1.1 Formation of the Main Strategic Principles of China in Central Asia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 on the territory on Central Asia five newly independent states emerged, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Disintegration of one of the super powers completely changed the world order and puzzled the whole international community. Another rising power on the east, China was faced with difficult question of how to deal with new states on its western borders. This prompted China to reconsider some aspects of its foreign policy. Since then the Heavenly Empire started developing its approach towards Central Asian Region. But before we analyze China’s strategy in Central Asia it’s necessary to take a look at the whole picture of shaping of Chinese foreign policy in a process of time.

Since the emergence of the People’s Republic of China with the change of international environment foreign policy of China towards its neighboring countries also changed several times. The emergence of the zhoubian concept, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and famous “wait-and-see strategy” proposed by Chinese reformist leader Deng Xiaoping may be called as cornerstones of China’s relations with its neighbors.

One of the Chinese scholars Zhang Chi wrote about the meaning of zhoubian concept and its implication in the sphere of international relations. The Chinese concept zhoubian “refers to a mathematical term for the sum of the length of the edge of a polygon or means “around the edges” [1, p.11]. However, in the foreign affairs and security fields, zhoubian has a special meaning. The concept is geopolitical and refers mainly to countries in the vicinity of China. The emergence of the zhoubian concept can be related to the need by the Chinese leaders to deal with the neighboring countries as China started opening to the world. Moreover the concept aimed at promoting the peaceful intentions of Chinese government as China’s leaders in their speeches were referring to this term precisely in a positive manner. In his speech delivered to the Central Military Commission in 1993 the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Jiang Zemin noted: “Our neighborhood security environment is getting better and better. It is the best period of our good-neighborly and friendly relations with neighboring countries since the founding of the People’s Republic of China” [1, p.13].

This friendly approach of China towards its neighbors was developed in early 1950s when the Prime Minister Zhou Enlai at his meeting with the delegation from India in 1953 proposed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence [1]. Zhang Chi writes that “Under the guidance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China established diplomatic relations with 36 countries during the first decade after the PRC’s foundation in 1949, including twelve neighborhood countries. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence marks a crucial change in the transition from the previous Revolutionary Diplomacy to National Diplomacy [1, p.22]. From that time Chinese leaders avoided the idea of the world revolution and decided to concentrate on the improvement of diplomatic relations with their neighbors. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence referred to “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence” [1, p.21]. Thereafter the Chinese leaders stated their determination in establishing good-neighborly relations with all neighbors on the basis of these principles.

The last but not the least point that put an end to the formation of Chinese foreign policy was wait-and-see strategy announced by reformist leader Deng Xiaoping. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the international situation was undergoing profound changes, including drastic changes in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Domestic political disturbances occurred in China, and reform and development suffered some temporary difficulties. Internationally, the United States did not need China’s help on the Soviet Union issue any longer. Disagreements appeared on both sides on, for instance, the issues of human rights, most favored nation treatment, and the proliferation of weapons. In the second half of 1989, faced with the enormous changes in the domestic and international situation, Deng Xiaoping summed up the policy in a famous slogan: “observe and analyze developments calmly, deal with changes patiently and confidently, secure our own position, conceal our capabilities and avoid the limelight, be good at keeping a low profile, never become a leader and accomplish things where possible” [1, p. 30]. This phrase once again underlined the position of China towards the world and its priorities of being more concentrated in China’s internal economic development. The official position of China was not to seek hegemony and the absence of any aspiration to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries.

It is necessary to note that culturally, China’s position in Central Asia was much less advantageous than that of its Eurasian neighbors: its geopolitical rivals could rely on ethnic affinity, shared religions, common lifestyle and mentality shaped by the long history of living in one state, and cultural affinity created by history and integration prospects. China had none of the above in any of the three regions. Its ethnic and religious affiliations and lifestyle and mentality placed it apart from the titular nations of Central Eurasia [30].

Having established diplomatic relations with the Central Asian governments, Beijing mobilized a large group of Chinese scholars to complete a comprehensive study of the region, established research centers in major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Lanzhou, Urumqi and funded extended research travel for scholars to the Central Asian Republics. Soon Chinese researches released a large number of works on the region, focusing on the idea that the economic development of Central Asia was sluggish with insufficient security guarantees and on the weakness of relations between the Central Asian states. Chinese scholars also identified other negative influences, such as uneven economic development, lack of feelings of unity, ethnic heterogeneity, the availability of highly developed and independent nationalist ideas in each state, and the risk of Islamic extremism [4].

The perspectives of Chinese scholars allow one to conclude that Beijing wishes to see the region free from the influence of other major powers and aims to strengthen its own presence. Excluding the possibility of unexpected negative changes in China, this raises at least three issues. How will China act when it becomes the region’s primary superpower, specifically, will it impose its own rules on everyone? Will the PRC maintain the same attitude towards Central Asia if Russia cannot counterbalance it and if the region ceases to be seen as Moscow’s backyard? What will happen in the future if more ambitious and nationalist individuals rise to leadership positions in China? These issues are quite complex and unpredictable. Currently, no one can answer the question of whether it is possible to permanently reduce the decisive role of personality in the Chinese government, where a tradition exists of absolute authority of the supreme ruler. It is also difficult to answer the question of whether China could continue to grow without any political or economic crises, as one can observe several problematic symptoms (e.g. limited domestic energy resources, growing dependence on foreign capital, increasing complexity of employment problems and food resources that have resulted from ongoing population growth, environmental deterioration due to permanent expansion of industry and use of various unnatural fertilizers in agricultural production, uneven economic growth in the regions, a heterogeneous population, and existence of separatist movements in some regions) [4].

Understanding Central Asian fears about the unpredictable consequences of strengthening China’s position in the region, some Chinese scholars believe that building confidence and creating a solid background for cooperation is a priority for the development of Sino-Central Asian cooperation. China therefore must focus on the following tasks: persuading Central Asian countries that it will always treat them as equals despite differences in power; raising Central Asia’s interest in the modernization, development, and enhancement of the Silk Road’s international significance; obliging Central Asian states to support the position of China on the Taiwan issue; and enticing them to fight against separatism [4].

Paramonov, Strokov and Stolpovskiy in their joint article divided the shaping of Chinese foreign policy towards Central Asian region into three stages.

The first stage begins in 1992 and lasts till 1995. In that period of time China was still practicing wait-and-see strategy proposed by Deng Xiaoping. It was still weak economically and politically and calmly continued gaining strength. Russia was still dominant geopolitical actor in Central Asia and China was reluctant to challenge it. Instead PRC decided to establish diplomatic relations with new neighbors, discuss security issues involving Russia and gain support in its fight against separatism. Border issues were discussed on the bilateral level. Annual trade turnover between China and Central Asian region was insignificant, about $350-512 million [5, p.68]. Summing up the PRC’s policy, with no clear idea about its interests in Central Asia, the results of China’s efforts to establish relations with the local states in the early 1990s proved contradictory. On the one hand, Beijing was moving ahead; it laid the foundation for these relations, which had to be started from scratch. On the other hand, in the first half of the decade China demonstrated a lot of caution; it did not show an interest in institutional and economic cooperation with the newly independent states. The far from simple international context in which China found itself at the time forced it to maintain good relations with Russia, which slowed down its progress in the Central Asian direction [5].

1996 – 2001 marked the second stage in the Central Asian policy of China. With the globalization, increasing influence of the United States on the international arena and emergence of new challenges PRC decided to lead more active policy and take a course to become the global power which can influence international system and does not just merely responds to changes in it. China needed international alliances and institutions in which it could preserve the leading role. This period can be marked as a turning point when Beijing avoided its wait-and-see strategy. In the Central Asian region China also increased its activities. The worsening situation in Afghanistan made Chinese government worry about country’s unstable XUAR. The risks of spread of terrorist movements, drug-trafficking and religious fundamentalism were increasing. This led in 1996 to the creation of Shanghai five which included China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and was supposed to take a lead in the fight against three evils: separatism, terrorism and religious extremism. After Uzbekistan joined it in 2001 the structure was transformed into Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Discovery of oil reserves in the Caspian region attracted Beijing’s attention as it needed energy resources for its growing economy. The economic relations improved significantly as China started flooding Central Asian markets with cheap goods. Annual trade turnover reached $580-1050 million [5, p.72]. “In its trade with Central Asian countries, China moved rapidly toward the formula “raw materials in exchange for finished products” [5, p.72]. This formula generally satisfied both parties. Central Asian states did not have enough production capabilities and needed to support developing economy as well as to meet the needs of the population. From that time “Beijing no longer accepted Russia’s right to domination in Central Asia and treated it as an equal partner” [5, p.74].

The third stage of Chinese foreign policy towards Central Asia started in 2001 and according to authors mentioned above continues nowadays. After 9/11 terrorist attack in United States and consequent deployment of American troops in Afghanistan to fight world terror USA increased its presence in almost every part of the world and Central Asian region was not an exception. Emergence of United States in a dangerous proximity to China could not leave Beijing unconcerned. In response Chinese leaders came up with even more vigorous strategies by increasing cooperation within SCO and on bilateral level. The economic rise of China allowed its leaders to invest into projects in Central Asia, lend money and sign big contracts in oil and gas industries of Central Asian countries. By 2008 the annual trade turnover between China and Central Asia reached about $20.2 billion [5, p.75]. Oil-and-gas rich Central Asia was found by PRC as a perfect source to meet the needs of Chinese growing economy. Being heavily dependent on energy supplies from Africa, Middle East and Asia-Pacific using seaways, considering rising prices for oil, China started thinking about diversifying its energy imports by building continental pipelines in Central Asia [6]. And it is increasing its influence in the region.

Despite China’s foreign policy became more persistent in the region one of the Chinese authors Zhao Huasheng claims that nevertheless Central Asia is not of the first importance for Beijing. China looks mainly eastward and southward. That is where main Chinese political and economic partners are located. These regions provide China access to ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea, United States of America and Europe, and what is more important to the main PRC’s headache Taiwan. In comparison with trade turnover of China and United States the trade between PRC and Central Asia seems largely insignificant. Even so, China continues to conduct active policy in Central Asia. This happens due to three simple reasons: security, energy and trade. Central Asian region plays a role of a rear for China. In case Beijing has a problem with Taiwan it must be sure its western borders are secure so China does not have to act on two or more fronts. The instability of XUAR is the main security concern of PRC on its western borders. Therefore China needs to assure that Central Asian states support its fight against separatism and terrorism. As Zhao Huasheng states in his article, in 2003, China formed new concept of foreign policy which put the creation of friendly, peaceful and prosperous environment on the first place [6, p.161]. This was mainly dictated by the rapid growth of Chinese economy and its rising power and consequent fears by China’s neighbors of its expansion. In such conditions it was necessary for PRC to create a new policy concept. The key element of the new concept is Chinese willingness to develop relations with neighboring countries by not only preserving own goals and interests but also considering goals and interests of neighbors [6].

According to Zhao Huasheng, China pursues several main aims in Central Asia:

• Border Security. Even if border issues were solved a long time ago, China needs to be sure nothing poses a threat to its western regions;

• Fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism. This is also related to western part of China where “East Turkestan” movement is seeking to separate Xinjiang from China. The goal of PRC is to prevent Central Asian states from providing support for separatists;

• To guarantee the stability of Central Asia as the strategic rear of China. Beijing should prevent the emergence of any real or potential strategic threat, ensure that Central Asia does not fall under control of any state or a group of states hostile to China, prevent militarization and military rivalry by outside powers in the region and emergence of any political and military groups directed against China;

• To guarantee availability of energy resources to China. Energy is one of the main interests of not only China but also of other geopolitical actors. Beijing should prevent the monopolization of vast energy resources by one of these actors. However China itself is not seeking a control over resources rather it stands for the development of energy sector of Central Asia based on fair competition and cooperation with other countries;

• To develop friendly relations with Central Asian states. All issues should be solved in a peaceful way. China in its relations with Central Asian countries should show the spirit of friendliness and fairness. It also should concentrate on interests acceptable for the states of this region;

• To maintain regional stability. It is necessary condition for the development of normal and predictable economic and political relations with Central Asia [6];

As the classification made by Paramonov, Strokov and Stolpovskiy was published in 2010 it didn’t take into account the new realities of post-2010 which, probably, may mark a new stage in PRC’s foreign policy. There are two main points indicating it. Firstly, the new fifth generation of Chinese leaders with Xi Jinping came to power. Secondly, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 poses very reasonable question of what is going to happen next. As growing number of American analysts continue to emphasize that Central Asia is not a priority for United States, Washington is significantly decreasing its presence in the region. Who is going to bear the burden of responsibility for security in Central Asia? Russia with its historical and cultural influence and new global economic power China seem to be the most obvious candidates. In this new stage we should expect much more active and offensive foreign policy of Beijing towards Central Asian states. Xi Jinping’s super productive tour in the region last year shows China’s determination to strengthen its positions in Central Asia.

Nowadays Chinese concerns and interests in Central Asia stay as following:

• Cooperation in the sphere of security and struggle against three evils;

• Trade facilitation, development of the western regions of China and promotion of New Silk Road connecting East and West;

• Ensuring stable energy supplies.

China should ensure stable and increasing energy supplies from Central Asia. While the situation on the eastern borders of China may deteriorate due to tensions with Japan over disputed islands or with United States and Taiwan Beijing is trying to secure its position on the west. So in case energy imports through Asia-Pacific region are interrupted for some reasons, Chinese economy will not be hurt so much. Another reason is of course Chinese growing economy and energy rich countries of Central Asia are those who can help to meet PRC’s needs.