Individually responsible to Parliament and that Parliament must be

dissolved if the government loses the confidence of the House of Com-

mons. By the end of the eighteenth century the official status of the

opposition was recognised.

During the eighteenth century the notion of the ‘mixed constitution’

was predominant in which monarch, Lords and Commons acted as

checks on each other. For example Blackstone (1765, vol. 1, p. 153)

announced that the royal veto on legislation meant that the king could

not propose evil but could prevent it and went on to eulogise the

mutual checks between nobility, king and people which Parliament

embodied. However, of the three elements, until the end of the nine-

teenth century the aristocracy in the House of Lords remained a

powerful force. Until the extension of the franchise to most of the

population which evolved by stages between 1832 and 1928, elec-

tions were largely controlled by aristocratic land-owning families with

a power base both in the Lords and in local affairs. There was also a

tension, which is still significant between the notion of a constitu-

tionalism based upon custom and tradition as interpreted by an elite,

represented for example by Edmund Burke (1729–1797), and the

republican ideals of individual rights and the rule of law represented

in the eighteenth century by Thomas Paine (above). The relatively

peaceful development of the UK governmental system during the eigh-

teenth and nineteenth centuries is often attributed to the openness and

flexibility of the British ruling classes in absorbing others into their

ranks, particularly the new industrial wealth creators.

In the eighteenth century when most mainland European states were

absolute monarchies, the British constitution was widely regarded by

overseas observers such as Montesquieu as a stable and liberal regime

embodying the values of the rule of law and separation of powers.

From inside Britain the picture was more blurred. The courts protected

68 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law

rights in the formal sense that whatever rights a person had were im-

partially adjudicated. However, the content of those rights was affected

by draconian legislation passed in the interests of aristocratic land-

owners, such as anti-poaching laws and a tax system that put the

overwhelming burden upon consumption as opposed to property, thus

penalising the poor (see Thompson, 1975).

On the other hand it would be wrong to get a one-dimensional

picture. As usual there was a continuing accommodation between com-

peting interests (see Thompson, 1975; Langbein, 1983). For example

the poor were able to call on the protection of the courts as well as

the rich and judges and juries were on the whole reluctant to impose

draconian penalties. Moreover, during this period, the common law,

albeit reluctantly, rejected slavery (Somersett’s Case (1772)), and per-

sonal liberty and freedom of expression were upheld (e.g. Leach v.

Money (1765); Entick v. Carrington (1765); Wolfe Tone’s Case (1798);

Libel Act 1792 – verdicts to be left to the jury).

Britain did not escape the social dislocations that were a prominent

feature of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries but, for

reasons that are not fully understood, managed to escape the

revolutions that brought down many European regimes. A possible

reason lay in the flexibility of our constitutional arrangements and the

willingness of the aristocratic elite to give way gradually in the face of

pressures for reform. Thus it took nearly a century to complete the

process towards popular democracy. Other reasons lay in the relative

flexibility of the social class structure in Britain and with the deference

of the English character (see Bagehot, in Crossman (ed), 1963).

From the mid-nineteenth century Parliament gradually and reluc-

tantly extended the right to vote as utilitarianism and economics

replaced law as the intellectual fashion of the day. This extension of the

franchise culminated in 1928 when women were given the franchise.

The extension of democracy led to a debate about the common law.

Traditionalists such as Dicey regarded the common law as a hedge

against tyranny while reformers such as Bentham despised the common

law as an enemy of democracy and efficient management. ‘(E)ighteenth

century veneration for the law was giving way to pungent criticism of it’

(Briggs, 1959, p. 92).

Power became increasingly concentrated in the House of Commons

and the executive. Lord Salisbury whose final administration ended in

1892 was the last prime minister to sit in the House of Lords and the

Labour Party was founded in 1900. It was during this period when

Parliament began to be genuinely representative that the courts explic-

itly recognised the principle of parliamentary supremacy. In relation to

69

The Structure of the UK Government: An Overview

the common law it is arguable that the broad justice-based system that

predominated during the eighteenth century was challenged by more

formalistic rule-based conceptions of law that suited the development

of capitalism and free markets in the nineteenth century.

During Queen Victoria’s reign (1837–1901) the monarchy reshaped

itself as a symbolic representative of the nation standing outside party

politics. The increasingly important legislative role of Parliament

awakened conflict between the two Houses of Parliament. The House

of Lords, representing traditional landowners and the House of Com-

mons, representing mainly commercial interests, struggled for dom-

inance over issues such as Irish home rule and the introduction of social

reforms. The Parliament Act 1911 resolved the matter in favour of the

Commons although the House of Lords retains significant influence.

4.3 The Growth of the Executive

During the late nineteenth century, impelled by the demands of a larger

electorate, the executive branch of government began to increase in size

and range of discretionary powers. Governmental functions which had

previously been exercised by local bodies were increasingly concen-

trated in central departments under the control of ministers answerable

to Parliament. An important landmark was the Northcote–Trevelyan

Report of 1854 which led to the creation of a permanent, professional

and impartial civil service, appointed on merit (replacing a system of

patronage and sinecures). In the USA for example the top ranks of the

civil service change with each new president. In recent years, however,

tensions have been created as ministers have increasingly relied on

‘special advisors’ appointed personally who, although paid from public

funds, are more closely associated with party politics than are regular

civil servants.

The eighteenth-century statute book had been dominated by laws

protecting property policed by the courts. During the nineteenth cen-

tury the wider franchise led to social welfare legislation which required

a large and powerful executive. Nineteenth-century local government,

public health and safety legislation was followed, in the early twentieth

century, by substantial housing, education and urban development

legislation. Immediately after the Second World War a wide-ranging

welfare system was introduced. It was widely accepted that the econ-

omy should be driven by the state. Subordinate legislation and non-

statutory rules were made by the executive on a large scale with limited

parliamentary scrutiny. Thousands of administrative tribunals staffed