- •Ian McLeod
- •7Th March [1991] 532
- •XXXIV Table of Cases
- •Interact with constitutional concerns.
- •1688 Conceded power to Parliament and is effectively appointed by
- •Independence, legislators, like judges, could claim to be insulated from
- •In its ideal form, treats all persons equally and releases the individual
- •Ireland. Until the Union with Ireland in 1801, Britain was a state, as
- •Incommensurables are the two freedoms identified by Sir Isaiah Berlin
- •Vices and the regulation of private activities.
- •22 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •26 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ing laws (Postema 1986, p. 46).
- •Idea which Hegel (1770–1831) ridiculed on the ground that the people
- •2.5 Rousseau: Communitarianism
- •Irrelevant (a view that is problematic when it comes to voting). This
- •36 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •3 All er 400 at 412, Lord Hoffman remarked that ‘the courts of the
- •Views of each state within the federation. In the uk any constitutional
- •Its actual output happens to have put great stress on individual rights
- •In the Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office, July 2001) may well furnish an
- •50 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •52 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •It is arguable that the cabinet has ceased to play a significant con-
- •56 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Importance of constitutional checks and balances. From this perspec-
- •Individually responsible to Parliament and that Parliament must be
- •70 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In the nineteenth century Bagehot claimed that the cabinet was the
- •2000A), recommended that the civil service be placed on a statutory
- •4.10 The Judiciary
- •4.2 The historical development of the constitution has been evolutionary in
- •Into line where rules are enforced in accordance with a predictable
- •5.4 Dicey’s Version of the Rule of Law
- •In body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the
- •Value of non-retrospectivity.
- •5.7 The Separation of Powers
- •5.7.1 The mixed constitution
- •In X Ltd V. Morgan Grampian Publishers Ltd [1990] 2 All er 1 at 13
- •Ing out of opinion within the legal profession (Judicial Appointments,
- •Ing, characteristically out of particular historical circumstances.
- •Independence could be compromised by a narrow ‘executive-centred’
- •114 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •It can dismiss superior court judges (Chapter 4).
- •Into account extra parliamentary remarks made by ministers, in for
- •3 All er 65 at 77–79; r. V. Khan (1996)). The courts will certainly take a
- •6.2 Historical Development
- •124 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ishing itself, having first created a body with more limited powers.
- •6.8 Note: Delegated Legislation
- •Ing the nineteenth century. Also during the nineteenth century the
- •158 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Includes a ‘Ministerial Code of Conduct’ (see sched. 4). The code
- •Ities in England and Wales.
- •168 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In particular transport policy is specifically subject to central govern-
- •176 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In one sense supported by dicta in Prescott V. Birmingham Corporation
- •View that the fiduciary duty implies that special weight must be given
- •178 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Increasingly important in view of the flexible nature of judicial review
- •In police and judicial affairs. Matters relating to immigration and asy-
- •184 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •186 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Increase in the powers of the European Assembly can be ratified by the
- •Implementing an ec Directive do not apply to future amendments of
- •Version to uk law, usually in the form of a statutory instrument (ibid.,
- •198 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interpret ‘so far as possible’ in the light of the aims and purposes of the
- •In English law, in the absence of bad faith, damages cannot normally
- •4 (1) (C) of the Act, which provides a defence to such an action where ‘the state
- •10 Parliament
- •10.1 Historical Development
- •Ing the constitution only because its members were easily corrupted by
- •214 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Is dominated by government business. This is why Bagehot thought
- •Is that it acts as a revising chamber to scrutinise the detail of legislation
- •10.4.2 Composition and procedure: ‘exclusive cognisance’
- •Injunction (see hc 365, 1986–7). In Rivlin V. Bilankin (1953) a libellous
- •242 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Vented ministers from sitting, and the uk Constitution would have
- •In a script other than roman, or containing words prohibited by the
- •In all the circumstances be taken to be at that time (a) resident there if
- •Vidual standing separately. The party list system is crude and has
- •In the case of a ‘money bill’ the Lords can delay only for one month
- •1957, Naa 1983 s. 1). The Comptroller is an Officer of the Commons
- •Independent bodies outside the central government.
- •X where another hospital has been closed?’. Conversely sycophantic
- •12.5.1 Scrutiny of delegated legislation
- •Inability of an individual mp to force disclosure of information. Early
- •In r. V. Preston [1993] 4 All er 638 at 663 Lord Mustill said ‘the
- •In each case she has a separate title and responsibilities. This is prob-
- •1936 (His Majesty’s Declaration of Abdication Act 1936). By conven-
- •In 1611 it was made clear that the King can legislate only within
- •Imply a power to tax directly or indirectly without very clear statutory
- •In Council relating to the civil service are legally enforceable, whereas
- •Industry was held to be bound by a statute regulating the licensing of
- •It, arguing that the decision is an unprecedented example of the courts
- •1997 S. 9; Intelligence Services Act 1994 s. 2; National Minimum Wages
- •In theory the prime minister may appoint anyone to the cabinet, but in
- •Is maintained by the Treasury. In cases of doubt the Attorney-General
- •324 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •1. Ministers of the Crown are expected to behave according to the high-
- •Is that it ensures that government explains its actions. It concluded that
- •Ing adverse publicity about his private life). Even in cases of personal
- •V. R. (1896)). This is consistent with the view that there is no contract.
- •In recent years concern has been expressed because of their involve-
- •View that there should be no distinction between the constitutional
- •Immunities and this may also apply to police officers while on duties on
- •Inquiry (s. 49). For example the Macpherson Inquiry into the death
- •In the relevant statute (for example the Attorney-General, or a speci-
- •356 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interfere with a decision to ban active homosexuals from serving in the
- •380 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •384 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Vention’ (per Lord Phillips mr in r. (Mahmood) V. Secretary of State
- •Itself and not merely an instrument of effective decision making.
- •In order to define the limits of judicial review. This excluded natural
- •Into most areas of government, including for example prison manage-
- •259 That justice must not only be done but must manifestly and
- •396 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Investigation more flexible than those of the courts but has limited
- •17.1 The Range of Remedies
- •17.2 The Judicial Review Procedure
- •408 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •17.2.1 Standing
- •Ise (r. V. Pollution Inspectorate ex parte Greenpeace (No. 2) (1994)).
- •V. Home Office (1990); r. V. Legal Aid Board ex parte Donn & Co.
- •In Cocks V. Thanet dc (1983) the House of Lords applied o’Reilly to
- •Important interests go beyond legal rules into territory where judges
- •424 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •469 At 477, Lord Donaldson said that ‘you have to look long and hard
- •Informed promptly of the reasons for the arrest and be brought
- •18.4.2 The interpretative obligation
- •8). However, it is not clear how far, if at all, it goes beyond the existing
- •577 At 581, Lord Slynn remarked that ‘it is clear that the 1998 Act
- •440 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •18.4.9 Derogation
- •Introduction of judicial consent for extended periods of detention
- •Vides a means to the end of self-actualisation. This argument has been
- •View that coheres with the thinking of the late Professor Karl Popper
- •V. Holmes (2000) a newspaper was permitted to publish a report on the
- •It is sometimes argued that s. 12 has the effect of privileging freedom
- •Ireland (1992) the Irish government banned a voluntary body from
- •Voluntarily and there seems no reason why these should be especially
- •International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
- •Important. A similar distinction is drawn in us law between the
- •It has been held that under Art. 11 states should take positive
- •Intimidation, including conditions as to the route of the procession
- •478 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ings because of its broad definition of terrorism. This includes the use
- •480 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In Sunday Business. In the article it was stated that the plaintiff ’s
- •In order to protect at least some privacy-related interests unprotected
- •506 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •20.7 A Hierarchy of Rights and the Contingencies
- •510 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ings of an experienced trial judge, the same confidence does not extend
- •21.4.3 Proprieties: sections 2, 3
- •Is no locality condition. If the object is to apprehend someone unlaw-
- •In relation to the need for reasonable suspicion, there is no
- •Information available, upon which to make his suspicion reasonable,
- •530 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interest in effective policing and the individual’s right to privacy and
- •Ing documents should be attempted before the issue of a warrant
- •538 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Items subject to legal privilege are, except as regards items held
- •540 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •1913). The conditions here are that there exist reasonable grounds for
- •If it is a search warrant (and not a production order) which is
- •It clear that such force can be used to secure entry to premises when
- •546 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interests of the United Kingdom. Nor does the duty to conform or
- •V. Evans (1985)). In Spycatcher, serious iniquity was not established
- •Information supplied under a legal duty had to be disclosed), economic-
- •Vention of crime but subject to the existence of independent safe-
- •22.5 Dan, a property developer, enters into an agreement with Oldcastle Council
- •580 Bibliography
- •Initiative in a public law Frame’, Public Law, 288–307.
- •In the civil law of defamation’, Communications Law, 1(5), 193–197.
- •2Nd edn, London: Cavendish.
4 (1) (C) of the Act, which provides a defence to such an action where ‘the state
of scientific and technical knowledge at the time (time of supply) was not such
that a producer of products of the same description as the product in question
might be expected to have discovered the defect if it had existed in his
products while they were under his control’. Section 5 of the Act also limits
damages under the Act to £5,000. Gervase claims that he has suffered injuries
worth £10,000 due to his being unable to pursue his job as a self-employed
taxi driver for six weeks.
The Act was passed to implement the EC Purchasers Protection Directive
(fictitious). Gervase wishes to rely on Art. 7 (e) of the Directive which provides
a defence only where ‘the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the
time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable
the existence of the defect to be discovered’. Advise Gervase as to the rules
by which any conflict between the Act and Directive will be resolved and the
procedures involved.
Part III
Governmental Institutions
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10 Parliament
Strictly speaking, Parliament is a meeting, summoned by the monarch
under the royal prerogative of the two separate Houses – the House
of Lords and the House of Commons – with the purpose of proposing
laws to the Crown and consenting to the Crown’s requests for money.
Today, as a result of the development of conventions favouring
democracy the role of Parliament is primarily to sustain the executive,
hold the executive to account and to approve legislation. Parliament
also acts as a way of translating the popular vote into the appointment
of an executive, since, again by convention, whoever commands a
majority in the House of Commons is entitled to form a government.
As we shall see, by virtue of the distortions of the electoral system, a
popular majority does not necessarily translate into a parliamentary
majority. In recent years the effectiveness and standing of Parliament
has probably weakened in that members of Parliament may lack the
will and resources to be independent of the executive and have there-
fore allowed political power to accrue to the executive.
10.1 Historical Development
The word ‘Parliament’, which in origin meant merely a parley or
conference, entered into official language about the middle of the
thirteenth century. It described formal conferences between the king
and the elite members of society. Broadly, the history of Parliament is
that of a power struggle between the Crown and Parliament and
between the two Houses of Parliament. The House of Commons has
triumphed over the Crown in the sense of the monarch, and over the
House of Lords, but the Crown in the sense of the executive appears
for now to be the winner.
The House of Lords was the earliest part of Parliament. The House
of Lords was the king’s great council of advisers, summoned and
dismissed by the king. The Lords were originally the great landowners
of the realm, ‘tenants-in-chief ’, created as such by the monarch and
transmitting to their descendants their property and the titles and
power that went with it. Membership also included church dignitaries.
There was also an ‘inner’ council of close advisers exercising execu-
tive functions. This developed into the Privy Council which retains
209
210 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
residual functions today but whose executive role has mainly been
taken over by the cabinet which is by convention nominally responsible
to Parliament.
The ‘pure’ feudal system did not survive the thirteenth century. Land
became freely disposable, and wealth and influence could be amassed
through commerce and professional skills. This made it possible for
people other than the hereditary landowners to aspire to political
power, and led to the rise of the House of Commons, the origins of
which lay in the occasional practice of the king of summoning leading
persons from the wider community to assist in settling appeals from
local courts, and to provide him with information.
The king increasingly used the Commons to provide support in his
continuing disputes with the nobility. In particular the representatives
were useful tax-gatherers, and in 1254 Henry III began the practice of
summoning the Commons to seek financial support particularly for
overseas adventures. The Commons consisted of property owners: the
knights from the shires and (after 1265) the burgesses (leading citizens)
from the boroughs. During the reign of Edward III (1327–77), parlia-
ments were summoned more regularly and the Commons began the
practice of submitting a list of demands and grievances before they
agreed to vote taxes to the king. They also began to distance themselves
from the Crown and the Lords by meeting separately.
The independence of the Commons owed much to the Crown’s need
for money to prosecute foreign wars and to finance the dynastic con-
flicts with the barons that continued until the Tudor period. Although
Parliament was not originally a law-making body, by the sixteenth
century it became customary for the most authoritative statements
of the existing law to be made by the monarch with the advice of the
separate Houses of Lords and Commons: the three ‘estates’ who
claimed to represent the realm. From this it was an easy step to Parlia-
ment making new law. Nevertheless, Parliament only met when sum-
moned by the king, drastic changes in the law were rare, the Crown
had plenty of inherited revenues, and the Commons usually did as it
was told (Chrimes, 1967, Ch. 2).
The Tudor period (1485–1603) saw the monarchy at the height of
its power and Parliament became largely subservient to the executive.
The power and wealth of the great barons had been exhausted by many
years of civil wars and inter-family quarrels. The government was
efficiently carried on, particularly during the reign of Elizabeth I,
through professional civil servants, prerogative bodies such as the Privy
Council and its offshoot courts, and a sophisticated network of local
officials appointed by the Crown. This sowed the seeds for the struggles
211
Parliament
of the seventeenth century between Crown and Parliament wherein the
king claimed the right to tax and to suspend and dispense with laws.
The common law courts equivocated on these matters. In 1642, how-
ever, Charles I conceded that English government comprised a mixture
of King, Lords and Commons (Answer to the Nineteen Propositions).
During the civil wars of 1642 to 1648 and the ensuing period of
republican government the ‘Long Parliament’ continued in a reduced
and frequently interrupted form. In 1660, Charles II was restored under
the constitution that was claimed to have existed at the beginning of the
civil war, this being a compromise between the Crown and Parliament.
His successor James I attempted to renew some of the claims to royal
supremacy that had led to the downfall of Charles I. Although James’s
religious policy was relatively liberal he was suspected of having a pro-
Catholic agenda, whereas Parliament was a bastion of protestantism.
James was deposed in 1688 by the threat of a Dutch invasion and
a new settlement formalised by the Crown and Parliament Recogni-
tion Act 1689. The group that established the 1688 settlement was
dominated by commoners but included 10 peers. The position of
Parliament was reinforced. Article 4 of the Bill of Rights 1688 forbade
the Crown to raise money without Parliament’s consent, and Article 9
enshrined the right of freedom of speech of Parliament and its mem-
bers. The Bill of Rights also required elections to the Commons. The
Act of Settlement 1700 outlawed royal pardons for those impeached by
the Commons, and forbade persons having offices or places of profit
under the king or securing promises from the Crown, from sitting in the
Commons. This last provision might have led to a genuine separation
of powers, but it was soon repealed to permit ministers to sit in the
Commons. The settlement had no need to make special arrangements
for the House of Lords, the role of which was generally accepted.
The eighteenth century saw the emergence of the ‘balanced con-
stitution’ in which monarch, Lords and Commons were supposed to
check each other but ended in popular agitation for democratic reform.
During most of this period the House of Lords was in practice the
dominant political force because its members had significant influence
upon elections to the Commons. The Commons was elected from a
small number of property owners and in most parts of England the
aristocratic landowners were in a position to manipulate elections.
The main developments of this period were the emergence of the
conventions of cabinet government and ministerial responsibility. The
monarch gradually ceased to run the executive in person and relied
upon a cabinet (which he still appointed) drawn from the ranks of
Parliament. This helped to ensure stable government in that the
212 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
cabinet had the confidence both of monarch and Commons. George
III (1760–1820) attempted to recover some of the Crown’s waning
influence and this provoked a response from the Commons which
asserted its independence from the Crown. Thereafter the party sys-
tem grew in strength and cabinets asserted the right to meet without
the monarch and to give advice to the monarch. Royal influence
diminished and it became established that the monarch must appoint
as prime minister the person who can command a majority of the
Commons, must act on cabinet advice and must dissolve parliament if
a government loses the support of the Commons. Nevertheless the
modern convention that the monarch always acts on the advice of
ministers was not firmly established until after the First World War.
From the middle of the eighteenth century the House of Commons
gradually became the dominant part of the legislature. Hume believed
that the Commons refrained from flexing its muscles and so unbalanc-
