In the middle ages 109

that of moral and natural law. Thus, just as the

other departments of human knowledge furnish

their several quotas of material, so civil and canon

law bring their contributions/^ In this way, philo-

sophical thought is endlessty extended, and philos-

ophy becomes an explanation of the whole.

But not alone are all vital questions answered;

everywhere there is coherence, and in the full mean-

ing of the word (auo-TT/z^a), — so that one may not

withdraw a single doctrine without thereby com-

promising a group of others. Everything hangs

together by implication and logical articulation;

everywhere appears to the utmost that consuming

desire for universality and order which lays hold of

the savants and leads them to introduce the most

comprehensive and rigorous schema possible.

Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and, to a less de-

gree, Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure are

systematic minds; their philosophy is an intellec-

tual monument, and the sense of proportion which

it reveals is the same as that of the Gothic cathedral

to which it has so often been compared. It is just

because everything is so fittingly combined in the

scholastic philosophy,^' and because it does satisfy

the mind's most exacting demands for coherence,

in which its very life consists, that it has charmed

through the ages so many successive generations of

thinkers.

11 Cf. above, ch. IV, vi,

12 See below, ch. X, for an example of this dc rinal coherence.

110 PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

We must also observe that scholastic philosophy

accomplishes, by means of a limited number of

ideas, that doctrinal order to which it is so devoted.

It simplifies to the full Hmit of its power. Each

doctrine which it introduces possesses a real value

for explanation, and consequently it cannot be sa-

crificed. Thus, to take only one instance, the

theories of act and potency, of matter and form, of

essence and existence, of substance and accident are

all indispensable to their metaphysics.^^ For them,

philosophy as well as nature obeys the principle of

parsimony. Natura non ahundat in superfluis,

writes Thomas Aquinas.^* Indeed, the thirteenth

century had already anticipated, in various forms,

that counsel of wisdom which is usually attributed

to William of Occam : not to multiply entities with-

out necessity. ^^ In its moderation, indeed, schol-

ia See ch. IX.

^i Summa Theol., la 3ae, q. XCIV, art. 2. The Leonine edition of

the Summa contra Gentiles, following the original text of Thomas

(Rome, 1918), shows what pains the author took in this book to

realize the internal order I refer to. The deliberate omissions, the

additions, the studied improvements, — all of this reveals much labor.

Cf. A. Pelzer, "L'edition leonine de la Somme contra les Gentlls."

Revue N4o-Scolastique de philosophie, May, 1920, pp. 224 ff.

i'' See below, p. 117, note 23, for sin apj)lication of this principle

made by Dante to universal monarchy. Duns Scotus is familiar with

the principle. For a note on the formula: pluritas non est ponenda

sine necessitate, see Mind, July 1918, by Thorburn, who observes

that it does not originate in Occam. It is in fact a formula which

moves through the whole thirteenth century, and which expresses

Just the felt need of unity that engages us in this chapter. All