Peculiarities of IL (in comparison with national law). The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey), 1927.	1. Peculiarities of International Law in the age of globalization. 2. The Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania) – Judgment of ICJ, 1949.
International Law as a “living law”. Barcelona Traction case (Belgium v. Spain) – Judgment of ICJ, 1964.	1. Fragmentation of International Law. 2. North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) – Judgment of ICJ, 1969.
1. Decisions of international courts as a source of International Law. 2. La Grand case (Germany v. United States of America) – Judgment of ICJ, 2001.	Humanitarian Intervention and “R 2 P” in present-day International Law. International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Kosovo's declaration of independence, 2010.
Evolutionary approach and judicial activism. Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2002).	1. Peculiarities of International Law in the age of globalization. 2. Barcelona Traction case (Belgium v. Spain) – Judgment of ICJ, 1964.

Peculiarities of IL (in comparison with national law).

Main difference lies in 3P: permissions, restrictions, prohibitions (less than 10%).

International law is characterized by contiguity – constant legal system.

No central power – more democratic character.

Regulation of different relation between different subjects.

Subjects of international law are different.

The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey), 1927.

The Lotus case concerns a criminal trial which was the result of the 2 August 1926 collision between the S.S. Lotus, a French steamship (or steamer), and the S.S. Boz-Kourt, a Turkish steamer, in a region just north of Mytilene (Greece). As a result of the accident, eight Turkish nationals aboard the Boz-Kourt drowned when the vessel was torn apart by the Lotus.

On 7 September 1927 the case was presented before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the judicial branch of the League of Nations, the predecessor of the United Nations.

The issue at stake was Turkey's jurisdiction to try Monsieur Demons, the French officer on watch duty at the time of the collision. Since the collision occurred on the high seas, France claimed that the state whose flag the vessel flew had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. France proffered case law, through which it attempted to show at least state practice in support of its position. However, those cases both involved ships that flew the flag of the flag state and were thus easily distinguishable. The Court, therefore, rejected France's position stating that there was no rule to that effect in international law.

The Lotus principle or Lotus approach, usually considered a foundation of international law, says that sovereign states may act in any way they wish so long as they do not contravene an explicit prohibition. The application of this principle – an outgrowth of the Lotus case – to future incidents raising the issue of jurisdiction over people on the high seas was changed by article 11[1] of the 1958 High Seas Convention. The convention, held in Geneva, laid emphasis on the fact that only the flag state or the state of which the alleged offender was a national had jurisdiction over sailors regarding incidents occurring in high seas.

The principle has also been used in arguments against the reasons of the United States of America, for opposing the existence of the International Criminal Court (ICC).[2]

International Law as a “living law”.

Eugen Ehrlich. The point Ehrlich sought to make was that the "living law" which regulates social life may be quite different from the norms for decision applied by courts, and may sometimes attract far greater cultural authority which lawyers cannot safely ignore. Norms for decision regulate only those disputes that are brought before a judicial or other tribunal. Living law is a framework for the routine structuring of social relationships. Its source is in the many different kinds of social associations in which people co-exist. Its essence is not dispute and litigation, but peace and co-operation. What counts as law depends on what kind of authority exists to give it legal significance among those it is supposed to regulate. Ehrlich's teaching is that the sources of law's authority are plural and insofar as some of those sources are political and others cultural they may conflict. But not all the norms of social associations should be thought of as 'law', in Ehrlich's view. Legal norms (understood sociologically, rather than juristically) are typically distinguished from merely moral or customary ones by powerful feelings of revulsion which typically attach to breach of them. They are, thus, regarded as socially fundamental. In addition, legal norms concern certain kinds of relationships, transactions and circumstances which he described as 'facts of the law' - specially important topics or considerations for social regulation.

Legal rules are supposed to be applied contemporary to modern life. The rule should be applied from the point of view from the time of application. Law changes without special actions.

Barcelona Traction case (Belgium v. Spain) – Judgment of ICJ, 1964.

http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/50/5343.pdf

Decisions of international courts as a source of International Law.

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La Grand case (Germany v. United States of America) – Judgment of ICJ, 2001.

The LaGrand case was a legal action heard before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which concerned the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In the case the ICJ found that its own temporary court orders were legally binding and that the rights contained in the convention could not be denied by the application of domestic legal procedures.

On January 7, 1982, brothers Karl and Walter Bernhard LaGrand bungled an armed bank robbery in Marana, Arizona, United States, killing a man and severely injuring a woman in the process. They were subsequently charged and convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The LaGrands were German nationals, having been born in Germany. While they had both lived in the United States since they were four and five, respectively, neither had officially obtained U.S. citizenship. As foreigners the LaGrands should have been informed of their right to consular assistance, under the Vienna Convention, from their state of nationality, Germany. However the Arizona authorities failed to do this even after they became aware that the LaGrands were German nationals. The LaGrand brothers later contacted the German consulate of their own accord, having learned of their right to consular assistance. They appealed their sentences and convictions on the grounds that they were not informed of their right to consular assistance, and that with consular assistance they might have been able to mount a better defense. The federal courts rejected their argument on grounds of procedural default, which provides that issues cannot be raised in federal court appeals unless they have first been raised in state courts.

Diplomatic efforts, including pleas by German ambassador Jürgen Chrobog and German Member of Parliament Claudia Roth, and the recommendation of Arizona's clemency board, failed to sway Arizona Governor Jane Dee Hull, who insisted that the executions be carried out.[1] Karl LaGrand was subsequently executed by the state of Arizona on February 24, 1999, by lethal injection. Walter LaGrand was then executed March 3, 1999, by lethal gas.[2]

Germany then initiated legal action in the International Court of Justice against the United States regarding Walter LaGrand. Hours before Walter LaGrand was due to be executed, Germany applied for the Court to grant a provisional court order, requiring the United States to delay the execution of Walter LaGrand, which the court granted.

Germany then initiated action in the U.S. Supreme Court for enforcement of the provisional order. In its judgment,[3] the U.S. Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction with respect to Germany's complaint against Arizona due to the eleventh amendment of the U.S. constitution, which prohibits federal courts from hearing lawsuits of foreign states against a U.S. state. With respect to Germany's case against the United States, it held that the doctrine of procedural default was not incompatible with the Vienna Convention, and that even if procedural default did conflict with the Vienna Convention it had been overruled by later federal law – the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which explicitly legislated the doctrine of procedural default. (Subsequent federal legislation overrides prior self-executing treaty provisions, Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888)).

The U.S. Solicitor General sent a letter to the Supreme Court, as part of these proceedings, arguing that provisional measures of the International Court of Justice are not legally binding. The United States Department of State also conveyed the ICJ's provisional measure to the Governor of Arizona without comment. The Arizona clemency board recommended a stay to the governor, on the basis of the pending ICJ case; but the governor of Arizona ignored the recommendation and Walter LaGrand was executed on March 3, 1999. As of 2013 this is the last use of lethal gas in the U.S., although five states still permit its use in varying circumstances.

Germany then modified its complaint in the case before the ICJ, alleging furthermore that the U.S. violated international law by failing to implement the provisional measures. In opposition to the German submissions, the United States argued that the Vienna Convention did not grant rights to individuals, only to states; that the convention was meant to be exercised subject to the laws of each state party, which in the case of the United States meant subject to the doctrine of procedural default; and that Germany was seeking to turn the ICJ into an international court of criminal appeal.

On June 27, 2001, the ICJ, rejecting all of the United States' arguments, ruled in favor of Germany. The ICJ held that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963 (Vienna Convention) granted rights to individuals on the basis of its plain meaning, and that domestic laws could not limit the rights of the accused under the convention, but only specify the means by which those rights were to be exercised. The ICJ also found that its own provisional measures were legally binding. The nature of provisional measures has been a subject of great dispute in international law;^[citation needed^] the English text of the Statute of the International Court of Justice implies they are not binding, while the French text implies that they are. Faced with a contradiction between two equally authentic texts of the statute, the court considered which interpretation better served the objects and purposes of the statute, and hence found that they are binding. This was the first time in the court's history it had ruled as such.

The court also found that the United States violated the Vienna Convention through its application of procedural default. The court was at pains to point out that it was not passing judgment on the doctrine itself, but only its application to cases involving the Vienna Convention.

Evolutionary approach and judicial activism.

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Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2002).

The final text of the Draft Articles was adopted by the ILC in August 2001, bringing to completion one of the Commission's longest running and most controversial studies. On 12 December 2001, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 56/83, which "commended [the articles] to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate action."[8]

Crawford notes that the rules are "rigorously general in character,"[9] encompassing all types of international obligations.

Internationally wrongful acts

According to the Draft Articles, an internationally wrongful act must:

• be attributable to the state under international law; and

• constitute a breach of an international obligation of the state.[10]

International Crimes

Earlier drafts of the Articles on State Responsibility contained Article 19, which provided for "state crimes".[11] Article 19 included the following provisions:

2. An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes an international crime.

3. Subject to Paragraph 2, and on the basis of the rules of international law in force, an international crime may result, inter alia, from:

(a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the maintenance of international peace and security, such as that prohibiting aggression;

(b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the right of self-determination of peoples, such as that prohibiting the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial domination;

(c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid;

(d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.