6.1.2 Output two: Lottery systems for new car plates

It means that one cannot apply for a new plate whenever they want in Beijing, they have to join in a lottery system, which is operated by the government once a month, if the citizens cannot get the new car plates, as a result, they cannot owe the car in law. Besides, the process is a random selection.

2. Hong Kong

6.2.1 Output one: Improvement of the interchange between private and public transport modes.

The improvement of the interchange between private and public transport modes is implemented through measures like provision of park-and-ride (P&R) facilities, provision of bicycle parks, rationalization of bus routes and stops, provision of transport Information through Internet and Mobile Applications, etc. The aim is to encourage citizens to take public transport by the methods of providing benefits of public transportation in all directions.

6.2.2 Output two: Use of Alternative Fuel Vehicles to replace Diesel Vehicles

This output is based on the promotion of “cleaner” fuel such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) or electricity in place of diesel. E.g., conversion of diesel taxis to LPG taxis, incentive scheme for LPG/Electric Light Buses, or replacement of pre-Euro and Euro I diesel commercial vehicles.

6.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong

6.3.1. Strategies

• Target groups and NATP:

In Mainland China, they will

1. Motivate all friends and families around to register for an application code.

2. Rent a plate for the same vehicle model from a car-rental company, which is manipulated by the intermediary company, usually, the 4S automobiles store. （margins of the law）

In Hong Kong, they will positively respond to the government’s scheme as there is an economic incentive behind, people are willing to cooperate. In contrast, the limitation policy in Beijing gives people more tendencies to be opportunistic. Nevertheless, the drawback may also happen in Hong Kong when people changed their ideas of using new green vehicles after getting money immediately.

• Beneficiaries and PATP:

In Mainland China, they will

1. Ask for less quotas every year (the quotas of plates change very year, it’s settled by the government at a fixed number due to the capacity of environment and public roads)

2. Participate into the game, so the winning rate for car users is lower.

In Hong Kong, they will ask for a higher amount of subsidies each year (Under the current scheme, one-off grants for replacement of a Euro II PLB with a brand new diesel, LPG and electric vehicles are $77,000, $88,000 and $92,000 respectively). Both the people in the two areas are asking for an advantageous standard every year.

6.3.2. Six dimensions of the analysis of the outputs

1. Perimeter

The quota distribution is always unbalanced in both Mainland China and Hong Kong. There are two kinds of unbalanced possibilities as showed below.

T he first unbalanced phenomenon is caused by actors’ strategies. In China, the need for cars is not mandated by regulations, people who do not need cars also participate into this game; in Hong Kong, subsidies may not be distributed exactly to those who are really in need, but cause unnecessary expenditures.

T he second unbalanced phenomenon in Mainland China is caused by target groups’ second strategy: plate renting. Those who really need plates cannot get the plate in the end, resulting in a waste of resources. As for Hong Kong, the transportation fund every year is a certain amount, unnecessary applications will definitely take up others’ quotas.

2. Institutional content:

If applicants have any doubts about results, they can report to monitoring departments in both areas, and telephone numbers are already published on the website. However, the right of appeal is not written in official documents in neither of the two areas.

3. High degree of formalization

Both Mainland China and Hong Kong have high degree of formalization: official regulations and documents are formulated in a detailed way

4. Final status.

In the two areas, results can be contested only when it’s published to the public. While in Hong Kong, there exists a public consultation process when the new policy was proposed.

5. Coherence:

In Mainland China, time limit is obvious, e.g., audits of applicants’ qualifications have to be completed within 8 working days, is the cooperation between the Index Regulation of Passenger Car Management office and other cooperating departments. While in Hong Kong, as the political-administrative actors’ chart is much simpler, therefore the coherence level between departments is higher than that in Mainland China.

5. Coordination

The two dominating policies in both Mainland China and Hong Kong are the traffic policies V.S. environmental policies. In the air pollution policy, however, they share the common interests---to reduce air pollution caused by motor vehicles.

Nevertheless, reduction in congestion may not mean reduction in air pollution. The right to get a car is also different from when & where citizens choose to drive their car. In Hong Kong, the Police Force also takes part into the implementation process, when they are strengthening emission inspection and enforcement, e.g., in the aspect of controlling smoky vehicles.

Document:

<Interim Provision for the control of the quantity of passenger cars in Beijing>