The r I s e of islam

The origins of Islam lie in the northern Arabian peninsula, where different

forms of Christianity and Judaism had competed and coexisted for centuries with

indigenous beliefs, in particular in the much-travelled trading and caravan communities

of Mecca and Medina. Mohammed was himself a respected and established

merchant who had probably accompanied the trade caravans north to Roman Syria.

Syria and Palestine already had substantial populations of Arabs, both farmers and

herdsmen, as well as mercenary soldiers serving the empire as a buffer against the

Persians. Reflecting his own synthesis of Judaic, Monophysite Christian, and traditional

Arab concepts within a Messianic framework which owed more to Judaism

than Christianity, Islam under Mohammed rapidly attained a considerable degree

of sophistication and coherence. Although Mohammed's preaching met initially

with stiff resistance from his own clan, the Quraysh, who dominated Mecca and its

trade (as well as the holy Kaaba), by 628-9 he had established his authority over

much of the peninsula, made an alliance with the Quraysh, and begun to consider

the future direction of the new Islamic community. On his death (traditionally

placed in 632) there followed a brief period of internecine warfare; and there is little

doubt that both religious zeal combined with the desire for glory, booty, and new

lands motivated the attacks into both the Persian and Roman lands. A combination

of incompetence and apathy resulted in a series of disastrous Roman defeats and the

loss of Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Egypt within the short span of ten years,

so that by 642 the empire was reduced to a rump of its former self. The Persian

Empire was completely overrun and destroyed. The Arab Islamic empire was born

(Hawting 2000; Kennedy 1986; Kaegi 1992; Whittow 1996: 69-88).

The most important loss was Egypt, the main source of grain for Constantinople

and other eastern coastal cities. Along with Syria and the other eastern provinces

it had provided the bulk of the empire's tax revenue. Constantinople was forced

to restructure radically its fiscal apparatus and its priorities, including the way the

army was recruited and supported; and the result was, by the later seventh century,

an administratively very different state from that which had existed a century

earlier.

Byzantium in the s e V e n th century

The reduced and impoverished East Roman or Byzantine empire now had to

contend not only with an aggressive and extremely successful new foe in the east.

It had far fewer resources at its disposal, it had lost effective control in the Balkans,

and had no real power in Italy, where the exarch, based at Ravenna, struggled

against increasingly difficult odds to maintain the imperial position. The insistence

of the imperial government during the reign of Constans II on enforcing the official

Monothelete policy reflected the government's need to maintain imperial authority

and the views of those in power that the Romans were being punished for their failure

to deal with the divisions within the Church. But it also brought the empire into

conflict with the papacy and the western Church, as well as provoking opposition

within the empire, bringing a further degree of political and ideological isolation

with it. Through the reigns of Constans II (641-68), Constantine IV (668-85), and

Justinian II (685-95), Asia Minor was raided and substantial tracts of territory

devastated annually from the early 640s well into the first half of the eighth century,

with catastrophic effects on population, on the economy of the regions affected,

especially the border zones, and on urban life, which was reduced effectively to

fortified garrison towns. A series of sieges and attempts to break Constantinopolitan

resistance between 674 and 678 finally failed, and a major siege in 717-18 was

defeated with great loss on the Arab side. The situation appeared desperate enough

for Constans II to move the imperial court to Sicily in 662. His assassination in

668 brought the experiment to an end, but illustrates contemporary perceptions.

Justinian II was deposed in 695; a series of short-lived usurpers followed until

Justinian II himself recovered his throne in 705. Deposed again and killed in 711,

internal political and military confusion lasted until the seizure of power by the

general Leo, who became Leo III (717-41) and, having defeated the Arab besiegers

in 717-18, finally re-established some political order (Haldon 1997: 41-91).

Arab strategy can be followed through several phases. Until the defeat of the

siege of 717-18 Byzantine resistance seems to have been almost entirely passive,

limited to holding on to fortified centres and avoiding any open contact. During

the Arab civil wars of the late 680s and early 690s the emperor Justinian II was

able to stabilize the situation for a short while; but it was only during the 720s

that the empire was able effectively to begin meeting Arab armies in the field and

reasserting imperial military control. In the meantime, the Byzantine resistance,

focused on fortified key points and a strategy of harassment and avoidance, had

at least prevented a permanent Arab presence in Asia Minor, aided of course

also by the geography of the region. The Taurus and Anti-Taurus ranges were an

effective physical barrier, with only a few well-marked passes allowing access and

egress.

The Balkan front was also a concern for Constantinople. Technically, the Danube

remained the border even in the 660s and 670s. In practice, only the presence of

an imperial army could bring the local Slav chieftains, briefly, to heel. In 679 the

situation was transformed by the arrival of the Turkic Bulgars, a nomadic people

who had been forced out of their homelands and pastures around the Volga by

the encroachments of the Khazars from the east. They were refused permission

by Constantine IV to cross the Danube for protection on 'Roman' territory (the

Danube river itself remained in fact largely under Byzantine control because it was

navigable, and the imperial fleet could patrol it); they crossed over, where they met

an army under Constantine himself. Poor discipline and mistaken signals led to a

serious defeat of the imperial forces, and over the next twenty years the Bulgars

consolidated their hold over the region, establishing a loose hegemony over the

indigenous Slav and other peoples in the region. By 700, the Bulgar khanate was

an important political and military power threatening Byzantine Thrace (Haldon

1997; Whittow 1996).