Corfield V. Coryell (1823): Privilege and Immunity Clause

• New Jersey passed a law saying only citizens could clam in state waters. WASHINGTON, a federal circuit judge, dismissed the claim for Immunities. Basically, States can not deny citizens of other states the “Fundamental” rights that belong to all citizens of all free governments. ** Among these rights are the right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for the purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise”; the right to take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by other citizens of the state.”

United Bldg. V. Camden (1984) Privilege & Immunity V. Commerce Clause

• A Camden ordinance required that 40% of employees of contractors working on city construction projects. The State tried to argue that the Privileges & Immunities clause only effects STATES, and not CITIES. The Court rejects such a literal interpretation, but explains the difference between the P & I and the Commerce clause.

• Majority: REHNQUIST: There is no difference between the State’s infringement on P & I and a city’s infringement. The court must determine if the right to work on public works projects is “fundamental”. The Commerce Clause allows the state to favor its own citizens, but the Commerce Clause only relates to when there is a conflict between federal and state regulations. The PRIVILEGE and IMMUNITIES clause imposes a direct restraint on state action in the interests of interstate harmony.

• Dissent: BLACKMUN: distinction between “state” and “city” is important.

Youngstown Co. V. Sawyer (1952): Separation of Powers, Emergency power

• In 1952, President Truman used the “emergency power” to seize steel mills to fill the needs of the Korean War. The importance of this case is not the decision of this case. The court rejected Truman’s seizure (6-3) but the court was even more divided on the use of an emergency power. 4 concurrences and 3 dissents recognized that implied emergency powers might have to be invoked.

• Majority: BLACK, DOUGLAS: Only Black, who wrote the opinion, and Douglas advocated a doctrine of express and enumerated powers, and rejected “emergency power.

• Concurring: JACKSON: Jackson’s opinion is significant because it developed a theory of three scenarios of invoking emergency power. The highest level is when the President acts pursuant to congressional authorization. The lowest level is when the President takes measures incompatible with Congress. In between those categories lay a “zone of twilight” in which Congress neither grants or denies… in that case, “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least in a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures of independent presidential responsibility.”

Us V. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (1936) Separation of Power, External V. Internal

• In 1934, Congress authorized the President to place an embargo on sale of arms and munitions against countries engaged in armed conflict, clearly a LEGISLATIVE power. The court upheld the statute partly on the distinction drawn between external and internal affairs.

• Majority: SUTHERLAND: Legislation over the international field must often accord to the President greater discretion than would be admissible for domestic affairs. Sutherland included a lot of Dicta to describe far-reaching dimensions of executive power in foreign affairs. He assigned the president a number of powers not found in Constitution. Curtiss-Wright is cited frequently to justify broad grants of legislative power to the President and also to exercise inherent, extra constitutional powers.

• This issue resurfaced when Congress investigated Iran Contra. The majority rejected the position that the Reagan administration was justified based on Curtiss.