In the middle ages 171

this mentality theological studies enjoyed a pres-

tige superior to that which was granted to philo-

sophical studies. The proximity of the faculties of

theology and philosophy introduced a kind of pas-

sion for combining (but not confusing) philosophi-

cal and theological questions in the same work.

Finally, as regards the realm of morals, philosophy

was regarded by the intellectuals of the Middle

Ages as a preliminary step in aspiring to happi-

ness. But this religious inspiration affects all the

other activities that make up the civilization of the

thirteenth century — politics, art, morals, family,

work. The religious inspiration is a relational

characteristic along with many others ; but precisely

because this characteristic belongs to the civiliza-

tion, it belongs to all its factors and is not peculiar

to philosophy, which is only one factor. Hence it

is as inadequate to the definition of their philosophj'

as would be, for example, the description of the oak

by reference merely to the nature of the soil, which

its roots share with those of the elm and the beech

and the other trees of the forest. One can under-

stand why historians who study expressly the civi-

lization of the Middle Ages,^^ should single out for

criticism the dominant preoccupation with salva-

tion, in the thirteenth century scholasticism, and

should regard this as sufficiently characteristic.

But it seems incredible that works which treat

21 As does, for example, H. O. Taylor in his remarkable work,

The Mediaeval Mind, vol. II, ch. XXXV.

172 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

solely of the historical exposition of philosophical

doctrines should be content with such a superficial

judgment; and the procedure seems to me inadmis-

sible.

In addition to the general criticism which we

have just made of this definition, on the ground of

insufiiciency, some special criticisms may be con-

sidered on the basis of our preceding study.

Scholasticism, others say, is philosophy placed in

the service of doctrine already estabhshed by the

Church. Not at all. To place philosophy in the

service of theology is to use apologetic ; and apolo-

getic, which proposes to show the rational character

of dogmas fixed beforehand, comes from scholastic

theology and not from scholastic philosophy. To

define, according to the expHcit procedure of Aris-

totle, is to say what a thing is, and not only what

it is not.

Is scholasticism, then, placed in such dependence

on theology as to follow it without any contradic-

tion whatever? The reply to this question is in the

affirmative, provided the ground is a common one.

But the question is whether this dependence is

enough to constitute a complete definition, and one

must reply in the negative. In the first place, be-

cause this dependence simply places boundaries or

limits beyond which one cannot pass. It does not

treat of what is beyond, or of numerous philosophi-

cal doctrines in which theology is not interested,

but in which our definition should be interested.