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in the era of the scientific revolution of the turn of the XIX-XX centuries, after a century reaches the point where uncertainty turns out to be the main characteristic of the real. Fluid, “flickering”, unpredictable reality is no longer able to play the role of the model with which knowledge is verified. Any attempt to determine the conformity of knowledge and reality of the inevitable is faced here with the need for some additional action: establishing or constructing that very sample (or image of reality) with which knowledge will be compared».490

However, we are very fortunate that we are dealing with law, even more so – that is explained by social constructionism, since “the establishment or construction of that very sample with which knowledge will be compared” has already taken place.

From the point of view of logic, interpretative judgments in jurisprudence (“whether” fact A is the subject of the legal rule B) may have the quality of truth or falsity. In such judgments, the subject and the predicate are the subject of relations under investigation and the “virtual” object of the legal norm, corresponding to the semantic space of values determined and limited by the “currency value”. The location of these objects in the system of expression (where the subject is, and where the predicate is) does not affect the fundamental significance of the logical operation. Furthermore, it is precisely in the sense of such an operation that we are interested in an isomorphic interpretation of the theory of correspondent truth. One can theoretically model, for example, the following judgments that clarify this logic: “A mobile phone number [object of relations] is personal data [a “virtual” object of law]...”; “The contract [object of relations] is a transaction [“virtual” object of the legal norm]...” etc. Moreover, in the area under consideration, for example, specifically: “Murdering of a computer game character [relationship] is not murder, provided for by Article 105 of the CrC of the Russian Federation [“virtual” object of legal norm]...” The second part of the last logical expression: “…because the killing of a computer game character [as a general rule] does not have “social currency value” and is of

490 Bakeyeva E.V. Ontological Concept of Truth in the Context of Postnonclassical Scientific Rationality // Proceedings of Vyatsky State University. 2012. No. 4. – P. 12.

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“fantasy nature”. Or, on the contrary, the reconstruction of an alternative example: “Unauthorized deletion of a computer game character [object the relationship] acquired with real money constitutes damage to property [“virtual” object of the legal norm], because such a character has “social currency value”, convertible into money as generalized symbolic media, and also functionally adequate to causing damage through illegal deletion of information, therefore the law can be applied to these relations”.

The example of “violence” in computer games (including cybersports) illustrates the problem of revealing a functional correspondence between the statement of violence as part of a subjective and objective social reality and the statement of violence, which constitutes a computer game event – we have already mentioned this in § 3.2 of Chapter 1 of this study, but we will give another illustration. As, for example, the President of the Russian Federation for Computer Sports, D.V. Smith, noted:

«The most popular game in Russian cybersports is Dota2. It competes in five-man teams. The game lasts for about an hour and includes pre-game training, where the guys select their own characters, who will be able to successfully withstand opponents. It is often accused of cruelty and violence. Yes, Dota is a game with fantasy characters who cast spells on each other and hit each other with swords on the head. But, first of all, it all goes not from the first person, but three-dimensional – looks like a normal cartoon. Secondly, for a professional cybersportsman, these visual details do not matter. He perceives his character as a set of numbers and functions – how many lives, weapons, skills, effects (highlighted by me – V.A.). In each graphic game you can set the minimum visual settings, most professional players do exactly as follows: it is information what is important, not beauty».491

Note that in the context of the present study and in the perspective under consideration, this opinion can be considered as an illustration of the lack of functional adequacy between the two statements.

Within such an approach, in a sense, the isomorphism of the functional features of the object of social relations is not so much a criterion of applicability of law as a tool for

491 Smith D.V. For a Child Who Spends a Lot of Time at a Computer, Cybersports is a Way Out // Mel. – [Electronic resource]. – [Site]. – URL: https://mel.fm/mneniye_eksperta/7604295–esport_eksperta/7604295–esport (accessed: 21.01.2019).

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selecting the objects of legal regulation when the scope of concept-words of a legal text is analyzed. Within the framework of systematic theoretical analysis we study the complex actual composition of social relationships and define the subjects isomorphic to “virtual” subjects of legal relations simulated by the norms of the applicable law. If we employ the criterion of isomorphism in this understanding, then the practical sense of using it, among other things, is expressed in the necessity to determine whether there are objects that correspond to the known value of a legal norm, having consistently studied the entire actual composition of social relationships. If there are such objects, then, most likely, there is also a socio-currency value (proceeding from the presumption of social and currency value in relation to those objects that fall within the area of “core” of a legal norm in the Hartian sense). Nevertheless, if there are no such objects in the actual composition at the first approximation, then it is necessary to use the “criterion of seriousness” to determine possible peripheral meanings of the concept-words used in the legal text.

What we are interested in is fantasy nature of functionality of the object in connection, inter alia, with the function of its virtual representation. It is clear that in the example of Minecraft the dynamite is fictional, even if the recipe is real. However, if its recipe is real, i.e. it can be used to make real dynamite, this information can have consequences for the real world, and thus the subject is “real” in terms of its direct or mediated functionality. L. Manovich singled out four key components of the new media objects – fractality, automation, variability, transcoding (see § 4 of Chapter 1 of this research). Under such conditions, it is difficult to assess the adequacy of the structure as such – everything is changeable (everything is not being, but becoming), but it is possible to assess the adequacy of the functional aspects of such a structure. To paraphrase the popular expression which corresponds to the common sense, “if something behaves as a property, it is property”. We emphasize that virtual property, which is the subject of turnover for real money, thus, in the framework of the proposed model is not fantasy, but

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quite real object of social relationship.492 Taking into account the methodology, it is impossible to say that the objects of virtual property are fantasy – they are quite real, if by fantasy not to understand the civil-law “thingness”, but the ability to form a part of civil turnover. Otherwise, we could easily say that the same fantasy is cashless money, uncertificated securities and a huge number of other objects of civil rights that have already become commonplace, which can, with a certain degree of conditionality, metaphorically493 be designated as res incorporales. That is, in a sense, they are, of course, of fantasy nature, but not in the special sense which corresponds to this research – these are quite real objects of intersubjective social reality, as well as virtual property in many online environments.

At the same time, even this “soft” version of the correspondent theory of truth, although it seems to be consistent with the problem at hand, does not seem to be the ideal solution to the task before us, including because it requires additional explanations and reservations in order to explain its legitimacy in its application in the legal argumentation, even in a kind of closed universum of law. Thus, for example, in the works of J. Austin494 it is possible to see a rejection of the isomorphism-based concept of correspondent truth in logic, since such an approach “projects the structure of our language onto the world”.495 And in general, criticism of the correspondent theory of truth makes us think about other criteria for establishing a link between concept-words and facts (among which, first of all, we are interested in the artifacts of media reality), which would make it possible to justify or reject the proposed hypothesis of functional adequacy as “criterion of reality” of the object of social relationships from the point of view of law.

492The example of virtual property, which is the subject of turnover for real money, is perhaps the most appropriate – in the case of it both convertible social and currency value and functional adequacy are obvious

493The author naively believes that such a number of reservations would prevent him from being criticized by the civilists, in the field of expertise of whom he embarrassingly enters.

494See e.g. Austin J. Truth / Supplementary Volume XXIV, 1950 [Electronic resource] // Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. The Virtual Issue No. 1. 2013. – [Site]. – URL: https://www.aristoteliansociety.org.uk/pdf/austin.pdf (accessed: 10.09.2019).

495Marian D. The Correspondence Theory of Truth.

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In view of this fact, let us try to interpret the problem not so much as the problem of logic as such, but as a related, albeit a special problem of interpretation of law. Thus, if we consider the problem of the semantic limits of law from the point of view of interpretation of legal texts and application of law, it can also be interpreted as a problem of interpretation of legal texts within the framework of Hart’s general analytical and legal methodological premise on the “core” and “penumbra” of word-concepts used in a legal text, reflected in the discussion with L. Fuller and further developed in the book “The Concept of Law” (1961). As noted by S.N. Kasatkin, “...the specificity of the language, according to the author, generates a fundamental incompleteness and uncertainty of law, the “open texture” of its rules, including both the “core” – a set of central, obvious meanings, and the “penumbra” – the area of borderline, unclear cases of use”.496 In the light of this methodology, controversial questions of extrapolation of legal texts on media reality artifacts form a “penumbra” of meanings. Such an interpretation of the problem appears to be legitimate in light of the problems of interpreting law as reflected in the legal collisions of the medial turn, as highlighted in this paper (see § 1 and § 2 of Chapter 1 of this study). As can be seen from the analysis of the writings of the thinker,

“Hart employs a theory of meaning for which any given concept-word distinguishes a core of certain, determinate meaning from a penumbra of uncertainty. On this account, every concept-word is a linguistic sign with both a definite meaning, and a set of imperfect, indeterminate meanings. Where the core meanings of the words constituting legal rules are sufficiently determinate to be applied decisively to a legal dispute, this is an ‘easy case’. Hart’s distinction asserts that the linguistic formulation of legal rules renders their meaning dependent on the meaning of concept-words used in these formulations. Meaning is determined by the function of a word in language. Hart argues that every word has standard instantiations where its application is conventionally accepted and its meaning is clear and determinate. This is the “core of meaning”. Where the application of a word to facts cannot be determined by the conventional rules of language, the meaning of that word may be said to be uncertain and indeterminate. This is Hart’s “penumbra of uncertainty”. In these cases,

496 Kasatkin S.N. The Main Work of Herbert L.A. Hart (to the Publication of the Russian Edition of the Book “The Concept of Law”) // Proceedings of Samara Humanitarian Academy. Series “Law”. – 2007. – No. 2. – P. 10.

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the relationship between fact and concept-word must be determined by non-linguistic standards and criteria, such as the presumed purpose or communication intention”.497

Thus, the interpretation of legal text, which implies the need to determine whether or not the object of social relationships, mediated by media reality, is within the scope of the possible meanings of concept-word used in it, as well as the subsequent application of law, requires a correspondence between such object and the term. In current socio-cultural conditions, the facts of media reality are on the periphery of the scope of legal texts. The definition of functional correspondence, in this sense, is the establishment, in terms of

“late” L. Wittgenstein, of “family resemblance” between the meanings related to easy cases of core meaning and facts of media reality located on the periphery. It is noteworthy that the thinker himself explained the concept of “family resemblance” on the example of the use of the word “game”:

“66. Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, cardgames, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games' "—but look and see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!—Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ballgames, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.—Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear.

And the result of this examination is: w T e see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

497 Thacker L.E. Interpretation and Legal Theory. A. Marmor Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, 193 pp. (Review) // Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies. – 1993. – Vol. 2. – P. 334.

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67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.— And I shall say: 'games' form a family”.498

At the same time, the notion of applicability of Wittgenstein’s ideas in jurisprudence, including directly to the field of problems of interpretation of legal texts, has been repeatedly criticized. Thus, for example, B. Bix notes that “the [Wittgenstein’s] rule-following considerations do not have any direct applications to law, at least not to the issues in legal interpretation to which Wittgenstein’s work is usually applied. The rulefollowing considerations are about the proper explanation of a phenomenon: the phenomenon of general agreement in practices regarding the simples terms and mathematical concepts… By contrast, law and legal interpretation seem, and seem obviously, to be some distance from the practices inspiring the rule-following considerations. Law and legal interpretation are not practices characterized by consensus or lack of disagreement. To the contrary, one might say that the practice of law is substantially, perhaps even pervasively contested. The question in legal interpretation is not how to explain agreement, but how to resolve disagreement”.499 B. Bix’s arguments are, at the very least, noteworthy. Moreover, as another cautious remark, we can note that Wittgenstein’s ideas reflected in the excerpt from “Philosophical Investigations” can only confuse the case if applied too literally – if the concept-words used in the legal text are not only ambiguous, but are also have “family resemblance” to others, it may complicate the reconstruction of a definite meaning.

498Wittgenstein L. Philosophical Investigations (1953) (in Russian) // Wittgenstein L. Philosophical Works. Part I. Transl. from German / Compilation and Introductory Article by M.S. Kozlova. Translation by M.S. Kozlova and Y.A. Aseev. – Moscow: Gnosis Publishing House, 1994. – PP 110–111.

499Bix B. Cautions and Caveats for the Application of Wittgenstein to Legal Theory [Electronic resource] / Law and Social Justice, Campbell, O’Rourke & Shier, eds, MIT Press, pp. 217–229 // Social Science Research Network. – [Site]. – URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=619123 (accessed: 10.09.2019).

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In the domestic research, the general and convincing counterarguments against this skepticism B. Bix, based on the notion of “the constructed nature of ontology of legal phenomena in the legal language”,500 were expressed by A.B. Didikin.501 Hence, if we consider the specific angle of this paper, in the methodology of analytical jurisprudence proposed by H. Hart, which is clearly intended specifically for the purposes of interpreting the law, the concept of “family resemblance” is used as a legitimate tool. This is most clearly seen in the example of interpretation of the concept of law by one of the main advocates of the approach proposed by the British author – A. Marmor – directly in the context of the problems of interpretation of law, presented by the latter in the book “Interpretation and Legal Theory” (2005).502 It should be noted that the approaches proposed by H. Hart are still relevant today, having been criticized, among others, by such influential lawyers as L. Fuller503 and R. Dworkin.504

In the light of A. Marmor’s interpretation, the conception of H. Hart can be expressed as follows. The use of natural language for the formulation of legal norms predetermines the dependence of the meaning of these norms mainly depends on the concept-words used in the relevant legal texts.505 Logical conceptions (e.g., of syllogism) apply only to relations between rules or expressions, not their relativity to the world.506 In the words of H. Hart himself, “logic remains silent on how to qualify particulars”, but that is where the problem of “core and penumbra” lies.507 To determine the meaning of words it

500Didikin, A.B. Interpretation of the Problem of Rule Following the in the Analytical Philosophy of Law // Proceeds of the Tomsk State University. Philosophy. Sociology. Political science. – 2015. – No. 2. (30). – P. 85.

501See Didikin, A.B. Interpretation of the Problem of Rule Following the in the Analytical Philosophy of Law // Proceeds of the Tomsk State University. Philosophy. Sociology. Political science. – 2015. – No. 2. (30). – PP. 83–89.

502Marmor A. Interpretation and Legal Theory. 2nd Ed. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005. – 179 p.

503Ibid. PP. 99–106.

504See: Kasatkin S.N. The Removability of the “Open Texture” of Law: Three Remarks by R. Dworkin // Legal Paradigm. – 2019. – Vol. 18. – No. 1. – PP. 93–98.

505Marmor A. Interpretation and Legal Theory. P. 97.

506Ibid. P. 98.

507Ibid.

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is acceptable to use the conception of “family resemblance”,508 based on the “core” meaning of concept-word, which is determined by self-evident examples of the use of the word in real practice,509 which form the criterion (in a special sense of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language510) for determination of the meaning of the concept-word that is of interest to us.511 Up to this point, A. Marmor’s reasoning seems to us sufficiently clear, consistent and applicable in practice. However, the question arises: the criteria for defining the concept-word in normal cases of natural language use and in cases where natural language is used to express legal norms should be different, which is indirectly confirmed by the empirical material of this study (see § 2 and § 3 of Chapter 1). In our view, analysis A. Marmor does not provide an explicit answer to the question about the criteria for the interpretation of legal texts and the application of the law.

However, from all the previous research, it follows that the legally significant criterion for determining “family resemblance” is expressed in functional correspondence. Based on common sense, functionality itself is defined by how the object of social relations can be used by actors (subjects of law) in an intersubjective social reality. With this approach, if, for example, a social institution of trade in virtual objects – artifacts of media reality – has been formed, then we can establish “family resemblance” between such objects and the central meaning of the legal term “property”. It should also be taken into account that new media are defined by such qualities as fractality, automation, variability, and transcoding (L. Manovich), and this, in most cases, predetermines the impossibility of structural correspondence of the artifacts of modern media reality and the central meaning of the concepts of legal texts that are focused on the establishment of technologically neutral rules of conduct. In the context of the research, the concept of functional

508Ibid. PP. 100–101.

509Ibid. P. 101.

510For an overview of criteria and symptoms in Wittgenstein’s terminology, see e.g: Loreti A. L. Wittgenstein on the Concepts of “Criterion” and “Symptom” // Philosophy of Education. – 2015. – Vol. 5 (62). – PP. 58–64.

511Marmor A. Interpretation and Legal Theory. P. 102.

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correspondence is opposed to the “fantasy nature” of the object of social relationships in relation to the legal reality. It is necessary to emphasize that in the context of this work, we are not talking about the fantasy nature of the object as such (in virtual reality, all objects are to some extent fantasy), but about the fantasy nature of representing the key functional properties of the object in virtual reality (i.e., what the objects “do” rather than “how they look”). In fact, the criterion in question is designated as the “the criterion of reality” because objective law, by definition, is not possible as a simulacrum (see § 5 of Chapter 1 of this study).

However, the main rationale for functional correspondence as a criterion for determining “family resemblance” and as a “criterion of reality” in the context of this work is systematically related to the “criterion of seriousness”. The non-absurd scope of legal regulation is determined by the objects of social relationships which have convertible socio-currency value.512 The presence of such a value implies that the object is nothing but an external referent of value (significance) of a generalized symbolic medium. In turn, both in the conception of T. Parsons and in the works of later authors mentioned in the study, such significance is expressed in the special quality of generalized symbolic media, allowing them to act as means of communication – of the communication of values, i.e. the performance of their certain functions in the system of social exchange through external value referents. This may be the rational explanation for the common sense expression “if something behaves as a property, this is property” mentioned before. Thus, both criteria are naturally interrelated. At the same time, although in essence each of the criteria is explained by one methodological approach, which goes back to the concept of generalized symbolic media, the meaning and significance of these criteria are different. Thus, the

512 In our view, the following conclusion is correlated with this idea: “Although has effectively punctured any notion that standard instance or core meaning is impervious to context and the value-systems inherent in manifest legislative purpose, a concept of standard instance or core meaning is indispensable to setting outer limits (emphasis added – V.A.) on potential meaning and, indeed, even to the revelation of legislative purpose itself”. Dickerson R. Statutory Interpretation: Core Meaning and Marginal Uncertainty // Missouri Law Review. – 1964. – Vol. 29. – P. 11.