Bradwell V. Illinois (1873): 14th a., Gender Discrimination

• Myra Bradwell asserted her right to a license to practice law in Illinois, which women were prevented from doing. Bradwell argued that the privileges and immunities guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. IV and under Sec. 1 of the 14^th A.

• Majority: MILLER: While the Court agreed that all citizens enjoy certain privileges and immunities which individual states cannot take away, it did not agree that the right to practice law in a state's courts is one of them. There was no agreement that this right depended on citizenship.

• Concurring: BRADLEY: The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and can not be based on exceptional cases.

• Dissent: CHASE, Chief Justice, was the lone dissent

Frontiero V. Richardson (1973): 5th a., Gender Discrimination

• Frontiero, a lieutenant in the Air Force, sought a dependent's allowance for her husband. Federal law provided that the wives of members of the military automatically became dependents; husbands of female members of the military, however, were not accepted as dependents unless they were dependent on their wives for over one-half of their support. Frontiero's request for dependent status for her husband was turned down. Did a federal law, requiring different qualification criteria for male and female military spousal dependency, discriminate against women thereby violating the 5^th A.’s Due Process Clause?

• Majority: BRENNAN: Yes. Brennan basis his opinion on the idea that classifications based on sex are “inherently invidious: and subject to strict scrutiny. The Court held that the statute in question clearly commanded "dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated," violating the Due Process Clause. Applying a strict standard of review to the sex-based classification, the Court found that the gov.’s interest in administrative convenience could not justify discriminatory practices. The Court held that statutes that drew lines between the sexes on those grounds alone necessarily involved "the 'very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution.'"

• Concurring: POWELL, CHASE, BLACKMUN: It is unnecessary to classify sex as a suspect classification. Democratic institutions are weakened, and confidence in the restraint of the Court is impaired, when we appear unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social and political importance at the very time they are under consideration within the prescribed constitutional process. (In reference to the ERA, which was being considered by the states, and acknowledged by BRENNAN)

• Dissent: REHNQUIST: For Reasons in District Court…(?)

• Note: Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued the case for the ACLU.

Craig V. Boren (1976): 14th a., Gender Discrimination

• An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory. Did an Oklahoma statute violate the 14^th A.'s Equal Protection Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and women?

• Majority: BRENNAN: the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court also found that the 21^st A. did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case. This is somewhat of a retreat from the “suspect” classification in Frontiero.

• Dissent: REHNQUIST, BURGER: First, the court should not give men a more stringent standard of review than most classifications. Second, the Court enunciates this standard without citation to any source, as being that “classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”