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passively allow or actively speaking for an independent value of virtual objects (virtual property). It is interesting that such practice is no longer considered as absurd, although it is not [yet] universal. Furthermore, we believe that the response to the questions of whether it is possible to apply law to this area of relationships shall be based on the same methodology as in the previous case – because both cases concern virtual reality as a phenomenon of the medial turn. It is, however, clear that in the conditions of a developed virtual economy the assessment of the degree of absurdity of application of property law rules to virtual property would vary from the case with murder. In this regard, it would be appropriate to recollect that, for instance, A.I. Savelyev and other authors in general do not exclude the possibility of application of the rules related to property or specifically the rules on ownership title by analogy to the relationships concerning virtual property.465 In other words, while the previous case concerning murder seems to us absurd, the deeper we go into the RF CrC, the less absurd the application of real law to virtual relationships seems to us. In the case of theft, we would already have some doubts that such application of law would be absurd. Moreover, in case of crimes related to dissemination of information there would likely be no doubts except for some degree of uncertainty in very special cases like those that touch the topic of imaginary, humorous or artistic information.

3) The example of application of the anti-terrorist legislation in respect of the relationships concerning disseminating a “recipe” of dynamite from Minecraft computer game, where the corresponding Internet site was firstly blocked and then unblocked. This example is exactly what develops the logic of the comment to the previous situation. The legal rule in this case is aimed to limit dissemination of information. At first glance, we see information that corresponds to the criteria set forth by the respective normative legal acts. However, an intuitive feeling of absurdity was strong both in Roskomnadzor and in the

465 See: Savelyev A.I. Legal Nature of Virtual Objects Purchased for Real Money in Multiplayer Online Games // Civil Law Herald. 2014. No. 1. P. 127–150.

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court because the law enforcement decision was reconsidered. Nevertheless, how the final legal qualification could be explained? It is this question that is the closest one to the idea that is suggested in this paragraph as a result of reconsideration of the concept of the magic circle in law.

Let us build up argumentation from the contrary and try to apply the known principles that may form a foundation of the magic circle concept in respect of each of the examples.

1.The principle implying qualification of the relationships (game or non-game).

This principle does not give real clarity to the question of whether or not it is possible to apply law in the situations in question. Metaphorically speaking, both in the cases mentioned above, and in other hypothetical cases the game goes far beyond narrow “playfield” and at the same time can be interrupted at any given moment when the parties decide to stop playing. The very last fact indicates that the general cultural quality of activity is not defining – what is defining is determining of the moment and conditions when a game stops to be a game.

2.The principle of subjective side (attitude towards the events in virtual world). This principle, suggested by B. Duranske, seems to be quite acceptable prima facie, but unfortunately, it breaks upon the rocks of further development of the thought experiment. This principle works in the simplest cases. For instance, let us assume that a subject, playing a live action role-playing game, relying on the assumption that her actions are strictly within the limits of the game, nevertheless inflicts wound to another player with a real, or even a decorative, sword. Even though the subject may deny the intent, she would hardly deny certain other forms of guilt. An understanding that a slice made with a corresponding object applied to another human being may lead to a wound comprises a part of self-evident common sense. Real objective harm to social relationships can be inflicted in virtual space even without realizing it – e.g. by way of leading other player to

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committing suicide. However, even in this case the application of law would be defined by classic concepts of corpus delicti. Real problems with application of this principle emerge where the law is applied in a way that it affects the interests of certain subjects but does not imply taking into an account considerations of subjective side at all – like in those cases where websites are subject to blocking in Russia.

3. The principle of consent (consent to virtual nature of the relationships). The argument by J. Fairfield, just like the argument by B. Duranske, seems to be quite workable, but also in certain and narrow number of situations that pertain to the area of dispositive civil law regulation. Players of a game or participants of other kind of virtual communication may come to an agreement that appropriation of virtual property, according to rules of the game, does not lead to real consequences. However, this can be limited only to those cases where the virtual property is, again, unserious and unreal. In criminal law, a subject cannot give a consent to theft in such way that it would remove the criminality of action, although later the injured party may, for instance, avoid raising a civil claim in criminal proceedings. Furthermore, if we consider more severe examples that may e.g. be connected to deprivation of life, the question of consent would seem to be quite irrelevant in a more apparent way.

Thus, we presume that the aforesaid discussion quite precisely pushes us to the idea that what is essential in order to identify absurdity in interpretation and application of legal rules (as well as in the process of modelling in course of creation of law) are the qualities of the object of legal relationships, and not any other circumstance that relate to communication between people. The communication is always real, but whether it is serious or not – that also depends, inter alia, on the object of the relationships.

How to discern such an object? It could be found in the focus of intersubjective and communicative dimension of virtual reality that is reconstructed by means of the social relationships in question. For instance, computer virtual worlds may be seen as

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works of technical art, but we have to look for an object that may potentially become an object of social relationships where social communication is developing dynamically.

§ 2. The criterion of seriousness or non-seriousness of object of relationships: “sociocurrency value”

Thus, the assessment of the “seriousness”466 or “unseriousness” of the object of social relationships for the purpose of determining the semantic limits of law should be applied not to social relationships as such or their model, but to the object of such relationships. Anticipating the following reasoning, we immediately express the main idea: if the object of such relations bears the “social and currency value” (or, “socio-currency value”) of a generalized symbolic medium, then such an object should be qualified as “serious”, and if not, then as “unserious”. In the context of the positions of modern sociology, as well as T. Parsons and S. Abrutyn themselves as key authors in this approach, it is not difficult to distinguish one type of objects from another, at least in theory – the object should not just be of any private subjective value (including material), but to represent an expression of a certain generalized value, which in this case can

466 The possible criticism of such a choice of the name for the criterion, based on the fact that the word “seriousness” implies a subjective attitude rather than an intersubjective quality as compared to the term “significance” would have been better, does not seem convincing. “Significance” may also well be subjective. It is also important that the contrast between playful and seriousness is recognized in game studies, which are an essential part of the methodology of the approach discussed in this article. See for example: Rodriguez H. The Playful and the Serious: An approximation to Huizinga's Homo Ludens [Electronic resource] / Game Studies. The International Journal of Computer Game Research. 2006. Vol. 6. Issue 1 // “Game Studies”. – [Site]. – URL: http://gamestudies.org/0601/articles/rodriges (accessed: 25.07.2019). Besides, the choice of the term is conditioned, first of all, by the antonymous connotations characteristic for the context of game culture, which in itself speaks about its semantic relevance. The definitions given to the word “seriousness” in dictionaries also confirm this possibility. For example, one of the meanings of the word “serious” according to the Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian language by S.I. Ozhegov and N.Y. Shvedova is “requiring close attention, fraught with important consequences, dangerous”. See: Ozhegov S.I., Shvedova N.Yu. Ed. 4th. M., 1997 [Electronic resource] // “Slovorod.ru”. – [Site]. – URL: http://www.slovorod.ru/dic- ozhegov/ozh-s.htm#_sje (accessed: 25.07.2019). Similar and context-specific interpretations can be found in English. For example, “serious” is defined, inter alia, as “pertaining to important things rather than trivial matters” or “not joking or trifling” and “seriousness” as “the condition of being grave and of involving serious consequences”. See: Seriousness [Electronic resource] // The Free Dictionary. - [Site]. - URL: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Seriousness (accessed: 25.07.2019).

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potentially be converted into another value. I.e. it must be an external referent of value in the terminology of S. Abrutyn.

The following line of discussion by H. Treviño can indirectly explain this thesis. As he notes, money and social approval are different media of social exchange, and we should not consider monetary reward itself as social approval. As T. Parsons suggested, the four media of interaction are exactly symbolic and not just material rewards. Furthermore, T. Parsons refers to J. Olds psychological experiments on laboratory rats that confirm that even animals are able to appreciate symbolic rewards, and not just food as a material object. 467 To emphasize this idea, H. Treviño makes reference to the words of T. Parsons who said that in his terminology money and social approval are generalized media of interaction, while food or technical help are not. The empirical proof of this idea lies in the fact that, according to J. Olds and other researchers, educational processes of laboratory rats can be rewarded by electric stimulation of the pleasure mechanism of brain rather than objects, which can satisfy natural needs.468

The author of the present study expressed a general conclusion about the criterion of seriousness in the article “Computer Games, ‘Magic Circle’ and Semantic Limits of Law” as follows:

«In the context of this paper, therefore, it is clear that money (“real” or “fiat”) was not by chance the main “trigger” for discussions about the possible extent to which law might interfere with social relations taking shape in virtual worlds and online multiplayer games. Money is a classic example of a generalized symbolic media. Therefore, it is not surprising that the intuitive feeling that when “virtual” relations are invaded by relations involving “real” money, the application of law is possible, because money itself is a generalized symbolic media, and therefore the situation in the sociological, and now in the legal sense, is quite serious. However, there are other generalized symbolic media corresponding to their social subsystems, at least power and influence. Also, we believe it is quite clear that in real social communication, just as money is expressed in a certain form (physical

467Treviňo J., Talcott Parsons Today. His Theory and Legacy in Contemporary Sociology / Ed. by A. Javier Treviňo, Foreword by Neil J. Smelser. – Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001. – P. 196.

468Cited by: Treviňo J., Talcott Parsons Today. His Theory and Legacy in Contemporary Sociology. – P. 196.

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objects – coins, banknotes, etc. or information – information about the state of a bank account, electronic wallet, etc.), although their meaning is symbolic, and other generalized symbolic intermediaries, in order to be communicated or expressed, need some form. In today’s information culture and in the light of the objectives of this study which is partly disclosed in this paper, these are, above all, information in digital form. And just as money, in the sense of a generalized symbolic media, can take on a variety of forms – not necessarily legitimatized coins and banknotes, but also obligations expressed in the free wording of the treaty – so too can power and, for example, influence be expressed in a very specific subject of the relationship – say, in a satirical cartoon. It follows from all this that not every such subject, object or form has “socio-currency value”.

Thus, the subject matters of relations, not the relations themselves, may or may not have “socio-currency value”, i.e. they may represent a way of expressing a generalized symbolic media and act as an external referent of value. If an object has “socio-currency value”, it should be considered as “serious”, and if not, as “not serious”. This predetermines one of the two criteria for the semantic limits of law, which, by way of example, can be explained as follows If the subject is “not serious” – i.e. it does not express any money, power, influence, obligation, or any other generalized symbolic media

– while interpreting the relevant legal norms we need to enter the area of “penumbra”, and if at the same time, as will be shown later in this study, the structure of the subject is “of fantasy nature”, we move on and, crossing the area of “penumbra” we face absurdity, where the application of law is impossible, because it is contrary to common sense, it destroys the (social) legal reality and breaks the rules of the language game called “law”.

The “test” for socio-currency value itself consists of two mandatory elements applied consequently. Firstly, it is the object’s communicative meaning, defined by the context of social interaction. Secondly, it is the convertibility of this communicative value into an arbitrary generalized symbolic medium. In theoretical sociology and political science, only two such symbolic media have been developed with sufficient clarity: money and political power. The others are somewhat vague, but this is not of fundamental importance for the efficiency of this test. Actually, it is not even necessary to qualify the initial subject of public relations from the point of view of a certain type of generalized symbolic media, it is enough to prove its convertibility. If, for example, a statement contained in a game chat room, by its objective qualities, corresponds to the features of a civil law offer (or a proto-offer, taking into account the discussion of the issue of the possibility of making deals related to virtual property),469 then the content of the statement

469 “Proto” (not “quasi”, for example), as such a message may or may not be an offer from the perspective of particular civil law approaches. For example, user agreements generally prohibit users from participating in the circulation of virtual property for real money. However, this position is not unambiguous, as such user interactions can be seen as examples of agreements for the provision of services on a payment-for-services basis (for acts involving the information system – games), which may in turn be considered to be outside the possible jurisdiction of the user agreement. The relevant provisions of such agreements may in such situations be regarded as limiting the civil capacity of users and therefore null and void. However, for the present study it is not important to do so, but that the very fact of such reasoning means that the law is applied to these relations, since the original statement has money (a generalized symbolic medium) as a reference. Therefore, the resolution of the situation by private instruments of civil law is a subject of legal argumentation proper, and it is no longer absurd to address them in a game context due to the “currency value” of the subject of the relations under consideration, which in this case directly refers to money as a generalized symbolic medium.

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or the statement itself may be regarded as a subject of social relations, which has a communicative meaning correlated with a generalized symbolic media.

Equally clear in this approach now is the situation with other symbolic media, not as “straightforward” as money, for example, with the political power. A statement that calls for participation in an unsanctioned demonstration, even if it is contained in a game chat room, breaks the “magic circle” on the first criterion – the seriousness of the object – precisely because it has a socio-currency value. A more subtle example in the context in question, however, implies a statement that does not in itself refer to the obvious – money or a demonstration – but is an example of something less obvious. Influence is probably a good example. For instance, in a game chat room, there may be communication involving the creation of an institution of virtual social reality, such as a clan or guild. From the perspective of theoretical sociology, this case is an example of the use of influence as part of the social capital of the organizer(-s). Potentially, the influence of the leader of a wellfunctioning game clan can be converted into both money (e.g., to keep the clan functioning as a compensation for the organizer’s time or expenses) and political power (e.g., if the clan leader uses his or her influence to engage clan members in some political activity).

Applying the law in such cases would no longer be exclusively absurd, as would be the case with an ordinary “sale and purchase” of virtual property under the rules and/or using game mechanics to meet the in-game needs of a game character. In such situations, it is necessary to take into account the second criterion – fantasy nature of the structure of the object (at the later stage of the research we have dismissed the idea of fantasy nature of the structure in favor of the fantasy nature of the function – V.A.), which is discussed later in this study. If the this criterion is satisfied, then the process of weighing values or similar actions is necessary to assess the possibility of applying real law to such relationships. If the subject, being serious, is also structurally and functionally adequate rather than fantasized, then the law can be applied without the implementation of intellectual processes of “weighing” values – then it will be a classic, common case of application of the law, fully consistent with the notions of common sense».470

This approach overlaps with the approach of J. Huizinga himself (who was working on the topic well before the emergence of digital games and the peak of the development of the concept of generalized symbolic media in theoretical sociology, but coming slightly ahead of T. Parsons in his work “Homo Ludens”) and his subsequent interpretations in the works of key authors in the field of game studies. For example, E. Castronova writes:

470 See: Arkhipov V.V. Computer Games, «Magic Circle» and Semantic Limits of Law // International Journal of Cultural Research. 2019. 1 (34). P. 73–87. It should also be noted with interest that the concept of “social and currency value” in the presented interpretation organically corresponds to the actual market of tokens used in the tools of cryptocurrencies and ICO. Moreover, the borrowed term “token” itself, which is already used in the modern sense of the word, is a natural metaphor of the subject of relations having “currency value” in the sense of a generalized symbolic media, because that is where the purpose of the token is expressed. This example is extremely important to justify the relevance of the approach proposed in this study in the context of the medial turn.

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«Games are hard to define, but game scholars such as Johan Huizinga and Roger Caillois identify them using the notion of irrelevance (emphasis added – V.A.). For Huizinga, by definition, a game cannot lead to consequences which would be significant from moral standpoint (emphasis added – V.A.). Whatever is happening, if it really matters in an ethical or moral sense, cannot be a game. Rather, he believes that games are places where we only act as if471 something matters. Indeed, play-acting seriousness can be one of the most important functions in a given game. According to Huizinga, if some consequence really does matter in the end, the game is over. In fact, the only act of moral consequence that can happen within a game is the act of ending the game, denying its as-if character, spoiling the fantasy, and thereby breaking the collective illusion that the game matters».472 Correspondingly, the main thing now is that the “moral consequences” to which E. Castronova draws attention, therefore, imply the connection to certain generalized symbolic media and external referents of value. As an accompanying comment, what E. Castronova says about games, implying first of all a narrow example of multiplayer online role-playing games, can also be applied to cases where the subject of social relationships is another (in the sense of § 5 of Chapter 1 of this study).

By the way, “seriousness” is also quite correlated with the notion of public danger

– another “deceptive commonplace” of legal dogmatics, which is presented as self-evident, although studies of the meaning of this term show the opposite. This term, which is focused on socially negative phenomena, is also not applicable by definition to positive examples of the implementation of law in relation to virtual space.

471There is an obvious connection with the H. Veihinger’s philosophy of “als ob”, on whose works L. Fuller, already mentioned in the pages of this work, relied many times, at least in his works on legal fictions.

472Castronova E. The Right to Play // New York Law School Law Review. – 2004. – Vol. 49. – No. 1. – PP. 188–189.

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§ 3. Modeling of commodification as a methodology for calculating convertible sociocurrency value

The concept of generalized symbolic intermediaries implies the possibility of “conversion” or “symbolic exchange”. The meaning of these terms, which are synonymous in the context of this study, can be explained as follows. From the perspective of theoretical sociology, there are several institutional fields – “economies” in P. Bourdieu's terminology, each of which is characterized by its own generalized symbolic medium. It is expressed (or expresses value) in an external referent of value. External referents of value, in turn, express the symbolic capital of a social actor. Social actors can acquire symbolic capital in one institutional domain through generalized symbolic media and external referents of value belonging to another institutional field, where they already have symbolic capital. Thus, “conversion” is the acquisition of symbolic capital in one institutional domain through the generalized symbolic media that are characteristic of another institutional domain. As J. Turner notes:

«Generalized symbolic media are not only used in discourse and distributed by corporate units and resources; they are also exchanged by actors within and between domains. Intrainstitutional exchanges are typically conducted with the generalized symbolic media of a domain. For example, teachers talk and exchange learning within the educational institutional domain; across domains, economic actors pay money for those who are certified (with diplomas) to have learning, thereby consummating an exchange of the money for learning exchange across institutional domains. Thus, one of the ways that generalized symbolic media circulate across domains is via exchanges; and, the more generalized symbolic media of powerful actors in dominant domains spend their resources

– resources like money from economy and power as franchised authority from polity – for the resources of other domains – say, learning (from education), health (from medicine), and verified knowledge (from science) – the more will all of these media circulate across institutional domains in a society”.473

473 Turner J.H. Emotions and Societal Stratification // Handbook of the Sociology of Emotion: Volume II / Ed. by Stets J.E., Turner J.H. – Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer, 2014. – P. 180.