- •Public Policy Analysis
- •IMpa Grands exercices de cours
- •1. Introduction 99
- •The Analysis of China’s Policy of Importing Solid Waste Zhanyu Li
- •1. Introduction 99
- •1. Introduction 99
- •8. Conclusion 129
- •Introduction
- •1.1 The choice of policies and countries
- •1.2 Short history of China’s policy of waste importation
- •1.3 Short history of Germany’s policy of waste importation
- •The Political Definition of the Problem
- •2.1 China’s political definition of the problem
- •Intervention hypothesis
- •2.2 Germany’s political definition of the problem
- •Intervention Hypothesis
- •2.3 Comparative studies
- •3.1 Five constituent elements of the pap of China’s policy of waste importation
- •3.2 Five constituent elements of the pap of Germany’s policy of waste importation
- •3.3 Comparative studies
- •China’s paAs
- •The paa of licensing the domestic consignees
- •4.2 Germany’s paAs
- •4.3 Comparative studies
- •5.1 China’s aPs
- •5.2 Germany’s aPs
- •5.3 Comparative studies
- •The outputs
- •6.1 China’s output of licensing enterprises using solid waste
- •6.2 Germany’s output of written consent of shipment of waste
- •6.3 Comparative studies
- •Evaluative Statements
- •7.1 Evaluating China’s output of licensing solid waste
- •7.2 Evaluating Germany’s output of consent
- •7.3. Comparative Studies
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •The Analysis of China’s Policy
- •Of Importing Solid Waste
- •Zhanyu Li
- •Abstract
- •Research Background
- •1.1 The definition of solid waste
- •1.2. The double-edged solid waste
- •1.3. The global waste trade
- •1.4. International conventions and agreements
- •Research Rationale
- •Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
- •3.1 The literatures on solid waste
- •3.2. The literatures on China’s import of solid waste
- •3.3. Conceptual framework
- •Research questions
- •Data Collection and Methodology
- •The overall description of solid waste imported by China
- •The driving force behind China's import of solid waste
- •7.1 The imported solid waste can mitigate the domestic lack of resources.
- •7.2. The cheap labour resources in China
- •7.3. The needs arising from certain industries
- •7.4. The underdeveloped domestic collecting system
- •7.5. Low shipping costs
- •The challenges facing Chinese public authorities
- •8.1. The transferring, renting and faking of import license.
- •8.2. The waste trafficking
- •8.3. The lack of public awareness of significance of imported solid waste
- •8.4. The inadequacy of technologies, personnel and other public resources
- •8.5. The secondary environmental pollution caused by inappropriate use of
- •Imported solid waste
- •The evolution of Chinese policies of importing solid waste
- •The current regimes of regulating import of solid waste
- •10.1. The competent authorities
- •10.2. The legal framework
- •Political agenda setting
- •Policy Programming
- •12.1. Political-administrative programs
- •12.2. Political-administrative arrangements
- •12.3. The actors' games at the stage of policy programming – the example of China's Association of Plastics Processing Industry
- •Policy implementation
- •13.1. Action plans
- •13.2. The operational analysis of aPs of enclosed management zone
- •Implementation acts (outputs)
- •14.1. Operational analysis of implementation acts
- •14.2. The Game of Policy Actors at the Stage of Policy Implementation- The example of the implementation of policy of imported solid waste at Luqiao District of Taizhou City.
- •Evaluating policy effects
- •15.1. The dimensions of evaluating the policy of import of solid waste
- •15.2. Data collections
- •15.3. Other independent variants
- •Appendix I
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Causal Model
- •2.3 Comparative discussions
- •Causal hypothesis
- •Political-administrative Program (pap)
- •Mainland China
- •3.1.1 Concrete objectives
- •3.1.2 Evaluative elements
- •3.1.3 Operational elements
- •3.1.4 Paa and resources
- •3.1.5 Procedural elements
- •Hong Kong
- •3.2.1 Concrete objectives
- •3.2.2 Evaluative elements
- •3.2.3 Operational elements
- •3.2.4 Paa and resources
- •3.2.5 Procedural elements
- •3.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Political-administrative Arrangement (paa)
- •4.1 Mainland China
- •4.2 Hong Kong
- •4.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Action plan (ap)
- •5.1 Mainland China
- •5.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Outputs
- •Mainland China (Beijing)
- •6.1.1 Output one: Restrictions on the last digit of vehicle plate numbers
- •6.1.2 Output two: Lottery systems for new car plates
- •Hong Kong
- •6.2.1 Output one: Improvement of the interchange between private and public transport modes.
- •6.2.2 Output two: Use of Alternative Fuel Vehicles to replace Diesel Vehicles
- •6.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •6.3.1. Strategies
- •6.3.2. Six dimensions of the analysis of the outputs
- •Evaluative statement
- •7.1 The evaluative statement in Beijing
- •7.2 The evaluative statement in Hong Kong
- •7.3 Comparative discussion
- •Conclusion
- •References
Action plan (ap)
5.1 Mainland China
5.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
Efficiency analysis:
Explicit regulations
Rules like applicant qualifications, application procedures or results announcements are published in the website of both countries(in the case of Hong Kong, the output is mainly achieved through the transportation funds or subsidies that are set up by the government), the information transparency of them is relatively high, instructions are given in a clear way.
For example, in Mainland China, the valid date of an application code was 3 months in former document, while the revised version made it more concrete and explicit by defining the first valid day of the 3 months the day after application code is examined.
A greater extent of discrimination
In Mainland China, the discriminatory level is much higher than that in Hong Kong, as for the following features:
non-car drivers (only them can apply for a new plate)
random selection (the lottery system itself)
chance of getting a plate: 12:1,
valid period of an application code: 3 months
In Hong Kong, although discriminations are obvious (only taxis drivers and Public Light Bus (PLB) owners can benefit from the government fund, other private drivers only enjoy tax relief), the applicant qualifications are not that strict: at end of 2011, over 99.9% of the taxis in Hong Kong were LPG taxis.
Structure of the PAA
In Mainland China, the structure of the PAA is quite extensive; a lot of participating departments in Beijing can be seen from the following: Beijing Traffic Management Bureau, Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau, Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau, Beijing Municipal Office, SAT (state administration of taxation), Beijing Municipal Administration of Quality and Technology Supervision, Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau, Beijing Municipal Bureau of Finance, Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice, Beijing Municipal Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security, Beijing Administration for industry and commerce.
But in Hong Kong, the participating actors are much simpler than those in Mainland China (see from the PAA figure), which leads to the implementation process more efficient.
Allocation of resources
Both areas are accompanied by more clear allocation of resources and the divisions of labor are also explicit.
Legal basis:
Mainland China:
Interim Provision for the control of the quantity of passenger cars in Beijing
Hong Kong:
Environmental Report 2011 by Transport Department
Outputs
Mainland China (Beijing)
6.1.1 Output one: Restrictions on the last digit of vehicle plate numbers
In Beijing, Restrictions on the last digit of vehicle plate numbers was first carried out in Beijing, starting from the Olympic Games in 2008. During each working day from Monday to Friday, there will be two last digits of vehicle plate numbers published through government websites and media that car owners who’s car is in accordance with the last two digits cannot have their car running on the road that day. Namely, each car can only run on the road for four working days instead of five.
