- •Public Policy Analysis
- •IMpa Grands exercices de cours
- •1. Introduction 99
- •The Analysis of China’s Policy of Importing Solid Waste Zhanyu Li
- •1. Introduction 99
- •1. Introduction 99
- •8. Conclusion 129
- •Introduction
- •1.1 The choice of policies and countries
- •1.2 Short history of China’s policy of waste importation
- •1.3 Short history of Germany’s policy of waste importation
- •The Political Definition of the Problem
- •2.1 China’s political definition of the problem
- •Intervention hypothesis
- •2.2 Germany’s political definition of the problem
- •Intervention Hypothesis
- •2.3 Comparative studies
- •3.1 Five constituent elements of the pap of China’s policy of waste importation
- •3.2 Five constituent elements of the pap of Germany’s policy of waste importation
- •3.3 Comparative studies
- •China’s paAs
- •The paa of licensing the domestic consignees
- •4.2 Germany’s paAs
- •4.3 Comparative studies
- •5.1 China’s aPs
- •5.2 Germany’s aPs
- •5.3 Comparative studies
- •The outputs
- •6.1 China’s output of licensing enterprises using solid waste
- •6.2 Germany’s output of written consent of shipment of waste
- •6.3 Comparative studies
- •Evaluative Statements
- •7.1 Evaluating China’s output of licensing solid waste
- •7.2 Evaluating Germany’s output of consent
- •7.3. Comparative Studies
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •The Analysis of China’s Policy
- •Of Importing Solid Waste
- •Zhanyu Li
- •Abstract
- •Research Background
- •1.1 The definition of solid waste
- •1.2. The double-edged solid waste
- •1.3. The global waste trade
- •1.4. International conventions and agreements
- •Research Rationale
- •Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
- •3.1 The literatures on solid waste
- •3.2. The literatures on China’s import of solid waste
- •3.3. Conceptual framework
- •Research questions
- •Data Collection and Methodology
- •The overall description of solid waste imported by China
- •The driving force behind China's import of solid waste
- •7.1 The imported solid waste can mitigate the domestic lack of resources.
- •7.2. The cheap labour resources in China
- •7.3. The needs arising from certain industries
- •7.4. The underdeveloped domestic collecting system
- •7.5. Low shipping costs
- •The challenges facing Chinese public authorities
- •8.1. The transferring, renting and faking of import license.
- •8.2. The waste trafficking
- •8.3. The lack of public awareness of significance of imported solid waste
- •8.4. The inadequacy of technologies, personnel and other public resources
- •8.5. The secondary environmental pollution caused by inappropriate use of
- •Imported solid waste
- •The evolution of Chinese policies of importing solid waste
- •The current regimes of regulating import of solid waste
- •10.1. The competent authorities
- •10.2. The legal framework
- •Political agenda setting
- •Policy Programming
- •12.1. Political-administrative programs
- •12.2. Political-administrative arrangements
- •12.3. The actors' games at the stage of policy programming – the example of China's Association of Plastics Processing Industry
- •Policy implementation
- •13.1. Action plans
- •13.2. The operational analysis of aPs of enclosed management zone
- •Implementation acts (outputs)
- •14.1. Operational analysis of implementation acts
- •14.2. The Game of Policy Actors at the Stage of Policy Implementation- The example of the implementation of policy of imported solid waste at Luqiao District of Taizhou City.
- •Evaluating policy effects
- •15.1. The dimensions of evaluating the policy of import of solid waste
- •15.2. Data collections
- •15.3. Other independent variants
- •Appendix I
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Causal Model
- •2.3 Comparative discussions
- •Causal hypothesis
- •Political-administrative Program (pap)
- •Mainland China
- •3.1.1 Concrete objectives
- •3.1.2 Evaluative elements
- •3.1.3 Operational elements
- •3.1.4 Paa and resources
- •3.1.5 Procedural elements
- •Hong Kong
- •3.2.1 Concrete objectives
- •3.2.2 Evaluative elements
- •3.2.3 Operational elements
- •3.2.4 Paa and resources
- •3.2.5 Procedural elements
- •3.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Political-administrative Arrangement (paa)
- •4.1 Mainland China
- •4.2 Hong Kong
- •4.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Action plan (ap)
- •5.1 Mainland China
- •5.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Outputs
- •Mainland China (Beijing)
- •6.1.1 Output one: Restrictions on the last digit of vehicle plate numbers
- •6.1.2 Output two: Lottery systems for new car plates
- •Hong Kong
- •6.2.1 Output one: Improvement of the interchange between private and public transport modes.
- •6.2.2 Output two: Use of Alternative Fuel Vehicles to replace Diesel Vehicles
- •6.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •6.3.1. Strategies
- •6.3.2. Six dimensions of the analysis of the outputs
- •Evaluative statement
- •7.1 The evaluative statement in Beijing
- •7.2 The evaluative statement in Hong Kong
- •7.3 Comparative discussion
- •Conclusion
- •References
4.2 Hong Kong
The outputs of the air pollution policy in Hong Kong can be conclude as follows:
Improvement of the interchange between private and public transport modes.
Use of Alternative Fuel Vehicles to replace Diesel Vehicles
Tightening fuel and vehicle emission standards
Strengthening emission inspection and enforcement
Setting up transport fund to support green technologies
Government communication, e.g. promote better vehicle maintenance and eco-driving.
We choose the first two outputs in Hong Kong because they can both be considered as similar measures to achieve similar goals compared to Beijing: to decrease the number of vehicles running on road and to limit the total number of cars within the country, however, in different ways (see figure 4.3 and figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4 Use of Alternative Fuel Vehicles to replace Diesel Vehicles
4.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
Similarities& differences
In Mainland China, Restrictions on the last digit of vehicle plate numbers was first carried out in Beijing, starting from the Olympic Games in 2008. During each working day from Monday to Friday, there will be two last digits of vehicle plate numbers published through government website and media that car owners who’s car is in accordance with the last two digits cannot have their car running on the road that day. Namely, each car can only run on the road for four working days instead of five.
In Hong Kong, the improvement of the interchange between private and public transport modes are implemented through measures like provision of park-and-ride (P&R) facilities, provision of bicycle parks, rationalization of bus routes and stops, provision of transport Information through Internet and Mobile Applications, etc.
As we can see, these two outputs both aim at reducing the traffic flow, but Beijing’s mode is much stronger than that of Hong Kong, as the aim is achieved by limiting drivers’ rights or properties; in Hong Kong, this strict mode seems impossible, because the right-protection awareness of citizens is quite high, and the power of relevant organizations is also strong.
Mainland China’s second output--- Lottery systems for new car plates means that one cannot apply for a new plate whenever they want, they have to join in a lottery system which is operated by the government once a month, it is a random selection. The second output in Hong Kong--- Use of Alternative Fuel Vehicles to replace Diesel Vehicles is based on the promotion of “cleaner” fuel such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) or electricity in place of diesel. E.g., conversion of diesel taxis to LPG taxis, incentive scheme for LPG/Electric Light Buses, or replacement of pre-Euro and Euro I diesel commercial vehicles.
Both of the two districts are trying to reduce the total number of waste producing vehicles, but Beijing achieve this by limiting car plates, while Hong Kong is by the quality of fuels, which to some extent, will reduce the overall vehicle numbers since heavily polluted vehicles have little chances to run on the road again.
As for the horizontal degree, the relationships between both areas’ actors are basically no bindings, recommendation is commonly used.
For vertical degree, in Mainland China, coordination is not strong between national and municipal levels, but strong within departmental or ministerial level. As Hong Kong is small, the vertical degree is not that strong.
For centrality degree: the dominating actor in Mainland China is Beijing Traffic Management Bureau, while in Hong Kong, the cooperation between transport and environment department is stronger.
Degree of politicization: are low in both countries.
Degree of openness: there is no consultation process in Mainland China, but it is an important element in Hong Kong, the public can find this kind of information directly from the government website.
