In the middle ages 133

We also observe a kind of uniformitj^ the cos-

mopolitanism of which we have been speaking, in

the political institutions of the European states

which were then in process of formation. Every-

where this process proceeds on the same general

principle, — the feudal monarchy, a representative

system of government.

Finally, as we have already seen,*^ the Popes

were genuine cosmopolitan forces of a practical

kind; for in their view the society of mankind was

to be extended universally.

In conclusion, it should be stated, the foregoing

does not imply that the mentality of the thirteenth

century was on a dead level of uniformity. By no

means. Human nature is always complex; and no

matter how general a phenomenon may be in any

condition of society, there always arise by the side

of it certain secondary phenomena of a contradic-

tory character. Of these account should of course

be taken, — but without exaggerating their signifi-

cance or bearing. It will always be true that moth-

ers in general love their children, notwithstanding

the fact that some heartless mothers exist. Just so, ,

respect for authority was prevalent in the thir- V

teenth century, in spite of the evidence of some

germs of rebellion against the discipline of the

Church and the power of the State. The unity of

the catholic faith was not prejudiced by the various

heresies and superstitious practices ; nor did the ex-

48 See above, pp. 123-126.

134 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

cesses of some barons weaken the virtues of the

feudal customs. The protests of a small group of

zealous mystics against the rich decoration of the

churches did not annul the delight of the vrhole

age with the beauty of their original art; nor did

the low morality of some of the clergy serve as a

general detriment to the purity of life in that class.

The spirit of the Middle Ages cannot be gath-

ered accurately out of a mere catalogue of anec-

dotes, nor from the exclusive perusal of satirists,

preachers and fable- writers, nor again from the his-

tory of certain chroniclers and writers, whose tem-

perament or office might prompt them to exagger-

ate. On the contrary, the real task and point is to

ascertain whether these facts and anecdotes and

caricatures (whose name is legion) describe the

usual or the exceptional instances; whether they

are mainly characteristic of the period ; and whether

they reach and express the real depths of the me-

diaeval soul.

So also in philosophy, a few isolated instances of

scepticism do not derogate from the general doc-

trinal assurance which is characteristic of the me-

diaeval philosophers. And similarly the great

number of systems of thought, and the atmosphere

of emulation in which they were conceived, can be

readily reconciled with the predominance of a phi-

losophy which was truly cosmopolitan, — as was the

scholastic pliilosophy.

I

CHAPTER SIX

Optimism and Impersonality

i. Optimism in philosophy, in art, in religion, ii. Imper-

sonality, iii. History of philosophy and literary attribution,

iv. Perenniality.

The optimism of the mediaeval mind is another

feature which stands out as distinctive of the

whole civilization. The thirteenth century is a con-

structive period in every domain. But such exer-

cise of constructive powers and such realization in

practice involved confidence in human resources and

capacities. That confidence the age possessed

abundantly. Not only had it a passion for ideals,

but it knew how to realize them in concrete form

and in practical life.

Wlien dealing with scientific classifications and

philosophical systems, optimism means confidence

in the powers of reason, serenity in intellectual

work. Without such confidence, could thej^ have

found the courage to set in order all the human sci-

ences, and especially could they have spent their

energies in meticulously ordering the manifold

parts of a system so extensive as is the scholastic

philosophy?

135

136 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

They were in no doubt concerning the power of

the reason to grasp external reahties, to know

everything to some extent.^ Subjectivism, which

confines the mind within the closed circle of its im-

pressions, was foreign to the spirit of the times.

Thus, when Nicholas of Autrecourt, called some-

times the Hume of the thirteenth century, taught

in Paris that the existence of the external world

cannot be demonstrated, that the principle of caus-

ality is without objective validity, he was plainly

an exception; and so he was regarded as an ama-

teur in paradoxes. The cultivated minds of the age

relied upon human reason unanimously. Frankly

/^ dogmatic, the scholastic philosophy considers lau-

' man intelligence to have been created to know the

truth, just as fire was made to burn. To be sure,

the philosophers of the thirteenth century believe

that human intelligence has its limits, — it knows

all things in a very imperfect manner — but within

these limits they give it full credence ; it is for them

a spark lighted at the torch of eternal truth. This

conception of certitude neither includes nor ex-

cludes our modern epistemology; like all that be-

longs to the mediaeval genius it is sui generis.

Scholasticism is not less optimistic in its moral

teachings. It makes happiness to consist in the

fullest possible development of personality. It

teaches that nothing can efface from conscience the

fundamental principles of moral law. It maintains,

1 See ch. VIII, i and ii.