- •Public Policy Analysis
- •IMpa Grands exercices de cours
- •1. Introduction 99
- •The Analysis of China’s Policy of Importing Solid Waste Zhanyu Li
- •1. Introduction 99
- •1. Introduction 99
- •8. Conclusion 129
- •Introduction
- •1.1 The choice of policies and countries
- •1.2 Short history of China’s policy of waste importation
- •1.3 Short history of Germany’s policy of waste importation
- •The Political Definition of the Problem
- •2.1 China’s political definition of the problem
- •Intervention hypothesis
- •2.2 Germany’s political definition of the problem
- •Intervention Hypothesis
- •2.3 Comparative studies
- •3.1 Five constituent elements of the pap of China’s policy of waste importation
- •3.2 Five constituent elements of the pap of Germany’s policy of waste importation
- •3.3 Comparative studies
- •China’s paAs
- •The paa of licensing the domestic consignees
- •4.2 Germany’s paAs
- •4.3 Comparative studies
- •5.1 China’s aPs
- •5.2 Germany’s aPs
- •5.3 Comparative studies
- •The outputs
- •6.1 China’s output of licensing enterprises using solid waste
- •6.2 Germany’s output of written consent of shipment of waste
- •6.3 Comparative studies
- •Evaluative Statements
- •7.1 Evaluating China’s output of licensing solid waste
- •7.2 Evaluating Germany’s output of consent
- •7.3. Comparative Studies
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •The Analysis of China’s Policy
- •Of Importing Solid Waste
- •Zhanyu Li
- •Abstract
- •Research Background
- •1.1 The definition of solid waste
- •1.2. The double-edged solid waste
- •1.3. The global waste trade
- •1.4. International conventions and agreements
- •Research Rationale
- •Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
- •3.1 The literatures on solid waste
- •3.2. The literatures on China’s import of solid waste
- •3.3. Conceptual framework
- •Research questions
- •Data Collection and Methodology
- •The overall description of solid waste imported by China
- •The driving force behind China's import of solid waste
- •7.1 The imported solid waste can mitigate the domestic lack of resources.
- •7.2. The cheap labour resources in China
- •7.3. The needs arising from certain industries
- •7.4. The underdeveloped domestic collecting system
- •7.5. Low shipping costs
- •The challenges facing Chinese public authorities
- •8.1. The transferring, renting and faking of import license.
- •8.2. The waste trafficking
- •8.3. The lack of public awareness of significance of imported solid waste
- •8.4. The inadequacy of technologies, personnel and other public resources
- •8.5. The secondary environmental pollution caused by inappropriate use of
- •Imported solid waste
- •The evolution of Chinese policies of importing solid waste
- •The current regimes of regulating import of solid waste
- •10.1. The competent authorities
- •10.2. The legal framework
- •Political agenda setting
- •Policy Programming
- •12.1. Political-administrative programs
- •12.2. Political-administrative arrangements
- •12.3. The actors' games at the stage of policy programming – the example of China's Association of Plastics Processing Industry
- •Policy implementation
- •13.1. Action plans
- •13.2. The operational analysis of aPs of enclosed management zone
- •Implementation acts (outputs)
- •14.1. Operational analysis of implementation acts
- •14.2. The Game of Policy Actors at the Stage of Policy Implementation- The example of the implementation of policy of imported solid waste at Luqiao District of Taizhou City.
- •Evaluating policy effects
- •15.1. The dimensions of evaluating the policy of import of solid waste
- •15.2. Data collections
- •15.3. Other independent variants
- •Appendix I
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Causal Model
- •2.3 Comparative discussions
- •Causal hypothesis
- •Political-administrative Program (pap)
- •Mainland China
- •3.1.1 Concrete objectives
- •3.1.2 Evaluative elements
- •3.1.3 Operational elements
- •3.1.4 Paa and resources
- •3.1.5 Procedural elements
- •Hong Kong
- •3.2.1 Concrete objectives
- •3.2.2 Evaluative elements
- •3.2.3 Operational elements
- •3.2.4 Paa and resources
- •3.2.5 Procedural elements
- •3.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Political-administrative Arrangement (paa)
- •4.1 Mainland China
- •4.2 Hong Kong
- •4.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Action plan (ap)
- •5.1 Mainland China
- •5.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •Outputs
- •Mainland China (Beijing)
- •6.1.1 Output one: Restrictions on the last digit of vehicle plate numbers
- •6.1.2 Output two: Lottery systems for new car plates
- •Hong Kong
- •6.2.1 Output one: Improvement of the interchange between private and public transport modes.
- •6.2.2 Output two: Use of Alternative Fuel Vehicles to replace Diesel Vehicles
- •6.3 Comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong
- •6.3.1. Strategies
- •6.3.2. Six dimensions of the analysis of the outputs
- •Evaluative statement
- •7.1 The evaluative statement in Beijing
- •7.2 The evaluative statement in Hong Kong
- •7.3 Comparative discussion
- •Conclusion
- •References
Causal Model
In this chapter, we use the “basic triangle” parameters of a policy, to analyze the problem definition, the causal hypothesis, the intervention hypothesis and the identify the actors, which include the political-administrative authorities, target groups and end beneficiaries, as well as positively/negatively-affected third parties that are indirectly influenced by the policy. The figures below show the basic triangle of air pollution policy of the two chosen cities (see Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2).
2.3 Comparative discussions
Through studying the basic triangle of air pollution policies concerning Hong Kong and Beijing, we can compare these two areas under the following aspects:
1. Problem definition
It is the same between the two cities in this regard. As is shown in figure 2.1&2.2, Beijing and Hong Kong are facing the current problem: air pollution caused by emissions of motor vehicles in urban area will lead to serious environmental problems, e.g. health hazard, ecosystem collapse.
2. Causal hypothesis
It is also alike in this part no matter in Beijing or Hong Kong. It means that if administrative authorities want to solve air pollution problems caused by motor vehicles, then they intervene on motor vehicle owners, by changing the behavior of target groups to control the problem, but not request the habitants to suffer from the negative effects of this problem to find a solution, e.g., wear a mouth-muffle to protect themselves.
Figure 2.1 The basic triangle of air pollution policy - Hong Kong
Hong Kong
If
administrative authorities want to solve air pollution problems
caused by motor vehicles, then they intervene
on motor vehicle owners, not on all the habitants.
Causal hypothesis
Figure 2.2 the basic triangle of air pollution policy - Beijing
Beijing
3. Intervention hypothesis
Being aware of the necessity of solving such problem, the authorities would try to make effort to change the behaviors of target group. As for this part, Beijing and Hong Kong adopt similar methods but put emphasis on different aspects.
For Beijing, if administrative authorities want to have car owners reduce air-polluting emissions, they would limit the number of cars, give subsidies to green vehicles buyers, impose motor vehicle tax, control circulation, oblige drivers to send cars to vehicle control center for detection, or government communication, e.g., less use of car air condition, decrease cold start. Regarding Hong Kong, if administrative authorities want to have car owners reduce air-polluting emissions, they would improve the interchange between private and public transport modes, tighten fuel and vehicle emission standards, strengthen emission inspection and enforcement, set up transport fund to support green technologies or conduct government communication, e.g., promote better vehicle maintenance and eco-driving.
So they are very similar to take actions to reduce the emission of motor vehicle, but they have their own points in the process of resolving this issue. It can be learned that the former one puts emphasis on the control the quantity of motor vehicle to reduce the emission, but the latter one wants to make attempts to strengthen the emission inspection and tighten fuel and vehicle emission standards. From this perspective, it is quite distinct from each other to practice ways to reach the goal.
4. Actors triangles
The authorities of Beijing are divided by national levels, provincial and municipal level in respect of Chinese national situation and socialism. Based on this situation, it is vey protracting in the process of air pollution policy in Beijing including policy development, planning, monitoring and legislative enforcement. However, this handicap does not appear in Hong Kong as one of two special administrative regions in China. Just like figure 2.1, it is more perspicuous about authorities in Hong Kong on the account of its independent managerial system. Consequently, this advantage offers a lot of convenience to implement air pollution policy in Hong Kong.
It is obvious that the target groups are motor vehicle owners in air pollution policy caused by emission of vehicles in both Beijing and Hong Kong. The traditional automobile sellers in these two cities, as the third party of target groups, face the challenges comprising the sharp decline in sales or improper products as a result of intervention hypothesis.
The end beneficiaries of air pollution policy are all habitants, especially those living to busy roads. The slight difference about this point between Beijing and Hong Kong is that Hong Kong stresses cleaning the air at street level, so contrasting to citizens in Beijing, people living to busy streets in Hong Kong get more benefits. Relatively, the third party is positively affected indirectly by the protection of government. As revealed in figures 2.1&2.2, these positive third parties integrate four groups: the first group is other road users who are encouraged by this policy, e.g. cyclists; the second group is environmental organization, which appreciates the improvement of air quality as the consequence of relating actions; the third, clean vehicle sellers get the additional income by the remarkable growing number of customers; while health organization as the fourth group gains better evaluation assessment of people’s healthy condition.
In summary, Beijing and Hong Kong share the same causal model, according to the analyses above. The apparent difference remains in the political- administrative authorities and the intervention hypothesis.
