3. Modern approaches to the study of military conflicts and the Hybrid War concept.

3.1 Modern approaches to the study of military conflicts.

In this part of the work the focus will be on modern approaches to the study of changing nature of wars in XXI century. It is important to mention, that various theoretical approaches to the explanation of changing war nature are not mutually exclusive but often overlap and complement each other, enriching perception of wars of a new type.

In 1989, a group of military theorists from US, William S Lind, colonel Keith Nightengale, captain John F Schmitt, colonel Joseph W Sutton, lieutenant colonel Gary I Wilso, published an article “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”⁴⁹ <42>, which initiated the discussion on the so-called wars of the “fourth generation”. In the beginning of the article the authors, referring to the historical experience, distinguish three generations of war in the history of mankind. For the first generation, the main features were mass and linear tactics, due to the use of smoothbore weapons.

With the development of technology in countries with industrial economies (occurrence of rifled weapon, telegraph and railways) firepower and artillery became the key factor in the conduct of war. Linear tactics are also undergoing changes, the goal of battles is the encirclement of the enemy's military force and its subsequent destruction – this is an essence of the second generation of wars. The main characteristics of the third generation appeared because of the plans of the German command on the eve of the First World War. Recognizing the weakness of the Germany’s industrial base, German military theorists have created radically new tactics, based on rapid maneuvers in order to bypass the enemy, penetrate into the rear and deprive him of his ability to resist⁵⁰ <42>. Such tactics were called blitzkrieg or “lightning war” and were successfully (because of massive introduction of tanks) used by the leadership of the Wehrmacht during the Second World War. During the process of transformation of historical types of wars, the impact of technology and ideas is clearly traced. Moreover the logic by which military planning changes is obvious: 1) the number of tasks that can be fulfilled by a minimum number of servicemen is increasing; 2) dependence on a centralized logistics system decreases; 3) accents shift from linearity and mass to maneuver; 4) the main goal is not the destruction of the enemy’s manpower, but the suppression of the will to resist the enemy’s armed forces and society in general⁵¹ <42>. The key factors in the transition of one stage to another are technological progress and the development of military ideas.

Subsequently, the authors provide a prediction regarding the rise of the fourth generation war. The line between war and peace will gradually fade away. Deviation from linearity will result in disappearance of clear identification of the front line and battlefield, and the actions of opponents will be against not only a military target, but also against society, presumed in physical and cultural aspects. Large military objects and industrial infrastructure will become rare, as a result of their vulnerability to growing effectiveness of joint operations of limited scope⁵² <42>.

Meaning that authors call technologies and ideas the key factors in transformation of wars; I will consider how both factors can influence the conduct of a new generation of war. Technological progress moves on, and military industry is often at the forefront of scientific innovations, therefore technology will significantly change the nature of future wars. For instance, the development of information technology enables to organize attacks on an adversary’s targets in cyberspace. Moreover, the so-called “psychological operations in the form of media-information interference”⁵³ <42>, through which the aggressor can manipulate the media and public opinion, undermine credibility of authorities and provoke mass riots and social unrest. Therefore, the achievement of military and political goals may not require immediate military intervention: it is enough to force the opposite side to stop resistance.

The war in the information and psychological dimensions, combined with traditional joint operations using modern weapons and equipment, as well as operations of Special Forces will become the most powerful tools at the hands of the military in both tactical and strategic dimensions. However, authors conclude, that considering the conditions of the nuclear era, such high-tech and highly effective actions “can carry the seeds of a nuclear catastrophe”⁵⁴<42>, since they can nullify the ability of one of the parties to a conflict with nuclear capabilities to wage war with conventional weapons. Therefore, successful actions that undermine or destroy the economic and political infrastructure, the integrity of society, and dramatic change in the balance of power, can provoke the losing power to use nuclear weapons. This circumstance, for its part, can be a deterrent to the use of fourth-generation war methods among nuclear powers<53>.

The second factor that transforms the nature of warfare is the development of military ideas. Here, authors wish to draw the attention of non-Western cultures, traditionally lagging behind in technology, therefore, trying to reverse this difference due to tactical tricks. The emergence of a fourth generation war based on ideas can be traced in terrorism, but it is crucial to clarify, that terrorism is not a war of the new generation, but poses some elements of this kind of military action. Even though successful terrorist groups have a well-established structure, for the terrorist the battlefield is characterized by a high degree of dispersion and covers the entire enemy community; In such conditions, the “fighter” draws resources from the surrounding area. The terrorists shifted tactical and operational focus from the rear of the enemy, which is characteristic of wars of the third generation; they seek to get around the enemy’s armed forces and strike at civilian targets. Authors note that terrorists ignore traditional military culture, which allows them to adapt to the modern disordered nature of military operations, and this is their main advantage over army structures. Concluding the reflections on the wars of the fourth generation, authors note one more essential element: “a foundation that is not connected with national states or is of a transnational nature”⁵⁵<53>. The traditional security system based on the interrelationships of national states makes it difficult to identify and combat transnational criminal networks and terrorist groups; in addition, actions against such organizations require violation of the sovereignty of another state. Consequently, the methods of criminals can be used to achieve military and political goals. For instance, according to the authors, some ideological groups in South America use drug trafficking as a weapon that destroys the culture of the United States. In summation, it should be pointed out that the ideas voiced by the US military experts largely predicted the further development of the nature of wars in the world.

In addition to the phenomenon of the fourth generation war described above, it is vital to consider other concepts that are popular mainly in Western military science, which is necessary for further explanation of the essence of the “hybrid wars”.

One of the most essential approaches for us is the concept of compound warfare. Even the meaning of the word “compound” indicates the complex nature of the complex. Indeed, a compound warfare is understood as operations during an armed conflict in which regular and irregular military formations act together and under the same leadership⁵⁶<9, p.16>. Classic examples of this type of war are American War of Independence (1775-1783), the Napoleonic wars (the war in Spain and, of course, the Patriotic War of 1812), and the Vietnam War (1964-1975), in which the forces of the Vietcong⁵⁷ <9, p.16> successfully interacted with the army of North Vietnam.

It is important to note that concerned actions of regular armed forces and irregular (guerilla, militia) achieve a synergistic effect due to the fact that the latter use of non-traditional methods of warfare, do not depend on centralized military logistics and use the terrain, which allows them to successfully resist regular enemy units.

The notion of compound warfare is closely intertwined with the concept of asymmetric warfare. Many significant characteristics of belligerents in such conflicts are asymmetric, there is “a clear disproportion of power capabilities, tactics and status of opponents”⁵⁸ <33>. The main features of this kind of military conflicts also include: 1) tactics of indirect military operations, used by the weak side; 2) the initially weak side attempts to find and use “weaknesses” of strong side; 3) use of prohibited methods of warfare; 4) the inability of the strong side to suppress the weak and defend the conquered positions ⁵⁹<33>.

Exploring the nature of asymmetric conflicts of the 20^th century, examples of which are the Vietnam War (1964-1975) or the war in Algeria (1954-1960), scientists found that the success of such campaigns depends less on the parties’ potential than on the interaction of military and non-military factors of victory, that is, the success of the campaign in the political, psychological and ideological dimension of the conflict. In other words, victory depends not only on military success, but also on the existence or absence of political will to continue the war, the ability to mobilize material and human resources, and for this, public support for the objectives of war is necessary⁶⁰<12, p.18>. The defeat of the US in Vietnam was largely due to asymmetry in the non-military (political, psychological and ideological) parameters of confrontation; this circumstance underscores the need for a successful strategy in the field of dissemination of information both in one’s own society and in the territory of the enemy. In the future this direction in theoretical and practical terms will be expressed in the concept of information wars, which will be discussed further.

Scientific-technical and social progress in the second half of the 20^th century, which is the world’s most capacious in the notion of “the process of globalization”, continues to have a significant impact on all areas of life of local societies and the world as a whole. War, as a field of activity requiring constant improvement of ideas and technologies, also did not escape the impact of globalization. In 1999, Chinese military theorists Qiao Lian and Xiansui Wang proposed a fundamentally new concept of “unrestricted warfare”⁶¹ <18>, the essence of which, in F. Hoffman’s opinion, is better characterized by the expression “war beyond limits” ⁶²<9, p.22>, where “limits” are understood to mean the traditional spheres, dimensions and methods of warfare inherent in Western armies. The novelty of the concept is that an unlimited war combines all possible resources, not just military ones, and does not necessarily take place in the usual battlefield. Trade, finance and the information space are becoming new areas of “combined” confrontation, thus, the concept itself can be expanded to “combined unlimited war”, the main principles of which are: 1) Omni-directionality; 2) synchrony; 3) asymmetry ⁶³<9, p.23>.

The principle of omni-directionality implies that the military leadership will need a clear perspective of the potential battlefield without “dead zones”, including traditional spheres (land, sea, air and space) as well as the political sphere, economy, culture, psychological and information space. Synchrony is necessary for the implementation of as many simultaneous operations in various spheres as possible to achieve maximum effect. The principle of symmetry, on one hand, requires the commanders to go beyond the usual framework inherent in traditional military conflicts, to change their thinking towards more adapted to contemporary realities; on the other hand, suggests that in such a war the spheres of confrontation will not necessarily coincide. These principles are surprisingly reflected in the assumption from 1989 article “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation” that the leading ideas in military science will in future arise not in Western armies. The proposed concept of war beyond limits also traces the idea of the great military theorist of the past, Sun Tzu, that war is only one of the tools to achieve victory over the enemy.

As we can see, the authors of the concept of war beyond limits have attempted to foresee how the process of globalization will affect military planning, their theory broadens the notion of a confrontation of the future in which direct military actions will occupy only one of many dimensions of war. One of the most important dimensions of confrontation in the 21^st century is the dissemination of information. According to S.V. Volodenkov, operations in the information space serve to “legitimize military objectives and subsequent military operations in the eyes of target audiences, which include the population of the aggressor country, the world community, the target country’s population, the political elites of the parties to the armed conflict – participants in the conflict⁶⁴” <30, p.188>. In most military strong Western countries, there are divisions, such as Cyberfor⁶⁵ <68>, which are part of the national armed forces, whose purpose is to conduct information warfare, control and manipulation of public consciousness during military operations. The US military leadership calls such operations “globally integrated” ⁶⁶<30, p.189>.

Information counteraction divisions can perform a wide range of tasks to ensure combat operations. These include:

1. Providing support among its population through the formation of an image of the enemy and a sense of threat;

2. The formation of the necessary reaction from the world community;

3. Undermining the trust of the population of the targeted country towards the authorities and the armed forces;

4. Creating an atmosphere of distrust and social tensions;

5. Support and mobilization of protest groups, riots;

6. Discrediting the authorities, the armed forces and law enforcement agencies in the eyes of their citizens and the world community;

7. A coup d’état with the subsequent legitimization of a new power in the eyes of the world community;

8. Obtaining total control over the information space of the target country and transition to external management⁶⁷ <30, p. 193>.

As we can see, such technologies for carrying out operations in the field of information dissemination allow achieving the desired political and economic goals without the use of lethal methods of influence. The military component itself remains an important element, but not always necessary, since waging war through information and communication technologies is cheaper in terms of resources and losses, and is considered more legitimate and effective for achieving strategic goals. Of course, information warfare in form of carrying out information-communication or psychological operations in the media space is recognized by representatives of various approaches to studying the nature of modern wars an important element of modern military conflicts.

To summarize, one can cite Carl von Clausewitz: “Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions and its own peculiar preconceptions”⁶⁸ <28>, which is difficult to disagree, since the development of society, economy and technology determines the ever-changing face of war. There are many approaches to the study of the modern nature of war, which converge on the fact that the role of information and other forms of nonlethal confrontation increasing. Today, the use of armed forces ceases to be a necessity for achieving military goals, but specifically the military component remains significant in the form of irregular operations. Furthermore, it is important to note that modern wars are “devoid a moral component, they combine elements of the most modern knowledge and technology, as well as primitive methods of physical destruction of people” <47,p.35>.