Russification

Viewed from the perspective of the Kremlin, the nationality issue in the ussr is a daunting and complex one. In a society that encompasses about 100 dif­ferent nationalities - which occupy their own territories and possess sharply variegated histories, cultures, social values, and economic interests - Soviet leaders must find ways to mold a sense of common identity and purpose. To this end Soviet ideologists in the post-Stalin era have produced a num­ber of concepts that are meant to deemphasize the national particularities of their peoples and to stress common Soviet features. Of these concepts, four have been of special importance: rastsvetanie, the claim that all nationalities in the USSR have experienced a flowering or development under Soviet rule; sblizhenie, the assertion that these nationalities are drawing together because of the creation of common political, economic, and cultural institutions in the USSR; sliianie, the fusion of the Soviet nationalities into a single nation; and the emergence of a new type of historical community - the Soviet people (sovietskii narod).

Behind the ideological double-talk, which implies that nations can "flower" while losing their identity, is a hidden agenda: Russification. Because Rus­sians are in the majority, because they created the Bolshevik party and the Soviet system, because they occupy most of the top positions, and because their language is the primary means of communication in the USSR, they are seen as the cement that holds the USSR together. Apparently the Soviet leader­ship believes that the more the other nationalities of the USSR are like the Rus­sians, the greater their feeling of mutual solidarity will be. Hence the view held by many Western scholars and non-Russian dissidents in the USSR that sblizhenie (drawing together), sliianie (fusion), and sovietskii narod (Soviet people) are simply code-words for Russification of the non-Russians.

Task 1. Read the text to yourself:

The Ukrainian Revolution

After the Bolshevik coup, the revolution turned into a civil war. Gone were the euphoria, the feeling of solidarity, the massive demonstrations, tumul­tuous assemblies, and heated debates of 1917. For the next three years numer­ous claimants for power in Ukraine and throughout the former empire were embroiled in a bitter, merciless military struggle, complete with large-scale terror and atrocities, to decide who and what form of government should replace the old order.

For many Ukrainians, the rise of the Bolsheviks in Russia not only ush­ered in a new, violent phase of the postrevolutionary period but also brought about a radical change in their political thinking. Repulsed by the dictatorial nature of the Bolshevik regime in the north, many Ukrainian leaders aban­doned their traditional preference for an autonomous or federal relationship with Russia. Henceforth, independence became their goal. However, Ukraini­ans, like other peoples of the former empire, became increasingly divided over their other goals and the ways to achieve them. Moreover, because of Ukraine's abundant natural resources and strategic location, almost every participant in the Civil War sought to gain control of the land. Therefore, af­ter the relatively calm hiatus imposed by the German occupation, Ukraine became the scene of the most chaotic, complex events of the Civil War.

At a time when empires collapsed and almost all the peoples of Eastern Eu­rope, including such small subject nations of the tsars as the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, gained their independence, why was it that the 30 million Ukrainians did not? The question is all the more pertinent because the Ukrainians probably fought longer for independence and paid a higher price in lives than any other East European nation.

In considering the general reasons for the Ukrainian defeat, it is necessary to distinguish between internal and external factors and the East and West Ukrainians' situations. In terms of internal factors, the basic dilemma of the Ukrainians - and this applies mainly to the East Ukrainians - was, to repeat a crucial point, that they were forced to begin the state-building process be­fore they had completed nation-building. The delay and underdevelopment of nation-building was a result of tsarist suppression and of nation-building's weak social base. Of all the social groups and classes in Ukraine, the intelli­gentsia was most prominent in the national movement and the state-building effort. However, the intelligentsia made up only 2-3% of the general popula­tion and only a small part of it was involved in the Ukrainian cause. Many of these intellectuals were as deeply steeped in Russian as in Ukrainian culture and it was psychologically difficult suddenly to sever their bonds with Rus­sia. Hence their wavering on independence and their attraction to autonomy and federalism. Finally, even in the course of the revolution and the Civil War, many Ukrainian intelligentsia were still unsure as to which goal was more important: social transformation or national liberation. Therefore, in Eastern Ukraine, the revolution placed idealistic, patriotic but inexperienced intellec­tuals into positions of leadership and forced them to act before they were sure of what they wanted or how to get it.

In assuming the leadership in the struggle for independence, the Ukrainian intelligentsia counted on peasant support. However, this huge reservoir of potential backers did not live up to its expectations. Uneducated, parochial, and politically-immature, the peasant knew what he was against but was not sure of what he stood for. He could understand that he was an exploited toiler.

Hence the early success of Bolshevik propaganda. Yet the more complex idea of nationhood was difficult for him to grasp and it was only late in the Civil War that many of the better-educated peasants definitively began to favour national self-government. But by that time the best opportunities for inde­pendence had already passed.

Even when the peasant was willing to support the cause of independence, organizing this support was exceedingly difficult. Unlike the small but com­pact groups of workers who were concentrated in a few of the largest cities and thus easily accessible to the Bolsheviks, the peasants were scattered in thousands of villages. Convincing them to cooperate was a logistical prob­lem with which the inexperienced intelligentsia found it difficult to deal. If the support that the Ukrainian nationalists had among the intelligentsia and peasants was problematic, the support they lacked in the cities - this applies to Galicia as well - was decisive. Unable to count on the workers, the urban bourgeoisie, and the administrators, officers, and technicians, the Ukrainian armies had great difficulties holding on to cities, which were the centers of communication, transportation, and administration. Thus, the so­ciological weaknesses of the Ukrainian movement in 1917-20 became strate­gic disadvantages that had a major impact on the outcome of the strug­gle.

Although the internal weaknesses of Ukrainian nationalism were consid­erable, external factors were decisive in its defeat. In the case of the Galician Ukrainians, whose national movement was as strong as those of other East European countries that attained independence, it was clearly not internal weakness but the overwhelming strength of the Poles that was primarily re­sponsible for its failure. In Eastern Ukraine, it was Bolshevik Russia - not the weak Bolsheviks of Ukraine - that blocked the attainment of independence. Late in 1920, Leon Trotsky, the commander of the Red Army, freely admitted that "Soviet power in Ukraine has held its ground up to now (and it has not held it well) chiefly by the authority of Moscow, the Great Russian Commu­nists and the Russian Red Army."

The success of Lenin's party was due not only to its excellent leadership and formidable organization, but also to the fact that it had the vast financial, administrative, industrial, and human resources of Russia at its disposal. The Bolsheviks could count on the support of the Russian and Russified work­ers in the cities of Ukraine, which allowed them to mobilize adherents when and where it counted most. And the East Ukrainians had another implaca­ble enemy: the Whites. To defeat such enemies would have required greater strength than most emergent national movements could muster.

Confronted with overwhelmingly powerful enemies, both the East and West Ukrainians were unable to gain the recognition and aid of the victorious Entente powers. Among the reasons why the Entente - which was quite forth­coming with military and diplomatic support for the anti-Bolshevik Whites and numerous new East European nation-states - turned its back on the Ukrainians were the following: ignorance of actual conditions in Ukraine, the energetic and effective anti-Ukrainian propaganda of the Poles and Whites, the association of the Central Rada and Hetmanate with the Germans, and the leftist ("Bolshevik") tendencies of the Directory. Finally, the extremely chaotic conditions that existed in Ukraine in 1917-21 greatly impeded the establish­ment of national self-government.

Yet the Ukrainians emerged from the revolution and Civil War with gains as well as losses. National consciousness, which had been limited to a part of the intelligentsia, spread to all segments of Ukrainian society. On the one hand, the peasant, who had demonstrated his ability to bring down govern­ments and fight for his interests, gained confidence and a sense of self-worth. With this came his desire for greater respect and consideration for his lan­guage and culture. On the other hand, the rise of Ukrainian governments taught peasants to identify themselves as "Ukrainians." Therefore, in a mere four years, the nation-building process moved forward tremendously. In this sense, the upheaval of 1917-21 was not only a socioeconomic but also a na­tional revolution.

While the struggle for national self-determination accounted for the dis­tinctive features of the Ukrainian Revolution, the socioeconomic transfor­mation of the land linked it with the all-Russian Revolution. In Ukraine, as elsewhere in the former tsarist empire, the old order disapppeared and the peasants distributed much of the confiscated lands among themselves. Thus, while the dreams of independence were unfulfilled, many Ukrainians had reason to believe that they did not emerge from the upheaval empty-handed. All depended on whether the Soviet government would allow Ukrainians to consolidate and expand on the gains of the revolution.

Task 2. Pronounce the words and learn their meanings:

euphoria [ju:’fouriә]	usher [‘/\∫ә]
tumultuous [tju:’m/\ltjuәs]	violent [‘vaiәlәnt]
numerous [‘nju:mәrәs]	resources [ri’so:siz]
claimant [‘kleimәnt]	adherent [әd’hiәrәnt]
throughout [θru:’aut]	to require [ri’kwaiә]

to allow [ә’lau]

Task 3. Give Ukrainian equivalents for the following word combinations and find the sentences with them in the text:

To usher in a new phase; to gain control of smth; at smb’s disposal; to master one’s strength; with this came… .

Task 4. Give English equivalents for the following word combinations and find the sentences with them in the text:

Бурхливі зібрання; масовий терор; внутрішні та зовнішні фактори; розраховувати на чью-небудь допомогу (підтримку); запеклий ворог.

Task 5. Explain word-building for:

Postrevolutionary; henceforth; moreover; underdevelopment; overwhelmingly; unfulfilled.

Task 6. Give synonyms for:

An upheaval; massive; debate; violent; to gain; prominent.

Task 7. Give antonyms for:

Heat; change; internal; townsman; early.

Task 8. Give 3 forms of the irregular verbs and learn them by heart:

To build; to have; to pay; to get; to come; to teach.

Task 9. What people live in the following countries and what languages do they speak?

Finland	Latvia
Estonia	Lithuania
Roumania	Hungary

Task 10. Express in English the main thought of each paragraph of the text.

Task 1. Read the text to yourself: