Social Change in the Hetmanate

For about a century, the Hetmanate had been the focus of Ukrainian political life. Although Russians controlled its foreign contacts and military campaigns, and constantly interfered in its international affairs, the administration, finances, army, and socioeconomic policies of the Hetmanate had been created and maintained by Ukrainians. Self-government encouraged the rise of a Ukrainian noble elite that was attached to and proud of its traditions. As late as 1767, the starshyna delegates to the Legislative Commission rejected Catherine’s reforms and confidently declared: “Our laws are best.” It was in the Hetmanate that, prior to the 20^th century, the precedent for Ukrainian self-government had been set.

More than a half-century after the Hetmanate was abolished, Taras Shevchenko wrote:

Once there was a Hetmanate

It passed beyond recall.

Once, it was, we ruled ourselves

But we shall rule no more.

Yet we shall never forget

The Cossack fame of yore.

Not only was the Hetmanate not forgotten, but its memories helped to create a new era in Ukrainian history, for it was from among the descendants of the starshyna that many of the intellectuals who later formulated modern Ukrainian national consciousness hailed. The history of the Hetmanate became a key component of national history ant the nation-building myth. The example of self-rule that it set helped to arouse the desire of modern Ukrainians for their own nation-state.

The experiment in Cossack egalitarianism had failed. During the 18^th century, the social structure of Left-Bank Ukraine was brought back into line with that of the neighboring East European lands. As an elite of nobles emerged in the Hetmanate, the peasantry again slipped back into serfdom, and the status of Cossacks sank to that of peasants. The Polish szlachta reestablished its regime on the Right Bank and the old order returned there. In Russian-ruled Ukraine, social tensions were eased somewhat by the opening up for settlement of the vast fertile Black Sea hinterland, which the imperial government had wrested from the Zaporozhians and the Crimean Tatars. But in the Polish-ruled Right Bank, where socioeconomic oppression was exacerbated by religious discrimination, the Ukrainian peasantry rose up in bloody revolt against the szlachta in 1768. The revolt failed, however, and the szlachta regained control. It appeared that the socioeconomic order was immutable. In the realm of culture, in contrast, heightened activity marked the early and middle parts of the 18^th century in the Hetmanate. Nevertheless, by the end of the century, Ukraine assumed a decidedly provincial character in all regions and on all levels – cultural, social, and economic.

The Cossacks had emerged from the uprising of 1648 with extensive privileges. In return for military service, they could own land and were exempted from taxation. They enjoyed self-government, could participate in trade, and had the right (formerly reserved for nobles) to distill alcoholic beverages. Thus, while most Cossack landholdings were scarcely larger than those of the peasantry, their rights were almost as great as those of the expelled Polish nobles. The only privilege denied Cossacks was the right to demand labor obligations from the peasantry, a right reserved for nobles alone. Despite these advantages, a steady deterioration was noticeable in the status of the rank and file Cossacks beginning from the late 17^th century.

As a result of the growing influence of the starshyna, common Cossacks lost such important political prerogatives as the right to elect their officers and participate in councils. Even more harmful to their welfare were the Cossacks’ economic problems. The crux of these problems lay in the fact that Cossacks were expected to function both as farmers and as soldiers. During the pre-1648 era, this dual role had been feasible because campaigns were brief, booty plentiful, and Polish government subsidies provided extra income. But, under the tsars, military conflicts, such as the twenty-one-year-long Great Northern War, dragged on interminably. And when Cossacks were not fighting, they were often forced by Russian officials to work on construction projects.

Because this protracted, exhausting service had to be borne at the Cossacks’ own expense, many fell into debt. As a result, numerous Cossacks sold their lands to their starshyna-creditors, often under pressure and invariably at low prices, and continued to live on their former properties as tenants who fulfilled peasant-like obligations. Only a few Cossacks managed to join the rapidly closing ranks of the starshyna. Thus, the “downward mobility” of the Cossacks reduced their number from 50,000 in 1650, to 30,000 in 1669, and to 20,000 in 1730.

Worried by the dwindling supply of cheap fighting men, tsarist authorities forbade the sale of Cossack lands in 1723 and again in 1728. But these measures were ineffective because they addressed only the symptoms and not the real cause of the problem. In 1735, the government of the Hetmanate attempted more thoroughgoing reforms. It divided Cossacks into two categories: the wealthier, battle-ready Cossacks, called vyborni, and those who were too impoverished to fight, called pidpomichnyky. While the former were away at war, the latter were expected to collect and deliver supplies, act as messengers, and even work the land of the fighting men. The pidpomichnyky were taxed, but only at half the rate of peasants. In effect, the poorer Cossacks became the servitors of their wealthier colleagues and of the starshyna. Despite these changes, the economic condition of all Cossacks continued to deteriorate. In 1764, there were 175,000 vyborni Cossacks and 198,000 pidpomichnyky on the rolls. But, in reality, only 10,000 of the vyborni Cossacks were actually battle-ready. The number of debt-free Cossacks farms also continued to decline. By the end of the century most of the poorer Cossacks had sunk to the level of state-owned peasants. Beset by economic pressures encroached upon by the starshyna, outdated in their military techniques and redundant in view of the vanishing frontier, Cossackdom, for all practical purposes ceased to exist in Ukraine.