- •Ian McLeod
- •7Th March [1991] 532
- •XXXIV Table of Cases
- •Interact with constitutional concerns.
- •1688 Conceded power to Parliament and is effectively appointed by
- •Independence, legislators, like judges, could claim to be insulated from
- •In its ideal form, treats all persons equally and releases the individual
- •Ireland. Until the Union with Ireland in 1801, Britain was a state, as
- •Incommensurables are the two freedoms identified by Sir Isaiah Berlin
- •Vices and the regulation of private activities.
- •22 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •26 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ing laws (Postema 1986, p. 46).
- •Idea which Hegel (1770–1831) ridiculed on the ground that the people
- •2.5 Rousseau: Communitarianism
- •Irrelevant (a view that is problematic when it comes to voting). This
- •36 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •3 All er 400 at 412, Lord Hoffman remarked that ‘the courts of the
- •Views of each state within the federation. In the uk any constitutional
- •Its actual output happens to have put great stress on individual rights
- •In the Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office, July 2001) may well furnish an
- •50 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •52 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •It is arguable that the cabinet has ceased to play a significant con-
- •56 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Importance of constitutional checks and balances. From this perspec-
- •Individually responsible to Parliament and that Parliament must be
- •70 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In the nineteenth century Bagehot claimed that the cabinet was the
- •2000A), recommended that the civil service be placed on a statutory
- •4.10 The Judiciary
- •4.2 The historical development of the constitution has been evolutionary in
- •Into line where rules are enforced in accordance with a predictable
- •5.4 Dicey’s Version of the Rule of Law
- •In body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the
- •Value of non-retrospectivity.
- •5.7 The Separation of Powers
- •5.7.1 The mixed constitution
- •In X Ltd V. Morgan Grampian Publishers Ltd [1990] 2 All er 1 at 13
- •Ing out of opinion within the legal profession (Judicial Appointments,
- •Ing, characteristically out of particular historical circumstances.
- •Independence could be compromised by a narrow ‘executive-centred’
- •114 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •It can dismiss superior court judges (Chapter 4).
- •Into account extra parliamentary remarks made by ministers, in for
- •3 All er 65 at 77–79; r. V. Khan (1996)). The courts will certainly take a
- •6.2 Historical Development
- •124 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ishing itself, having first created a body with more limited powers.
- •6.8 Note: Delegated Legislation
- •Ing the nineteenth century. Also during the nineteenth century the
- •158 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Includes a ‘Ministerial Code of Conduct’ (see sched. 4). The code
- •Ities in England and Wales.
- •168 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In particular transport policy is specifically subject to central govern-
- •176 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In one sense supported by dicta in Prescott V. Birmingham Corporation
- •View that the fiduciary duty implies that special weight must be given
- •178 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Increasingly important in view of the flexible nature of judicial review
- •In police and judicial affairs. Matters relating to immigration and asy-
- •184 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •186 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Increase in the powers of the European Assembly can be ratified by the
- •Implementing an ec Directive do not apply to future amendments of
- •Version to uk law, usually in the form of a statutory instrument (ibid.,
- •198 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interpret ‘so far as possible’ in the light of the aims and purposes of the
- •In English law, in the absence of bad faith, damages cannot normally
- •4 (1) (C) of the Act, which provides a defence to such an action where ‘the state
- •10 Parliament
- •10.1 Historical Development
- •Ing the constitution only because its members were easily corrupted by
- •214 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Is dominated by government business. This is why Bagehot thought
- •Is that it acts as a revising chamber to scrutinise the detail of legislation
- •10.4.2 Composition and procedure: ‘exclusive cognisance’
- •Injunction (see hc 365, 1986–7). In Rivlin V. Bilankin (1953) a libellous
- •242 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Vented ministers from sitting, and the uk Constitution would have
- •In a script other than roman, or containing words prohibited by the
- •In all the circumstances be taken to be at that time (a) resident there if
- •Vidual standing separately. The party list system is crude and has
- •In the case of a ‘money bill’ the Lords can delay only for one month
- •1957, Naa 1983 s. 1). The Comptroller is an Officer of the Commons
- •Independent bodies outside the central government.
- •X where another hospital has been closed?’. Conversely sycophantic
- •12.5.1 Scrutiny of delegated legislation
- •Inability of an individual mp to force disclosure of information. Early
- •In r. V. Preston [1993] 4 All er 638 at 663 Lord Mustill said ‘the
- •In each case she has a separate title and responsibilities. This is prob-
- •1936 (His Majesty’s Declaration of Abdication Act 1936). By conven-
- •In 1611 it was made clear that the King can legislate only within
- •Imply a power to tax directly or indirectly without very clear statutory
- •In Council relating to the civil service are legally enforceable, whereas
- •Industry was held to be bound by a statute regulating the licensing of
- •It, arguing that the decision is an unprecedented example of the courts
- •1997 S. 9; Intelligence Services Act 1994 s. 2; National Minimum Wages
- •In theory the prime minister may appoint anyone to the cabinet, but in
- •Is maintained by the Treasury. In cases of doubt the Attorney-General
- •324 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •1. Ministers of the Crown are expected to behave according to the high-
- •Is that it ensures that government explains its actions. It concluded that
- •Ing adverse publicity about his private life). Even in cases of personal
- •V. R. (1896)). This is consistent with the view that there is no contract.
- •In recent years concern has been expressed because of their involve-
- •View that there should be no distinction between the constitutional
- •Immunities and this may also apply to police officers while on duties on
- •Inquiry (s. 49). For example the Macpherson Inquiry into the death
- •In the relevant statute (for example the Attorney-General, or a speci-
- •356 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interfere with a decision to ban active homosexuals from serving in the
- •380 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •384 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Vention’ (per Lord Phillips mr in r. (Mahmood) V. Secretary of State
- •Itself and not merely an instrument of effective decision making.
- •In order to define the limits of judicial review. This excluded natural
- •Into most areas of government, including for example prison manage-
- •259 That justice must not only be done but must manifestly and
- •396 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Investigation more flexible than those of the courts but has limited
- •17.1 The Range of Remedies
- •17.2 The Judicial Review Procedure
- •408 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •17.2.1 Standing
- •Ise (r. V. Pollution Inspectorate ex parte Greenpeace (No. 2) (1994)).
- •V. Home Office (1990); r. V. Legal Aid Board ex parte Donn & Co.
- •In Cocks V. Thanet dc (1983) the House of Lords applied o’Reilly to
- •Important interests go beyond legal rules into territory where judges
- •424 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •469 At 477, Lord Donaldson said that ‘you have to look long and hard
- •Informed promptly of the reasons for the arrest and be brought
- •18.4.2 The interpretative obligation
- •8). However, it is not clear how far, if at all, it goes beyond the existing
- •577 At 581, Lord Slynn remarked that ‘it is clear that the 1998 Act
- •440 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •18.4.9 Derogation
- •Introduction of judicial consent for extended periods of detention
- •Vides a means to the end of self-actualisation. This argument has been
- •View that coheres with the thinking of the late Professor Karl Popper
- •V. Holmes (2000) a newspaper was permitted to publish a report on the
- •It is sometimes argued that s. 12 has the effect of privileging freedom
- •Ireland (1992) the Irish government banned a voluntary body from
- •Voluntarily and there seems no reason why these should be especially
- •International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
- •Important. A similar distinction is drawn in us law between the
- •It has been held that under Art. 11 states should take positive
- •Intimidation, including conditions as to the route of the procession
- •478 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ings because of its broad definition of terrorism. This includes the use
- •480 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •In Sunday Business. In the article it was stated that the plaintiff ’s
- •In order to protect at least some privacy-related interests unprotected
- •506 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •20.7 A Hierarchy of Rights and the Contingencies
- •510 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Ings of an experienced trial judge, the same confidence does not extend
- •21.4.3 Proprieties: sections 2, 3
- •Is no locality condition. If the object is to apprehend someone unlaw-
- •In relation to the need for reasonable suspicion, there is no
- •Information available, upon which to make his suspicion reasonable,
- •530 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interest in effective policing and the individual’s right to privacy and
- •Ing documents should be attempted before the issue of a warrant
- •538 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Items subject to legal privilege are, except as regards items held
- •540 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •1913). The conditions here are that there exist reasonable grounds for
- •If it is a search warrant (and not a production order) which is
- •It clear that such force can be used to secure entry to premises when
- •546 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
- •Interests of the United Kingdom. Nor does the duty to conform or
- •V. Evans (1985)). In Spycatcher, serious iniquity was not established
- •Information supplied under a legal duty had to be disclosed), economic-
- •Vention of crime but subject to the existence of independent safe-
- •22.5 Dan, a property developer, enters into an agreement with Oldcastle Council
- •580 Bibliography
- •Initiative in a public law Frame’, Public Law, 288–307.
- •In the civil law of defamation’, Communications Law, 1(5), 193–197.
- •2Nd edn, London: Cavendish.
546 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
tip of an object was protruding from that pocket. DC Bell immediately
concluded that Mick had a knife in his pocket. He approached Mick saying
‘Come outside laddie. I want to search you.’ Mick, who was a law student at
the local university, was not a member of a motor-cycle gang and had never
been to ‘The Biker’s Cafe’ before. Mick, somewhat startled by DC Bell’s
manner, asked ‘Why?’, and received the reply: ‘I’m a police officer. You’d
better do what I say.’ Mick followed DC Bell out to the street and, without
further conversation, allowed him to pull out the object in his (Mick’s) pocket.
It proved to be a torch.
(i) Discuss whether the search of Mick was lawful and consistent with the
ECHR.
(ii) Suppose that, in searching Mick’s pocket, DC Bell had discovered a
packet of heroin. Would the discovery of the packet be admissible
evidence against Mick in any subsequent trial?
21.3 Explain the procedures, under PACE, whereby the police may obtain access
to evidence which it is thought will be of assistance in the investigation of
any crime.
22 State Secrecy
The republican perspective which I introduced in Chapter 1 stresses
open government as an important way of combating domination.
There are two aspects to state secrecy. The first concerns a public right
of access to information held by government. Our private law tradi-
tions mean that the basic position is that no such right exists. The state,
like a private person, can control its information unless there is a
positive law to the contrary. Apart from cases where the principles of
natural justice apply (see Chapter 16), the common law gives no right
to information. Indeed in Burmah Oil Corporation v. Bank of England
[1980] AC 1090 at 1112, Lord Wilberforce did not believe that the
courts should support open government. There are, however, certain
statutory rights to information of which the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 is the most general but is not yet in force. On the other hand
public interest immunity in litigation and the absence of a general duty
to give reasons for government action reinforce state secrecy.
The second aspect concerns claims by the state to suppress informa-
tion held by others such as the media. Here the state is interfering with
common law rights and also the right of freedom of expression under
Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The onus is
therefore on the state to justify its intervention. In relation to govern-
ment information, secrecy is re-enforced by many statutes, notably the
Official Secrets Act 1989 forbidding disclosure of certain information,
by the civil law of breach of confidence, and by employment contracts.
There is also a tradition of voluntary secrecy generated by the
priority of efficiency over accountability and partly perhaps by the psy-
chological condition of many persons who desire to hold public office.
For example, such persons may favour secrecy to reinforce their self-
importance and may also be disposed towards tribalism. In par-
ticular, ministers and senior civil servants agree to subject any memoirs
they propose to publish to vetting by the Cabinet Office. ‘All informa-
tion obtained by virtue of office is regarded as held for the State and
not for the benefit of the office holder or the interested reader’ (Cmnd
6386 (1986), para. 62). Contemporary policies of privatisation and
encouraging public bodies to follow commercial practices, including
‘commercial confidentiality’, also militate against openness in favour
of a protective, defensive culture.
547
548 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
Access to government information as such is not protected by the
ECHR. Nor does it fall within Art. 10 (freedom of expression). Article
10 has been said to protect people who wish to disclose information
and does not force anyone to do so (see Leander v. Sweden (1987)).
However this takes no account of the democratic interest in the free
flow of information which the ECHR has recognised in the context of
press freedom (see Chapter 19). There may, however, be a right to
information, under Art. 6 (right to a fair trial) and Art. 8 (respect
for family life; see Gaskin v. UK (1989) – adoption records – applied
restrictively in Gunn-Russo v. Nugent Care Housing Society (2001)).
In addtion to general concerns about freedom, arguments in favour
of ‘open government’ include the following:
. Democracy: officials should be accountable to a well-informed
public opinion.
. Autonomy: people should be able to exercise informed choice in
relation to their own affairs.
. Justice: in being able to correct false information.
. Direct public participation: in decision making as an end in itself.
. Public confidence: in government.
Arguments in favour of government secrecy are primarily efficiency
based and include the following:
. Release of certain kinds of information might cause serious harm,
e.g. national security, crime prevention, child care and some eco-
nomic information.
. Expense and delay, bearing in mind that seekers of information may
be cranks, enemies or maniacs.
. Freedom of information could weaken ministerial responsibility to
Parliament.
. Frankness within government, e.g. the danger of policy making
being inhibited by premature criticism or the quality of debate being
diluted by the temptation to play to the gallery (see Birkinshaw,
2001, p. 283 et seq.).
. Public panic if disclosures are misunderstood.
. Vanity and self-protection by public officials so that it might be
more difficult to make public appointments.
. The mystique of government emphasised by Bagehot as a source of
stability (see Chapter 3).
549
State Secrecy
22.1 Voluntary Disclosure of Information
There is nothing to prevent the government from giving informa-
tion on its own terms. Indeed the Official Secrets Act provides for
‘authorised’ information to be disclosed and the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act 2000 leaves government with a discretion to disclose the
many matters that are exempt from a duty to disclose under the Act
(below). From the republican perspective this is not satisfactory in that
it is not conducive to human dignity that important rights should
depend on the goodwill of those in power. For example, the govern-
ment provides unattributed information to journalists who are willing
to fall into line (the ‘Lobby’). The press also accepts the ‘D’ notice
system which relies on voluntary censorship by a committee of officials
and press representatives and voluntary regulation by the Press Com-
plaints Commission.
Pressures for ‘open government’ have also been met by the vol-
untary disclosure of information (but not documents) held by central
government departments (see Open Government Cm 2290, 1993). This
Code of Practice (1994) is subject to many exceptions notably, infor-
mation the disclosure of which ‘would harm the candour and frankness
of internal discussion’. A charge can be made for supplying informa-
tion and there is no enforcement mechanism other than general
channels of complaints within departments. However, the Parliamen-
tary Commissioner can make recommendations.
The Code is sometimes restrictive. For example, the government
will ‘normally’ disclose, but only after the policy is announced, facts
and analysis of the facts which the government considers relevant and
important in framing major policy proposals or decisions. ‘Infor-
mation’ also includes reasons for administrative decisions to those
affected, information about how public services are run including
costs, complaints procedures, range of services, targets and standards,
in response to specific requests, information relating to policies,
actions and decisions.
The exceptions are in some cases vague. They include harm to
defence, security and international relations, information received in
confidence from foreign governments, courts or international organi-
sations, communications with the royal household, prejudice to the
administration of justice, harm to public safety or public order; danger
to the life or physical safety of any person, protection of confidential
sources, environmental damage, immigration and nationality, effective
management of the economy and tax collection, effective management
and operations of the public service, public employment, including
550 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
personnel records, public appointments and honours, ‘unreasonable’,
voluminous or vexatious requests, information which will soon be pub-
lished or where publication is premature, research statistics or analysis,
individual privacy, third-party’s commercial confidences, information
given in confidence, disclosures prohibited by statute, international
agreement or under parliamentary privilege.
22.2 Statutory Rights to Information
There are certain statutory rights to information held by the govern-
ment. They are characterised by broad exceptions and weak or non-
existent enforcement mechanisms. None of them gives access to the
inner workings of the central government.
The most important of them are as follows:
. Historical records (see Cm. 853 (1991)). These are, subject to
exceptions, made available after 30 years (Public Records Acts 1958,
1967, 1975). The 1993 White Paper on open government (Cm. 2290)
proposed that records be withheld beyond 30 years only where
actual damage to national security, economic interests or law and
order can be shown, or if disclosure would be a breach of confidence
or cause substantial distress or danger. At present many records are
subject to blanket exclusion. The Freedom of Information Act 2000
removes exemptions for communications within UK governments,
court records, decision making and policy formation, legal profes-
sional privilege and trade secrets contained in historical records.
Information relating to honours is to be protected for 75 years and
law enforcement matters for 100 years.
. Personal information held on computer or in structured manual
records (Data Protection Act 1998). However, the Act exempts
much government data including national security matters, law and
tax enforcement matters and data ‘relating to the exercise of
statutory functions’.
. Local government information. The Local Government (Access to
Information) Act 1985 gives a public right to attend local authority
meetings including those of committees and sub-committees and to
see background papers, agendas, reports and minutes. There are
large exemptions. These include decisions taken by officers, confi-
dential information, information from central government, personal
matters excluded by the relevant committee, and ‘the financial or
business affairs of any person’. The Act appears to be easy to evade
551
State Secrecy
by using officers or informal groups to make decisions. It is not clear
what counts as a background paper.
. The Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960 gives a right to
attend meetings of parish councils and certain other public bodies.
The public can be excluded on the grounds of public interest (see
R. v. Brent Health Authority ex parte Francis (1985)).
. The Access to Personal Files Act 1987 authorises access to local
authority housing and social work records by the subject of the
records and in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of
State (see also Housing Act 1985 s. 106 (5)).
. The Environmental Information Regulations 1992 (SI 1992 no. 320)
implementing EC Directive, (90/313) require public authorities to
disclose certain information about environmental standards and
measures. The information must be made available on request, but
there are no specific requirements as to how this is to be done.
A charge can be made. Requests can be refused on grounds includ-
ing manifest unreasonableness or a too-general request (how does
a citizen know what to ask for?), confidentiality, increasing the likeli-
hood of environmental damage, information voluntarily supplied
unless the supplier consents, international relations, national secur-
ity. Under the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation and in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Envi-
ronmental Matters (1998, Cm. 4736 (2000)) the government is
required to make regulations giving a general right to environmen-
tal information subject to exceptions on public interest grounds.
These will replace the present regulations and be integrated into the
machinery of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 under s. 74 of
that Act (see also HL 9 (1996–97), Freedom of Access to Information
on the Environment).
22.3 The Freedom of Information Act 2000
The majority of democratic states possess freedom of information
legislation giving the public a legal right of access to governmental
information. The Freedom of Information Act 2000 is a weak ver-
sion. It is not yet in force and is required to be in force by 2005 (s. 87).
Some parts of it, in particular a requirement to prepare ‘publication
schemes’ (s. 19), are already in force but these give no right to par-
ticular information.
Subject to many exemptions and, in some cases to a governmental
veto the Act requires public authorities to disclose information on
552 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
request and also to confirm or deny whether the information exists
(s. 1). This is supervised and enforced by an Information Commissioner
who also has advisory and promotional functions. The Information
Commissioner will also supervise a Code of Practice on Access to
Government Information and approve publication schemes. The Act
does not prevent an authority from disclosing any information (s. 78).
The scope of the Act is potentially wide. Under Sched. 1, central
government departments (but not the cabinet, the royal household or
the security services), Parliament, the Welsh Assembly (but not the
Scottish government), local authorities, the police, the armed forces,
state educational bodies and NHS bodies are automatically public
authorities as well as a long list of other specified bodies, as are com-
panies which are wholly owned by these bodies (s. 6). The Secretary of
State may also designate other bodies, office holder or persons as
public authorities which appear to him to be exercising ‘functions of a
public nature’ or who provide services under a contract with a public
authority the functions of which include the provision of that service
(s. 3 (1)). This might include, for example, a voluntary body acting on
behalf of a government agency. The Secretary of State can, however,
put limits on the kind of information that the bodies he lists can
disclose (s. 7).
The Act gives certain rights to any person to request in writing (s. 8),
information held by the authority on its own behalf or held by another
on behalf of the authority (s. 3 (2)). Reasons do not normally have
to be given for the request. However, disclosure can be refused if the
applicant has not provided such further information as the authority
reasonably requires to enable the requested information to be found
(s. 1) although the authority must provide reasonable advice and
assistance (s. 16). A request can also be refused if the cost of com-
pliance exceeds a limit set by the Secretary of State or where the request
is vexatious or repetitive (s. 14). A fee regulated by the Secretary of
State can be charged (s. 9). The authority must respond promptly and
within 20 working days. However, if the matter might involve an
exemption there is no time limit other than a ‘reasonable time to make a
decision’ (s. 10).
The Information Commissioner can require the authority to disclose
information either on his own initiative (enforcement notice, s. 52), or
on the application of a complainant whose request has been refused
(decision notice, s. 50). Reasons must be given for a refusal and the
Commissioner can, where appropriate, inspect the information in
question and also require further information. An authority can refuse
to disclose to the Commissioner any information which might expose
553
State Secrecy
it to criminal proceedings other than proceedings under the Act itself.
Both sides may appeal to the ‘Information Tribunal’ on the merits
with a further appeal to the High Court on a point of law (s. 57). The
right to information can be enforced by the courts through the law of
contempt but no civil action is possible (s. 56).
However, the government sometimes has a veto over the Commis-
sioner’s enforcement powers (s. 53). This applies to information held
by the central government, the Welsh Assembly and other bodies
designated by the Secretary of State. It applies to any request that falls
within the exemptions. An ‘accountable person’ (a cabinet minister, or
the Attorney General or their equivalents in Scotland and Northern
Ireland), can serve a certificate on the Commissioner ‘stating that he
has on reasonable grounds formed the opinion’ that there was no
failure to comply with the duty to disclose the information. Reasons
must be given and the certificate must be laid before Parliament. The
certificate would also be subject to judicial review.
The right to information under the Act is subject to many
exemptions contained in Part II. These apply both to the information
itself and usually to the duty to confirm or deny. Most are blanket
exemptions for whole classes of information. Some require a ‘prejudice’
test relating to the particular document. However, this is less onerous
for the government than the ‘substantial prejudice’ that was originally
envisaged (White Paper, (1997). Some exemptions are absolute. Those
that are not absolute are subject to a public interest test (see below).
The absolute exemptions are as follows:
. information which is already reasonably accessible to the public
even if payment is required (s. 21);
. information supplied by or relating to the intelligence and security
services (s. 23). A minister’s certificate is conclusive subject to an
appeal to the Tribunal by the Commissioner or the applicant which
in respect of the reasonableness of the decision is limited to the
judicial review grounds (s. 60);
. information contained in court records widely defined (s. 32);
. information protected by Parliamentary privilege (s. 34);
. information that would prejudice the conduct of public affairs in the
House of Commons or the House of Lords (s. 36);
. certain personal information, although some of this is available
under the Data Protection Act 1998 (s. 40 (1) (2));
. information the disclosure of which would be an actionable breach
of confidence (s. 41), a public interest test applies at common law
(see below);
554 General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law
. information protected by legal obligations such as legal professional
privilege or European Law (s. 44).
In other cases the exemption applies only where it appears to the
authority that ‘the public interest in maintaining the secrecy of
the information outweighs the public interest in disclosure’ (s. 2 (1)b).
The balance is therefore tipped in favour of disclosure. However,
because this test is subjective, the Commissioner’s powers may be
limited to the grounds of judicial review.
The main exemptions of this kind are as follows:
. information which is held at the time of request with a view to be pub-
lished in the future (s. 22). No particular time for publication need be
set although it must be reasonable that the information be withheld;
. information required for the purpose of safeguarding national
security. There is provision for a minister’s certificate as under s. 23
(see above);
. information held at any time for the purposes of criminal pro-
ceedings or investigations which may lead to criminal proceedings
or relate to information provided by confidential sources (s. 30).
This would include many inquiries into matters of public concern;
. information the disclosure of which would or would be likely to
prejudice defence, foreign relations, relations between the United
Kingdom devolved governments, the House of Commons or the
House of Lords, law enforcement widely defined to include many
official inquiries, the commercial interests of any person including
the public authority holding the information, or the economic
