- •Ian McLeod
- •7Th March [1991] 532
- •XXXIV Table of Cases
- •Interact with constitutional concerns.
- •1688 Conceded power to Parliament and is effectively appointed by
- •Independence, legislators, like judges, could claim to be insulated from
- •In its ideal form, treats all persons equally and releases the individual
- •Ireland. Until the Union with Ireland in 1801, Britain was a state, as
- •Incommensurables are the two freedoms identified by Sir Isaiah Berlin
- •Vices and the regulation of private activities.
- •22 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •26 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ing laws (Postema 1986, p. 46).
- •Idea which Hegel (1770–1831) ridiculed on the ground that the people
- •2.5 Rousseau: Communitarianism
- •Irrelevant (a view that is problematic when it comes to voting). This
- •36 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •3 All er 400 at 412, Lord Hoffman remarked that ‘the courts of the
- •Views of each state within the federation. In the uk any constitutional
- •Its actual output happens to have put great stress on individual rights
- •In the Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office, July 2001) may well furnish an
- •50 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •52 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •It is arguable that the cabinet has ceased to play a significant con-
- •56 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Importance of constitutional checks and balances. From this perspec-
- •Individually responsible to Parliament and that Parliament must be
- •70 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In the nineteenth century Bagehot claimed that the cabinet was the
- •2000A), recommended that the civil service be placed on a statutory
- •4.10 The Judiciary
- •4.2 The historical development of the constitution has been evolutionary in
- •Into line where rules are enforced in accordance with a predictable
- •5.4 Dicey’s Version of the Rule of Law
- •In body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the
- •Value of non-retrospectivity.
- •5.7 The Separation of Powers
- •5.7.1 The mixed constitution
- •In X Ltd V. Morgan Grampian Publishers Ltd [1990] 2 All er 1 at 13
- •Ing out of opinion within the legal profession (Judicial Appointments,
- •Ing, characteristically out of particular historical circumstances.
- •Independence could be compromised by a narrow ‘executive-centred’
- •114 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •It can dismiss superior court judges (Chapter 4).
- •Into account extra parliamentary remarks made by ministers, in for
- •3 All er 65 at 77–79; r. V. Khan (1996)). The courts will certainly take a
- •6.2 Historical Development
- •124 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ishing itself, having first created a body with more limited powers.
- •6.8 Note: Delegated Legislation
- •Ing the nineteenth century. Also during the nineteenth century the
- •158 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Includes a ‘Ministerial Code of Conduct’ (see sched. 4). The code
- •Ities in England and Wales.
- •168 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In particular transport policy is specifically subject to central govern-
- •176 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In one sense supported by dicta in Prescott V. Birmingham Corporation
- •View that the fiduciary duty implies that special weight must be given
- •178 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Increasingly important in view of the flexible nature of judicial review
- •In police and judicial affairs. Matters relating to immigration and asy-
- •184 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •186 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Increase in the powers of the European Assembly can be ratified by the
- •Implementing an ec Directive do not apply to future amendments of
- •Version to uk law, usually in the form of a statutory instrument (ibid.,
- •198 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interpret ‘so far as possible’ in the light of the aims and purposes of the
- •In English law, in the absence of bad faith, damages cannot normally
- •4 (1) (C) of the Act, which provides a defence to such an action where ‘the state
- •10 Parliament
- •10.1 Historical Development
- •Ing the constitution only because its members were easily corrupted by
- •214 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Is dominated by government business. This is why Bagehot thought
- •Is that it acts as a revising chamber to scrutinise the detail of legislation
- •10.4.2 Composition and procedure: ‘exclusive cognisance’
- •Injunction (see hc 365, 1986–7). In Rivlin V. Bilankin (1953) a libellous
- •242 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Vented ministers from sitting, and the uk Constitution would have
- •In a script other than roman, or containing words prohibited by the
- •In all the circumstances be taken to be at that time (a) resident there if
- •Vidual standing separately. The party list system is crude and has
- •In the case of a ‘money bill’ the Lords can delay only for one month
- •1957, Naa 1983 s. 1). The Comptroller is an Officer of the Commons
- •Independent bodies outside the central government.
- •X where another hospital has been closed?’. Conversely sycophantic
- •12.5.1 Scrutiny of delegated legislation
- •Inability of an individual mp to force disclosure of information. Early
- •In r. V. Preston [1993] 4 All er 638 at 663 Lord Mustill said ‘the
- •In each case she has a separate title and responsibilities. This is prob-
- •1936 (His Majesty’s Declaration of Abdication Act 1936). By conven-
- •In 1611 it was made clear that the King can legislate only within
- •Imply a power to tax directly or indirectly without very clear statutory
- •In Council relating to the civil service are legally enforceable, whereas
- •Industry was held to be bound by a statute regulating the licensing of
- •It, arguing that the decision is an unprecedented example of the courts
- •1997 S. 9; Intelligence Services Act 1994 s. 2; National Minimum Wages
- •In theory the prime minister may appoint anyone to the cabinet, but in
- •Is maintained by the Treasury. In cases of doubt the Attorney-General
- •324 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •1. Ministers of the Crown are expected to behave according to the high-
- •Is that it ensures that government explains its actions. It concluded that
- •Ing adverse publicity about his private life). Even in cases of personal
- •V. R. (1896)). This is consistent with the view that there is no contract.
- •In recent years concern has been expressed because of their involve-
- •View that there should be no distinction between the constitutional
- •Immunities and this may also apply to police officers while on duties on
- •Inquiry (s. 49). For example the Macpherson Inquiry into the death
- •In the relevant statute (for example the Attorney-General, or a speci-
- •356 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interfere with a decision to ban active homosexuals from serving in the
- •380 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •384 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Vention’ (per Lord Phillips mr in r. (Mahmood) V. Secretary of State
- •Itself and not merely an instrument of effective decision making.
- •In order to define the limits of judicial review. This excluded natural
- •Into most areas of government, including for example prison manage-
- •259 That justice must not only be done but must manifestly and
- •396 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Investigation more flexible than those of the courts but has limited
- •17.1 The Range of Remedies
- •17.2 The Judicial Review Procedure
- •408 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •17.2.1 Standing
- •Ise (r. V. Pollution Inspectorate ex parte Greenpeace (No. 2) (1994)).
- •V. Home Office (1990); r. V. Legal Aid Board ex parte Donn & Co.
- •In Cocks V. Thanet dc (1983) the House of Lords applied o’Reilly to
- •Important interests go beyond legal rules into territory where judges
- •424 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •469 At 477, Lord Donaldson said that ‘you have to look long and hard
- •Informed promptly of the reasons for the arrest and be brought
- •18.4.2 The interpretative obligation
- •8). However, it is not clear how far, if at all, it goes beyond the existing
- •577 At 581, Lord Slynn remarked that ‘it is clear that the 1998 Act
- •440 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •18.4.9 Derogation
- •Introduction of judicial consent for extended periods of detention
- •Vides a means to the end of self-actualisation. This argument has been
- •View that coheres with the thinking of the late Professor Karl Popper
- •V. Holmes (2000) a newspaper was permitted to publish a report on the
- •It is sometimes argued that s. 12 has the effect of privileging freedom
- •Ireland (1992) the Irish government banned a voluntary body from
- •Voluntarily and there seems no reason why these should be especially
- •International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
- •Important. A similar distinction is drawn in us law between the
- •It has been held that under Art. 11 states should take positive
- •Intimidation, including conditions as to the route of the procession
- •478 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ings because of its broad definition of terrorism. This includes the use
- •480 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In Sunday Business. In the article it was stated that the plaintiff ’s
- •In order to protect at least some privacy-related interests unprotected
- •506 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •20.7 A Hierarchy of Rights and the Contingencies
- •510 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ings of an experienced trial judge, the same confidence does not extend
- •21.4.3 Proprieties: sections 2, 3
- •Is no locality condition. If the object is to apprehend someone unlaw-
- •In relation to the need for reasonable suspicion, there is no
- •Information available, upon which to make his suspicion reasonable,
- •530 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interest in effective policing and the individual’s right to privacy and
- •Ing documents should be attempted before the issue of a warrant
- •538 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Items subject to legal privilege are, except as regards items held
- •540 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •1913). The conditions here are that there exist reasonable grounds for
- •If it is a search warrant (and not a production order) which is
- •It clear that such force can be used to secure entry to premises when
- •546 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interests of the United Kingdom. Nor does the duty to conform or
- •V. Evans (1985)). In Spycatcher, serious iniquity was not established
- •Information supplied under a legal duty had to be disclosed), economic-
- •Vention of crime but subject to the existence of independent safe-
- •22.5 Dan, a property developer, enters into an agreement with Oldcastle Council
- •580 Bibliography
- •Initiative in a public law Frame’, Public Law, 288–307.
- •In the civil law of defamation’, Communications Law, 1(5), 193–197.
- •2Nd edn, London: Cavendish.
Immunities and this may also apply to police officers while on duties on
behalf of the Crown, such as guarding prisoners in court (see also A-G
for New South Wales v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd (1955); Enever v. R.
(1906); R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner (MPC) ex parte Black-
burn (1968); R. v. Chief Constable of Devon & Cornwall ex parte
Central Electricity Governing Board (1982)).
Second there is fear of unaccountable power. Dating from the
Metropolitan Police Act 1829 this has led to local police forces rather
than the centralised agency beloved of the police state, and to attempts
to make these forces accountable to the local community. Local police
forces are answerable to their local police authority which comprises a
mixture of local councillors and justices of the peace. The inclusion of
the latter is an illustration of the blurring of the separation of powers, in
that JPs have an uneasy mixture of judicial and administrative functions
among which an interest in police work may be regarded as undesirable.
Third there are concerns for efficiency and, again, accountability,
this time for the spending of government money. The technical support
required by the police is too expensive to be provided without sub-
stantial central government funding with its inevitable con-commit-
ment of central control. Moreover modern crime is no respecter of local
or even national boundaries and electronic communications require
rapid co-ordination between local police areas.
Under the Police Act 1996, which consolidates the Police Act 1964,
and subsequent legislation, counties are the basic police unit in England
and Wales. The organisation of the London police has historically
been governed by special provisions under which the police authority
was the Home Secretary and the Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis, who is the equivalent to a chief constable, and Assistant
Commissioners were appointed by the Crown on the advice of the
Home Secretary. By virtue of the Greater London Authority Act 1999
there is now a separate police authority for Greater London with a
similar composition and powers as other police authorities although
the senior appointments remain with the Home Secretary. There is also
346 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
a special City of London Police Force limited to the square mile that
technically comprises the City. Its police authority is the City local
authority, the Court of Commons Council.
The 1996 Act provides for the alteration of local police areas (s. 32).
This requires the consent of the Home Secretary either after proposals
from individual forces, or on his own initiative following a local
inquiry. Many forces have been amalgamated. In 1961 there were 123
separate police forces in England outside London whereas there are
now 43. There is provision for co-operation between forces (s. 53).
In recent years the search for efficiency and the interdependence of
local police forces has led to the creation of central organisations such as
the National Police Data Bank, and the Mutual Aid Co-ordinating
Centre. The recent creation of the National Criminal Intelligence
Service and the National Crime Squad Service may constitute an em-
bryonic national police force (see Police Act 1997). These bodies carry
out police operations directly operating formally by agreement with
local forces. They are regulated by central boards the membership of
which strikes a balance between a minority of independent persons
appointed by the Secretary of State, and nomination by chief officers
and local police authorities from among their members. There is also
provision for appointment of a ‘crown servant’ and a member of the
security services (see Police Act 1997 as amended by Criminal Justice
and Police Act 2001). Their operational directors, are the equivalent of
chief constables. They are appointed by the boards from a list approved
by the Secretary of State and can be removed with the approval of the
Secretary of State who can also order their dismissal. A Central Police
Training and Development Authority has also been created (Criminal
Justice and Police Act 2001) the objectives of which are decided by the
Secretary of State who can also give it detailed guidance and directions.
The regulation of local forces is split three ways. The chief constable
is in charge of day-to-day policing. The police authority, in London the
metropolitan police authority, provides funds and exercises a limited
policy and strategy function. The Home Secretary exercises policy,
funding and supervisory powers and controls senior appointments.
Thus the police authority must respond both to the chief constables’
operational requirements and to the policy requirements of the central
government. It therefore acts as a transmission belt between the two.
15.2.1 The chief constable
Day-to-day ‘direction and control’ is vested in the chief constable
(in London the metropolitan police commissioner), whose powers and
347
The Police and the Armed Forces
duties have been said to be owed only to the law itself (Police Act 1996
s. 10; R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn [1968]
2 QB 118 at 136). It appears that no one is politically accountable
for operational decisions taken by the chief constable although, as
we shall see, the central government has substantial power to direct
policing priorities. The relationship between a chief constable and an
individual police officer is not that of employer and employee. As we
have seen, the powers and duties of a constable derive from the general
law and not even the chief constable can order police officers how to
exercise their powers, for example of arrest, in a particular case.
The chief constable has operational discretion but must have
regard to the objects and targets set out in an annual plan made by the
police authority under s. 8 of the Police Act 1996. This plan includes
policing priorities and expected financial constraints. The chief con-
stable must also report to the police authority annually and whenever
required (s. 20).
15.2.2 The police authority
Each police force has a local ‘police authority’. This is a committee or
joint committee of the relevant local authority. It normally comprises
17 members including nine local councillors, three magistrates, and five
appointed by the local authority from a short list made by the Home
Secretary. Thus elected persons form a bare majority over the recipients
of patronage. The political balance of the elected members must reflect
that of the council as a whole (Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001
s. 105). The functions of the police authority depend entirely on statute.
(i) The police authority must maintain an efficient and effective
police force (Police Act 1996 s. 6 (1)). This is a crucial but ambiguous
provision. Some argue that it gives the police authority political con-
trol in the sense that it allows it to specify how policing priorities
should be ordered. The more widely held view is that it only requires
the authority to provide material resources and to fix the budget
for whatever policing policies are determined by the chief constable.
However, s. 7 enables a police authority to impose ‘objectives’ on its
force consistent with any objectives imposed by the Home Secretary
(below). The police authority is required by s. 8 to make an annual plan
setting out its strategic priorities, its expected financial resources and its
proposed allocation of resources. The plan must also have regard to
national objects and performance targets set out by the Home Secre-
tary under ss. 37 and 38 of the 1996 Act.
348 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
(ii) The police authority appoints, retires and dismisses senior
police officers, that is, chief constables and assistant chief constables.
The consent of the Home Secretary is required (Police Act 1996 ss. 11,
11A, 12). In London, the metropolitan commissioner and deputy
commissioner are appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Home
Secretary. They can be removed by the metropolitan police authority
with the consent of the Home Secretary (Greater London Authority
Act 1999 s. 315, 318; Police Act 1996 ss. 9E, 9F). Other appointments,
dismissals and disciplinary decisions are for the chief constable or
metropolitan police commissioner. There is an appeal to a tribunal
against decisions to retire and dismiss whether by the police authority
or the chief constable (s. 85).
(iii) The police authority receives an annual report from the chief
constable and can also require special reports. However, the chief con-
stable can refuse to provide information if he believes that it would
either be contrary to the public interest or outside the functions of the
authority (Police Act 1996 s. 22). Disputes are settled by the Home
Secretary. Here again there is room for debate as to whether the police
authority should be concerned with matters of policing policy.
(iv) The police authority administers the police fund (ibid. s. 14).
15.2.3 The Home Secretary
Under the Police Act 1996 the Home Secretary has a range of
important statutory powers over individual forces and broadly similar
powers under the Police Act 1997 over the National Criminal Intel-
ligence Service (NCIS) and National Crime Squad (NCS) (above).
These powers do not include the giving of direct operational orders
but could be indirectly used to achieve considerable central control.
The main powers are as follows:
. Consent to the appointments and dismissals of the chief constable
and deputy chief constables. In the case of the NCIS and NCS the
directors are appointed by the boards from a list approved by the
Secretary of State ( Police Act 1997 ss. 6, 52).
. To require a police authority to dismiss a chief constable in the
interests of ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ (s. 42).
. To set objectives (s. 37), and performance targets (s. 38), to issue
codes of practice (s. 39).
. To make regulations about pay, discipline, uniforms, organisation,
training, duties and equipment, welfare and housing.
. To require reports from chief constables, police authorities (s. 43 (1)).
349
The Police and the Armed Forces
. To give grants to police authorities (s. 46). Central government
grant amounts to about 70% of the cost of running a local force.
. To inspect individual forces. For this purpose there is an Inspecto-
rate of Constabulary which makes an annual report which is laid
before Parliament. The Home Secretary can require the inspectorate
to hold an inspection into any force (s. 40). The Home Secretary can
also appoint any person to hold an inquiry into the efficiency or
effectiveness of a force and can give directions as the result of the
