- •Public Policy Analysis
- •IMpa Grands exercices de cours
- •1. Introduction 99
- •The Analysis of China’s Policy of Importing Solid Waste Zhanyu Li
- •1. Introduction 99
- •1. Introduction 99
- •8. Conclusion 129
- •Introduction
- •1.1 The choice of policies and countries
- •1.2 Short history of China’s policy of waste importation
- •1.3 Short history of Germany’s policy of waste importation
- •The Political Definition of the Problem
- •2.1 China’s political definition of the problem
- •Intervention hypothesis
- •2.2 Germany’s political definition of the problem
- •Intervention Hypothesis
- •2.3 Comparative studies
- •3.1 Five constituent elements of the pap of China’s policy of waste importation
- •3.2 Five constituent elements of the pap of Germany’s policy of waste importation
- •3.3 Comparative studies
- •China’s paAs
- •The paa of licensing the domestic consignees
- •4.2 Germany’s paAs
- •4.3 Comparative studies
- •5.1 China’s aPs
- •5.2 Germany’s aPs
- •5.3 Comparative studies
- •The outputs
- •6.1 China’s output of licensing enterprises using solid waste
- •6.2 Germany’s output of written consent of shipment of waste
- •6.3 Comparative studies
- •Evaluative Statements
- •7.1 Evaluating China’s output of licensing solid waste
- •7.2 Evaluating Germany’s output of consent
- •7.3. Comparative Studies
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •The Analysis of China’s Policy
- •Of Importing Solid Waste
- •Zhanyu Li
- •Abstract
- •Research Background
- •1.1 The definition of solid waste
- •1.2. The double-edged solid waste
- •1.3. The global waste trade
- •1.4. International conventions and agreements
- •Research Rationale
- •Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
- •3.1 The literatures on solid waste
- •3.2. The literatures on China’s import of solid waste
- •3.3. Conceptual framework
- •Research questions
- •Data Collection and Methodology
- •The overall description of solid waste imported by China
- •The driving force behind China's import of solid waste
- •7.1 The imported solid waste can mitigate the domestic lack of resources.
- •7.2. The cheap labour resources in China
- •7.3. The needs arising from certain industries
- •7.4. The underdeveloped domestic collecting system
- •7.5. Low shipping costs
- •The challenges facing Chinese public authorities
- •8.1. The transferring, renting and faking of import license.
- •8.2. The waste trafficking
- •8.3. The lack of public awareness of significance of imported solid waste
- •8.4. The inadequacy of technologies, personnel and other public resources
- •8.5. The secondary environmental pollution caused by inappropriate use of
- •Imported solid waste
- •The evolution of Chinese policies of importing solid waste
- •The current regimes of regulating import of solid waste
- •10.1. The competent authorities
- •10.2. The legal framework
- •Political agenda setting
- •Policy Programming
- •12.1. Political-administrative programs
- •12.2. Political-administrative arrangements
- •12.3. The actors' games at the stage of policy programming – the example of China's Association of Plastics Processing Industry
- •Policy implementation
- •13.1. Action plans
- •13.2. The operational analysis of aPs of enclosed management zone
- •Implementation acts (outputs)
- •14.1. Operational analysis of implementation acts
- •14.2. The Game of Policy Actors at the Stage of Policy Implementation- The example of the implementation of policy of imported solid waste at Luqiao District of Taizhou City.
- •Evaluating policy effects
- •15.1. The dimensions of evaluating the policy of import of solid waste
- •15.2. Data collections
- •15.3. Other independent variants
- •Appendix I
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Causal Model
- •2.3 Comparative discussions
- •Causal hypothesis
- •Political-administrative Program (pap)
- •Mainland China
- •3.1.1 Concrete objectives
- •3.1.2 Evaluative elements
- •3.1.3 Operational elements
- •3.1.4 Paa and resources
- •3.1.5 Procedural elements
- •Hong Kong
- •3.2.1 Concrete objectives
- •3.2.2 Evaluative elements
- •3.2.3 Operational elements
- •3.2.4 Paa and resources
- •3.2.5 Procedural elements
- •3.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Political-administrative Arrangement (paa)
- •4.1 Mainland China
- •4.2 Hong Kong
- •4.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Action plan (ap)
- •5.1 Mainland China
- •5.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Outputs
- •Mainland China (Beijing)
- •6.1.1 Output one: Restrictions on the last digit of vehicle plate numbers
- •6.1.2 Output two: Lottery systems for new car plates
- •Hong Kong
- •6.2.1 Output one: Improvement of the interchange between private and public transport modes.
- •6.2.2 Output two: Use of Alternative Fuel Vehicles to replace Diesel Vehicles
- •6.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •6.3.1. Strategies
- •6.3.2. Six dimensions of the analysis of the outputs
- •Evaluative statement
- •7.1 The evaluative statement in Beijing
- •7.2 The evaluative statement in Hong Kong
- •7.3 Comparative discussion
- •Conclusion
- •References
3.1.2 Evaluative elements
Evaluative elements often elaborate which type of data to be collected, by using what kind of techniques, in which way this data should be interpreted and how long it will take to finish the whole evaluative process.
In order to achieve the new Ambient Air Quality standards(GB3095-2012), a “three steps” evaluative plan is carried out. The first step is giving priorities to three important areas in Mainland China: Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area, Pearl River area, and Yangtze River Delta area. Six pollutant indexes are monitored: SO2, NO2, PM10, PM2.5, O3 and CO, and the concentration of pollutants in average 1 hour, 24 hours, AQI (Air Quality Index) and representative monitoring points will be published by the Ministry of Environmental Protection and monitoring organization. For instance, the numbers of monitoring sites in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Shijiazhuang, Tangshan and Cangzhou are respectively 12,15,10,17, 8, 6 and 3. Figure 3.4 below also shows the requirements to install monitoring sites.
Figure 3.4
The average daily number of vehicles |
The minimum distance between traffic road and monitoring points (m) |
|
PM 10 |
SO2, NO2, CO and O3 |
|
≤3 000 |
25 |
10 |
3 000 – 6 000 |
30 |
20 |
6 000 – 15 000 |
45 |
30 |
15 000 – 40 000 |
80 |
60 |
>40 000 |
150 |
100 |
Source: Ambient air quality monitoring standards
3.1.3 Operational elements
Operational elements explain the intervention methods to fulfill the objectives of a public policy in details. This term can also be interpreted as the motivation behind to change the behaviors of target groups, and four forms of intervention instruments are defined as following (Knoepfel, 2007):
The regulatory mode. Corresponding to the imission standards, the requirements settled by the government in the vehicle aspect are the emission standards, namely, to what extent the exhaust emissions produced by cars are allowed. For Mainland China, the current emission standards being used are regulated by Limits and measurement methods for exhaust pollutants from compression ignition and gas fuelled positive ignition engines of vehicles (III, IV, V), which is issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Most cities are using IV standards (equals to Euro IV) from 2012, developed cities like Beijing are using V standards (equals to Euro V), while less developed cities are still using III standards (equals to Euro III). Figure 3.5 gives the European emission standards for passenger cars.
Figure 3.5 The European emission standards for passenger cars (Category M*), g/km
Source: European Commission
Other counter measures of traffic management can be observed like circulation control in the city center, or quota limitation on vehicle ownership. The former represents a typical case in Beijing, the capital of China, namely restrictions on the last digit of vehicle plate numbers. The latter program is found to be implemented in five cities up to the year 2013: Beijing’s lottery systems for new car licenses in 2010 is considered as the first quota limitation method on vehicle ownership in Mainland China, following the same spirit, Guiyang (2011), Guangzhou (2012), Shijiazhuang (2013) are all joining into this game with slightly different measures: in Guiyang, two sorts of plates are separated---“normal plate” and “specific plate”, the latter is released by a lottery system that have access to every place, while the former is unlimited released but prohibited from entering the city center; in Guangzhou, quota is released in the form of “green vehicle + lottery + auction”, with a proportion of 1:5:4 (a part of index is spared to support green vehicle buyers, the rest plates are released either by lottery or auction); Shijiazhuang is just a new comer in this area, the limitation aims at the third car of a family. Besides the four cities, Shanghai is only region that adopt an absolute market method since 1994---auction.
The incentive mode. In air pollution reduction policy, the most direct way is to give subsidies or tax relief to green vehicle buyers. This is exactly what happened in Mainland China. In 2010, five cities (Shanghai, Changchun, Shenzhen, Hangzhou and Hefei) first benefit from the new act--- pilot financial aid funds for purchasing private new energy vehicles and the highest subsidy can be achieved to 60000 RMB when purchasing electronic vehicles. On the other hand, low price of public transport ticket is considered another benefit to local residents, so as to discourage the use of private vehicles (such programs can be observed in Beijing since 2007, with a large amount of transport finance supported by the government, public transport users are able to enjoy a relatively low cost compared to other high commodity expenses).
Instead of encouragement, negative economic measures like fuel tax, vehicle purchase tax as well as road pricing are also effective in air pollution reduction. Figure 3.6 indicates all the intervention measures that are under consideration or have been implemented in Beijing.
The persuasive mode. This kind of intervention is usually achieved by government communication and environmental protection organizations also play an important role (e.g. CANGO established a Green Commuting Fund in 2009). They advocate green travel, encourage taking more public transport, riding bicycle or walking on foot instead of motor vehicles, and also, try their best to promote “Car Free Day”.
The last mode involves the direct supply of goods and services to the public. This is not very common in the Chinese air pollution policy, while the Green Commuting Fund established by CANGO that we discussed above can be considered as on type of direct supply.
Figure 3.6 Intervention measures according to different use rights in Beijing
|
Property or use rights |
|
Types of intervention modes |
Direct access to resource |
Indirect access to resource |
Obligations |
Circulation control (e.g., restrictions on the last digit of vehicle plate numbers) (2008) |
Quota limitation on vehicle ownership (e.g., lottery systems for new car licenses) (2010) |
Parking space as the premise of purchasing a new car (2013)111 |
||
Positive or negative economic incentives |
Road pricing (road tolls)112 |
High cost of parking (2010) |
Tax imposition on the purchase of new cars (2001) |
||
Tax imposition on fuel(2009) |
||
Low price of public transport ticket (2007) |
||
Persuasions |
Off-peak hour travel |
Encourage of using other transport modes (e.g., public transportation, cycle, or walking) |
