Is that it ensures that government explains its actions. It concluded that

ministers are obliged to respond to parliamentary criticism in a man-

ner which will satisfy it, including, where appropriate, by resignation

(para. 21). But this may be no more than acknowledgement of both

political and constitutional obligations. The government, which main-

tains the validity of the accountability/responsibility dichotomy, has

not accepted the Committee’s views. This illustrates the absence of any

authoritative way of identifying the meaning of a convention.

There remains a problem of an ‘accountability gap’. The dichotomy

between responsibility and accountability means that accountability

can break down where a minister blames a civil servant for some

failure and subsequently directs that individual not to appear before

a select committee (this is permitted under the cabinet office docu-

ment Departmental Evidence and Response to Select Committees (1997)

which replaced the so called Osmotherly Rules). Notoriously, the

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry refused to allow the civil

servants involved in aspects of the Westland affair to appear before the

Commons Defence Select Committee (see HC 519, 1985–6, Cmnd.

9916 (1986)). This problem has in part been addressed in the parlia-

mentary Resolutions. Although civil servants still give evidence to

select committees under the direction of ministers, the minister must

impress civil servants to be as helpful as possible in providing accurate,

truthful and full information. (HC resolution para (iv) above). Ulti-

mately, however, Parliament still lacks power to compel ministers to

answer questions and cannot require civil servants to give evidence

to select committees.

14.5.3 Resignation

The issue of ministerial resignation engages both collective and indi-

vidual responsibility. This is so because where resignation takes place it

saves fellow ministers from having to offer support for the beleaguered

minister under the principle of collective ministerial responsibility. The

327

Ministers and Departments

question of ministerial resignation may now be regarded as having

received undue emphasis; more weight is now attached to other facets

of responsibility which embrace a duty to provide information to

Parliament as well as a duty to provide an explanation and redress

where errors are made. Nevertheless the issue of resignation remains

of importance.

When the issue of ministerial resignation is considered, it may be

necessary to separate a constitutional duty to resign from political pres-

sures to resign (Scott, 1995–6). It seems that resignation is only consti-

tutionally required in two categories of case: (i) where a minister has

knowingly misled Parliament (except in the very limited cases where

this is justified: see Public Service Committee, 2nd Report, 1995–6 HC

313, para. 32; Scott, 1996a, p. 421); or (ii) the minister is personally to

blame for a serious departmental error (Woodhouse, 1994; Sir Richard

Butler in evidence to Scott, 9 Feb. 1994, Transcript pp. 23–24).

In cases falling within category (i), both the Ministerial Code and

Resolutions of the Houses of Parliament emphasise that resignation is

only demanded of ministers who knowingly misled Parliament. One

recent resignation suggests the possibility that loss of office may also

result where a minister has not volunteered a full disclosure of infor-

mation to a ministerial colleague who has then unwittingly misled Par-

liament (see Hammond, 2001, para. 5.128 and further below although,

in this case, wider issues of political embarrassment complicate any

assessment).

An honest but unreasonable belief in the accuracy of information

given to Parliament can be a lifeline to beleaguered ministers. Scott

found that Mr Waldegrave clung to the view that government policy

governing the sale of arms to Iraq had been reinterpreted but that

it had not changed – a view which Scott found unconvincing to the

point where it was unsustainable in serious argument (Scott, 1995–6,

D3.123–124). Waldegrave did not resign. Did this suggest that a min-

ister was not constitutionally responsible for incompetence? If not,

who was? Similar questions arise after Lord Falconer’s refusal in 2001

to resign in respect of the funding and sale of the Millennium Dome.

The second case where resignation is required embraces both serious

personal misjudgement and serious error in the minister’s department

in which the minister is implicated. Examples of the former include the

case of Peter Mandelson who, in 1998, did not disclose that he had

received a substantial private loan from a fellow minister whose

business affairs were subject to investigation by Peter Mandelson’s

department. Edwina Currie’s remarks on salmonella in eggs in 1988

also revealed personal misjudgement.

328 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law

Major failings of policy for which a minister bears the ultimate

responsibility should also lead to resignation. There does not now

seem to be a general duty requiring resignation for departmental errors

caused by officials. Crichel Down, which was once thought to have

required resignation in such cases, is not now considered to support

such a wide proposition. Sir Thomas Dugdale’s resignation prob-

ably owed more to political misjudgement and a lack of parliamentary

support, rather than self-sacrifice as a direct consequence of mistakes

of officials.

The circumstances in which a minister will bear responsibility for

major failings is not easy to identify where Executive Agencies have

been established, because here the issue is blurred by the uncertain

dichotomy between policy and operation. Ministers seem reluctant to

resign where the fault lies in management failings (e.g. James Prior and

Kenneth Baker after escapes from prisons. Michael Howard also

refused to resign after the breakout from Parkhurst prison and more

recently Lord Falconer has not resigned over the troubled Millennium

Dome). But it is not clear where the boundary between policy and

management failings can be drawn.

Calls for ministerial resignation are also part of an adversarial

debate, and the interplay of politics and convention cannot be ignored.

Some ministers have not tendered their resignation until the lack of

political support has become clear (e.g., David Mellor in 1992 follow-