Culture Wars The Struggle to Define America by James Davison Hunter (z-lib.org)

296 TOWARD RESOLUTION

~""· At on~ level the observation may be on target. Th'~

Rf~~T~~1~11;,,,ai;gµa};>lf,is,:ppli:ti€8llfff>¢i'l.tlij.,~

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R~'.3Jgnradmmiswaa0n<'Tha:t bein1phe case; it Wbuld' tin1y4'fe' a'"~~r ofrmFe1Jd8rFfff power ati3'teCf. As sure as the years come and go,' alli-

ances weaken and administrations change; leaders get old, retire, and die.

Burthe-end,;0f the.·Religiauscl~ight.should·.n~·lie·Gmiftts~d'•wifti<tilre·

encfofpolitkal activism on the parl of the "Iargef.orihodaX aiiii•~ The former may be defunct as a "movement" but the passions that animate the latter are anything but defunct. Remember that, after all, the war is a war of moral visions.

Indeed, i~ likely that the decline of the Religious Right onlr rep- r e · · in of ta e ' evolution oL ~ultµre";ar.

l'tfe~srtate ·

6t'ilie•lQ~Osand-me 'iJi!*,~'*«1990s for ·PJtiNf~8~,t

ftom·tbe· natj@al:sJage io'.sfate :Jn.tlt·toeali.ai!!ti~.~!,Jl. As Tim LaHaye put it, "In the nineties, the R~ligious Right is goihg"1<> be composed of a host

of independent, locally sponsored and funded organizations that work in unison. ":By•.tlre•early1990s,· PatLR.obertsoii~s1)Bltticall'~~~Wd

. ptliditct •at a·time1· one neighborhood at atime, and one state at a time. We're not going to win it all at once with some kind of millennial rush at..the _White_ flouse."3 .Tcf1hi~fend, Hieir'aim isfrt<t··'Imltf~fJ~nr~­ nofogy"ttaining ·stliobls" afounCf tne'COUiltl'}'Din.~atl't~df,,,~~a,ny

draws support, legitimation, and intelligence from more than a hundred very prominent Evangelical leaders who comprise its steering committee. According to its introductory brochure, '

·we believe the times we live in are so desperate and the culture of North America has come so close to going over the cliff ... that any plans less aggressive and less courageous [than those specified by COR] will not turn our culture around in time to avoid a new dark age for the entire civilization. In a nutshell, we believe we must

systematically attempt to rebuild our civilization on the biblical foundations on which we were originally built. We believe God is calling all local Christians to participate in this holy endeavor.... We have no other option.4

~~'',a"ti;\l.c..:o/;t:af''plat!>!,~alls;-fer••~fi:.·~s~~\ll,~shmentoftwenty-fou:i;:

''mtmstry'h~tfW0F•g;e0mmittees1?·.fi·r:·sbcty··maj1:>r"'ei~ein:tweu'gt:f(l;i!lt'NoPl!h·

1::::;:;:::::;;::~:;~gj;6f~·· ~~l~nt' ~~;0!

The first priority of the national leadership, then, has been to "locate the fearless, local leaders in each of these cities, who will want to build this local Spiritual Army under their own leadership."5

Though the tone is very different, this tendency among politically active Evangelicals is typical of the strategy taken by Catholics, Jews, and secularists on both sides of the cultural divide. T~~ri& not fading away by any means. It is, aHnes~~~~

However the culture battles actually take shape, the passions that animate the culture war remain. The truth is that the two sides of the cultural divide peacefully coexist only so long as neither· side gains actual or symbolic advantage over the other. The opportunity to appoint a replacement to the Supreme Court (as in the case of the nomination of Robert Bork in 1987, David Souter in 1990, and Clarence Thomas in 1991), rallies and marches commemorating or celebrating the anniversary of a formative political event (such as Central America Week, or Gay Awareness Week); the introduction in Congress of a highly disputed piece of national legislation (such as the Equal Rights Amendment or the constitutional amendment banning flag burning), a controversial Court ruling (such as the decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services in July 1989 allowing individual states to impose restrictions on the practice of abortion), the showing of a controversial film (as in The Last Temptation of Christ) or art exhibit (as in the Mapplethorpe exhibit in various cities), and even the recurring presidential elections every four years-all of these events and many others provide concrete occasions for one side or the other to gain measurable advantage over the other. The result is a rupturing of any "peace" that might seem to exist. The culture war will undoubtedly take on many different forms and involve an everchanging cast of personalitiesand organizations, but tlftt;fl;M(il~"¥ifig'

. y~,·~~1'!Jit~~~ell.

""'~~Wlirat witlet>me .. 1tjt/: ;,

LOCATING THE ADVANTAGE

It is naive under any histprical cirC1;lmstances to assume that the truthful position will prevail, or that "things will work out for the best for all concerned." It is equally naive to imagine that a rationally negotiated settlement of the culture war will take place. ~ot only is ,it theoretically implausible, it is also well nigh a sociological impossibility...'rhe principal reason is that the;a~~--

a "tmfwliii:CKi~wmt .. r a'geiiiiiiel)ii'pTli:tiit~~liumi

1(t•tl,\~:·.. '~···'..:;l&,"d~~t#J"tbe~th:n~t~nlyis ~e-;ociologicai

impulse for~one s •ttfsubjugate the other, each side would seem to insist on it. This is most clearly seen in the deliberate effort of both extremes to monopolize the symbols of legitimacy (patriotism, Americanism, family, First Amendment, and so on), thus exduding other groups that claim a right to the American heritage. Extremes on each side of the cultural divide, in ot,her words, engage in a strange form of double talk: each side insists that the other has a right to exist and to exercise free speech; at the same time, the opposition is judged illegitimate by virtue of the substance of its message (for example, the opposition is "unpatriotic," "un-American," or "undemocratic") and, by

implication, it should not exist and should not voice its opinion. To put this more sharply;lheoim:plicmtiian iHhatSinecFIMi e(Sp0Slti1'fi,~r tfi><1Hd~yfitfi~·~6d.tf~6MM""l\rt>uld ,~-be~tiff'.J.~ti~mt~~~'.!at

tolerance is strained. The rhetoric used by both extremes exaggerates the power and intentions of their opposition. It also seeks to preempt American ideals and thus monopolize the symbols oflegitimacy. In this, each side implicitly attempts to discredit the positions if not threaten the very existence of its opposition. ·

Yet all of this leaves the impression that, in reality, the contemporary cultural conflict is at a standoff: the claims of one side essentially balancing the claims of the other; the resources of one equalizing the resources of the other. If this impression has been made throughout, it is in part because this inquiry has focused principally upon understanding the nature and scope of the cultural conflict, without _assessing which side may have the advanta ·

Who Has the Edgel

movement has the potential to become solidified enough to 'take over the country.' " They predict that "by the end of .this century ... [conservative Christians] seem destined to become the single most powerful

force in the United States."7 ~~~gktEmejR~~

pliw&ibl@; ~~~tet'P~laim's~~~

~~~~i~~the

l~Wi$'e~r:ie\Jlwmir~~~apn

. ·-····:1''.e'!~~--'\Dro- e:J•~rm~w.. the mastery over the skills of fund w ·of an increasingly conservative· older sector of

the population.8 Add to this the extensive array of "parallel institutions" mentioned earlier-the schools, colleges and universities, the publish- ing-and the credibility of Hadden and Shupe's claim increases.

tactics of civil disobedience it employs, signals this change. There are other signs as well. In his testimony before the Congress, the director of Chicago's Pro-Life Action League stated emphatically: "Nonviolent direct action to end abortion is preferable to bombing abortion chambers. But if access to free speech, assembly and redress of grievances are denied, the violence of abortion will inevitably be opposed by other

means."9 ~--~1Ww,f0t,~fel!am18'dseWptih.e11t;1 #a>Gau....

to s~~ffff',~·iingt4ih1.1stta...~ is n~1~-~~~1!11!lihfmt11iillsts·1HJiiiiJA~1--

~~"10

~- Still another reason why the orthodox moral vision maintains viability is that the state itself, though predominantly secular in character, is not monolithically secular. Numerous individuals and groll'ps within the state are allies of orthodox interests and ideals and, from the inside,

300 TOWARD RESOLUTION

·press their claims.. Depending on the administration, cultural conservatives are very often found in the executive branch of government, as was certainly true during the Reagan and Bush administrations. Consider, in this regard, the powerful adversary role played by then secretary of education (and Catholic conservative) William Bennett. Also depending on the administration in power, the circulation of elites in the federal judiciary and in the Supreme Court can also have a powerful impact in ·favor of orthodox interests. The vision of America embodied in the judiciary will have enduring consequences long after particular members have been replaced.

All of these factors are compelling in themselves. But are they sufficient to endow conservative Christianity and the broader alliance of cultural conservatives with power to achieve an outsized share of influence in the struggle to define the American.character and its future?

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-~~~f,-the "reality-defining" mechanisms of contemporary American society. As is well known, the knowledge· industry experienced tremendous growth in the twentieth century, especially after the Second World War. In research and development, in all levels of education (elementary, secondary, and higher education), in the media of mass communications (including national, regional, and local newspapers, magazines, the three largest commercial television networks, and the majority of all radio broadcasting, advertising, and film), in information-processing technology (particularly computer technology), an_d in the information services (including therapy, social work, accountancy, architecture, law, medicine, and the like), both expenditures and personnel grew prodigiously. It would be pointless to review here what has already been analyzed with great diligence by others. 11

But to give a general idea; b1~~~·~!M~l!liti·llt!S:t•J.Silm&m~gc

The dimensions of the.knowledge sector, then, have become immense. But the real significance of this lies not in its rate of growth or its rate of innovation but in its political, moral, and intellectual character. Much of the sector is dominated by the pragmatic interests of a postindustrial economy: technological innovation, organizational efficiency, and managerial effectiveness. Perhaps the most charitable evaluation

one could make about these pursuits is that they are agnostic toward

~:=~~.~~~ts and concerns. ~~:~

· both lower and higher lev-

-"~~~i~ti-

~~m!v.As noted earlier, surveys of the opinion of media, intellectual, and ~nt rtainment elites, studies of the curriculum of elementary and secondary school textbooks, among other sources, all make clear that it is here that progressivist ideals are most deeply institutionalized and most vigorously advocated. 13

The secular knowledge sector is a crucial influence in determining the outcome of our cultural conflict in part because ~e

e knowledge industry e modern state, then, are linked in complex and fundamental

ways. ~~~@fih"rfi.Utf?~·,:&tal\e•~..h~=',um-:fi'L

- t·

Sin nee is mandato

grade, and since the government has a mono ol on

chif.Q.n:n are reqmre to educated under the auspices of the stat . The only alternatives available, as we know, are for families that have the time to give to home schooling or the money to afford private education.

The patronage and protection of the state is significant for another

reason. As alluded to earlier, t~-o~Jm;:;m~~ msliiEl~~"PJ1tlli~~wratiS~~~7ffi'

~'JiiNs:',.k'8~n~mfg1f•Mr€i'riC\W6i'W•~t,•lie~~

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go~~~--Bm~~~mmt!t1f(!lff11>Vef·~1§4JF"s6Chi

,~~~-~g,·~J~~_au~·pIJi&:ipiest«'hus the very etho~ of the te ts unsupporttve of a broad cultural system rooted m, leg-

itimated by, and promoting (through public policy) a commitment to transcendent ideals.

T$~~~~:Ji\)~1iti~<,>f119pu,lar s1:1ppe11tf&irw~ig!~~~~~~- .Jp,,, ical~y-~ilf-;~J'gitiWuf·.C()ntempor:ary~Ame~·p:i,:ibli~~li.li;·

awar~""iw~ter~nfpower;-iS another· Fafoot.

~llltU:re'Wif:-As I argued in chapter l, th~culmtre-~-~'

~g~•""iiiidClleCialises~-Most:Ol'thodox:jews;·coriSCiVQ;~-­

Ewng¢1ltjil~Protestiiits;-Mwever. are memb(i~~ pf th«:·~

claSS; ~e-secular"'progresswesrnd-ilieir 'r~[gic)ii;. . . .. -...

of the· highly educatCcl; wealthier, and relatively--moliile~p-p,gr 1m~le and·middle d~fcigecfiriptofessidnal·wotk. The sociald1ftere~es

are seen in other ways as well. Whereas Orthodox Jews and conserva-

~-~~- Catholics are very_ ?,ft~ll .fel11l<:i_}_°- ~~--a~~.,,~~~ters, __ t~-.c~ ungent ·of·me-•al'thodox-Jl1mded, the ~vanael~i~~ a~~~~·ll

WW,ns-aP,<;l. rural.;~r-eas_.~f th.e $o~lh··and-Midwest/ By,~&lf:"~

Ca'th6fits liiid¥fotestants·are ·strongly represc;fr.i:tcn'.t;°Ut:t_:~''!4~}J?~~f more progressive Jews and seeularists abiic)sfurliroffillY~f.esEfl'iMfin

the uf6ancenters;of the Northeast, Midwest, and West Coast-Los Angeles, San Francisco, Denver, Chicago, New York, Boston, and Washington, D.C. Moreover, the orthodox tend to be, on average, a slightly older population and disproportionately female, whereas progressivists, and secularists in particular, tend to be younger and disproportionately male. 14

Perhaps even more telling is the social location of the centers of

cultural activism. ~l~~~lr~-~~~~~l'·~:-~~~~~~mPr­

thodQ!f·~r-·pr~es~~t,:a'r"ei'o'tt.t~"1a-Wuh1111.~arukN~~J@~se citieS'f~tfe;m:g-willillOSt:~Ql~Cii(mf~ ~usAageles-;•(!J~Bl\ff'l\'i.:!ltt:~­ pl'ise:~liµ~·-n.ut:1eus~of~afiionar·ii~·-and the regions from which the Iirger cultural ~arfare_emanates. Nevl?~~- ~_e.J;~.~~~on

of·o:rlturat(:(jfiSemltives'is 'f'ar less 'concentrateif.in:'tliiSe~@S:~

arnple;:..m.; a survey-of~~~ than·40o- pubiiniff~u;-Ol'ga~1zatlnns.tak~ft-.,,

. from d:J,t; Encycliipedia ofltssociat~om, just-more:manc~pe~nt)r.o:E

th0se.· ~ommiite(ffo' cottservative· cau~--wereclC'XilltelMli:-tr-~al

andregiomd·urban-~~tef'!I, ctJnlparefl to:83pe~(:Jfirudi•alplitflS.

The relnainder f~om both camps were located in small cities and towns. Nearly as revealing, 18 percent of the conservative associations were located in the South, compared to 3 percent of the liberal associations. 15 The point is very simple. It is considerably more difficult to alter the ethos of national public life for those operating in large measure from the periphery of social power than for those whose efforts are concen-

trated in the center. In this way, too, the;! larger progressivist vision has an advantage. ·

Lest it be imagined that because of these formidable societal tendencies, history will ultimately favor the progressivist vision ofAmericathat the defeat of the conservative vision is nearly a foregone conclu- sion-one must consider some other influences and tendencies that favor the orthodox side of the cultural divide. The first is that specific challenges· to the dominant reality-defining institutions (such as television, film, music) very often work. The boycotting of the products of companies that. sponsor television shows considered morally objectionable by such groups as the American Family Association or CLeaR-TV, as we have seen, have influenced advertising and programming. The protest of the Parents' Music Resource Center against what they felt was gratuitous violence and illicit sexuality succeeded in getting numerous record companies to place a warning label on record album jackets. And the picketing of such films as The Last Temptation ofChrist by conservative Catholics and Evangelicals have likewise affected box-office profits. The orthodox alli?tnce, then, is capable of providing an effective challenge to a secular and progressively inclined media. .

Another factor favoring the orthodox is that institutions promoting a progressivist vision for America are equally vulnerable to the pressures of reorganization and redirection as the orthodox institutions. There are.some indications ofrightward movement on the part of such mainline Protestant denominations as the United Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., on such issues as abortion, homosexuality, and the like. The enfeebling of the once robust National Council of Churches is another illustration of change and redirection in organizations committed to progressive social action. As with the orthodox, these organizations and the vision they promote also depend heavily upon public acceptance and legitimation: they are compromised when they do not have it. ·

In addition to these factors, the conservative vision of America can be reinforced by the failures of a liberal social policy in providing quality education, in ensuring public safety, in protecting the social order, in generating ·economic prosperity, and so on. For all of these reasons, then, the orthodox side of the cultural divide is more powerful than might first be imagined.

A Plausible Denouement

co

amily and family policy; law, mass media, public education, electoral politics, and so on. Within these contexts, outcomes will depend upon effective strategies, the allocation of resources, and the accidents of historical opportunity. For the time being, however, general conclusions about the broader direction of the culture war may not be possible.

it too will have repercussions. 'Dbii~~lllf.llr

~~ •c•

One is tempteclto argue, for example, that as long as cultural conservatives maintain alternate institutional mechanisms for promoting their distinct cultural perspective, the conflict will persist unabated. And yet this is not necessarily the case. The Italian social philosopher Antonio Gramsci, discussed in chapter 2, has argued that "organic" or progressively oriented intellectuals succeed in their bid to replace the older cultural hegemony in part by assimilating "traditional" intellectuals.16 What this means, if Gramsci is correct, is that the moral and political

·vision of opposition defended by traditional intellectuals is transformed through compromise and moderation. In the end, the very substance of the traditional antagonism is neutralized.

There are indications that this proces:; has already begun to take

shape in the various orthodox communities. In the Orthodox Jewish

·community,· for example, this is seen in the emergence of "Modern Orthodoxy" as distinct from the traditional Hasidim. On the surface what distinguishes the Modern Orthodox community is its posture toward the observance of Hafakah (traditional Jewish law). The Modern Orthodox reject the idea that strict observance ofritual duties and pro-

hibitions is a sign of religious purity. True faith, rather, is born out of a proper relationship with God and with other human beings. What their right-wing counterparts view as a negligence toward Jewish law,

. therefore, they tend to view as flexibility. But more significantly, the Modern Orthodox are distinguished by their nonseparatist approach toward non-Orthodox and non-Jewish culture. The Modern Orthodox are openly syncretistic, drawing on many aspects of contemporary experience that an~ believed to enhance the practice of faith. They are

. ~-..--.--....,,..

ditional ethic of self-sacrifice and self-mortification. For previous generations such asceticism served the purposes oflivillg a more spiritual

.life. Among the younger cohort of elite~, this has given wa to a quest

two-thirds (62 percent) agreed that "for the Christian, realizi~g your full potential as a human being is just as important as putting others before you." With regard to the politics of family life, a significant percentage of the younger generation had largely abandoned a commitment to the "traditional" model of family life in favor of a socially androgynous model, where men and women play out similar if not identical roles in

nuclear power, and American relations with the Soviet Union, the attitudes and opinions of the younger generation of Evangelical leaders did not differ appreciably from their secular counterparts. ~

thu . _ ....... ;~?:-_!··1111t]::-··-~

~~;;:e -;~ ~~~~~!! ..

~-·~iill~:l9,~>~~~...And yet the majority reject~d the belligerence of such groups as the Moral Majority

as an appropriate manner of political engagement.

This process of an accommodation to the spirit of the times can be seen at a more subtle cultural level too. As numerous observers have made clear, the knowledge sector has altered the intellectual character