Meyers V. United States

• Taft 1926. This case suggested that agencies must be subject to presidential control, in order that the bureaucracy be kept politically accountable.

• SCt held that a statute which limited President’s ability to remove a postmaster was unconstitutional under Article II. SCt here relied on several conclusions:

• Act of removal is itself executive in nature and must therefore be performed by the President;

• Under the “take Care” clause, it is the President, not his subordinates, who must take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and

• Article II vests executive power in the President, not subordinate officials.

• Historical Basis of Meyers

• Meyers derives considerable support from vesting of executive power in President and basic decision to have unitary, rather than plural, executive branch.

• On the other hand, there is evidence that at least some of the founders distinguished between “executive” and “administrative” authority, and that they believed that Congress should share in the power to remove some of what we now treat as executive officials.

The rise of independent agencies

• The two cases below recognize a congressional power to create “independent” agencies – governmental entities that are free from presidential removal power, and to some uncertain degree, presidential power to supervise and control the decisions of their officers. (e.g. Federal Trade Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Federal Communications Commission)

Humphrey’s Executor V. United States - ftc member removal

• 1935. Decided during a time of great faith in bureaucratic expertise, held that an agency’s proper functioning will be impaired if it is too vulnerable to political interference.

• SCt unanimously upheld a statute limiting the President’s authority to remove members of the FTC; such members could be “removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”

• SCt distinguished this case from Myers by noting that Myers involves purely executive officers restricted to the performance of executive functions.

• In contrast, FTC is an administrative body created by Congress to implement legislative policies in accordance with legislative standard in the statute, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative or judicial aid. FTC acts in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially.

Wiener V. United States - War Claims Commission removal

• 1958. Held that, although statute creating the War Claims Commission was silent on the question of removal, the commission’s adjudicatory nature implied a limitation on President’s power to remove.

Buckley V. Valeo - Appointments Clause and fec – Officer of the u.S.

• 1976. This is the principal modern case on the Appointments Clause. SCt invalidated the composition of the Federal Election Commission (FEC), established by the Federal Election Campaign Act.

• The Act provided that a majority of the FEC’s members were to be appointed by the President Pro Tem of the Senate and the Speaker of the House.

• Congress gave the FEC broad powers to enforce the Act, including the right to bring civil actions against violators. Congress also gave the FEC extensive rule-making authority.

• Holding. SCt held that the tasks performed by the FEC were executive in nature, and could only be exercised by “Officers of the United States.” Since Congress had no constitutional right to appoint such federal officers, the FEC as presently constituted was invalid, and could not exercise most of its statutory powers.

• Definition of “Officer of U.S.– SCt defined “Officer of the United States” to include “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the Unites States.”