In the middle ages 183

its object proper/ Error lies only in the judg-

ment, when we eombine two concepts and declare

that their contents coincide, although in reality they

are in disagreement. It follows from this that

reason in our life has genuine worth ; it is not a way-

ward will-o'-the-wisp which leads him astray who

trusts to it, — it is a torch which illumines.

But that which the intellect understands is only

a small measure of reality; therefore, one must un-

derstand the limits of reason. Intellectual knowl-

edge is imperfect and inadequate. First, because

our ideas are derived from the content of sense-per-

ception, from which follows that we cannot know

properl}^ more than the realities of sense; accord-

ingly, the supersensible can be known only by an-

alogy. From this point of view, the human intelli-

gence is no longer the powerful eagle, but the

winged creature of night, the bat (noctua), which

faces with difficulty the full light of the sun, — the

supersensible realm. Moreover, even the corporeal

reality is apprehended by imperfect processes. We

know only the general determinations of being, no-

tions of what is common, for instance, to live or to

move in various living or moving beings. The na-

ture of the individual as such escapes us, — even

though, with Duns Scotus, we derive a kind of con-

7 Intellectus circa propriiim objectum semper verus est; unde et

seipso numquam decipitur; sed omnis deceptio accidit in intellectu

et aliqiio inferiori, puta phantasia vel aliquo hujusmodi. Thomas

Aquinas, Snmma Theol., V, q. XCIV, art. 4.

184 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

fused intuition of the concrete and singular. Fur-

thermore, these general notions do not even mani-

fest what is specific in the essences which are

known ; indeed, we employ the same common notion

of life for plants and animals and men, and we are

condemned to ignorance of the innermost reality

peculiar to the life in each class of these living be-

ings. On all sides, therefore, reality surpasses

knowledge; the unknowable encompasses us round

about.

Ill

Yet this very same reason, at once so glorified

and humbled, is the queen of conscious life. It

rules the appetitive life, by restraining the passions

and lower appetites. Reason shines as a torch

which lights and directs the will, necessary or free.

We will only what we know as good — iiihil volitum

nisi cognitum — and already this precedence of in-

tellect over will establishes a dependence of the will

on the intellect.

It is because we are reasonable beings that free

volitions are psychologically possible. Thomas

Aquinas, and Duns Scotus too* — so long regarded

as holding here a different view— gives a remark-

able intellectual explanation of liberty which is not

found in any preceding system.

8 Sec P. Minges, Ist Duns Scotus Indeterminist? Baiimker's-

Bp.lfrrige, 1905, V, i. Cf. my TJistoire de la Philosophie M4di4vale,

p. 460.