In the middle ages 169

that theological doctrines are true, we cannot ad-

mit that other doctrines can contradict them."^^

That the prohibition is solely negative in char-

acter, appears from a statute of the Faculty of

Arts of 1272. This statute simply enjoins the

"artists" (artistae) from "determinare contra

fidem'\- but it does not instruct them " deter minare

pro fide/^^^ No one followed this simple precept

with greater breadth of mind than did Thomas

Aquinas; and his famous position regarding the

eternity of the world is ample evidence of this fact.

Thus, the Bible teaches that God created the world

in time. To avoid contradicting this dogma,

Thomas eliminates the thesis that the world is

eternal. But he does maintain that the idea of

eternal creation is not contradictory, — because the

eternity of the world would not be in opposition to

its contingency.^"

Finally, as regards its limited effect on philos-

18 "Supposito quod huic scientiae non subjacet nisi verum . . .

supposito quod quaecumque vera sunt judicio et auctoritate hujus

scientiae . . . his inquam suppositis, cum ex eis manifestum sit quod

tam auctoritas hujus scientiae quam ratio . . . veritati innititur et

verum vero contrarium esse non potest, absolute dicendum quod

auctoritati hujus scripturae ratio nullo modo potest esse contraria."

Swmma. TheoL, X, 3, No. 4.

19 Chartularium Univers. Parisiensis, ed. Denifle et Chatelain, I, 499.

20 Mundum non semper fuisse sola fide tenetur et demonstrative

probari non potest. . . . Demonstrari non potest quod homo aut

caelum aut lapis non semper fuit . . . unde non est impossible quod

homo generetur ab homine in infinitum. Summa TheoL, 1', q.

XLVI, art. 2.

170 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

ophy, this prohibition applies only to matters ex-

pounded by both philosophy and theology. The in-

terdiction has no force unless both domains are in-

volved; therefore philosophy was affected only to

a very limited extent.

With this understanding of the scholastic con-

ception before us, we might seek to estimate the

truth of their view concerning the relation of phi-

losophy to theology. The result would of course

vary, according to the acceptance or rejection of

Christianity and the particular meaning given to

the idea of revelation. But we are here concerned

with an historical problem. Certainly, from that

point of view, there can be no doubt concerning the

position in fact taken by the scholastics of the thir-

teenth century.

VI

We are now in position to evaluate the commonly

accepted view of scholastic philosophy, which was

given at the outset of this lecture. The definition

which was then quoted, — accepted by most his-

torians of mediaeval philosophy — conceives of

scholastic philosophy as essentially religious.

Of course, one can say of scholastic philosophy

that it is largely inspired by religion. However,

this is true in so general a sense that the fact turns

out to be irrelevant for purposes of definition.

Their philosophy evolved in a social atmosphere in

which religion was dominant. Under the spell of