Ing adverse publicity about his private life). Even in cases of personal

misjudgement or serious policy failure, resignation will be influenced

by pragmatic issues touching upon the gravity of the issue, party sup-

port for the beleaguered minister, including that of senior back-

benchers, the timing of the discovery of the error, the support of the

prime minister and cabinet and the public repercussions of the fault.

Norman Lamont kept his post as Chancellor of the Exchequer after

sterling was withdrawn from the exchange rate mechanism in 1992

notwithstanding that this amounted to a serious reversal of a central

strand of government macro-economic policy. James Callaghan, his

predecessor during the 1967 devaluation crisis, was less fortunate.

Parliament was not, however, sitting during the 1992 crisis. A minister

may be politically (as opposed to conventionally) obliged to resign

in other cases if he or she can no longer command political support,

most notably the support of the prime minister. Political embarrass-

ment, as much as the misleading of Parliament, appears to explain

Peter Mandelson’s resignation during the Hinduja Passport affair

(Hammond, 2001). The extent to which a minister’s behaviour side-

tracks newspapers from other news favoured by party managers is also

329

Ministers and Departments

important. Raw politics may thus force a minister from office, and

this, rather than constitutional obligation, may explain why resigna-

tion sometimes occurs following public criticism of the private lives

of some ministers. However Woodhouse (1994, p. 33) asserts that

cases of personal indiscretion can also fall within the ambit of conven-

tional requirements because they affect the public credibility of the

minister affected.

14.6 Civil Servants

14.6.1 Legal status

There is no legal definition of a civil servant. As with other basic insti-

tutions, the position of a civil servant is governed largely by tradition

and a pragmatic mixture of prerogative, convention, parliamentary

practice and statute. Thus the relationship between politicians and the

permanent and supposedly impartial civil service is a delicate and

vulnerable one. The Tomlin Commission (Cmnd. 3909 (1931)) defined

civil servants as ‘servants of the Crown, other than holders of political

or judicial office who are employed in a civil capacity and whose

remuneration is paid wholly and directly out of moneys voted by

Parliament’. The police, for example, are not civil servants and are

paid partly out of local funds.

The relationship between the Crown and a civil servant is usually said

to be governed by the royal prerogative. According to this view a civil

servant has no contract of employment and cannot enforce the terms of

his employment other than those laid down by statute (Civil Service

Code, para. 14). At common law the Crown can dismiss a civil servant

‘at pleasure’, that is, without notice and without giving reasons (Dunn