a social construction. For example, shame is constructed from five perceptions: motive (I want to do right); possession (I have done wrong); value (I disapprove); agency (I am the cause of the event); and self–agent relations (the audience for my act is better than I am).

Hochschild’s (1983) widely cited study of emotion management among airline flight attendants

has led to a significant body of research that has focused on the emotional effects of managing emotions. These studies are reviewed by Morris and Feldman (1996) and Gibson (1997).

Peggy Thoits (1990) has taken Hochschild’s ideas on emotion management to another level. In her view, emotions are comprised of four elements: situational cues, physiological changes, expressive gestures, and an emotion label. These are so connected in memory and behavior pattern that the elicitation of one evokes the others. Thoits proposes that when emotions and feeling rules are discrepant, the actor can manage this through either cognitive or behavioral manipulation of the four elements of emotion. For example, one can withdraw when a deviant emotion is felt (behaviorsituational), or one can exercise or take drugs to change the physiological base of the emotion (be- havior-physiological), or one can redefine the situation so that its implication for emotion changes (cognitive-situational), and so on.

Thoits also expands Hochschild’s notion of emotional deviance through proposing four situations that might dispose toward it: multiple role occupancy, subcultural marginality, role transition, and rigid rules governing ongoing roles or ceremonial occasions. Thoits also proposes that a deviant emotion not only violates the feeling rules but also includes emotions that are too prolonged, too intense, or directed at the wrong target. Yet even deviant emotions may become legitimate if they are widely shared, thus leading to a change in social norms. An example is the change in national sentiment brought about by the protests of the antiwar movement during the Vietnam period.

In another fundamentally symbolic interactionist approach to emotions, Clark (1997) examines sympathy, an emotion treated importantly by Adam Smith ([1759] 1853) in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. Clark sees sympathy as a pervasive emotion, making society possible, for without it there would be no ‘‘social glue.’’ Indeed, since sympathy is so important, ‘‘sympathy entrepreneurs,’’ emerge to facilitate the evocation and display of this emotion. These are voluntary organizations designed to mobilize sympathy for specific victims (for example, Mothers Against Drunk Driving [MADD]) or commercial organizations, such as greeting card companies, that facilitate expressions of sympathy by large publics. Clark also sees what she refers to

as ‘‘sympathy margins’’ as regular features of social relationships. These are earned credits, so to speak, that enable individuals to call on the understanding, sympathy, and forgiveness of others when they are caught out, or caught short, or have otherwise become hapless victims.

Steven Gordon (1981) is another exponent of the social constructionist view of emotions. Although he acknowledges that emotions per se are elemental and biological, he contends that shortly after childhood they are culturally transformed into what he calls ‘‘sentiments.’’ For example, the elemental emotion of anger is converted into such sentiments as resentment, righteous indignation, moral outrage, and so on. This is presumed to be the fate of all emotions. Since sentiments are socially formed, they can be invented or even abandoned.

Gordon stands within the tradition of Norbert Elias (1978a, 1978b), who offered an insightful historical perspective on the emergence of the emotion of shame as an important feature of social relations between different social classes. Elias examined especially the relations between the rising bourgeousie of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the aristocrats who disdained them. In many instances the nobility, seeking to insulate itself from the incursions of lower-status merchants and traders, refined their practices in the execution of common daily chores involving dining, selfcleansing, toilet functions, and so on. Those who could not match the newly defined limits of gentility were exposed to ridicule and shaming. For a long historical period, the aristocracy were the arbiters of manners, that is, what passed for acceptable social conduct. Those who were ill trained in the ultrarefinements thus properly felt shame.

Although symbolic interactionism has been used to refute the idea of fixity in the domain of emotions, Susan Shott (1979) and Thomas Scheff (1979, 1988, 1994, 1997) have also employed it to show how emotions underlie social order and stability. The fact that pattern and predictability exist in much of social life, rather than chaos and randomness, poses one of the longstanding problems in sociological analysis. It is generally acknowledged that the reverse side of social order is social control, indicating that society manages somehow to instill in individuals a propensity to comply with required social forms and that deviance from

these forms, though greater in some periods than in others, is actually quite limited. How is this accomplished?

There are two main answers to the question, and both of them turn on emotion. First, social order may be imposed by dominant and powerful groups. Their tactic is to evoke fear for nonconforming behavior. Although it has been argued by some, such as Talcott Parsons, that such regimes cannot be stable in the long run, in the short run they can have remarkable sticking power. Decades or even centuries may elapse before a feared government is overthrown.

The second ground for social order entails acceptance of the existing pattern of things. And here sociologists have split on what is accepted. On the one hand, social order can flow from belief in the validity of the social norms. One pays one’s taxes, serves in the armed forces, does not steal even when there is an opportunity to do so undetected, and so on because the rules are deemed valid and it feels morally right to abide by them. A second view, which has come to prominence, is that underlying social order is an emotional order. Without an emotional basis, social order would not be possible.

Attacking the question from a symbolic interactionist perspective, Shott proposes a set of ‘‘role-taking emotions’’ that are central to social control: guilt, shame, embarrassment, pride, and vanity. Each of these involves the central symbolic interactionist mechanism of putting oneself in the place, or taking the role, of the other person and thereby evoking his or her perspective. The result of such role-taking can be an emotion directed toward the self, because it evokes in the self the judgment that others are making about the self. Guilt involves the selfand (presumed) other-judg- ment of ‘‘moral inadequacy.’’ Shame entails the selfand (presumed) other-rejection of an ‘‘idealized self-image.’’ Embarrassment arises from the realization that others view one’s self-presentation as ‘‘inept.’’ Pride comes from placing oneself in the position of others and regarding oneself with approbation; vanity is a reduced form of this, in that one is not sure of other’s approval.

These emotions (with perhaps the exception of vanity) operate homeostatically. Individuals are moved to reduce the incidence of such unpleasant emotions as guilt, shame, and embarrassment and

increase the incidence of pleasant emotions such as pride. How is this done? Obviously, one avoids the unpleasant emotions by avoiding conduct that would earn the disapprobation of others. One gains pleasant emotions by engaging in conduct of which others approve. In general, the emotions fit one into the moral requirements of others, who are themselves governed by the same set of preand proscriptions for social conduct.

Shott suggests that the role-taking emotions are an inexpensive way for society to obtain social order, since they make each person his or her own guardian in ensuring that the emotional tone of one’s life remains, on balance, more pleasant than painful. Where such self-control fails, the prospects of social order are not entirely dim, for the emotions that ensue—guilt, shame, or embarrass- ment—motivate reparative action to reequilibrate the social order as well as others—therefore, one’s own—opinion of oneself. Thus, guilt and shame have been shown to increase compensatory altruism toward others, and embarrassment has been shown to evoke compensatory supererogation or attainment as a way of reequilibrating the judgments of others about the self to return to a positive balance.

Finally, Shott proposes a role-taking emotion that is not reflexive, in that it does not pertain to a judgment of the self. This is empathy, which allows one to feel what the other person in the situation is feeling, or what one would likely feel if one were in the place of the other person. Empathy makes any emotion vicariously accessible. Where the emotion reveals the other to be in a socially vulnerable place, one has the embodied sense of the need that other has for social rescue, and the likelihood of engaging in that rescue is enhanced. Thus empathy allows for the evocation of solidarity with others and the preservation of social order through protective behaviors that take up the slack when others are unable to act suitably in their own behalf.

Scheff is also concerned with social order, but he focuses on shame and pride as the ne plus ultra emotions in this regard. He takes a cue from Charles Horton Cooley’s ([1902] 1922) famous looking-glass metaphor: ‘‘Each to each a looking glass, reflects the other that doth pass’’ (p. 184). Cooley asserted that pride and shame were the emotional engines for getting individuals to conform to the requirements of their fellow members

in society. Scheff proposes that individuals are continuously in a state of either pride or shame. But then the question arises as to why, if these emotions are so important, there is so little evidence of them.

Scheff proposes that shame is a recursive emotion. That is, once present it has a tendency to evoke more shame, or even anger, over the fact that one is ashamed. This can lead to a spiral of emotion about emotion about emotion . . . that leads to both an inability to escape the emotion and a tendency to hide it from others—a frequent response when coping with shame. This hiddenness, proposed as a defining feature of shame, ties in with the work of Helen Block Lewis (1971), whose intensive analysis of psychotherapy protocols revealed two types of ‘‘unacknowledged’’ shame: overt, undifferentiated shame and bypassed shame. The former is manifested by painful feelings and selfderogation (‘‘I am stupid, foolish, feckless, incompetent,’’ and the like). Often this is accompanied by stammering, unnecessary word repetition, averted gaze, and declining audibility of speech. Both the verbal, paralinguistic and proxemic forms are means of hiding the self from the evaluating gaze of others.

Bypassed shame, on the other hand, leads to covert such symptoms as obsessive focusing on the episode that evoked the inadequate response, as if the replay could retrieve the lost status. Thought and speech are hyperactive, actually preventing one from participating with others in the natural rhythm of conversational flow. Both types of shame share the common characteristic of low visibility, thus demonstrating the power of shame as the emotional foundation of social control. Only those with sufficient self-esteem can acknowledge their shame and thus discharge it. But self-esteem itself, as proposed by Mead, derives from the good opinion of others, which itself arises when one conforms to their normative requirements; that is, when there has been social control.

This formulation, implying catharsis in the discharge of shame, ties into Scheff’s work on the problem of undischarged emotions. Scheff proposes that catharsis of these residual emotions can only occur in properly ‘‘distanced’’ settings. Here Scheff adopts the concept of ‘‘aesthetic distance,’’ employed by Bullough in his analysis of drama. According to Bullough (1912), an audience can

experience a dramatic presentation in various ways according to its emotional distance from what appears on stage. Too little distance involves the audience so deeply that it forgets it is merely watching a play and wants to mount the stage in defense of the hero. Too much distance leaves the audience uninvolved, indifferent to whatever murder or mayhem may be happening on stage. Optimum, or aesthetic, distance, like the last of Goldilocks’s porridge bowls and beds, is ‘‘just right,’’ providing a comfortable level of emotional arousal that leads to the ‘‘purgation of pity and terror,’’ which according to Aristotle was the aim of drama.

In a similar vein, Scheff proposes that troublesome residual emotions may also be purged in social settings where there is optimum distance. To do so, he suggests, requires that the expressive emotional content be retrieved (for example, crying, trembling, sweating), but in a context in which the individual can be both participant and observer of his or her own emotional display. When these conditions for emotional aesthetic distance are met, catharsis occurs. This is signaled by an anomalous emotional outcome: even though the residual emotion may be unpleasant, discharging it is not unpleasant, and there is a succeeding state of clarity of thought, relaxation, renewed energy or exhilaration. Although the catharsis paradigm is somewhat different from the social control paradigm, the two are joined in that unacknowledged shame, which is not discharged, often leads to spirals of emotion (e.g., anger over shame over fear) that incapacitate individuals in their social interactions, leading sometimes to violent outbursts that break though all the bonds of social control.

Robert Thamm (1992) builds a theory of emotions on the foundations of Talcott Parsons’s and Edward Shils’s scheme for a general theory of action. In their formulatiion, social actors are linked in reciprocal forms of action and response through expectations and sanctions. In social settings, individuals have expectations of each other, and in light of those expectations they reward or fail to reward each other’s behavior. From each actor’s perspective, according to Thamm, this leads to four questions: (1) Is the self meeting expectations? (2) Is the self receiving rewards? (3) Is the other meeting expectations? (4) Is the other receiving rewards? These constitute a social matrix for

the production of emotions. As the answers to these questions vary from yes (+) to no (−) to don’t know (0), different emotions result. A given state of the system of self and other’s expectations and sanctions can be coded by a pertinent series of pluses, minuses, and zeros. For example, if the answer to all four questions is yes, the coding is [++++]; if the answer to all four is no, the coding is [−−−−]; if the answer to the first two is yes and the last two is no, the coding is [++−−].

Based on the permutations of the many possible states of the expectations–sanctions system, Thamm hypothesizes a variety of emotional resultants. For example, when the self meets expectations [+000], the self feels pleased with itself. When the self does not meet expectation [−000], the self feels disappointed with itself. When the other does not meet expectations [00−0], the self feels disappointed in the other. When the self meets expectations but is not rewarded [+−00], the self feels powerless. When the other does not meet expections, so that the self is not rewarded [0−−0], the self feels anger at the other. Many additional hypotheses follow from the variations along the spectrum of expectations–sanctions possibilities.

The reliance of the cultural approach to emotions on mental structions susceptible to socialization and variable according to historical conditions of change, directly conflicts with at least some elements of the social structural position. The latter places more emphasis on universal situational determinants of emotion and on some biological mechanisms that articulate with the situa- tion–emotion nexus. Kemper (1987) has attempted to reconcile some of the opposing views through a syncretic analysis, focusing on the issue of primary and secondary emotions.

Kemper proposes that a large body of crosscultural, phylogenetic, autonomic, social relational, and classificatory evidence leads to a model of four primary emotions: fear, anger, sadness, and joy (or nominal variants of these). Since there are additional emotions, the question is: What is their source? Kemper proposes that emotions beyond the primary ones may arise from a specific pattern of socialization in which a social definition and label are applied to a situation in which one of the primary emotions is being felt. For example, pride may be derived from socialization to the idea of self-regard for accomplishment in a context of joy.

Shame may result from socialization to the idea of self-rejection in a context of anger. And guilt may derive from socialization to the idea of self-rejec- tion for what is defined as a morally wrong action in the context of fear. The primary emotion contexts are important because they provide the autonomic, therefore specifically emotional, underpinnings of the secondary emotions. The cultural components, such as situational definitions and emotional labels, are important because they help the person differentiate and ascribe the feeling to particular social and behavior contexts.

Gibson (1997) offers a different approach to the reconciliation of the structural and cultural approaches to emotions by incorporating aspects of both in his model for feeling and expression of emotions in organizations. Both structural conditions and display rules operate to instigate and control emotions in organizational contexts.

REASON AND EMOTION

One of the longest-standing problems in the study of emotions is the relationship between emotions and reason. This question has engaged two millennia of philosophers and psychologists, including Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, Hume, and Freud. Sociologists are latecomers here, but have substantially and persuasively claimed that reason is not an isolated domain of human action, but is imbued with emotion (Kemper 1993), a point that a sociological approach makes particularly clear.

Max Weber ([1922] 1947) set the stage by distinguishing between Zweckrational, or expedient action, and at least two types of emotional action: Affectuel, or impulsive action, and Wertrational, or value-oriented action. But he did little to develop the relationship between the two emotional types and the strictly expedient type. The latter is the prototypical action of economic theory, where means are examined and selected to attain the best possible outcome. In the economic version, money is the usual yardstick for the efficacy of the decision based on expediency. Other considerations are treated more or less as ‘‘noise,’’ disturbing the adequacy of the model. The sociological version of this economic approach is rational choice theory.

In a radical confrontation with rational choice theory, Collins (1993) throws down the gauntlet to

economically based theories. He argues that the main preference order is based on emotional currency, namely emotional energy (EE) which is acquired in successful interactions with others (see earlier description of Collins’ work). The good feelings—confidence and enthusiasm—that individuals derive from participation in interaction are the summum bonum, and this is what individuals are attempting to maximize in their so-called rational choices, regardless of what the currency may appear to be—money, status, practical or aesthetic enjoyment of material goods, and so on.

Lawler and Thye (1999) approach the rational choice issue through the window of social exchange theory, in which self-interested actors are trying to obtain something of value from other self-interested actors. They examine the context of exchange, which ordinarily will have a certain emotional tone and emotional requirements, the processes of exchange, which may make actors feel satisfied, excited, or otherwise emotionally aroused, and the outcome of exchange at which point actors may feel gratified or angry, prideful or crestfallen. In a useful schematic formulation, Lawler and Thye organize the context, process, and outcome features of exchange according to six different mainly sociological approaches to the study of emotions. For context, the cultural-normative approach (Hochschild 1979) and the structural-rela- tion approach (Collins 1975, Kemper 1978); for processes, a psychologically oriented social-cogni- tive approach (Bower 1991) and a sensory-informa- tional approach (Heise 1979); and for outcomes, a social attribution approach (Weiner 1986) and a social formations approach (Collins 1981 and Lawler and Yoon 1998). This schematic formulation enables analysts to move easily into the examination of motions in social exchange situations.

EMOTIONS AND MACROPROCESSES

Most sociological examinations of emotion are social-psychological; that is, social structures, processes, or outcomes of these are seen to produce emotions in the individuals involved, with emotions differing according to where in the structure, process, or outcome the individual stands. Jack Barbalet (1998) provides an important exception to this social-psychological approach, conceiving of emotion as integral to social relations and social

processes themselves. Emotion is felt by individu- als—this cannot be escaped—but as an aspect of societal patterns of social organization in terms of class, gender, race, and the like. This leads to another perspectival difference: Most sociological approaches to emotion examine social processes and social relations as the independent variables— they cause or produce emotions. Barbalet reverses this and examines how emotions cause or produce social processes and social relations. Furthermore, this is conceived at the macro level, engaging societal, as opposed to interpersonal, processes.

For example, working-class individuals might be expected to harbor social resentment against those who are better off, but such resentment is scant in the United States and has led to no effective political movements. Following Bensman and Vidich (1962), Barbalet tries to explain this in part by locating different sectors of the working class in different places in normal trade cycles in capitalist societies. A dynamic economy contains both expanding (e.g., computers) and contracting (e.g., textiles) industries, and workers in the different industries cannot be expected to experience the same emotions, thus vitiating any theory or program that views workers in a monolithic way.

In another venture into the macrosociology of emotions, Barbalet examines the emotion, mood, or feeling of confidence as an important feature of social process. Particularly in the business community, confidence is a necessary condition of investment. Indeed, in Barbalet’s view, confidence dominates even rational calculation. This is because rational business planning is limited by the fact that it is future-oriented and the information that rational assessment requires is unavailable—it can only unfold in the future. Therefore, to undertake action under conditions of limited rationality, the business community must rely on its intuition that investment will be profitable. Put otherwise, it must have confidence. Government is an important constituent of the situation, sometimes enhancing and sometimes depressing business confidence. Barbalet proposes that what differentiates these effects of government policy is whether they reflect ‘‘acceptance and recognition’’ of the business community. For example, government spending on infrastructure or the bailout of the savings and loan industry reflect such appreciation. On the other hand, business interests feel slighted when the government proposes strict policies to

reduce global warming, and business confidence falls accordingly. In both examples—those of the working class and business—the emotions are aggregated products of many individuals that then act as a discrete force in society.

In an unusually strong entry of a macrosociological approach into the domain of emotions, Jasper (1998) and Goodwin and Jasper (1999) have argued for the overlooked importance of emotions in the understanding of large scale social movements. Social movements, they argue, are awash in emotions. Anger, fear, envy, guilt, pity, shame, awe, passion and other feelings play a part either in the formation of social movements, in their relations with their targets who are either antagonists or possible collaborators, and in the lives of potential recruits and members. Without the emotions engaged in movement environments, dynamics, and structure it would be hard to explain how social movements arise, amass critical levels of support, maintain such support in long enduring campaigns in the face of often intense opposition, and provide means for recruiting and sustaining supporters, both as active members and as favorably disposed publics and bystanders. Understanding the dynamics of emotions thus clarifies social movement dynamics.

CONCLUSION

The sociology of emotions has a long history but only a short recent life. It is a diverse speciality, reflecting many of the axial divisions that currently rend the field, but one that lends itself to the illumination of a large number of problem areas from the micro to the macro level. The main requirement for the present-day sociology of emotions is, as Peggy Thoits (1989) has argued, to pursue empirical support for its many theories. Only in this way will it become clear in which direction theory can most fruitfully go.

(SEE ALSO: Affect Control Theory and Impression Formation; Rational Choice ; Social Exchange Theory)

REFERENCES

Barbalet, Jack 1998 Emotion, Social Theory and Social Structure: A Macrosociological Analysis. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Bensman, Joseph, and Arthur Vidich 1962 ‘‘Business Cycles, Class and Personality.’’ Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Review 49:30–52.

Bower, G. H. 1991 ‘‘Mood Congruity of Social Judgments.’’ In J. Forgas, ed., Emotion and Social Judgments. Oxford: Pergamon.

Bullough, Edward 1912 ‘‘Psychic Distance as a Factor in Art and as an Aesthetic Principle.’’ British Journal of Psychology 5: 669–679.

Clark, Candace 1997 Misery and Company: Sympathy in Everyday Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Collins, Randall 1975 Conflict Sociology. New York: Aca-

demic Press.

———1981 ‘‘On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology.’’

American Journal of Sociology 86: 984–1014.

———1990 ‘‘Stratification, Emotional Energy, and the Transient Emotions.’’ In T. D. Kemper, ed., Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions. Albany: State University of New York Press.

———1993 ‘‘Emotional Energy as the Common Denominator or Rational Action.’’ Rationality and Society 5: 203–230.

Cooley, Charles H. (1902) 1922 Human Nature and the Social Order, Rev. ed. New York: Scribner’s.

Durkheim, Émile (1915) 1965 The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. J. W. Swain. New York: Free Press.

Elias, Norbert 1978a The Civilizing Process. New York:

Urizen Books.

———1978b The History of Manners. New York: Urizen Books.

Gibson, Donald E. 1997 ‘‘The Struggle for Reason: The Sociology of Emotions in Organizations.’’ In R. J. Erickson and B. Cuthbertson-Johnson, eds., Social Perspectives on Emotion, Vol. 4. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.

Goffman, Erving 1959 The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

———1967 Interaction Ritual. Garden City, N.Y.:

Doubleday.

———1981 Forms of Talk. Philadelphia, Pa.: University

of Pennsylvania Press.

Goodwin, Jeff, and James M. Jasper 1999 ‘‘Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory.’’ Sociological Forum 14: 27–54.

Gordon, Steven L. 1981 ‘‘The Sociology of Sentiments and Emotions.’’ In M. Rosenberg and R. S. Turner, eds., Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives. New York: Basic Books.

Heise, David R. 1979 Understanding Events: Affect and the Construction of Social Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hochschild, Arlie Russell 1979 ‘‘Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure.’’ American Journal of Sociology 85:551–575.

——— 1983 The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feelings. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jasper, James M. 1998 ‘‘The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and Around Social Movement.’’ Sociological Forum 13: 397–424.

Kemper, Theodore D. 1978 A Social Interactional Theory of Emotions. New York: Wiley.

———1987 ‘‘How Many Emotions Are There? Wedding the Social and the Autonomic Components.’’

American Journal of Sociology 93:263–289.

———1989 ‘‘Love and Like and Love and Love.’’ In D. D. Franks and E. D. McCarthy, eds., The Sociology of Emotions: Original Essays and Research Papers. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.

———1990 ‘‘Social Relations and Emotions: A Structural Approach.’’ In T. D. Kemper, ed., Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions. Albany: State University of New York Press.

———1993 ‘‘Reason in Emotions or Emotions in Reason.’’ Rationality and Society 5: 275–282.

———and Muriel T. Reid 1997 ‘‘Love and Liking in the Attraction and Maintenance Phases of Long-Term Relationships.’’ In R. Erickson and B. CuthbertsonJohnson, eds., Social Perspectives on Emotion, Vol. 4. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.

Lawler, Edward J., and Jeongkoo Yoon 1998 ‘‘Network Structure and Emotion in Exchange Relations. ‘‘American Sociological Review 63: 871–894.

——— and Shane R. Thye 1999 ‘‘Bringing Emotions into Social Exchange Theory.’’ In K. Cook and J. Hagan, eds., Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 25. Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews.

Lewis, Helen B. 1971 Shame and Guilt in Neurosis. New York: Wiley.

MacKinnon, Neil J. 1994 Symbolic Interaction as Affect Control. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Mead, George H. 1934 Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Morris, J. Andrew, and Daniel C. Feldman 1996 ‘‘The Dimensions, Antecedents, and Consequences of Emotional Labor.’’ Academy of Management Review 21: 986–1010.

———1979 Catharsis in Healing, Ritual, and Drama. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———1988 ‘‘Shame and Conformity: The DeferenceEmotion System.’’ American Sociological Review

53:395–406.

Scheff, Thomas J. 1994 Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism, and War. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

——— 1997 Emotions, the Social Bond, and Human Reality: Part/Whole Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Seeman, Melvin 1959 ‘‘On the Meaning of Alienation.’’

American Sociological Review 24: 783–791

Shott, Susan 1979 ‘‘Emotion and Social Life: A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis.’’ American Journal of Sociology

84:1317–1334.

Smith, Adam (1759) 1853 The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Rev. ed. London: G. Bell and Sons.

Smith-Lovin, Lynn, and David R. Heise 1988 Analyzing Social Interaction: Advances in Affect Control Theory. New York: Gordon and Breach.

Thamm, Robert 1992 ‘‘Social Structure and Emotion.’’

Sociological Perspectives 35:649–671.

Thoits, Peggy 1989 ‘‘The Sociology of Emotions.’’ Annual Review of Sociology 15:317–342,

——— 1990 ‘‘Emotional Deviance: Research Agendas.’’ In T. D. Kemper, ed., Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Weber, Max (1904–1905) 1958 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. T. Parsons. New York: Scribner’s.

Weiner, Bernard 1986 An Attributional Theory of Motivation and Emotion. New York: Springer-Verlag.

THEODORE D. KEMPER

Marx, Karl (1842–1844) 1971 The Early Texts, Ed. D. McLellan, Oxford: Blackwell.

———(1867) 1967 Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. New York: International Publishers.

———and Friedrich Engels (1846) 1947 The German Ideology. New York: International Publishers.

ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY

The scientific study of the social distribution of environmental impacts has quickly become an important area of inquiry within environmental sociology. Scholarly interest in this topic—which has been referred to as environmental justice,