The Revolutions of 1917

There were two Russian revolutions in 1917. The first, called the February Revolution, was more of a collapse than an uprising. It began innocuously enough when on 8 March, Petrograd workers went on strike to protest food shortages. But when they were ordered to fire on civilians, the tsarist troops went over to the side of the workers. Within days, much of the capital's garrison did the same. Meanwhile, the population of the city poured into the streets in a show of solidarity with the strikers. It became suddenly apparent that the tsarist government was almost entirely bereft of popular support. As demonstrations spread throughout the empire, Nickolas II abdicated, his ministers and officials dispersed, and the hated police went into hiding. By 12 March, the tsarist regime had crumbled like a house of cards.

If the February Revolution was essentially the result of a collapse of power the second revolution, called the October Revolution, was brought on by a seizure of power. It was carried out by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, a group that only six months earlier would been considered as most unlikely candidates to rule Russia.

News of the tsarist regime's collapse reached Kyiv on 13 March 1917. Within days, representatives of the city's major institutions and organizations formed an Executive Committee which was to maintain order and act as an exten­sion of the Provisional Government. Meanwhile, the Kyiv Soviet of Work­ers' and Soldiers' Deputies became the center of the radical left. But, un­like in Petrograd, a third player entered the scene in Kyiv: on 17 March the Ukrainians established their own organization, the Central Rada (rada means "council" in Ukrainian; the Russian equivalent is soviet). It was created by the liberal moderates from TUP (Tovoristvo Ukrainskih Progressistiv), led by Evhen Chykalenko, Serhii Efremov, and Dmytro Doroshenko, together with the Social Democrats headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura. A few weeks later, the new, burgeoning Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary party, represented by Mykola Kovalevsky, Pavlo Khrystiuk, and Mykyta Shapoval, also joined the Central Rada. The well-known and highly respected Hrushevsky, on his way back from exile, was elected president of the Central Rada. Thus, in contrast to the Russians in Kyiv who were split between the moderates of the Executive Committee and the radicals of the Soviet Ukrainians of all ideological persuasions were united in a single representative body.

During the one year that the Central Rada had been the major political factor in Ukraine, it achieved notable successes and experienced dismal failures. Considering the weak, repressed, and politically inexperienced state of the Ukrainian intelligentsia prior to the revolution, the creation and growth of the Central Rada was a considerable achievement. By its activity, it finally put to rest long-standing and widely held doubts about the very existence of a Ukrainian nationality. Indeed, it transformed the Ukrainian issue into one of the key issues of the revolutionary period. In strictly political terms, the Central Rada more than held its own in dealing with the Provisional Govern­ment.

It also out-maneuvered the Bolsheviks of Ukraine, forcing them to turn to Russia for aid. Intent on creating a democratic, parliamentary government, the Central Rada adhered to its goals despite the pressure for arbitary ac­tion. A striking example of this commitment was its precedent-setting grant of wide-ranging cultural autonomy to the Jewish minority, despite the fact that its representatives were among the severest critics of the Ukrainian gov­ernment. But perhaps the Central Rada's most far-reaching achievement was that by its stubborn demand for Ukrainian self-government, it seriously chal­lenged the previously untouchable principle of "one, indivisible Russia" and forced both the Provisional Government and, later, the Bolsheviks to retreat (at least in theory) from this shibboleth of Russian political thinking.

The most obvious fact about the Central Rada was, however, that it failed. Among the basic causes of that failure was that it lacked the two main pillars of statehood, namely an effective army and administrative apparatus. Without the latter, the Central Rada was unable to maintain contact with the provinces and countryside where most of its potential support lay. Equally damaging was the lack of consensus on what policies to follow. This deficiency was painfully evident in the bitter feud between Vynnychenko and Petliura, two of the government's key ministers. Vynnychenko argued that the Central Rada should pursue more socially radical policies so that it could "out-socialize" the Bolsheviks and live up to the expectations of the masses for drastic change. Petliura, meanwhile, believed that more emphasis should be placed on buiIding the institutions of a nation-state. Finally, the immedi­ate cause of the Central Rada's demise was its inability to satisfy German demands.

The failure of the Central Rada lay in the underdevelopment of the Ukrainian national movement. In effect, the Central Rada was forced to begin state-building before the process of nation-building had been completed. Because of the re­pressive nature of the tsarist regime and the socioeconomic peculiarities of Ukrainian society, most of the educated people in Ukraine were either Rus­sians or Russified. The Ukrainian movement had not yet penetrated the cities and these crucial centers of industry, communications, and skilled personnel functioned as bastions of the Russian and Russified minorities who were of­ten militantly anti-Ukrainian. Hence, there was a critical lack of competent in­dividuals available for organizing and staffing the army and administration of a Ukrainian state. The people who were available were young and inex­perienced: Vynnychenko was 38, Petliura was 35, Kovalevsky (leader of the largest Ukrainian party, the Socialist Revolutionaries) was 25, Mykola Shrah (who substituted for Hrushevsky as presiding officer of the Central Rada) was 22. Aware of its lack of human as well as material resources, Serhii Efremov, a member of the Central Rada, urged it to refrain from assuming author­ity, for, he argued, the masses awaited miracles and a Ukrainian government would be sure to disillusion them. In view of these seemingly insurmount­able obstacles, it is understandable why Vynnychenko, referring to the Cen­tral Rada's efforts, remarked: 'Truly, we were like the gods ... attempting to create a whole new world from nothing.

Task 2. Pronounce the words and learn their meanings:

innocuous [inokjuәs]

tsarist [‘za:rist]

seizure [‘si: ә]

executive [ig’zekjutiv]

doubt [daut]

outmanoeuvre [autmә’nu:vә]

Task 3. Give Ukrainian equivalents for the following word combinations and find the sentences with them in the text:

To go over to the side of smb; to be into hiding; to bring on; drastic change; to substitute for smb.

Task 4. Give English equivalents for the following word combinations and find the sentences with them in the text:

Оголосити страйк; бути позбавленим підтримки народу; Тимчасовий Уряд; покласти край; звертатись (до когось) по допомогу.

Task 5. Give synonyms for:

Dismal, indivisible, to argue, to follow policy, drastic.

Task 6. Give antonyms for:

Failure, weak, indivisible, to split, unlikely.

Task 7. Explain word-building of the following words:

The inexperienced; inability; insurmountable; innocuously; meanwhile; unlikely.

Task 8. Give 3 forms of the irregular verbs and learn them by heart:

To bereave, to spread, to hold, to split, to put, to strike, to hide.

Task 9. Find in the text the verbal nouns and give their Ukrainian versions.

Task 10. Answer the following questions:

1. How can you characterize the February and the October Revolutions of 1917 in Russia?

2. When was the Central Rada created and by whom?

3. Who was elected the president of the Central Rada?

4. What was the Central Rada’s most far-reaching achievement?

5. What the basic causes were the Central Rada’s failure?

Task 11. Make the written translation: