JP-NOVA-XXI_era_vek_2020

ЯПОНИЯ XXI NOVA: эраи век

«интернационализация» (кокусайка) все прочнее входит в обиход в Японии, что показывает, что современные японцы, особенно в городских конгломератах, привыкли к новой реальности: иностранные работники стали привычной частью повседневной жизни. Их труд востребован на малых и средних предприятиях, в сфере обслуживания и многихдругихсекторахэкономики.

В ноябре 2018 г., в то время, когда нехватка трудовых ресурсов стала ощущаться особенно остро в связи приближающими Олимпийскими Играми в Токио, парламент страны одобрил закон о разрешении въезда в Японии для работы 340 тысяч работников по новому типу «специальной визы для квалифицированных кадров» (токутэй гино биза), формально требующей подтверждения определенной квалификации, но не требующей диплома о среднемили высшем образовании.

Заключение. Второе десятилетие XXI в. стало переломным моментом в дискурсе о роли иностранной рабочей силы в двух восточноазиатских государствах. Сначала в Республике Корея в 2006 г., а затем и в Японии в 2018 г. рамки приема иностранных специалистов самой разной квалификации были существенно расширены, что позволяет говорить о появлении и развитии концепции иммиграционной политики в обеих странах. Изменилась и политика социальной интеграции внутри обоих государств. Концепция «многонациональной семьи» (multicultural family) в Республике Корея и региональная политика по «межкультурному сосуществованию» (табунка кёсэй сэйсаку) в Японии прошли испытание временем в течение двух первых десятилетий нового века и стали платформой для дальнейшей более детальной разработки концепций мультикультурного общества в обеихгосударствах.

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Список использованной литературы

1.Carvalho, Daniela de. Migration and Identity in Japan and Brazil: the Nikkeijin. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003.

2.Sonya Ryang & John Lie (eds.) Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009.

3.Tsuda, Takeyuki and Cornelius, Wayne A. Japan: Government Policy, Immigrant Reality, Controlling Immigration: a Global Perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, pp. 439-478.

4.Tsuda, Takeyuki. The Permanence of «Temporary Migration”: the “Structural embeddedness” of Japanese-Brazilian immigrant workers in Japan. The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 58, no. 3, August 1999, pp. 687-722.

5.Xiang, Biao. “Transplanting Labor in East Asia”, Yamashita et al., eds. Transnational Migration in East Asia, Senri Ethnological Reports 77 (2008), pp .175-186.

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The Main Issues of Japan-India political relations in the 1960s: Diverging Visions on Mutual Cooperation

In the early 1960s, the Cold War realities started to influence much the international relations in every part of the world. In the context of growing tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States the key countries of the Asian region were also supposed to take a distinct position in their foreign policy that would correspond to their national priorities. It is obvious that such “key players” as India and Japan continued to follow the basic concepts of their foreign policies that led to the divergence between the two countries.

It was India that turned to be one of the main organizers of the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, when the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was established. In broader meaning, the major issues of the Conference were the impact of decolonization, the problem of racial inequality, the countries contribution to peace and disarmament, which meant following a non-alignment policy in the Cold War conflicts1. In fact, India had taken the leading role in the NonAligned Movement among the Asian countries. Consequently, the Jawaharlal Nehru’s government stood for the political cooperation between various countries of the region in the matter of maintaining peace and security, regardless of their pro-American or pro-Soviet orientation.

As for Japan, it continued to adhere to the policy of strengthening and expanding the Japan-US military and political alliance that was officially established after the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was signed in 1960. According to the terms of the Treaty the national security of Japan was maintained by the US military presence in Japan. The Japanese government, in its turn, was virtually obliged to

1 Iurlov F.N., Iurlova E.S. Istoriia Indii. XX vek [The history of India. XX century]. Moscow, IV RAN, 2010, p.577.

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follow and support the foreign policy principles of the United States.

However, the "Security Treaty" conclusion caused a large-scale protest, which led to a deep political crisis in Japan. As the result, the Kishi government2 was forced to resign in late June 1960, and the next Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato ( ) formed a new government3. It is noteworthy, that mass demonstration’s participants, opposing the adoption of the Japan-US Treaty, called also to follow the principles of the Bandung Conference4 5.

On the other hand, Japanese officials continued to express skepticism about the idea of non-alignment. Even the Prime-Minister Ikeda once remarked in the context of SinoJapanese tensions over the border territories, that “only weak and small countries chose the middle course of noncommitment where important issues were concerned”6 . Possibly, the true meaning of the remark might be that such a powerful country as India was able to protect its national interests in other ways rather than following the nonalignment policy.

One should also take into account the both countries relationship with the superpowers, i.e. the USA and the USSR. Japan, as mentioned above, was involved in the strategic

2Kishi Nobusuke ( ) was a Japanese politician and the Prime Minister of Japan from 1957 to 1960.

3Iurlov F.N., Iurlova E.S. Ibid., pp. 320, 322.

4The Bandung Conference was the first large-scale Asian-African Conference, held in 1955, with the participation of the 29 newly independent countries. The Conference aimed at promoting Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and became an important step towards the creation of Non-Aligned Movement.

5Okatachi Kohei. Nichiin kankei sho:shi (The history of Japan-India relations in brief). . .Tokyo, «Asia Economy», 1969,

p. 91.

6 Narasimha Murthy P.A. India and Japan. Dimensions of their relations (historical and political). New Delhi, ABC Publishing House, 1986, p. 359.

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program of the US Asian policy. The government of India, in turn, could not but realize that the United States possessed large economic and military resources, and also supported India in its democratic development policies. However, from Indian perspective the “Western world” was directly connected with colonialism and imperialism, which contradicted the basic ideas of the Bandung Conference. For this reason, for the Indian Premier Nehru it was more preferable to intensify relationship with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the USSR could probably act as a counterweight to China in regards to the Sino-Indian tensions7. Thus, India preferred political rapprochement with the USSR rather than with the United States.

In general, in the beginning of the 1960s, both India and Japan officials’ attention was mostly paid to their internal problems. Since Japan was concerned about its rapid economic development the international relations issues, including deepening relations with the Asian countries, were not among the priorities of the Japanese government policy. India, on the contrary, had a poorly developed economic system that required significant modernization. Moreover, India had been facing the problem of territorial disputes with its neighbouring countries for several decades.

In this context, the second official visit of the Japanese Premier Ikeda to India, made in November 1961, had played far less important role than the visit of his predecessor Kishi in 1957.

During the summit meeting, Pandit Nehru expressed his hope to his Japanese counterpart that "convergence between Japan and India would not be limited only to the economic aspect, but would also expand to mutual cooperation in regard to contributing toward peaceful settlement of disputes, focusing especially on the Asian region” 8 . In addition, he pointed to the tendency for

7Iurlov F.N., Iurlova E.S. Ibid., p. 576.

8Okatachi Kohei. Ibid., p. 93.

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spreading the Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and expressed his concerns about the political isolation of India due to existing tensions with China. In these conditions, the rapprochement with Japan seemed, in Nehru's opinion, extremely important9.

Still, the Prime Minister Ikeda’s viewpoint turned out to be the opposite. He stated that the Japanese government’s attitude to the Chinese issue was different, so it did not intend to interfere or mediate in resolving the Sino-Indian border conflict. Moreover, he made it clear that, at the moment, Japan would adhere to the terms of the treaties of 195110 in its foreign policy.

At the same time, the Ikeda government paid special attention to its Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy towards developing countries in Asia. In this connection, the main purpose of Ikeda's visit was likely to persuade India to reconsider its foreign policy principles in exchange for a promise to increase Japanese economic assistance11.

The factors, mentioned above, did not contribute to the strengthening of mutual trust between the governments of Japan and India. Hence, the results of the Prime Minister Ikeda visit to India demonstrated the differences existing between the two countries leaders in their foreign policy views. It also had no any significant impact on the further bilateral political cooperation in a regional interaction process as a whole. This is evidenced by the fact that the next

9Ibid.

10This refers to the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan signed simultaneously with the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Some of the articles of the Security Treaty were reconsidered further, and the new Japan-US Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed in 1960.

11Molodiakov V.E., Molodiakova E.V., Markar’ian S.B. Istoriia Iaponii. XX vek [The history of Japan. XX century]. 2nd ed. Moscow, IV RAN, Kraft+Publ., 2009., pp. 343-344.

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official visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to India was made only 23 years later.

The first half of the 1960s turned to be a difficult period for India, in which it was involved in two military conflicts - the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965. It was the time when the Japanese government demonstrated clearly its position of non-involvement in any interstate conflicts of other countries, thereby making it clear that creating a comprehensive cooperation with any country of the Asian region is not among its political priorities.

Since the border dispute escalation between India and China12 in 1959, both countries had still been unable to come to an agreement on resolving the territorial conflict in the Himalayas. Eventually, in October 1962 the Chinese army crossed the border, broke through the Indian defense and moved deep into Indian territory, invading disputed territory along the Himalayan border13. In these circumstances the Prime Minister J. Nehru had to send official requests for support to the heads of friendly governments, including Japan. In his message Nehru said: “The present Sino-Indian border conflict is not just a mere local border clash. This incident is a full-scale military act of aggression by China against India. Therefore, we appeal to the solidarity and seek for help and support of all friendly countries"14.

Replying to this the Japanese Prime Minister expressed sympathy with India over the difficulties thrust upon it by Chinese military action but did not intend to go beyond extending moral support. It was a neutral position which

12This refers to the Sino-Indian border dispute over the sovereignty of the territory in the Himalayas. The so-called McMahon Line was recognized by the Simla Convention (1914) between British India and Tibet, without the agreement of China.

13Chinese troops invaded about 2000 mile-long territory in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line.

14Okatachi Kohei. Ibid., p.94.

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Japan took, unlike the support pledge by most other “free nations”15.

At the same time the Prime Minister Nehru sent a request for military support to the US President J. Kennedy. The US government was about to provide military assistance to India, when in November 1962 China declared a ceasefire and announced its withdrawal to the northern point of the McMahon Line. Although the Chinese army left the invaded territory in the northeast, China claimed its presence in the strategically important Aksan Chin area in the northwest. As a result, China demonstrated its military advantage over India16.

Soon after the Sino-Indian military conflict had come to its end, Premier Ikeda reiterated the official position of the Japanese government on the issue by saying that “Japan was not thinking of either stopping trade with China or cutting down its economic commitment to India”17 . Moreover, he preferred not to make any comments on whether China’s actions were aggression against India or not, and said the following: “….we are to decide ourselves what role we are to play in the Sino-Indian border dispute….we are willing to extend aid so long as it is not military”18.

Then, on December 10, the Prime Minister said in his foreign policy speech to the Diet: “The reality of the armed Sino-Indian clashes in the border dispute has demonstrated

how unrealistic are advocacy of neutralism and mere calls for peace”19.

From the above it should be noted that there was some hope in Nehru’s government that Japan, keeping in mind the appearance of Indo-Japanese relations in the postwar decade, might offer its support in a severe situation. For that reason it

15Narasimha Murthy P.A. Ibid., p. 376.

16Iurlov F.N., Iurlova E.S. Ibid., p. 684.

17Narasimha Murthy P.A. Ibid, p. 376.

18Ibid.

19Ibid.

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came as a surprise that Japan even did not expressed any intention to.

In this regard, an Indian researcher P.A. Narasimha Murthy discusses the reasons for Japan's refusal to support India in its military clash with China as the followings.

Firstly, “it was one of those rare occasions when the Japanese government was able to demonstrate to the political opposition that it could take independent action on specific international issues like the Sino-Indian conflict. Whereas the United States had responded favourably to India’s call for support, Japan was non-committal”20.

Secondly, “the Sino-Indian border conflict came at a time when China and Japan were about to carry their economic relations to a new stage. In the circumstances a neutral stand seemed the best way out – one which did not jeopardize Tokyo’s already acquired economic interests in India, and goodwill and markets which were about to be gained in China”21.

Thirdly, “Japanese public reaction to the conflict remained mild and non-committal, as the public were more concerned about the crisis in Cuba than the local conflict in the Himalayas. Thereby, it induced official policy to move in the same direction”22.

One could say that the border war of OctoberNovember 1962 provoked the Indian public to reconsider the country's foreign policy principles. The international isolation and the defeat that India experienced during the conflict shattered the Indian leader’s faith in Asian solidarity. As the result, the Prime Minister J. Nehru decided to pursue a policy of containing China's influence in Asia that led to deepening the cooperation with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Pandit

20Narasimha Murthy P.A. Ibid., p. 377.

21Narasimha Murthy P.A. Ibid., pp. 377-378.

22Narasimha Murthy P.A. Ibid., p. 378.

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Nehru never abandoned the idea of non-alignment in his foreign policy.

After the death of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri took over as Prime Minister of India. In the face of the formation of military ties between China and Pakistan and the first Chinese nuclear tests, conducted in 1964 and 1965, Shastri’s government proclaimed the State program for strengthening the defense capability of the country. It required both political and economic reforms, as well as renovation of the country's diplomacy. First of all, the new Indian government took measures to intensify military cooperation with both superpowers – the US and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Prime Minister Shastri held a course for deepening cooperation with the Asian region countries, among which Japan could become a priority one as a developed Asian country which was in alliance with the United States.

At the same time some Indian and other foreign politicians made proposals “to persuade the two countries to match their perceptions and move towards concerted diplomatic action in order to infuse confidence among other Asian nations. Moreover, taking into consideration the fact that the balance of power in Asia had been upset and peace was disturbed by China, a corrective measures an Asiatic defense consisting of India and Japan was necessary”23. Needless to say that there was no any idea to create an “integrated military alliance in free Asia, but a diplomatic coalition of the stronger powers, in other words, a countervailing power to restrain China”24.

However, in the beginning of the 1960s neither India nor Japan was interested in such conception. The reason was that both countries leadership considered the best way to withstand pressure from China was to build their own

23Narasimha Murthy P.A. Ibid., p. 380.

24Ibid., p. 381.

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