1997 S. 9; Intelligence Services Act 1994 s. 2; National Minimum Wages

Act 1998; National Audit Act 1983 s. 1). Except for (i) the unlikely

event of intervention by the monarch and (ii) the almost equally remote

possibility of rejection by the House of Commons, there is no formal

machinery to curb the power of a prime minister who has support of a

majority government. Moreover there is no convention that the prime

minister can be removed by a vote of no confidence in the Commons.

Such a vote can only bring down the government as a whole. Every-

thing therefore depends upon the political balance between the particu-

lar holder of the office, the cabinet and party solidarity. The influence

of senior backbench MPs may be significant, particularly where the

cabinet is divided.

311

312 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law

The main conventions that secure the pre-eminent power of a prime

minister are as follows:

1. The prime minister must be a member of and enjoy the support of

the House of Commons. This was originally designed to limit the

power of governments, but modern party discipline and the domina-

tion of the House of Commons by paid career politicians whose

elections are financed by party funds means that, given a majority

of seats, the support of the Commons is usually automatic.

2. The prime minister appoints and dismisses all government ministers

and determines their status and pecking order. S/he also has powers

of appointment in relation to senior judges and many other impor-

tant public posts (a mixture of statute and convention). The prime

minister is also the minister responsible for the civil service.

3. The prime minister controls the cabinet agenda, formulates its deci-

sions and allocates cabinet business. In this way cabinet discussion

can be bypassed and matters entrusted to smaller groups of min-

isters or civil servants. Loyalty is secured through the principle of

collective responsibility.

4. The cabinet is serviced by a secretariat. The cabinet secretary, a

permanent official, is also head of the home civil service and reports

to the prime minister. This gives the prime minister unique access to

the government machine since the cabinet office co-ordinates the

work of all government departments and is responsible for the train-

ing and deployment of the civil service.

5. The prime minister may advise the Queen to dissolve Parliament

without consultation with the cabinet. Thus the prime minister can

choose the date of a general election, holding his or her colleagues’

careers to ransom.

6. Ministers’ energies are centred upon their own departmental inter-

ests. Few have the time or knowledge to concentrate upon issues

outside their departmental concerns.

7. The prime minister is head of the internal security services.

8. The prime minister is the channel of communication between Queen

and government.

9. The prime minister is the main spokesperson for the nation and as

such has unique access to the media. The prime minister’s press

office holds a key position. There is a danger that, in terms of public

perception and therefore legitimacy, the prime minister is perceived

as a president, in other words as a head of state thereby eclipsing

the monarchy.

313

Ministers and Departments

14.1.2 Limits on prime ministerial power

The main limits upon the power of a prime minister lie in the checks

and balances that prevent the prime minister using his or her powers

arbitrarily. These include:

1. The Queen’s power to intervene in extreme cases (see Chapter 13).

2. The risk of dismissing cabinet ministers who may enjoy political

support in their own right. In practice, a prime minister’s freedom

to appoint ministers may be limited by party considerations. The

cabinet is full of rivals for power.

3. There are similar risks in bypassing or overruling cabinet discussion

and in advising a dissolution.

4. The absence of a separate prime ministerial department (apart from

a small but growing private office). However, prime ministers may

have a staff of independent policy advisers brought in from outside

the regular civil service.

5. A prime minister could be deposed as party leader and therefore

lose the support of the Commons.

6. A prime minister could not impose his or her will over a united

cabinet that enjoys substantial support in the Commons. The resig-

nation of Margaret Thatcher in 1989 provides an example.

14.2 The Cabinet

In theory the cabinet is the policy-making body which is collectively

responsible to Parliament and co-ordinates the work of government

departments (see Haldane Committee (1917) Cmnd. 9230). The cabinet

is a creature of convention and has no legal powers. Statute law recog-

nises the status of the cabinet by protecting cabinet secrecy (Health

Service Commissioners Act 1983 s. 12; Parliamentary Commissioner

Act 1967 s. 8 (4)) and sometimes powers can be exercised only by a

minister of cabinet rank (Data Protection Act 1984 s. 27; Telecom-

munications Act 1984 s. 45).

The cabinet originated in the seventeenth century as a group of privy

councillors called together to give confidential advice to the monarch.

An attempt was made in the Act of Settlement 1700 to prevent ‘inner

caucuses’ of ministers from usurping the functions of the Privy Council,

but the provisions were never implemented and were later repealed. The

term ‘cabinet’ was originally one of abuse and referred to the King’s

314 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law

‘closet’ or anteroom. George I (1714–27) leaned particularly heavily

on party leaders, and from his reign on the monarch ceased to attend

cabinet meetings. During the reign of George III (1760–1820) the con-

vention emerged that the monarch should generally consult the cabinet.

Eighteenth-century cabinets served the dual purpose of ensuring

that the executive could command the support of the Commons and as

a means of presenting the monarch with a united front, and from a

mid-nineteenth-century perspective Bagehot regarded the cabinet as

the pivot of the constitution and its driving force. Today we are less

sure of this because of the rival power centres of the prime minister,

civil servants and influential groups of ministers, and media and politi-

cal advisers appointed by individual ministers.

By convention the prime minister advises the Queen on all cabi-

net appointments and dismissals. The Queen has no power of veto.