- •Ian McLeod
- •7Th March [1991] 532
- •XXXIV Table of Cases
- •Interact with constitutional concerns.
- •1688 Conceded power to Parliament and is effectively appointed by
- •Independence, legislators, like judges, could claim to be insulated from
- •In its ideal form, treats all persons equally and releases the individual
- •Ireland. Until the Union with Ireland in 1801, Britain was a state, as
- •Incommensurables are the two freedoms identified by Sir Isaiah Berlin
- •Vices and the regulation of private activities.
- •22 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •26 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ing laws (Postema 1986, p. 46).
- •Idea which Hegel (1770–1831) ridiculed on the ground that the people
- •2.5 Rousseau: Communitarianism
- •Irrelevant (a view that is problematic when it comes to voting). This
- •36 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •3 All er 400 at 412, Lord Hoffman remarked that ‘the courts of the
- •Views of each state within the federation. In the uk any constitutional
- •Its actual output happens to have put great stress on individual rights
- •In the Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office, July 2001) may well furnish an
- •50 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •52 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •It is arguable that the cabinet has ceased to play a significant con-
- •56 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Importance of constitutional checks and balances. From this perspec-
- •Individually responsible to Parliament and that Parliament must be
- •70 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In the nineteenth century Bagehot claimed that the cabinet was the
- •2000A), recommended that the civil service be placed on a statutory
- •4.10 The Judiciary
- •4.2 The historical development of the constitution has been evolutionary in
- •Into line where rules are enforced in accordance with a predictable
- •5.4 Dicey’s Version of the Rule of Law
- •In body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the
- •Value of non-retrospectivity.
- •5.7 The Separation of Powers
- •5.7.1 The mixed constitution
- •In X Ltd V. Morgan Grampian Publishers Ltd [1990] 2 All er 1 at 13
- •Ing out of opinion within the legal profession (Judicial Appointments,
- •Ing, characteristically out of particular historical circumstances.
- •Independence could be compromised by a narrow ‘executive-centred’
- •114 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •It can dismiss superior court judges (Chapter 4).
- •Into account extra parliamentary remarks made by ministers, in for
- •3 All er 65 at 77–79; r. V. Khan (1996)). The courts will certainly take a
- •6.2 Historical Development
- •124 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ishing itself, having first created a body with more limited powers.
- •6.8 Note: Delegated Legislation
- •Ing the nineteenth century. Also during the nineteenth century the
- •158 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Includes a ‘Ministerial Code of Conduct’ (see sched. 4). The code
- •Ities in England and Wales.
- •168 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In particular transport policy is specifically subject to central govern-
- •176 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In one sense supported by dicta in Prescott V. Birmingham Corporation
- •View that the fiduciary duty implies that special weight must be given
- •178 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Increasingly important in view of the flexible nature of judicial review
- •In police and judicial affairs. Matters relating to immigration and asy-
- •184 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •186 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Increase in the powers of the European Assembly can be ratified by the
- •Implementing an ec Directive do not apply to future amendments of
- •Version to uk law, usually in the form of a statutory instrument (ibid.,
- •198 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interpret ‘so far as possible’ in the light of the aims and purposes of the
- •In English law, in the absence of bad faith, damages cannot normally
- •4 (1) (C) of the Act, which provides a defence to such an action where ‘the state
- •10 Parliament
- •10.1 Historical Development
- •Ing the constitution only because its members were easily corrupted by
- •214 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Is dominated by government business. This is why Bagehot thought
- •Is that it acts as a revising chamber to scrutinise the detail of legislation
- •10.4.2 Composition and procedure: ‘exclusive cognisance’
- •Injunction (see hc 365, 1986–7). In Rivlin V. Bilankin (1953) a libellous
- •242 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Vented ministers from sitting, and the uk Constitution would have
- •In a script other than roman, or containing words prohibited by the
- •In all the circumstances be taken to be at that time (a) resident there if
- •Vidual standing separately. The party list system is crude and has
- •In the case of a ‘money bill’ the Lords can delay only for one month
- •1957, Naa 1983 s. 1). The Comptroller is an Officer of the Commons
- •Independent bodies outside the central government.
- •X where another hospital has been closed?’. Conversely sycophantic
- •12.5.1 Scrutiny of delegated legislation
- •Inability of an individual mp to force disclosure of information. Early
- •In r. V. Preston [1993] 4 All er 638 at 663 Lord Mustill said ‘the
- •In each case she has a separate title and responsibilities. This is prob-
- •1936 (His Majesty’s Declaration of Abdication Act 1936). By conven-
- •In 1611 it was made clear that the King can legislate only within
- •Imply a power to tax directly or indirectly without very clear statutory
- •In Council relating to the civil service are legally enforceable, whereas
- •Industry was held to be bound by a statute regulating the licensing of
- •It, arguing that the decision is an unprecedented example of the courts
- •1997 S. 9; Intelligence Services Act 1994 s. 2; National Minimum Wages
- •In theory the prime minister may appoint anyone to the cabinet, but in
- •Is maintained by the Treasury. In cases of doubt the Attorney-General
- •324 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •1. Ministers of the Crown are expected to behave according to the high-
- •Is that it ensures that government explains its actions. It concluded that
- •Ing adverse publicity about his private life). Even in cases of personal
- •V. R. (1896)). This is consistent with the view that there is no contract.
- •In recent years concern has been expressed because of their involve-
- •View that there should be no distinction between the constitutional
- •Immunities and this may also apply to police officers while on duties on
- •Inquiry (s. 49). For example the Macpherson Inquiry into the death
- •In the relevant statute (for example the Attorney-General, or a speci-
- •356 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interfere with a decision to ban active homosexuals from serving in the
- •380 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •384 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Vention’ (per Lord Phillips mr in r. (Mahmood) V. Secretary of State
- •Itself and not merely an instrument of effective decision making.
- •In order to define the limits of judicial review. This excluded natural
- •Into most areas of government, including for example prison manage-
- •259 That justice must not only be done but must manifestly and
- •396 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Investigation more flexible than those of the courts but has limited
- •17.1 The Range of Remedies
- •17.2 The Judicial Review Procedure
- •408 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •17.2.1 Standing
- •Ise (r. V. Pollution Inspectorate ex parte Greenpeace (No. 2) (1994)).
- •V. Home Office (1990); r. V. Legal Aid Board ex parte Donn & Co.
- •In Cocks V. Thanet dc (1983) the House of Lords applied o’Reilly to
- •Important interests go beyond legal rules into territory where judges
- •424 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •469 At 477, Lord Donaldson said that ‘you have to look long and hard
- •Informed promptly of the reasons for the arrest and be brought
- •18.4.2 The interpretative obligation
- •8). However, it is not clear how far, if at all, it goes beyond the existing
- •577 At 581, Lord Slynn remarked that ‘it is clear that the 1998 Act
- •440 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •18.4.9 Derogation
- •Introduction of judicial consent for extended periods of detention
- •Vides a means to the end of self-actualisation. This argument has been
- •View that coheres with the thinking of the late Professor Karl Popper
- •V. Holmes (2000) a newspaper was permitted to publish a report on the
- •It is sometimes argued that s. 12 has the effect of privileging freedom
- •Ireland (1992) the Irish government banned a voluntary body from
- •Voluntarily and there seems no reason why these should be especially
- •International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
- •Important. A similar distinction is drawn in us law between the
- •It has been held that under Art. 11 states should take positive
- •Intimidation, including conditions as to the route of the procession
- •478 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ings because of its broad definition of terrorism. This includes the use
- •480 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In Sunday Business. In the article it was stated that the plaintiff ’s
- •In order to protect at least some privacy-related interests unprotected
- •506 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •20.7 A Hierarchy of Rights and the Contingencies
- •510 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ings of an experienced trial judge, the same confidence does not extend
- •21.4.3 Proprieties: sections 2, 3
- •Is no locality condition. If the object is to apprehend someone unlaw-
- •In relation to the need for reasonable suspicion, there is no
- •Information available, upon which to make his suspicion reasonable,
- •530 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interest in effective policing and the individual’s right to privacy and
- •Ing documents should be attempted before the issue of a warrant
- •538 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Items subject to legal privilege are, except as regards items held
- •540 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •1913). The conditions here are that there exist reasonable grounds for
- •If it is a search warrant (and not a production order) which is
- •It clear that such force can be used to secure entry to premises when
- •546 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interests of the United Kingdom. Nor does the duty to conform or
- •V. Evans (1985)). In Spycatcher, serious iniquity was not established
- •Information supplied under a legal duty had to be disclosed), economic-
- •Vention of crime but subject to the existence of independent safe-
- •22.5 Dan, a property developer, enters into an agreement with Oldcastle Council
- •580 Bibliography
- •Initiative in a public law Frame’, Public Law, 288–307.
- •In the civil law of defamation’, Communications Law, 1(5), 193–197.
- •2Nd edn, London: Cavendish.
214 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
prime minister to appoint sufficient peers to secure a majority in the
House of Lords. In 1909–11 there was a major constitutional crisis
the result of which, following two general elections, was that the Lords
agreed to the passing of the Parliament Act 1911.
The Parliament Act 1911 placed the relationship between Lords and
Commons on a legal basis in which the Commons has the last word.
The one vital power left to the Lords is that of preventing a govern-
ment from remaining permanently in office since the Parliament Acts
do not apply to a bill to prolong the life of Parliament. Subject to this
the role of the House of Lords is the limited one of suggesting revisions
to legislation and providing an opportunity for debate and investiga-
tion in committee of matters of public concern. Further reforms were
made by the Life Peerages Act 1958 which reinvigorated the House by
allowing appointed life peers to sit. This made the House of Lords
a respected, but still ultimately powerless, debating chamber. The pres-
ent government proposes to reform the House of Lords. It has com-
menced the process in a modest way by the House of Lords Act 1999,
which reduced the number of hereditary peers able to sit in the House
from many hundred to ninety-two. Its further proposals envisage a
predominantly appointed House with a small elected element (see
Chapter 11).
10.2 The Meeting of Parliament
The foundations of the modern law were established by the 1688
Revolution. The main principles are as follows. They are a mixture of
law and convention.
1. ‘Parliament ought to be held frequently’ (Bill of Rights 1688 Art. 13)
and must meet at least once every three years (Meeting of Parlia-
ment Act 1694). In fact Parliament meets annually (convention
backed by administrative necessity, for example authorising tax
and public spending).
2. Parliament must automatically end at the expiry of five years from
the date of its writ of summons (see below) (Septennial Act 1715;
Parliament Act 1911).
3. Within the five years Parliament may be dissolved by the monarch
(law) on the advice of the prime minister (convention). However, it
is possible that in certain extreme cases the monarch can exercise
personal choice whether or not to dissolve Parliament (see p. 295).
A Parliament usually lasts for about four years, dissolution being
timed for the political advantage of the prime minister. This is one
215
Parliament
of the main sources of prime ministerial power. It is sometimes
suggested that Parliament should sit for a fixed term, thus remov-
ing a prime minister’s power to call an election to suit his own
party. This could, however, paralyse a weak government (see Royal
Commission on the Constitution, Cmnd. 5460, 1969–73). A prime
minister whose government is defeated on a vote of confidence in
the House of Commons must ask for a dissolution.
4. Dissolution triggers a general election which must be held within
18 working days of the dissolution. The same proclamation dis-
solves Parliament and summons a new one. If the monarch dies after
the proclamation but before the meeting of the new Parliament the
meeting is postponed for 14 days (Representation of the People Act
1985 s. 70). In practice Parliament is either prorogued or adjourned
(below) a few days before being formally dissolved so as to permit a
breathing space during which it technically remains in being.
5. A ‘Parliament’ is divided into ‘sessions’. These are working periods
usually running from November until July (about 170 sitting days).
Public bills that are not completed by the end of a session lapse.
Sessions are ‘prorogued’ by the monarch under the royal preroga-
tive. Each session is opened by the monarch, with an Address from
the Throne which outlines the government’s legislative proposals.
The event provides an opportunity for a general debate on govern-
ment policy which takes place immediately afterwards. Within each
Session each House can be adjourned at any time by resolution of
the House.
6. There is machinery for recalling each House while it stands pro-
rogued (e.g. Meeting of Parliament Act 1870; Emergency Powers
Act 1920). An adjourned Parliament can be summoned quickly by
the Speaker and the Lord Chancellor (who presides over the House
of Lords) at the request of the prime minister. The Speaker can also
suspend individual sittings. However, it does not seem to be pos-
sible for ordinary MPs to recall Parliament in order to debate any
crisis that may arise while Parliament is not sitting. Government
has many powers under the royal prerogative, notably to deploy the
armed forces and even to declare war, which it can exercise without
reference to Parliament.
10.3 The Functions of Parliament
As we have seen, Parliament combined with the Queen is the supreme
law-making body. The separate Houses of Parliament each have dis-
tinctive functions.
216 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
10.3.1 The House of Commons
Today, Parliament is largely a reactive body responding to initiatives
from the government, and sometimes from outside bodies. The House
of Commons has several functions which in our loose system, unpro-
tected as it is by the separation of powers, may conflict. Indeed the
House of Commons is widely regarded as dysfunctional. The main
functions of the House of Commons are as follows:
(i) It legitimises the government by financing and supporting it
through its majority and providing a training and recruiting
ground for government ministers
(ii) It enacts legislation although this normally takes the form of
approving or amending legislation made by the government.
(iii) It holds the government to account through debates, questions
and committee investigations.
(iv) It provides a forum for ventilating matters of public concern.
These can be generated by outside bodies representing particular
interests or by the grievances of individuals. While every MP has
a duty to represent his or her constituents it is unclear how far
MPs are entitled to act as advocates for other interests.
The procedures by which these functions are implemented will be
discussed in Chapter 12.
. Our system is a parliamentary system as opposed to the presidential
system pioneered by the USA. By this is meant that the government
is not directly elected but chosen by Parliament. By convention the
prime minister is the person who commands the support of the major-
ity in the Commons. The prime minister then advises the Queen
on the appointment of the other government ministers and the
Queen must accept the PM’s advice. By convention most ministers
must be members of the House of Commons thus ensuring that they
are fully accountable. There are, however, statutory limits upon the
number of ministers who can sit in the Commons (above, p. 112), a
principle that reflects the separation of powers. Therefore some
ministers notably the Lord Chancellor, sit in the Lords. Some states
such as France combine the parliamentary and presidential systems
by having a directly elected president who appoints a prime minister
and government, the members of which can, but need not be, mem-
bers of the legislature. The legislature can remove the government.
It is not essential to the parliamentary system that ministers are
217
Parliament
also MPs provided that Parliament can choose and dismiss the
government.
. The size and complexity of modern government means that par-
liamentary control over government cannot be exercised directly.
Parliamentary approval of the executive’s budget and accounts is
largely a formality. Detailed scrutiny and control over government
spending takes place mainly within the government itself through the
medium of the Treasury. However, a substantial parliamentary
safeguard is provided by the National Audit Office, headed by the
Comptroller and Auditor General. This is an aspect of a modern
tendency to create specialised supervisory bodies while preserving
constitutional propriety by making them formally responsible to
Parliament.
. Legislation is usually presented to Parliament ready drafted by the
executive. Although any group of members can propose a law, in
practice, because the Leader of the House who is responsible for the
timetable is a member of the government the parliamentary process
