Ukraine during the Second World War

It seemed, as Europe moved toward the Second World War, that Ukraini­ans had little to lose from the radical changes that it promised to bring. Still traumatized by Stalinist excesses and the increasing Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian repression in the western regions, Ukrainians had reason to be­lieve that any change - even that brought on by war - would favorably alter the conditions under which they lived. But those who thought so would be sadly mistaken, for although the war radically transformed the situation of Ukrainians, their plight changed from bad to worse. The collapse of Poland at the outset of the war led to the imposition in Western Ukraine of the even-more-repressive Soviet regime. But when the German invaders swept away the Soviets, they brought with them a Nazi regime that in Ukraine reached the heights of brutality and inhumanity. Caught between the Nazi and Soviet regimes and lacking, for all practical purposes, a state to protect their inter­ests, Ukrainians were especially vulnerable to the devastation of the war and the ruthless policies of its totalitarian protagonists.

With the elimination or the individu­als, organizations, and political parties that represented middle-of-the road, liberal tendencies among West Ukrainians, the latter were left with only one viable political organization – the underground network of the OUN.

But with the outbreak of the war, the tensions that had long been brewing within the OUN surfaced. A sharp division had devel­oped between the older veterans of the 1917-20 struggle, who constituted the foreign-based leadership of the OUN, and the young Galician radicals, who had joined the organization in the 1930’s. The latter group had led the bitter struggle against the Polish government on West Ukrainian territory and had often landed in Polish jails. The two camps did not disagree on matters of principle, for both subscribed to the basic tenets of Ukrainian integral nation­alism; however, generational differences, personality clashes, and tactical is­sues did divide them. After the assassination of Konovalets in 1938, his close associate, the gentlemanly and reserved Andrii Melnyk, was nominated as his successor. The young radicals, for their part, argued that their own col­league, the dynamic, strong-willed Stepan Bandera, who had recently been freed from Polish imprisonment, was better qualified to lead the OUN in the critical times that lay ahead.

In September 1939, Bandera demanded that the OUN form a military underground force that would be ready to fight against anyone - even Germans if need be - who stood in the way of Ukrainian independence. He insisted that the OUN develop contacts with Western Allies as well as with the Germans. But Melnyk and his associates steadfastly defended their positions, arguing that the emphasis on ties with Germany had to continue because Western powers had shown no interest in supporting Ukrainian aspirations and because the creation of a military underground would only bring German retaliation rather than military or political gains.

But it was the question of who should constitute the new OUN leadership that really inflamed passions. In August 1939, while many of their rivals were still imprisoned, the Melnyk faction called a conference in Rome and formally proclaimed Andrii Melnyk as vozhd OUN. However, on 10 February 1940 Stepan Bandera convened another conference in Cracow, where his faction rejected the decisions of the Rome meeting. Unable to reach a compromise each group proclaimed itself to be the only legitimate leader of the OUN. Those who sided with Bandera, and these included the youthful majority of the or­ganization, came to be called the OUN-B or OUN-R (revolutionary) or simply Banderites; supporters of Melnyk, who consisted of the more moderate inte­gral nationalists, were referred to as OUN-M or Melnykites.

This schism in the OUN was clearly a great setback for the integral nationalist cause. Antagonism between the two factions reached such heights that they often fought each other as ferociously as they did the enemies of Ukrainian independence. Thus, as Ukrainian integral nationalists prepared to face the great tests set before them by the war, they were badly divided. .Moreover, their bitter infighting damaged the Ukrainian integral nationalist movement as a whole, for it lowered its moral authority.

As elsewhere in occupied Europe, underground resistance to the Germans in Ukraine developed soon after their arrival, primarily in response to Nazi policies. It was aided by the fact that the Germans did not have enough troops to control the vast areas they conquered. Furthermore, there already existed in Ukraine underground networks organized by the OUN, the Soviets, and, in the northwest, the Poles, all of which were capable of putting partisan forces into the field. Recruits for anti-German partisan warfare were not lacking and were drawn from the large numbers of Red Army stragglers, fugitive Ukrain­ian nationalists, Communist party members, Jews, turncoat policemen, and escapers from forced-labor contingents who took to the forests to escape the Germans. They were joined by those who simply wanted an opportunity to strike a blow against the Nazis. Because much of Ukraine is steppe and, there­fore, unsuitable for partisan warfare, most activity was concentrated in the northwestern part of the country, in the forests of Volhynia, the swamps of Polissia, and the Carpathian Mountains.

It was in Polissia and Volhynia that the first Ukrainian nationalist partisan units appeared and, surprisingly, at the outset they were not associated with OUN. As soon as the Nazi-Soviet war broke out, Taras Bulba-Borovets, a local Ukrainian activist linked with the UNR-Petliurist government-in-exile in Warsaw, formed an irregular unit called "Polissian Sich," later renamed the UPA (Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia - Ukrainian Insurgent Army), for the purpose of clearing his region of the remnants of the Red Army. When the Germans tried to disband his unit in late 1941, he took his men into "the woods" to fight both the Germans and the Soviets. In 1942, members of both OUN-M and OUN-B, who were fleeing Koch's repression, also established small units in Volhynia.

In late 1942, the OUN-B decided to form a large-scale partisan force and thereby lay the foundation for a regular Ukrainian army, which they believed would be needed when the Nazi-Soviet war came to an end. There were also extremely pressing immediate reasons for such a step: first, as German re­pression of the local populace increased, the villagers demanded that the OUN take steps to protect them, and, second, as Soviet partisans from Belorussia began to penetrate into northwestern Ukraine by late 1942, it was necessary for the OUN to assume the role of the "people's army" in order to prevent the Soviets from doing so.

In order to unite all the nationalist units, the OUN-B forcibly incorporated the units of Borovets and OUN-M into its own forces for which it now usurped the name UPA. Roman Shukhevych, a member of the OUN-B leadership and the highest-ranking Ukrainian officer in the recently disbanded Nachtigall unit was appointed commander-in-chief of the expanded force. Benefiting from the extensive and efficient OUN-B underground network, UPA quickly grew into a large, well-organized partisan army, which took control of large parts of Volhynia, Polissia, and, later, Galicia. Although many Ukrainian émigré and even some Soviet sources claim that, at its high point in late 1943 to early 1944, its numbers reached over 100,000, well-substantiated estimates place the figure at between 30,000 and 40,000 fighters. Compared to other underground movements in Nazi-occupied Europe, the UPA was unique in that it had practically no foreign support. Its growth and strength were therefore, an indication of the very considerable popular support it enjoyed among the Ukrainians.

Not only did UPA take on both the Nazis and the Soviets, but in the mixed Ukrainian/Polish areas of Volhynia, Polissia, and Kholm, it also became involved in an exceedingly brutal conflict with the Poles. Regardless of the outcome of the war, Ukrainian integral nationalists were determined to drive the Poles (many of whom were colonists from the interwar period) out of areas where Ukrainians were a majority. For its part, the Polish nationalist underground army, the Armija Krajowa (AK), was just as determined to retain control of lands that had been part of the Polish state. The result was a murderous struggle – often encouraged by the Germans and provoked by Soviet partisans – between Ukrainian and Polish forces for territory and to settle old scores.

Tragically, it was the civilian population that bore most of the costs. According to Polish sources, in 1943-44 about 60000-80000 Polish men, women, and children were massacred in Volynia by Ukrainians, especially the SB, the security units of the OUN. Ukrainians claim that massacres of their people began earlier, in 1942, when Poles wiped out thousands of Ukrainians villagers in the predominantly Polish areas of Kholm, and that they continued in 1944-45 among the defenceless Ukrainian minority west of the San River. In any case it is clear that both Ukrainian and Polish armed units engaged in wholesale slaughter, bringing to a bloodly climax the hatred that had been increasing between the two peoples for generations.

Although more nationally conscious than they had been in the 1917-20 period, Ukrainians during the Second World War were caught between the Nazis and Soviets. To the great disillusionment of the integral nationalists they had practically no opportunity to pursue their own interests. In contrast to the 1917-20 period, Ukrainians were in a position only to react to events in 1939-45 - not to influence them. Yet, despite horrendous losses and set­backs, the final outcome of the war did have some positive features from the Ukrainian point of view. Most noteworthy was the fact that, as a result of the Soviet conquest of Western Ukraine, all Ukrainians were united in a single political entity for the first time in centuries: in the USSR, or more specifically, in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Moreover, Stalin's tempo­rary concessions to the national aspirations of the non-Russian nationalities gave rise to hopes that after the war "things would be different." Finally, as part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was included among the victors in the war. For many Soviet Ukrainians the exhilaration of victory gave rise to a feeling of hope, expressed by a Soviet officer in 1945: "The entire atmosphere was charged with the expectation of something new, something magnificent and glorious. None of us doubted in the brightness of the future.”

Task 2. Pronounce the words and learn their meanings:

Nazi [‘na:tsi]	escaper [is’keipә]
vulnerable [‘v/\lnәrәbl]	contingent [kәn’tid әnt]
devastation [devә’stei∫n]	Warsaw [‘wo:so:]
ruthless [‘ru:θlis]	murderous [‘mә:dәrәs]
fugitive [fju:d itiv]	to encourage [in’k/\rid ]
jew [d u:]	score [sko:]

Task 3. Give Ukrainian equivalents for the following word combinations and find the sentences with them in the text:

Even-more-repressive (Soviet) regime; to call (to convene) a conference; forced-labour contingents; to strike a blow against smb; in late 1941.

Task 4. Give English equivalents for the following word combinations and find the sentences with them in the text:

Бути позбавленим власної держави; підпільний рух; УПА; відповідно до того, як мала закінчитися війна; зведення давніх рахунків.

Task 5. Explain word-building for:

Inhumanity; unsuitable; gentlemanly; infighting; disbanded; disillusionment; noteworthy.

Task 6. Give synonyms for:

Fugitive; to alter; plight; outset; to constitute; forest.

Task 7. Give antonyms for:

Sadly; theoretical; warfare; to decrease; to separate; majority.

Task 8. Find in the text the Emphatic Constructions.

Task 9. Find in the text derivatives to the “nation” and give their translation.

Task 10. Make up a plan in the interrogative sentences to retell the text according to it.

Task 1. Read the text to yourself: