In the middle ages 141

views concerning the history of philosophy and lit-

erary attribution. The determination of historical

fact and authorship is subordinated to the truth

which the scholastics are concerned to advance; the

determination of fact has no absolute value as such.

Consequently, they confine themselves to seeking,

from the authorities they refer to, a support for the

thesis they wish to defend.

From this attitude arises the tendency of the

mediaeval thinker to attenuate, and even to sup-

press, all doctrinal divergencies, — such as those of

Plato, of Aristotle, of Augustine, of Isidore of

Seville, of the venerable Bede, of Anselm of Can-

terbury. Are not all these co-workers in a common

task? To understand this, one must study not the

common and stock phrases quoted by all, but rather

the difficult and more subtle texts, to which they

succeed in giving so many different meanings. The

thirteenth century has characteristic expressions to

describe this procedure, — for example, "in melius

inter pretari'' to interpret in a better way; "reve-

renter exijoneref to explain with respect; "jnum

dare intellectum" to give a dutiful meaning. These

are euphemisms of which the greatest make use,

when it is necessary to adapt some embarrassing

passage to their own theories on a given subject.

We recall here the astute words of John of Salis-

bury concerning the philosophers of his day,

eager to bring Plato and Aristotle into agree-

142 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

merit, — how they worked in vain to reconcile dead

people who contradicted each other all their lives !

Such heing the fact, it seems difficult to admit

that the philosophers of the thirteenth century were

the slaves of tradition and the scrupulous servants

of authority. In judging of their critical attitude,

and of their attitude towards the ancients, one

should not tie fast to the mere letter of their state-

ments; on the contrary, one should judge by their

interpretation of the texts which they are citing, for

or against their doctrines. If they sin against the

spirit of criticism, it is due to excess of liberty and

not to the lack of it. The most eminent philoso-

phers took great liberties with their authorities.

"What else is authority but a muzzle?" wrote Adel-

ard of Bath to his nephew.^ "Authority has a nose

of wax, which may be turned in any direction," said

Alan of Lille.^ And Thomas declared, as is so

well known, that the argument from authority is

the weakest of all, — where the huvian reason is in-

volved.^

On the other hand, their attitude has a significant

practical implication. If philosophical work is di-

rected to the collective and progressive construction

of a fund of truth, as its aim, then of course only

7 "Quid enirn aliud auctoritas dicenda quam capistrum?" Adelardi

Batensis de quibusdam naturalibus quaestionibus, op. cit., fol. 76 V.

8 Contra Ilaereticos, I, 30. "Auctoritas cereum habet nasum . . .

i.e., in diversum potest flecti sensum."

Summa Theol, 1", q. VIII, ad secundum. Locus ab auctoritate

quae fundatur super ratione humana est infirmissimus.