- •Ian McLeod
- •7Th March [1991] 532
- •XXXIV Table of Cases
- •Interact with constitutional concerns.
- •1688 Conceded power to Parliament and is effectively appointed by
- •Independence, legislators, like judges, could claim to be insulated from
- •In its ideal form, treats all persons equally and releases the individual
- •Ireland. Until the Union with Ireland in 1801, Britain was a state, as
- •Incommensurables are the two freedoms identified by Sir Isaiah Berlin
- •Vices and the regulation of private activities.
- •22 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •26 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ing laws (Postema 1986, p. 46).
- •Idea which Hegel (1770–1831) ridiculed on the ground that the people
- •2.5 Rousseau: Communitarianism
- •Irrelevant (a view that is problematic when it comes to voting). This
- •36 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •3 All er 400 at 412, Lord Hoffman remarked that ‘the courts of the
- •Views of each state within the federation. In the uk any constitutional
- •Its actual output happens to have put great stress on individual rights
- •In the Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office, July 2001) may well furnish an
- •50 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •52 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •It is arguable that the cabinet has ceased to play a significant con-
- •56 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Importance of constitutional checks and balances. From this perspec-
- •Individually responsible to Parliament and that Parliament must be
- •70 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In the nineteenth century Bagehot claimed that the cabinet was the
- •2000A), recommended that the civil service be placed on a statutory
- •4.10 The Judiciary
- •4.2 The historical development of the constitution has been evolutionary in
- •Into line where rules are enforced in accordance with a predictable
- •5.4 Dicey’s Version of the Rule of Law
- •In body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the
- •Value of non-retrospectivity.
- •5.7 The Separation of Powers
- •5.7.1 The mixed constitution
- •In X Ltd V. Morgan Grampian Publishers Ltd [1990] 2 All er 1 at 13
- •Ing out of opinion within the legal profession (Judicial Appointments,
- •Ing, characteristically out of particular historical circumstances.
- •Independence could be compromised by a narrow ‘executive-centred’
- •114 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •It can dismiss superior court judges (Chapter 4).
- •Into account extra parliamentary remarks made by ministers, in for
- •3 All er 65 at 77–79; r. V. Khan (1996)). The courts will certainly take a
- •6.2 Historical Development
- •124 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ishing itself, having first created a body with more limited powers.
- •6.8 Note: Delegated Legislation
- •Ing the nineteenth century. Also during the nineteenth century the
- •158 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Includes a ‘Ministerial Code of Conduct’ (see sched. 4). The code
- •Ities in England and Wales.
- •168 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In particular transport policy is specifically subject to central govern-
- •176 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In one sense supported by dicta in Prescott V. Birmingham Corporation
- •View that the fiduciary duty implies that special weight must be given
- •178 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Increasingly important in view of the flexible nature of judicial review
- •In police and judicial affairs. Matters relating to immigration and asy-
- •184 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •186 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Increase in the powers of the European Assembly can be ratified by the
- •Implementing an ec Directive do not apply to future amendments of
- •Version to uk law, usually in the form of a statutory instrument (ibid.,
- •198 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interpret ‘so far as possible’ in the light of the aims and purposes of the
- •In English law, in the absence of bad faith, damages cannot normally
- •4 (1) (C) of the Act, which provides a defence to such an action where ‘the state
- •10 Parliament
- •10.1 Historical Development
- •Ing the constitution only because its members were easily corrupted by
- •214 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Is dominated by government business. This is why Bagehot thought
- •Is that it acts as a revising chamber to scrutinise the detail of legislation
- •10.4.2 Composition and procedure: ‘exclusive cognisance’
- •Injunction (see hc 365, 1986–7). In Rivlin V. Bilankin (1953) a libellous
- •242 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Vented ministers from sitting, and the uk Constitution would have
- •In a script other than roman, or containing words prohibited by the
- •In all the circumstances be taken to be at that time (a) resident there if
- •Vidual standing separately. The party list system is crude and has
- •In the case of a ‘money bill’ the Lords can delay only for one month
- •1957, Naa 1983 s. 1). The Comptroller is an Officer of the Commons
- •Independent bodies outside the central government.
- •X where another hospital has been closed?’. Conversely sycophantic
- •12.5.1 Scrutiny of delegated legislation
- •Inability of an individual mp to force disclosure of information. Early
- •In r. V. Preston [1993] 4 All er 638 at 663 Lord Mustill said ‘the
- •In each case she has a separate title and responsibilities. This is prob-
- •1936 (His Majesty’s Declaration of Abdication Act 1936). By conven-
- •In 1611 it was made clear that the King can legislate only within
- •Imply a power to tax directly or indirectly without very clear statutory
- •In Council relating to the civil service are legally enforceable, whereas
- •Industry was held to be bound by a statute regulating the licensing of
- •It, arguing that the decision is an unprecedented example of the courts
- •1997 S. 9; Intelligence Services Act 1994 s. 2; National Minimum Wages
- •In theory the prime minister may appoint anyone to the cabinet, but in
- •Is maintained by the Treasury. In cases of doubt the Attorney-General
- •324 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •1. Ministers of the Crown are expected to behave according to the high-
- •Is that it ensures that government explains its actions. It concluded that
- •Ing adverse publicity about his private life). Even in cases of personal
- •V. R. (1896)). This is consistent with the view that there is no contract.
- •In recent years concern has been expressed because of their involve-
- •View that there should be no distinction between the constitutional
- •Immunities and this may also apply to police officers while on duties on
- •Inquiry (s. 49). For example the Macpherson Inquiry into the death
- •In the relevant statute (for example the Attorney-General, or a speci-
- •356 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interfere with a decision to ban active homosexuals from serving in the
- •380 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •384 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Vention’ (per Lord Phillips mr in r. (Mahmood) V. Secretary of State
- •Itself and not merely an instrument of effective decision making.
- •In order to define the limits of judicial review. This excluded natural
- •Into most areas of government, including for example prison manage-
- •259 That justice must not only be done but must manifestly and
- •396 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Investigation more flexible than those of the courts but has limited
- •17.1 The Range of Remedies
- •17.2 The Judicial Review Procedure
- •408 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •17.2.1 Standing
- •Ise (r. V. Pollution Inspectorate ex parte Greenpeace (No. 2) (1994)).
- •V. Home Office (1990); r. V. Legal Aid Board ex parte Donn & Co.
- •In Cocks V. Thanet dc (1983) the House of Lords applied o’Reilly to
- •Important interests go beyond legal rules into territory where judges
- •424 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •469 At 477, Lord Donaldson said that ‘you have to look long and hard
- •Informed promptly of the reasons for the arrest and be brought
- •18.4.2 The interpretative obligation
- •8). However, it is not clear how far, if at all, it goes beyond the existing
- •577 At 581, Lord Slynn remarked that ‘it is clear that the 1998 Act
- •440 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •18.4.9 Derogation
- •Introduction of judicial consent for extended periods of detention
- •Vides a means to the end of self-actualisation. This argument has been
- •View that coheres with the thinking of the late Professor Karl Popper
- •V. Holmes (2000) a newspaper was permitted to publish a report on the
- •It is sometimes argued that s. 12 has the effect of privileging freedom
- •Ireland (1992) the Irish government banned a voluntary body from
- •Voluntarily and there seems no reason why these should be especially
- •International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
- •Important. A similar distinction is drawn in us law between the
- •It has been held that under Art. 11 states should take positive
- •Intimidation, including conditions as to the route of the procession
- •478 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ings because of its broad definition of terrorism. This includes the use
- •480 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In Sunday Business. In the article it was stated that the plaintiff ’s
- •In order to protect at least some privacy-related interests unprotected
- •506 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •20.7 A Hierarchy of Rights and the Contingencies
- •510 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ings of an experienced trial judge, the same confidence does not extend
- •21.4.3 Proprieties: sections 2, 3
- •Is no locality condition. If the object is to apprehend someone unlaw-
- •In relation to the need for reasonable suspicion, there is no
- •Information available, upon which to make his suspicion reasonable,
- •530 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interest in effective policing and the individual’s right to privacy and
- •Ing documents should be attempted before the issue of a warrant
- •538 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Items subject to legal privilege are, except as regards items held
- •540 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •1913). The conditions here are that there exist reasonable grounds for
- •If it is a search warrant (and not a production order) which is
- •It clear that such force can be used to secure entry to premises when
- •546 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interests of the United Kingdom. Nor does the duty to conform or
- •V. Evans (1985)). In Spycatcher, serious iniquity was not established
- •Information supplied under a legal duty had to be disclosed), economic-
- •Vention of crime but subject to the existence of independent safe-
- •22.5 Dan, a property developer, enters into an agreement with Oldcastle Council
- •580 Bibliography
- •Initiative in a public law Frame’, Public Law, 288–307.
- •In the civil law of defamation’, Communications Law, 1(5), 193–197.
- •2Nd edn, London: Cavendish.
In theory the prime minister may appoint anyone to the cabinet, but in
practice the selection is confined to members of the prime minister’s
own party. A majority should be members of the House of Commons.
Under the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975, the Lord Chancellor and
three other cabinet members must be drawn from the House of Lords.
Cabinets usually comprise between 20 and 30 ministers including the
heads of the main government departments and certain other senior
office-holders. Other ministers and civil servants often attend cabinet
meetings for particular purposes, notably the Chief Whip who forms a
link between the government and its backbench supporters.
Cabinet business is frequently delegated to committees and sub-
committees or even to informal groups of ministers and other persons
such as civil servants and political advisors. This is an important
method by which the prime minister can control the decision-making
process. Nevertheless, the use of committees and delegation seems to be
an inevitable consequence of the size and complexity of modern gov-
ernment. There are two kinds of formal cabinet committee: (i) ad hoc
committees set up on a temporary basis to deal with particular prob-
lems and (ii) named permanent committees, for example defence and
overseas policy, economic strategy and legislation. The names and
membership of these committees are published (http://www.cabinet.
office.gov.uk). However, even these could be bypassed in favour of
informal groups of prime ministerial cronies.
Collective cabinet responsibility (below) ensures that the cabinet is
bound by committee decisions, whether or not the full cabinet has dis-
cussed them. Thus it is sometimes said that the full cabinet has become
merely a rubber stamp or ‘dignified’ part of the constitution, the key
decisions being made elsewhere. The secrecy surrounding the workings
315
Ministers and Departments
of the cabinet is also an aspect of collective responsibility and makes
objective analysis difficult. Other practical limits upon cabinet power
are that its meetings are relatively short (about two hours per week),
its members have departmental loyalties, and its agenda and procedure
are controlled by the prime minister.
Cabinet committees are ‘shadowed’ by committees of civil servants.
The cabinet secretariat services and co-ordinates the work of the cabi-
net including the crucial and sensitive task of recording its decision for
implementation by departments. The deputy prime minister is currently
the minister responsible for the cabinet office. The cabinet secretariat
comprises about 100 civil servants headed by the cabinet secretary who
is also head of the home civil service and chief adviser to the prime
minister. The cabinet secretariat also co-ordinates other Whitehall
committees and designates most of their chairmen. It therefore plays a
central role in the practice of the constitution. Arguably the three roles
of the official concerned create fundamental conflicts of duty.
14.3 Ministers
A minister is defined by the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975 as an
office holder under Her Majesty. It is for the Queen on the advice of
the prime minister to designate the number and titles of ministers. Some
ministers have separate legal personality as corporations sole. By con-
vention a minister must be a member of Parliament. In theory this
strengthens parliamentary control over the executive. As we saw in
Chapter 5, there are statutory limits on the number of paid ministers
who can sit in the Commons so as to prevent a prime minister flooding
the House with his or her supporters. In practice, however, party politi-
cal pressures and patronage have combined to make the Commons
usually subservient to the executive. There are about 100 ministers,
ranked as follows.
. Cabinet ministers. Most cabinet ministers head the largest and most
important departments but some offices are traditionally without
departments and can be assigned to special or co-ordinating work by
the prime minister. These include the Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster and the Lord President of the (Privy) Council. The Leader
of the House of Commons is also a member of the cabinet and is
responsible for managing government business in the House. The
most important departments are headed by secretaries of state. These
316 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
are the successors of the powerful officials created by Henry VIII to
control the central government. In theory any secretary of state can
exercise the powers of any other secretary of state unless statute says
otherwise (see Simcock, 1992, p. 535).
. Ministers of state. These are the second in command within depart-
ments and are usually allocated particular areas of responsibility.
. Parliamentary under-secretaries of state (where the head of the
department is a secretary of state).
. Parliamentary secretaries. These are mainly recruited from the House
of Commons and assist departmental heads with political and ad-
ministrative work.
. Parliamentary private secretaries. These are members of Parliament
who act as unpaid assistants to individual ministers. They do not
count as ministers for the purpose of counting the number of
ministers who may sit in the House of Commons.
. Whips. These control party discipline and provide a channel of
communication between government and backbenches. The Chief
Whip is not a member of the cabinet but attends cabinet meetings
and consults with the prime minister on matters such as the appoint-
ment of ministers.
. The law officers. The Attorney-General is the chief law officer, and is
assisted by the Solicitor-General. There are corresponding Scottish
law officers. As party politicians the law officers raise questions
about the separation of powers. The Attorney-General and the
Solicitor-General are members of the House of Commons. They are
entitled to consult other ministers but by convention act indepen-
dently. The Attorney-General has the following specific functions in
relation to the judicial process:
(i) representing the government in civil proceedings either as
plaintiff or defendant;
(ii) prosecuting in important criminal cases. By statute his consent
is needed for the prosecution of some offences;
(iii) independently of his role as government lawyer, instituting legal
proceedings on behalf of the general ‘public interest’, either on
his own initiative or on the application of any member of the
public (a relator action). This might include an action against a
public authority. The Attorney-General’s decision whether or
not to intervene cannot be challenged in the courts (Gouriet v.
Union of Post Office Workers (1978));
(iv) intervening in any legal proceedings to put the government’s
view and referring questions of law to the Court of Appeal where
an accused person has been acquitted of a criminal offence.
317
Ministers and Departments
The extent to which the Attorney-General is influenced by the wishes
of the government is obscure. For example in a case involving
government attempts to suppress newspaper reports about matters
of national security, his two roles as government lawyer and repre-
sentative of the public interest are inseparable. We have only the
predictable assertions of successive attorney-generals that they can
be trusted. In 1924 the government fell because the attorney acted on
instructions from the government (see Edwards, 1984, pp. 206–12).
14.4 Government Departments
By convention a minister must head each department in order to
preserve ministerial responsibility. There are no constitutional require-
ments relating to the organisation of government departments. They
can freely be created, abolished or amalgamated by the government.
The matter is sometimes regarded as one of ‘royal prerogative’ but
could also be the right of the Crown, as of any private organisation, to
organise itself as it wishes thus illustrating a possible weakness in our
non-statist constitution. In the nineteenth century committees of the
Privy Council or special bodies were set up to deal with new govern-
mental responsibilities but, as the work of government increased,
separate permanent departments headed by ministers were created.
These were expanded, abolished, split up or combined as circumstances
dictated. Flexibility is facilitated by statutory provisions allowing func-
tions, property, etc. to be transferred between departments and also to
outside bodies (see Ministers of the Crown Act 1975, Civil Service
(Management Functions) Act 1992; Deregulation and Contracting Out
Act 1994). For purposes of litigation a list of appropriate departments
