- •Public Policy Analysis
- •IMpa Grands exercices de cours
- •1. Introduction 99
- •The Analysis of China’s Policy of Importing Solid Waste Zhanyu Li
- •1. Introduction 99
- •1. Introduction 99
- •8. Conclusion 129
- •Introduction
- •1.1 The choice of policies and countries
- •1.2 Short history of China’s policy of waste importation
- •1.3 Short history of Germany’s policy of waste importation
- •The Political Definition of the Problem
- •2.1 China’s political definition of the problem
- •Intervention hypothesis
- •2.2 Germany’s political definition of the problem
- •Intervention Hypothesis
- •2.3 Comparative studies
- •3.1 Five constituent elements of the pap of China’s policy of waste importation
- •3.2 Five constituent elements of the pap of Germany’s policy of waste importation
- •3.3 Comparative studies
- •China’s paAs
- •The paa of licensing the domestic consignees
- •4.2 Germany’s paAs
- •4.3 Comparative studies
- •5.1 China’s aPs
- •5.2 Germany’s aPs
- •5.3 Comparative studies
- •The outputs
- •6.1 China’s output of licensing enterprises using solid waste
- •6.2 Germany’s output of written consent of shipment of waste
- •6.3 Comparative studies
- •Evaluative Statements
- •7.1 Evaluating China’s output of licensing solid waste
- •7.2 Evaluating Germany’s output of consent
- •7.3. Comparative Studies
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •The Analysis of China’s Policy
- •Of Importing Solid Waste
- •Zhanyu Li
- •Abstract
- •Research Background
- •1.1 The definition of solid waste
- •1.2. The double-edged solid waste
- •1.3. The global waste trade
- •1.4. International conventions and agreements
- •Research Rationale
- •Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
- •3.1 The literatures on solid waste
- •3.2. The literatures on China’s import of solid waste
- •3.3. Conceptual framework
- •Research questions
- •Data Collection and Methodology
- •The overall description of solid waste imported by China
- •The driving force behind China's import of solid waste
- •7.1 The imported solid waste can mitigate the domestic lack of resources.
- •7.2. The cheap labour resources in China
- •7.3. The needs arising from certain industries
- •7.4. The underdeveloped domestic collecting system
- •7.5. Low shipping costs
- •The challenges facing Chinese public authorities
- •8.1. The transferring, renting and faking of import license.
- •8.2. The waste trafficking
- •8.3. The lack of public awareness of significance of imported solid waste
- •8.4. The inadequacy of technologies, personnel and other public resources
- •8.5. The secondary environmental pollution caused by inappropriate use of
- •Imported solid waste
- •The evolution of Chinese policies of importing solid waste
- •The current regimes of regulating import of solid waste
- •10.1. The competent authorities
- •10.2. The legal framework
- •Political agenda setting
- •Policy Programming
- •12.1. Political-administrative programs
- •12.2. Political-administrative arrangements
- •12.3. The actors' games at the stage of policy programming – the example of China's Association of Plastics Processing Industry
- •Policy implementation
- •13.1. Action plans
- •13.2. The operational analysis of aPs of enclosed management zone
- •Implementation acts (outputs)
- •14.1. Operational analysis of implementation acts
- •14.2. The Game of Policy Actors at the Stage of Policy Implementation- The example of the implementation of policy of imported solid waste at Luqiao District of Taizhou City.
- •Evaluating policy effects
- •15.1. The dimensions of evaluating the policy of import of solid waste
- •15.2. Data collections
- •15.3. Other independent variants
- •Appendix I
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Causal Model
- •2.3 Comparative discussions
- •Causal hypothesis
- •Political-administrative Program (pap)
- •Mainland China
- •3.1.1 Concrete objectives
- •3.1.2 Evaluative elements
- •3.1.3 Operational elements
- •3.1.4 Paa and resources
- •3.1.5 Procedural elements
- •Hong Kong
- •3.2.1 Concrete objectives
- •3.2.2 Evaluative elements
- •3.2.3 Operational elements
- •3.2.4 Paa and resources
- •3.2.5 Procedural elements
- •3.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Political-administrative Arrangement (paa)
- •4.1 Mainland China
- •4.2 Hong Kong
- •4.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Action plan (ap)
- •5.1 Mainland China
- •5.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Outputs
- •Mainland China (Beijing)
- •6.1.1 Output one: Restrictions on the last digit of vehicle plate numbers
- •6.1.2 Output two: Lottery systems for new car plates
- •Hong Kong
- •6.2.1 Output one: Improvement of the interchange between private and public transport modes.
- •6.2.2 Output two: Use of Alternative Fuel Vehicles to replace Diesel Vehicles
- •6.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •6.3.1. Strategies
- •6.3.2. Six dimensions of the analysis of the outputs
- •Evaluative statement
- •7.1 The evaluative statement in Beijing
- •7.2 The evaluative statement in Hong Kong
- •7.3 Comparative discussion
- •Conclusion
- •References
3.2.4 Paa and resources
The dominating political-administrative actors in Hong Kong are much simpler: the Transport Department, the Environmental Protection Department and the Hong Kong Police Force.
3.2.5 Procedural elements
Unfortunately, as for the Aarhus Convention, Hong Kong also neither signed to the convention nor it was ratified.
3.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
Similarities& differences
Concrete objectives
What Mainland China and Hong Kong have in common is that they are both in a transition period---the old standards are going to end and the new one waits to come. What’s more, they both add a new pollutant in their new coming standards---PM2.5, which is mainly produced by motor vehicles in urban cities.
However, the standards in Hong Kong are a bit stricter than those in Mainland China, and one special thing about Mainland China is the different standards in various zones (three zones before 2016 and two zones after 2016). Unspecific definition of zones may help the government carry out vague interpretations when facing the evaluation process.
Evaluative elements
Mainland China and Hong Kong both set lots of monitoring sites to monitor the real time air quality data.
While in Hong Kong, it gives a more clear and detailed calculation method (API) to measure the air quality situation and the monitored period is more accurate (8-hour average concentration); in Mainland China, the calculation method is not given directly from the government websites or documents, it is more complicated to understand how the published data come from.
Operational elements
Mainland China and Hong Kong both use various modes to intervene on the behaviors of target groups like subsidies, regulation, encouragement and so on, but the emission standards in Hong Kong (Euro V) are much stricter than those in Mainland China, as most cities in the latter country adopt Euro IV. What is more, positive initiatives are mainly used in Hong Kong compared to Beijing, with more technical support by the government, encouragement overweighs punishment.
PAA and resources
Both the two countries have three areas of dominating actors to participate in the PAA.
Hong Kong, as the special administrative region, actors are much more simple and less complicated than those in Mainland China, therefore, accountability process becomes clearer.
Procedural elements
As for the Aarhus Convention, neither of the two areas signed to the convention nor it was ratified.
But from the information transparency aspect, Hong Kong is better than Mainland China, because the data we can find from Hong Kong’s government is more comprehensive and reliable.
Political-administrative Arrangement (paa)
4.1 Mainland China
The PAA of a public policy represents the competent authorities that are responsible for its implementation. In the air pollution policy of Mainland China, the outputs can be concluded as follows:
Restrictions on the last digit of vehicle plate numbers
Lottery systems for new car plates
Giving subsidies to green vehicles buyers
Imposing motor vehicle tax
Obliging drivers to send cars to vehicle control center for detection
Government communication, like less use of car air condition, decreasing cold start.
We choose the first two outputs to be discussed into details in our further policy analysis, as they are the unique measures taken by the Mainland Chinese government, which are not so common in other regions (see figure 4.1 and figure 4.2).