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New York V. United States (1992): 10th Amendment, Supremacy Clause

  • In 1985, Congress passed a statute designed to force states to find disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste. At question was a portion of the statute forcing the state to take possession of the waste if they failed to discover other solutions

  • Majority: (6-3) O’CONNOR: The statute was an invalid effort by Congress to commandeer the state’s legislative process and thus inconsistent with the 10th A. The Court said that states are not “mere political sub-divisions of the United States, nor are state governments regional offices or administrative agencies of the federal gov.

Printz V. United States (1997): 10th a., Commerce Clause, Original Intent

  • This case involves a provision in the Brady Act of 1993, which restricts the ability to buy a gun. Under the Act, state Chief Law Enforcement Officers (CLEOs) are forced to do background tests on gun buyers. Three CLEOs challenged the statute, claiming that congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional. The court struck down the provision of the statute in a 5-4 vote. More important than the decision is the debate over the ORIGINAL INTENT of the framers of the Constitution. Both sides rely on their interpretations of the Federalist Papers, and both claim to be following the original intent of the founders.

  • Majority: SCALIA: the conclusion follows New York v. US, and says, “The Federal Gov. may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program”, and that the mandatory obligation imposed on CLEOs runs “afoul of that rule.” Scalia relies on Federalist No. 27, 39, 51, 33. Scalia also feels that the “necessary and proper” clause is answered in New York, saying that the COMMERCE CLAUSE authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly, it does not authorize Congress to regulate the state gov. regulation of interstate commerce. (Congress can do it, but can’t make the States do it!)

  • Dissent: STEVENS, SOUTER, GINSBURG, BREYER: Stevens asserts that the “Founders intended to enhance the capacity of the Fed. Gov. by empowering it – as part of the new authority to make demands directly on individual citizens – to act through local officials.” Stevens says, There is not a clause, sentence, or paragraph in the Constitution that supports the proposition that a local police officer can ignore a command contained in a statute enacted by Congress pursuant to an express delegation of power in enumerated in Article 1. The dissent refers to Federalist No. 27, 36, 45, 44 to show ORIGINAL INTENT. The dissent also says that the majority view would undermine most of the post-New Deal COMMERCE CLAUSE decisions

Cooley V. Board of Wardens (1852): Federalism, Concurrent Powers

  • A Pennsylvania State law provided that all ships of a certain type that came into port needed to employ a pilot for safety. All ships that didn’t would need to pay a fee. Cooley argued that the state law was a regulation of Foreign Commerce, and an act solely within the authority of congress, which had passed regulating legislation on 1789. The question is one of CONCURRENT Jurisdiction, the Court, now under TANEY, moved away form the broad nationalistic interpretations of the Marshall court.

  • Majority: CURTIS: The court distinguished the “fees” of the statute from the “imposts and duties” on foreign vessels forbidden by Article 1, section 10. The regulation of foreign commerce was not an exclusive power of Congress. States could exercise CONCUURENT jurisdiction over portions of power, especially when invited by congress.

  • Later, the court would devise a “Dual Federalism” saying that the powers of the Nat. Gov. and the State where “mutually exclusive”. The Supreme Court then said that the Nat. Gov. interests over Commerce appeared to override the state police powers and local operation, but then upheld legislation intended to over-ride the Court’s decision. The subsequent history sounds confusing, but it is important to show the significance of the “dormant” Commerce Clause, which is better explained in the next case, Philadelphia v. New Jersey.