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interacting with each other. Hence, a theoretical possibility to apply economic analysis to anything that potentially has social currency value according to the initial intuitive hypothesis is not excluded, as this does not exclude the principle of convertibility in the terminology of this study. It is another matter that it is not possible to absolutize the possibility of increasing social capital in one institutional area at the expense of another such area, and to consider the fundamental possibility of converting one intermediary into another as an expression of the nature of one such intermediary. In other words, the fact that power can be obtained through influence (i.e. it is possible to convert influence into power) does not and should not tell us anything about the nature of power, nor about the nature of influence, but only demonstrates certain possibilities of “symbolic exchange” between social actors. Figuratively speaking, the mechanisms of abstraction underlying the generalized symbolic media belonging to different institutional areas represent a “black box” to each other, but at the same time interaction is possible between them – or rather, they can mediate a kind of interaction, communication, between social actors

That being said, we are interested in the question of which object of social relationships exactly shall be analyzed from the standpoint of the concept of the semantic limits of law in order to make a conclusion about its seriousness or unseriousness, reality or fantasy, and hence on the possibility to interpret and apply the law in such a way that the object falls under the scope of legal regulation in cases of “borderline situations of legal interpretation” (as far as the case concerns creating new legal rules, we shall mostly be interested in seriousness and unseriousness of the object). The economic theory can provide answers to these questions as well. A demonstrative, although [intentionally] naïve, yet precise textbook “The Basics of Economy” suggests the following as a response to an objection that “there is no thing that cannot be measured, where monetary units are universal measurement instrument, but not an end in itself”:

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«You have surely heard many times that life is invaluable. However, we often put this treasure at risk. By purchasing cheaper goods of inferior quality, choosing unreliable but accessible means of transport, living in polluted city center nearby our work, or just crossing the street at the red traffic light, because we do not want to wait for the green one, we put ourselves under additional risk. One more minute of waiting becomes for us more important than the value of life, multiplied by risk to lose it under the wheels of a car. What is the reason for that? The reason lies in the necessity of choice. You remember that the resources in possession of certain human being and society are generally limited, and in order to receive something you need to sacrifice something else. In this sense, everything has its value. It is what we need to sacrifice what is the price of what we want to receive”.475

The object in this case is likely not the invaluable human life itself, but something in respect of which we determine the value. Let us emphasize, however, that we are not interested in abstract economic models of value of an arbitrary object (such models, indeed, could be created in respect of everything – however, in such a case we would also face a question of absurdity, but this time in economics, not law), but in monetary value or in the value within a conventional value system related to other generalized symbolic media.

Based on the example of computer games we, therefore, can come to a conclusion that playing a computer game is sometimes (but not always and not in all aspects) a matter of rational choice between joy and health, or, better, joy and time – this time that could be invested into career, or love etc. That is why in this case an immediate object of social relationship (that can be assessed economically, converted into money, and then – into other external referents of value of generalized symbolic media) – is not “computer games in general” and not “playing computer games in general”. The special object of social relationship that can be regulated by law without breaking its semantic limits, is time that a human being, who could have certain obligations imposed by law, spends in a computer game. In this case, a prohibition to play computer games during worktime would not be

475 Boyko M. The Basics of Economics. – Moscow: Nobel Press, Print on Demand, 2015. – 470 p. [Electronic resource] // The Basics of Economics. – [Site]. – URL: http://azy– economiki.ru/docs/the_basics_of_Economics.pdf/_basics_of_of_Economics.pdf/ (accessed: 06.02.2019). PP. 12-13.

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absurd. This kind of prohibition would be a subject-matter of “weighing” the constitutional values. In the conditions where everyone is guaranteed with the right to leisure time, freedom of information and freedom of access to cultural heritage, such kind of prohibition in off-work time would not be legal – but this is the “second” area of the semantic limits of law that implies such kind of “weighing”. However, the prohibition to act in a certain way within the game itself, provided that such actions do not imply potential converting of the external referents of value (for example, selection of the in-game development path of a game character that forms a part of game process) would be blatantly absurd, as well as prohibition or other regulation of the process of receiving aesthetical pleasure from the process of playing a game. The examples of this kind could easily be continued.

That being said, since money – is a generalized symbolic media, the external referent of value is commodity. In case a special object of social relationships may be subject to theoretical commodification, then law could regulate it, because this would confirm its status as an external referent of value. Therefore, if we take money as the main illustrative (but not principal and not the single one) example, we also have to take into an account the concept of commodification.

A vocabulary definition suggests that commodification is:

«…the process during which more and more kinds of human activity receive monetary value and de facto become commodities that are bought and sold on the market. A theoretical ground for this idea is found in the works by Karl Marx who asserted that capitalism is selfexpandable economic system that requires more and more commodification. Capitalism, therefore, leads to substitution of spiritual and human values by the monetary ones”.476

476 The definition is given in the following edition: Sociological Dictionary (in Russian) / N. Abercrombie, S. Hill, B.S. Turner. – Moscow: Economics, 2004. Cited by: Commodification. What is Written in the Dictionary [Electronic resource] // Strelka Institute. - [Site]. - URL: https://strelka.com/ru/magazine/2016/03/28/vocabulary-commodification (accessed on 06.02.2019). In connection with the reference to K. Marx, it makes sense to emphasize that a critical rethinking in the light of the concept of generalized symbolic media of some theories which may seem to have lost their relevance at first glance, may have methodological potential. For example, in 1982, V.V. Lapaeva, analyzing K. Marx, in her analysis concluded: “For the circulation of paper money, it is necessary that the sign of money receives social significance (emphasis added – V.A.). It is carried out by means of legislation and state coercion, thanks to which the paper symbol receives a compulsory course...” etc. See: Lapaeva V.V. Legal Issues in K. Marx’s “Capital”. – M.: Yurid. Lit., 1982. – С. 90

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We, however, have to emphasize that within this research, within the limits of sociological theory of generalized symbolic media and the accompanying model agnosticism, commodification as an instrument of defining the semantic limits of law is not aimed to facilitate substitution of spiritual and human values at all – using of the “commodification method” is absolutely instrumental. Even more so, instead of transforming of other external referents of value into commodities, we can classify commodities from the standpoint of other systems of generalized symbolic media (for instance, political power or love). In social reality and, all the more, in theoretical modelling such systems can well-coexist as ‘frames’ mentioned in game studies that could be switched between when necessary.

Returning to the commodification per se, there are a few good examples by E. Korotkova:

«The commodification of space, to make long story short, – is transformation of space into commodity, determination of its value, sale, purchase etc. You don’t sell just a house, but a house in specific place. In essence, this space becomes the same commodity as real-estate property. In this sense, commodification of space and gentrification are neighboring concepts. You transform the very space into a commodity, an expensive commodity, and because of its high value citizens of not that modern and fresh houses can no longer allow themselves to live in this place. I.e. they have money for an apartment, but not for the “space”… One of the more topical examples of commodification is presented by paid parking on the Moscow streets. In the essence, something that was not ever defined previously became a commodity – free parking space. Now you rent it from the city for certain fee. The same story happened with renting of the part of pedestrian walks for summer terraces of cafes: something that earlier was considered belonging to all free of charge became tradeable and exchangeable for money”.477

477 Commodification. What the Experts Say [Electronic resource] // Strelka Institute. - [Site]. - URL: https://strelka.com/ru/magazine/2016/03/28/vocabulary-commodification (accessed on 06.02.2019). R. Pozner also wrote about the possibility of “calculating” the economic value of individual legal artifacts (which is not surprising in the context of the methodology of economic analysis of law), see: Pozner R.A. Economic Analysis of Law: In 2 Volumes (in Russian). Saint Petersburg: Economic School, 2004. – Vol. 2. – P. 719.

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Based on such premises it is not hard to notice that in a “normal situation” (in a situation where there are no grounds to raise an intuitive hypothesis on breaking of the semantic limits of law) the law itself, and, first of all, civil law serves the direct instrument of imperative commodification. For instance, the institution of intellectual property directly commodifies creativity. But this view is quite customary and does not raise major surprise. What is more interesting is that the institution of compensation of moral harm can thus be seen as an experience of commodification of other generalized symbolic media – following the real practice, this case may concern a broad range of examples, from health and knowledge to love and loyalty.

In conclusion of this paragraph, we have to emphasize one again that modeling of commodification is a theoretical instrument, and not a response to the question regarding the nature of relationships. In the process of discussing of this work, one of the critics suggested the following party provocative question. If presence of convertible social currency value is a quality that allows explaining when it is not absurd to apply or create law, then how this approach would work in respect of criminal law restrictions related to deeds encroaching the sexual freedom and sexual integrity of persons? Would violence that comprises an objective side of the corresponding deeds constitute some social currency value? The answer is – no, it is not violence. What the methodology developed in this research would consider as the object of social relationships in this aspect, would be sexual freedom and sexual integrity as they are. In this case, it would be those aspects that would be considered as having social currency value. Such a value, indeed, may in theory be converted to money (by a way than everyone knows), and, although such a convertation would be amoral, it would work as a theoretic instrument.

In the end of this paragraph lets us refer to what S. Abrutyn himself wrote about conversion.

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«Generally speaking, in an ideal world, GSM (generalized symbolic media – V.A.) would circulate alongside each other with little tension: Priests are paid a salary, and thus money in the form of wages would circulate alongside sacredness/piety, but would maintain a reasonable and safe distance. Religion, in other words, would never acquire the logic of economics».478

However, the author emphasizes that it is not always the case in real life. First, «where two GSM with the same mode of orientation circulate beside each other, and the foreign GSM dominates the indigenous GSM, we can talk of corruption».479 A clear example of corruption can be seen in a case where in law or politics such GSM as money is used instead of political power or justice correspondingly. Second, when different modalities of orientation are confused and the instrumental one starts to dominate over the moral one, we can raise a question of “pollution”:

«Money, or ERVs [external referents of value] connected to it, like toys, can be advertised to working mothers as a solution to the time crunch preventing them from giving love and loyalty to their children in the prescribed normative way. Love, in this situation, becomes a servant of money, as the cultural and material components of the latter compete or supplant the former in real social relationships».480

Thus, the methodology that follows from the concept of generalized symbolic intermediaries allows us to identify those subjects of social relationships which can be significant in the legal sense. In other words, as it follows from the general context of this study, the common sense in determining the range of possible objects of legal regulation is expressed in the convertible socio-currency value of these objects. This approach, which reflects the methodological search sequence expressed in the present study, answers the question of what can in principle be included in the field of the legal or, in more dogmatic terms, constitute a subject of legal regulation.

478Abrutyn S. Money, Love, and Sacredness: Generalised Symbolic Media and the Production of Instrumental, Affectual, and Moral Reality // Czech Sociological Review. – 2015. – Vol. 51. – No. 3. – P. 460.

479Ibid. P. 461.

480Ibid.

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§ 4. The criterion of functional adequacy or “fantasy nature” of object of social relationships

As it follows from all of the previously mentioned discussions, the criterion of “seriousness” of object of social relationships is persuasively relevant to the cases when we need to determine whether or not it is possible to extend legal regulation to some, and first of all “new”, objects of social relationships (an example of which, as we will see later, may be, for instance, smart robots, tradeable big data and other phenomena of digital economy as reflected in a number of publications of the author of this research). However, in cases of “borderline situations” of legal interpretation, or in other words – “areas of penumbra”, where certain legal rules that are potentially applicable or not applicable to new social relationships exist, the problem of the following nature arises. If we take as the sole criterion the criterion of seriousness, we will not have a clear way to discern to which of the current legal norms such a “serious” subject corresponds. If, however, we will try to employ an alternative criterion of correspondence between our object of interest and its description in hypothesis or disposition of legal norm as the sole criterion, we will not reach clarity on the matter of whether or not we shall extend the norm in question to such a new object. In other words, the “criterion of seriousness” makes it possible to determine the significance of the object of legal regulation, but does not provide an opportunity to establish and explain a semantic connection with a particular concept used in the legal text.

The previously mentioned problem was formulated already in application to the example of blocking of website containing imaginary (game-related) recipe of “dynamite” in Minecraft computer game based on the norms that do not contain specific criteria of assessment. The flow of discussion was as follows. Let us assume that the main criteria for solving of the collision lies in the fact that such a “recipe” is not related to any social institution in social constructivist sense at all (such an approach was reflected in the initial hypothesis). Even if we explicate this initial view to a degree of specification that

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presupposes assessment of convertible “social currency value”, we may find some contradictions. Yes, the “recipe” of such dynamite itself cannot be used to create a real explosive substance, but the game that, at the same time, is played by millions of people worldwide, cannot avoid having at least some convertible social value at least in some aspect. Moreover, many players create and maintain social institutions connected exclusively to creating objects in virtual world (i.e. there are social institutions). Looks like a deadlock. Let us try to approach the problem from the other side. Assume that the case is solely related to the fact that the recipe of dynamite is not real (running ahead of the story, we can say that the recipe is “fantasy” or missing functional adequacy). Let us then try to build up argumentation from the contrary. If the recipe of dynamite were real, would it clearly say that the website should be blocked? It has to be emphasized that the case implies absence of direct legislative criteria for blocking of such kind of information, in contrast to, for example, certain situations related to illegal drugs. But something seems wrong here is well – if we consider this case as an illustration of a broad case of potentially illegal and/or publicly dangerous information, the necessity of blocking is not apparent – for instance, we can decide that such information for certain reasons should be permitted. After this twist of the discussion the issue in general transforms into the issue of whether or not it is possible to limit dissemination of artistic (non-serious, playful, imitating – i.e. a simulacrum of its kind) information that contains references to real objects, or it would contradict to the principle of freedom of creativity? If the question is formulated in this way, it becomes clear that in “borderline situations” of legal interpretation, there should actually be several criteria that shall be applied simultaneously. It is because of this that we now would like to develop the second criterion of functional adequacy. In its turn, we see the concept of “fantasy nature” as the opposite one to the functional adequacy, which is used in law mostly in narrow sense related to the quality of innovation in application to trademarks.

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What is “fantasy nature”? To being with, let us try to go from the contrary. Thus, for instance, the N.N. Menshikova, the author of the article “The Category of Fantasy Nature in Science” admits that fantasy nature is “one of the mental categories of those who participate in cognition of both real and imaginary worlds”.481 As N.N. Menshikova says, the category of fantasy nature may be interpreted in broad and in narrow sense. In broad sense, fantasy nature “reflects the ability of language and thought to discern essential qualities of real world by means of referring to internal subjective individual world of a human being”.482

In a narrow sense, fantasy nature “is associated with artistic fiction, with literary genres, as well as with styles in painting and architecture (the concept of “fantastic” architecture by P. Florensky)”.483 As the main approach for consideration, the author chooses a broad interpretation of fantasy nature. However, this approach does not clarify the meaning of the term “fantasy nature” in the context of the present study, since it actually implies the identification of the terms “of fantasy nature” and “imaginary”, and we would prefer to use different terms to designate: imaginary,484 again, in a broad sense, refers to the properties of consciousness, including, in particular, the reconstruction of an object in consciousness, and such a reconstruction will not necessarily be fantasy. Quite typical, in this sense, is P. Ricoeur’s quotation, which N.N. Menshikova provides:

«To imagine is not to have a mental image of something, but to reveal connections by means of imaging».485

481 Menshikova N.N. Category of Fantasy in Science // Proceedings of Chelyabinsk State University. 2008. No. 36.

P. 95.

482Ibid.

483Ibid.

484In the context of this study, the “imaginary” is a virtual model of a real-world object.

485Ibid. P. 99.

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Again, we note that here we are talking more about clarifying conventional terms in the context of the present study, and not trying to identify some “objective” meaning of terms that probably not even exists. I.e. we talk here about application of the method of analytical philosophy.

In search of the solution for the problem posed, let us assume that the description of the criterion of functional adequacy or fantasy nature of functionality of the object of social relationships through an interpretation of the concept of correspondent truth in logic, referring to isomorphism, has certain prospects.486 In this context, it is a distinction between the two interpretations of the correspondent theory of truth proposed by D. Marian in the source cited in the preceding footnote: “correspondence as correlation” and “correspondence as isomorphism”.487 A stricter option (correlation) implies that “every truth correspond to exactly one fact”, while “different truths correspond to different facts”.488 A softer option implies that “truthbearers and facts are both complex structured entities: truthbearers are composed of (other truthbearers and ultimately of) words, or concepts; facts are composed of (other facts or states of affairs and ultimately of) things, properties, and relations”.489 Hence, the correspondence is determined by the relation between the parts of truthbearers, on the one hand, and facts, on the other.

In turn, according to E.V. Bakeeva,

«...everything changes at that moment when this invariant itself (along with its ontological assumptions) becomes questioned. This problematicity deprives all the concepts of truth, formulated within the framework of a gnoseologic orientation, from being convincing at once. The first and foremost of them, the correspondent, reveals its doubtfulness only insofar as it loses the stability of the concept of reality. The virtualization process of reality, which began

486When applying this theory, a set of ideas and interpretations is implied, which do not significantly go beyond the common places of the science of logic, as, for example, they are described in the following exhaustive generalization: Marian D. The Correspondence Theory of Truth [Electronic resource] // Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. – [Site]. – URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#6 (accessed: 03.10.2018).

487Ibid.

488Ibid.

489Ibid.