In the middle ages 185

We are drawn to the good. This means that we

are inclined to will whatever reality is presented as

capable of satisfying a certain indwelling tendency,

— our tendency, namely, toward what is considered

to be suitable to us. Just as the intellect conceives

being in the abstract, as integral being, so it con-

ceives the good as such, the general good. For

when the intellect acts, it obeys the law of its activi-

ty; and in doing so it abstracts the good as such,

and sees in this (or any) being the good which it

contains. Only the complete good can draw us ir-

resistibly, because it alone satisfies this intellectual

tendency of our nature.^ It is then impossible for

the will not to will it. If the Infinite Good should

manifest Himself, the soul would be drawn towards

it, as iron is attracted by the magnet. The attrac-

tions which the martyrs felt for the benefits of this

life, at the very moment when they preferred to die,

remarks Duns Scotus, is the sign and effect of this

necessary tendency toward the good, the good as a

totality.

But during our earthly life the good never ap-

pears to us unadulterated ; for every good is limited.

The moment we reflect, the limitation is perceived;

every good is good only under certain aspects; it

contains deficiencies. Then the intellect places me

before two intellectual judgments. For example,

9 Objectum autem voluntatis quae est appetitus humanus, est uni-

versale bonum, sicut objectum intellectus est universale verum.

Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theol., laSae, q. H, art. 8.

186 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

it is good for me to undertake a journey; not to un-

dertake it contains also some good. Behold, I am

called upon to judge my own judgments. Which

judgment shall I choose? The will must decide, —

and it decides freely, for neither judgment enjoins

a necessary adhesion. We will freely the good

which we choose, not because it is the greater good,

but because it is some good. In a sense we may

say that our choice stops with the good which we

consider the best. But, in the last analysis, this is

true only if we add, that the will freely intervenes

in the decision. In other words, it is under the in-

fluence of the will that the practical intellect makes

its judgment, that the one or the other course of ac-

tion is the better. The will can in reality give its

preference to either of the alternatives. At the

moment of definite choice, deliberation ceases and

gives place to decision. So Thomas and Duns

Scotus avoided the psychological determinism

which puzzled other scholastics, — such as Godfrey

of Fontaines and John Buridan.

Thus, liberty resides in the will, but it has its

roots in the judgment. Consequently, a free act is

a deli])erate act, and entirely reflective. An act of

this kind is not a common thing. Indeed, whole

days pass during which we do not make intellectual

decisions, — that is, in the scholastic ineaning of the

word.