blizhnij-vostok-v-fokuse-politicheskoj-analitiki

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ствуя в постоянном контакте с израильскими властями, продолжала работу по сохранению и поддержанию русского православного наследия на Святой земле.

Поступательный характер российско-израильских отношений подтверждается активным делегационным обменом, в том числе и на высшем уровне. Сближение позиций двух сторон во внешнеполитической сфере ускорилось после визита президента Российской Федерации Владимира Путина в Израиль 28 апреля 2005 г. Последний раз В. Путин посетил Израиль в июле 2012 г. для участия в церемонии открытия

вНетании мемориала бойцам Красной армии. Премьер-министр Израиля Биньямин Нетаниягу неоднократно посещал Москву, демонстрируя тем самым интенсивный характер российско-израильских отношений, которые, по определению обеих сторон носят «особенный» характер. Обоюдные визиты министров, парламентариев, общественных деятелей наших стран стали обычным явлением.

Результатом дипломатических усилий России и Израиля стало подписание нескольких десятков межправительственных соглашений, охватывающих все области взаимного сотрудничества, в том числе

вполитической, экономической, военной, научно-образовательной и культурной сферах.

Виюне 1995 г. в Москве состоялось первое заседание Смешанной российско-израильской Комиссии по торгово-экономическому сотрудничеству. С тех пор заседания Комиссии поочередно проводятся на постоянной основе попеременно в России и Израиле. За последние пять лет объем товарооборота вырос втрое, превысив 3,6 млрд долл. Продолжается сотрудничество в области освоения космоса. С помощью российских ракет-носителей на орбиту были выведены израильские спутники: в июне 1998 г. – «ТехСат-2», в декабре 2000 г. – «Эрос-А1»,

вдекабре 2003 г. – «Амос-2», в декабре 2004 г. – «Эрос-Б», в апреле 2006 г. – «Эрос-Б1». Активно развиваются контакты между силовыми ведомствами в целях координации действий по борьбе с международным терроризмом.

Активно развиваются межпарламентские связи: в Госдуме парламентскую группу «Россия-Израиль» возглавляет депутат Н.Н. Гончар; ассоциацией дружбы «Изариль-Россия» в Кнессете руководит З. Элькин. В последние годы значительно укрепились партнерские связи израильских городов с Россией и властями российских городов и регионов. Этому способствовало подписание в Иерусалиме в 2003 г. Соглашения о сотрудничестве между конгрессом муниципальных образований Российской Фе-

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дерации и Центром местной власти Израиля. Тель-Авив и Москва являются городами-побратимами. Насыщеннее и разнообразнее за последнее десятилетие стали культурные, общественные, молодежные, научно-технические контакты, спортивные связи.

В2007 г. в Тель-Авиве открылся российский культурный центр. Трудно переоценить значение для развития культурных контактов

между нашими странами соглашения об отмене визового режима между Россией и Израилем, подписанного в марте 2008 г. С тех пор поток туристов из России в Израиль увеличился на 300%. Ежегодно более полумиллиона россиян (второе место после США) посещают израильские города и курорты.

Несмотря на то что Израиль является давним и основным стратегическим союзником Вашингтона, будучи самостоятельным государством, он принял решение о неприсоединении к санкциям, которые ввели в отношении России Европейский союз и США.

Конечно, есть между нашими странами спорные вопросы, есть расхождения в позициях, например, по такой многоплановой теме, каковой относится ближневосточное урегулирование. Являясь наряду с США, Евросоюзом и ООН коспонсором ближневосточного урегулирования, Россия выступает за решение палестино-израильского конфликта на основе формулы «два государства для двух народов», тогда как израильский подход не предполагает предоставления полностью независимой и самостоятельной государственности палестинцам. Критически Россия относится к израильской политике расширения поселений на Западном берегу.

Проявляя расположенность к Израилю, Россия не пренебрегает своими интересами в отношении Ирана, Ирака, Сирии и других стран региона. Отношения с Ираном выражаются, в частности, оказанием помощи в овладении мирными ядерными технологиями, что негативно воспринимается в Израиле и США. Израиль выступает против поставок российского вооружения конфликтующим с Израилем государствам, а также против контактов России с ХАМАС и некоторыми др. палестинскими организациями, которые квалифицируются Израилем как «враждебные образования». Тем не менее, обе стороны исходят из того, что каждая страна имеет право принимать любое решение и на сегодняшний день диалог на эту тему продолжается.

Очевидно, что в последнее время российская ближневосточная политика, считаясь с новыми реалиями, стала более взвешенной и прагматичной. Понимание этой позиции было продемонстрировано готовностью участия израильской стороны в совместной координа-

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ционной комиссии, в рамках деятельности которой Россия обязалась предупреждать ВВС Израиля о предстоящих авианалетах на позиции «Исламского государства».

Post scriptum

В заключении отметим, что на данном этапе российско-израиль- ские отношения имеют поступательную положительную тенденцию и, несмотря на серьезные разногласия в оценках ближневосточной политики, характеризуются возрастающим доверием друг к другу. За годы двустороннего сотрудничества сложился устойчивый механизм, позволяющий вести взаимоприемлемый политический диалог абсолютно по всем аспектам и любым вопросам, которые представляют взаимный интерес.

ANDREY V. FEDORCHENKO

Hindrances to Russian High-Tech Export

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transfer from the United States.

Pursuant to the US-Israel Free Trade Zone Agreement (1985), the US companies, who participate in tenders to win contracts to the tune of over USD 50,000, are granted the national regime, but this applies only to 13 civil statecontrolled agencies in Israel (however, they include the largest civil purchasers: Airports Authority, Shipping and Ports Authority and Railways Authority).

The participation of American suppliers in tenders for the purchase of weapons and defense technology is governed by the 1987 Memorandum of Understanding between the US and Israel (its full name is Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Israel and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Principles Governing Mutual Cooperation in Research and Development, Scientist and Engineer Exchange, Procurement and Logistic Support of Defense Equipment (the “MOU”).

Although the national regime has been applied to the US producers of these products, the Israeli companies from the R&D sector have retained their preferential status in such tenders.

The above US – Israeli accords have formally reduced the chances for Israeli companies to win contracts through tenders, as the lion’s share of bilateral trade is occupied by high-technology products, however, they have been provided with an additional stimulus to reduce the product costs and improve the domestically produced output.

In the field of state procurement, the US offers an additional huge market for Israel owing to the Offset Agreements. By way of exporting high-tech products to Israel, American companies extend the overseas sales markets for high-tech products manufactured by Israeli companies, due to compensatory deals.

A critical incentive to engage Israeli companies has been the practice of using the US government military aid to purchase military products from Israel. These funds are partially allocated to the development of military and industrial projects on the Israeli territory, which is a very unconventional practice in the US foreign policies.

The US has allowed other countries to use the US military aid for the purpose of buying weapons made in Israel.

All those factors combined reduce the competitiveness of other NonAmerican suppliers (including Russian ones) in the Israeli market.

Another hindrance in the way of fostering technological collaboration between Russia and Israel is that the level of such collaboration is viewed by the Israeli authorities through the prism of the nature and intensity of similar cooperation that Russia maintains with the regional adversaries of Israel, primarily with Syria and Iran.

The Israeli stance on the issue of military supplies to Syria is known perfectly

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well. The Israeli government, being guided by its own concept of national security, tends to negatively assess any Russian-Syrian contacts in the field of military and technical cooperation, as it is apprehensive of the possibility for the Russian weapons and military equipment to be partially redelivered to Libya and also to the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel. The goal of such policies is absolutely apparent – to ensure the military superiority of Israel over its northern neighbor, including in the air space. Such superiority, in particular, empowered Israel to deliver air strikes against the targets in the vicinity of Damascus on the 3rd and 5th of May, 2013.

According to the Israeli and western experts, the fact that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad possesses advanced GMS (Guided Missile Systems) can disrupt the balance of power in the region, and can also impede the setting-up of a no-fly zone over Syria, following the example with Libya. The point is that the S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems deployed in the environs of the Syrian capital can make Israel’s entire airspace a no-fly zone.

There is a certain similarity with this scenario in the development of relations between Moscow and Teheran. Despite Israel’s zero tolerance and frequent occurrence of political disagreement between Russia and Iran, Moscow does not intend to scale down its cooperation with the Islamic Republic.

Russia has been engaged in delivering defensive arms. If the Israeli demands had been accepted, it would have meant that Russia would be forced out of the Middle East arms markets even further, but under conditions of increasing instability in the Arab world it might have led to the radical curtailment of the export potential of Russia’s Defense Industry sector.

Israel has been exerting tangible influence on decision makers in all matters related to the supplies of Russian arms to the countries of the Middle East and Near East region. Relying on the support from the United States, Israel has put a lot of pressure to bear on the Russian leaders seeking to reduce the deliveries of sophisticated military equipment, including those that have purely defensive designation, to the countries that are in opposition to Israel. This mechanism was instrumental before in relation to the foreign trade agreements between Russia and Syria, Iran, Libya. In the final analysis, Russia has adopted a more stringent stance in connection with these issues.

Proceeding to the examination of the economic barriers in relation to the Russian exports, it should be remembered, in the first place, that until recently Israel has explicitly pursued protectionist policies, its domestic market was protected from external competition by high tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The liberalization of the foreign trade regime, in general, started only in 1991. The first step in that direction was a replacement of non-tariff restrictions on imports by import duties. Then, as a result of unilateral tariff liberalization,

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upgrading and retooling of the Russian (formerly Soviet) military products. According to the data made available by the Israeli government and industrial sources, almost a third of all military deals transacted by Israel since 1991 are related to the equipment manufactured in Russia; over a period of 11 subsequent years, the amount of such deals has exceeded USD 6 billion714.

Israel has constantly infringed on the Russian rights to its intellectual property because the legal framework underlying the Russian-Israeli relations was not thoroughly designed. In the course of negotiations on the establishment of a Free Trade Zone between Israel and the Customs Union comprising Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, an issue of including the provisions deemed to safeguard the national rights to intellectual property in the mechanisms sustaining the future integration association was addressed.

The government authorities in charge of military and economic management in Israel are not prepared to purchase high-tech products from Russia. The barriers that are hard to surmount are installed at the initial stage of participation in government tenders. The sector of government purchases is heavily controlled by the state, and it not likely that the control mechanisms will be relaxed in a foreseeable perspective. It is applicable primarily to the system of government tenders and standardization.

The procedure underlying tender management is fairly flexible. In some cases, there can be exceptions to the general rules governing the operation of open tenders. The law sets out many circumstances under which the tender may not be a mandatory procedure715.

The most important are listed below:

●The contractual amount is below NIS (Shekel) 42,000;

●The contract should be signed urgently;

●In some cases, an open tender can cause damage to the national security of Israel;

●As a result of the tender procedure, the state-owned company might incur losses, its competitive power might be reduced, it might face difficulty in complying with its public obligations. This caveat can provide a safe harbor for a substantial segment of the government sector, outside the competitive playing field and,

simultaneously, provide a guaranteed sales channel for the stateowned companies.

Apart from that, a possibility for conducting a selective tender is envisaged in the event that:

714Defense News, March 17, 2003.

715See: Gozlan v. Biet Shemesh Local Council. High Court Petition 368/76, 31 (i) P.D. 505, 511 (1976).

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price and transportation costs in Israel – CIF price);

●Based on the maximum price established by the laws regulating the pricing procedures;

●Based on the evaluation of the supplier;

●Based on the cost accounting practice.

One of the key features about the mechanism of defense procurement is that almost all tenders have a closed format or the tender procedure is not resorted to at all. The following list sets out a number of conditions under which a tender procedure cannot be used:

●the value of a procurement contract is below NIS 16.8;

●the products are purchased from the only national producer of a specific product or the only service provider or the only producer who is in possession of the expedient engineering capability and the R&D system;

●the innovative products that are purchased need to be subjected to testing;

●the procurement operation has been preceded by similar transactions (over the recent three years);

●there is an urgent need in these products;

●the services of innovative nature are purchased, the provision of such services requires a very high qualification of the supplier, know-how and especially trustworthy relations with the supplier;

●the disclosure of any information about the transaction can be detrimental to the national security, economy or foreign policies of Israel.

Moreover, the Minister of Defense can deviate from the rule of a mandatory tender procedure, if “this is required under the specific circumstances”. However, if a tender is held, it is a closed tender procedure, in the majority of all cases.

The pattern of government procurement allows to apply a direct selection method to suppliers, on a broad scale. Normally, such suppliers are large corporations with a leading status in the high-tech production industry, who have been engaged in long-term business relations with the Ministry of Defense or Army Command. The government procurement programs encourage the development of innovative business, primarily, in the state-owned military and industrial monopolies and large Israeli corporations of private sector engaged in the production of defense equipment and related products. The proliferation of market tools for the placement of government orders is hampered by personal connections of the military functionaries working for government agencies and the top management of the military and industrial corporations, as well