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Acceptance

Acceptance validates the contract; it gives it life. It is at that moment that a contract exists; that there is consensus ad idem (assuming a valid offer and consideration). It also must be clear, unequivocal, unconditional and made by the person to whom the offer is intended.

It is not enough to say that you find the offer to be "agreeable"; you must "accept" the offer although your acceptance can be implied by your conduct. It must also be brought to the direct attention of the offeror before a valid contract exists.

Conduct can amount to acceptance in the proper circumstances such as the delivery of the goods mentioned in the offer. The courts have laid down two conditions for conduct to be equated with acceptance: (1) that the conduct was an expression of acceptance and not done for some other reason or motive, and (2) that the action or conduct was intended as acceptance. If a judge were called upon to assess conduct for this reason, the judge would not weigh the acceptor's conduct subjectively, but would decide if a "reasonable person" would infer acceptance from that conduct.

The offeror can dictate the terms of the acceptance. Offers may set certain conditions on acceptance and to these, the acceptor is bound. For example, the offer may require acceptance in writing (if such a requirement has not been made, then a written offer may be accepted verbally.) In one case, a mobile home was purchased. With the home came a warranty card which had to be returned to the manufacturer for it to be held valid. The card was not sent to the manufacturer. The warranty was said to not apply because the purchaser never accepted the manufacturer's offer.

To this legal quagmire, should be added those rare situations where someone puts out an offer at-large, such as the Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. did in 1893. The company put a sum of money on deposit with a bank and said they would pay this money to anybody who got influenza while using their product. Well, a consumer caught influenza. The courts held that a special "unilateral contract" could be created in these circumstances and the Smoke Ball Co. had to pay up.

One trick offerors sometimes attempt is to say that the proposed acceptor's silence will amount to acceptance. This is invalid and cannot have the effect of forcing a person to a contract without the requisite of positive acceptance, delivered to the offeror, either in words or conduct.

Another game potential contractors play with one another is called the "battle of the forms". This happens when, for example, I send you an offer and you amend it slightly and then send it back signed but amended! This action destroys the original offer and is not acceptance. It is a new offer entirely, called a counter-offer. Only if the person who submitted the original offer accepts the counter-offer, would you have yourself a contract.

Livingstone v. Evans (1925)

In this case, two persons were haggling over the price of property. The offer was for $1,800. The buyer counter-offered "Will give $1,600 cash." Vendor replied "Cannot reduce price" after which the buyer accepted. The court stated that a counter-offer normally terminates the original offer, which is no longer subject to acceptance. But in this case, the judge thought that the "cannot reduce price" message "was a renewal of the original offer ... that (the vendor) was standing by it and, therefore, still open" to acceptance.

Butler Machine Tool Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp. (1979)

The judge said that "where there is a battle of the forms, there is a contract as soon as the last of the forms is sent and received without taking objection to it. In some cases, the battle is won by the person who fires the last shot. He is the person who puts forward the latest term and conditions; and, if they are not objected to by the other party, he may be taken to have agreed with them." But in this case, the battle of forms was resolved in favour of the original document because it stipulated that its terms would "prevail over any terms and conditions in the buyer's order."

Tywood Industries Ltd. v. St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp & Paper Co. Ltd. (1979)

A battle of forms played itself out and then a purchase order came in which called for arbitration in case of dispute. The purchase order was never signed by the plaintiff. The court decided that the reference to arbitration had never formed part of the contract between the two parties. The court noted that the defendant did not draw the attention of the plaintiff to the arbitration clause nor did it complain when the plaintiff did not sign the purchase order.

Dawson v. Helicopter Exploration Co. (1955)

acceptance by conduct

Correspondence had been exchanged between two parties which did not make it clear if there was a contract. Plaintiff had been offered a 10% share in exploration rights if he would accompany the defendant on exploration flights. The plaintiff wrote back: "If you will inform me, if and when you obtain a pilot for your helicopter, I will immediately take steps ... to be on hand." Defendant ignored the "agreement" One judge of Canada's Supreme Court wrote that "a promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be "instinct with an obligation," "imperfectly expressed," which the courts will regard as supplying the necessary reciprocal promise." Another judge wrote "the (plaintiff's) letter ... constitutes an acceptance of that offer, more particularly as every portion thereof is consistent only with the (plaintiff's) intention that he was accepting and holding himself in readiness to perform his part. While it has been repeatedly held that an acceptance must be absolute and unequivocal, it is equally clear that such an acceptance need not be in express terms and may be found in the language and conduct of the acceptor."

Felthouse v. Bindley (1862)

An uncle and nephew were negotiating the price of a horse. The uncle wrote offering a certain amount. The nephew did not reply but asked an auctioneer to exempt the horse from an auction. The auctioneer forgot the instruction and the horse was sold to another party. The uncle sued and the court disagreed saying that there was no contract; the nephew had never communicated his intention to accept to his uncle "or done anything to bind himself."

Saint John Tug Boat Co. v. Irving Refinery Ltd. (1964)

In this case, while there was no written acceptance to the offer, the conduct of the respondent was such that the court drew the conclusion that is accepted the offer. Quoting an old English decision, the court said: "If, whatever a man's intention may be he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would believe that he was consenting to the terms proposed by the other party and that other party upon that belief enters into a contract with him, the man thus conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other party's terms."

Eliason v. Henshaw (1819)

A contract was found not to exist between these two parties because the defendant had delivered acceptance to a place other than that stated in the offer. "An offer of a bargain by one person to another, imposes no obligation upon the former, until it is accepted by the latter, according to the terms in which the offer was made. Any qualification of, or departure from, those terms, invalidates the offer, unless the same be agreed to by the person who made it. Until the terms of the agreement have received the assent of both parties, the negotiation is open, and imposes no obligation upon either."

Carmichael v. Bank of Montreal (1972)

An offer was to expire at 6 pm. By the given time, in spite of best efforts, the real-estate agent (Mr. Tilley) could not locate the bank manager but managed to leave a telephone message, just before 6 pm, that the offer had been accepted. But the court held that the offer had been properly accepted because "acceptance was conveyed to defendant through its agent Tilley. The verbal communication of the acceptance of the counter-offer to a responsible person in charge at the defendant's bank was, in my opinion, sufficient acceptance of the offer."

Jen-Den Investments Ltd. v. Northwest Farms Ltd. (1978)

The court decided that "in some cases an offer in writing for the sale of land may be accepted by parol, but it does not follow that an offer in writing for the sale of land may be accepted by parol in every case." The judge went on to reject the verbal counter-offer because "in Manitoba the understanding of conveyance and lawyers generally is that in the case of an offer in writing made through a real estate broker or salesman, the normal and usual mode of acceptance is in writing."

Barrick v. Clark (1951)

A potential purchaser took 25 days to respond to an offer of farm land. By that time, the land had been sold to someone else. An offer, unless revoked or containing a deadline, is only valid for a reasonable time, each case to be decided on its merits. For stocks the time frame would be far shorter than for farmland. In the context of this case, 25 days was judges to be too long, or unreasonable.

Manchester Diocesan Council of Education v. Commercial and General Investments Ltd. (1970)

An equivocal "the sale has now been approved" letter was endorsed as a valid acceptance even though the letter went on to say that the approval of a government agency was also necessary.

One interesting problem that has surfaced in contract law is the use of modern technology in the communication of an acceptance. It has led to an exception to the general rule that acceptance must be personally delivered to the offeror. In the absence of specific instruction to the contrary by the offeror, a person may mail an acceptance to the offeror and the contract is said to be perfected when the acceptor places this acceptance in the mail box for return mail even if, in fact, it never reaches the offeror. This is known as the "postal rule." If the post office loses or delays the acceptance letter, there is still a binding contract. The rule was summarized in a 1892 case Henthorn v. Fraser as follows: "Where the circumstances are such that it must have been within the contemplation of the parties that, according to the ordinary usages of mankind, the post might be used as a means of communicating the acceptance of an offer, the acceptance is complete as soon as it is posted."

If the acceptor decides to use another means of delivery than that requested by the offeror, then the acceptor assumes any risk associated with that means of communications; if nondelivery occurs for technical reasons, there is no contract.

The implications of the above used to be important in determining not only where the contract was made but then, under which law will the contract be subject? The general rule is the law of the state where acceptance was brought to the offeror's attention, except for situations where the "postal rule" applies. Then, since the contract is perfected wherever the acceptance is posted, it would be that law which would apply. However, courts no longer solely rely on those strict rules for deciding which law to apply to a contract. A fairer, more general rule now applies wherein the laws of the state with which the contract has the "closest and most real connection" will apply. As this is an area of the law that is uncertain, many contracts specifically state which laws will apply to resolve any dispute about the contract.

Household Fire & Carriage Accident Insurance Co. v. Grant (1879)

This case was one of the first to establish the postal rule. For contracts formed by correspondence through the post, the judge said that the "post office (is) the agent of both parties. If the post office be such common agent, then it seems to me to follow that, as soon as the letter of acceptance is delivered to the post office, the contract is made complete and final and absolutely binding as if the acceptor had put his letter into the hands of a messenger sent by the offerer himself as his agent to deliver the offer and receive the acceptance."

Holwell Securities v. Hughes (1974)

The postal rule does not apply if (1) the express terms of the offer specify that the acceptance must reach the offeror and (2) if, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature of the subject-matter under consideration, the negotiating parties cannot have intended that there should be a binding agreement until the party accepting an offer ... had in fact communicated the acceptance or exercise to the other." See also the Saskatchewan River Bungalows case in the Page 3 From the Case Books section where wording such as "the acceptance must be received at the head office of X" would preclude the postal rule unless there had been representations that communication by mail was acceptable or encouraged.

Brinkibon Ltd. v. Stahag Stahl (1983)

In this British case, negotiations were held internationally, using a variety of communication devices. The court first stated the general rule that "a contract is formed when acceptance is communicated by the offeree to the offeror. If it is necessary to determine where a contract is formed ... this should be at the place where acceptance is communicated to the offeror." It then decided that in cases "of instantaneous communication ... the contract (if any) was made when and where the acceptance was received." This is an exception to the "postal rule." So the "postal rule" does not apply to fax transmissions.

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